The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 Michael Starks FROM DECISION RESEARCH Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ FROM DECISION RESEARCH Word Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No Associative/ RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Rule Based Context A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Dependent/ Abstract Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S Heuristic/ A H/A H H H/A A A A Analytic Needs Working Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Memory General Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Intelligence Dependent Cognitive Loading Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Inhibits Arousal Facilitates I F/I F F I I I I or Inhibits FROM DECISION RESEARCH The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 Michael Starks Reality Press Las Vegas Nevada Copyright © Michael Starks (2017) ISBN-13: 978-1546377542 First Edition May 2017 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted without the express consent of the author. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Table of Contents PREFACE I WITTGENSTEIN, SEARLE AND THE TWO SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT 1. The Logical Structure of Consciousness (behavior, personality, rationality, higher order thought, intentionality) .................................... 1 2. The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 9 WITTGENSTEIN 3. The Foundation Stone of Psychology and Philosophy--A Critical Review of 'On Certainty' by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969) (1951). ...... 118 4. Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul Horwich 248p (2013) ........................................................................................... 152 5. Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations by David Stern (2004) ................................................................................ 177 6. Review of Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock Ed. (2007) ........................................................... 206 7. Review of Meaning and the Growth of Understanding Wittgenstein's Significance for Developmental Psychology -- Chapman and Dixon Eds. (1987) ................................................................................ 222 8. Review of Wittgenstein -- Rethinking the Inner by Paul Johnston (1993) ........................................................................................... 239 9. Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd 203p (1989) ....................................................................... 261 10. Review of Wittgenstein-a critical reader Hans-Johann Glock (ed.) (2001) ................................................................................ 285 11. A Review of ‘The Blue and Brown Books’ by Ludwig Wittgenstein 208p (1958) (1933-1935)............................................................ 293 12. Review of Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy by David Pears (2006) ...................................................................... 313 13. Review of Ludwig Wittgenstein by Edward Kanterian (2007) 321 14. Review of Wittgenstein And Psychology- A Practical Guide by Harre and Tissaw (2005) ..................................................................... 328 15. Review of Culture and Value by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980) 345 16. Review of The New Wittgenstein-- Crary & Read Eds 403p (2000) 349 17. Review of Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock (2007) ................................................................. 359 18. Review of 'Tractatus Logico Philosophicus' by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922) ........................................................................................... 370 19. Review of 'Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy-- Neither Theory nor Therapy' by Daniel Hutto 2nd ed (2006) ........................... 386 JOHN SEARLE and the CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 20. Review of Making the Social World by John Searle (2010) 406 21. Review of 'John R Searle-Thinking About the Real World' by Franken et al eds. (2010) ......................................................................... 429 22. Review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’ by John Searle (2008) 450 23. Can there be a Chinese Philosophy? -- a Review of Searle's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy--Bo Mou Ed 440p (2008) ............ 471 24. Seeing With the Two Systems of Thought—a Review of ‘Seeing Things As They Are: a Theory of Perception’ by John Searle (2015) 501 PREFACE “He who understands baboon would do more towards metaphysics than Locke” Charles Darwin 1838 This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring them up to date (2017). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance. As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy and dictatorship is inevitable. It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so I try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior. I start with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality, which provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior. This centers around the two writers I have found the most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It I is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18) Nevertheless, a real understanding of Wittgenstein’s work, and hence of how our psychology functions, is only beginning to spread in the second decade of the 21st century, due especially to P.M.S. Hacker (hereafter H) and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (hereafter DMS), but also to many others, some of the more prominent of whom I mention in the articles. Horwich gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. “There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” Although there are countless books on Wittgenstein, in my view only a few very recent ones (DMS, H, Coliva etc.) come close to a full appreciation of him, none make a serious attempt to relate his work to one of the other modern geniuses of behavior John Searle (hereafter S) and nobody has applied the powerful two systems of thought framework to philosophical issues from the viewpoint of evolutionary psychology. I attempt to do this here. I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use II language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I analyze various writings by and about them from the perspective of the two systems of thought, employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. When I read ‘On Certainty’ a few years ago I characterized it in a review as the Foundation Stone of Philosophy and Psychology and the most basic document for understanding behavior, and about the same time DMS was writing articles noting that it had solved the millennia old epistemological problem of how we can know anything for certain. I realized that W was the first one to grasp what is now characterized as the two systems or dual systems of thought, and I generated a dual systems (S1 and S2) terminology which I found to be very powerful in describing behavior. I took the small table that John Searle (hereafter S) had been using, expanded it greatly, and found later that it integrated perfectly with the framework being used by various current workers in thinking and reasoning research. Since they were published individually, I have tried to make the book reviews and articles stand by themselves, insofar as possible, and this accounts for the repetition of various sections, notably the table and its explanation. I start with a short article that presents the table of intentionality and briefly describes its terminology and background. Next, is by far the longest article, which attempts a survey of the work of W and S as it relates to the table and so to an understanding or description (not explanation as W insisted) of behavior. It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case, there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we III must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must lead directly to actions. The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model. Thus, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s future. The modern ‘digital delusions’, confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System 1, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers). The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it. Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”. In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Also, for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or physics, the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty. Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what the ‘results’ mean. Reductionist metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor. I had hoped to weld my comments into a unified whole, but I came to realize, as Wittgenstein and AI researchers did, that the mind (roughly the same as language as Wittgenstein showed us) is a motley of disparate pieces evolved IV for many contexts, and there is no such whole or theory except inclusive fitness, i.e., evolution by natural selection. Finally, as with my previous books 3DTV and 3D Movie Technology - Selected Articles 1996-2016 (2017), and Psychoactive Drugs-- Four Classic Texts (1976- 1982) 878p (2016), and in all my letters and email and conversations for over 50 years, I have always used ‘they’ or ‘them’ instead of ‘his/her’, ‘she/he’, or the idiotic reverse sexism of ‘she’ or ‘her’, being perhaps the only one in this part of the galaxy to do so. The slavish use of these universally applied egregious vocables is of course intimately connected with the defects in our psychology which generate academic philosophy, democracy and the collapse of industrial civilization, and I leave the further description of these connections as an exercise for the reader. Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century (2017) I am aware of many imperfections and limitations of my work and continually revise it, but I took up philosophy ten years ago at 65, so it is miraculous, and an eloquent testimonial to the power of System 1 automatisms, that I have been able to do anything at all. It was ten years of incessant struggle and I hope readers find it of some use. [email protected] V