T L A HE ITERARY NIMAL T L HE ITERARY A NIMAL Evolution and the Nature of Narrative Edited by Jonathan Gottschall and David Sloan Wilson Forewords by E. O. Wilson and Frederick Crews Northwestern University Press Evanston, Illinois Northwestern University Press www.nupress.northwestern.edu Copyright © 2005 by Northwestern University Press. “Literature, Science, and Human Nature” copyright © 2001 by Ian McEwan. Published 2005. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ISBN 0-8101-2286-3 (cloth) ISBN 0-8101-2287-1 (paper) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The literary animal : evolution and the nature of narrative / Edited by Jonathan Gottschall and David Sloan Wilson ; forewords by E. O. Wilson and Frederick Crews. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8101-2286-3 (cloth : alk. paper)—ISBN 0-8101-2287-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Literature and science. 2. Evolution (Biology) in literature. 3. Human beings in literature. 4. Narration (Rhetoric) I. Gottschall, Jonathan. II. Wilson, David Sloan. PN55.L39 2005 809'.9336—dc22 2005004290 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–1992. Contents E. O. Wilson Foreword from the Scientific Side vii Frederick Crews Foreword from the Literary Side xiii Jonathan Gottschall and David Sloan Wilson Introduction: Literature—a Last Frontier in Human Evolutionary Studies xvii PART I: EVOLUTION AND LITERARY THEORY Ian McEwan Literature, Science, and Human Nature 5 David Sloan Wilson Evolutionary Social Constructivism 20 Dylan Evans From Lacan to Darwin 38 Daniel Nettle What Happens in Hamlet? Exploring the Psychological Foundations of Drama 56 Joseph Carroll Human Nature and Literary Meaning: A Theoretical Model Illustrated with a Critique of Pride and Prejudice 76 Marcus Nordlund The Problem of Romantic Love: Shakespeare and Evolutionary Psychology 107 Robin Fox Male Bonding in the Epics and Romances 126 PART II: THE EVOLUTIONARY RIDDLE OF ART Brian Boyd Evolutionary Theories of Art 147 Michelle Scalise Sugiyama Reverse-Engineering Narrative: Evidence of Special Design 177 PART III: DARWINIAN THEORY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS Jonathan Gottschall Quantitative Literary Study: A Modest Manifesto and Testing the Hypotheses of Feminist Fairy Tale Studies 199 Daniel J. Kruger, Maryanne Fisher, and Ian Jobling Proper Hero Dads and Dark Hero Cads: Alternate Mating Strategies Exemplified in British Romantic Literature 225 Catherine Salmon Crossing the Abyss: Erotica and the Intersection of Evolutionary Psychology and Literary Studies 244 Denis Dutton Afterword 259 Works Cited 265 Contributors 301 Foreword from the Scientific Side E. O. Wilson The cleavage between naturalism and social constructivism in literary theory highlighted by the essays to follow extends to the foundation of knowledge itself. The essence of the matter, I believe, is as follows: Either the great branches of learning—natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities—can be connected by a web of verifiable causal explanation or they cannot. Either existence can be mapped as a continuum with the aid of science, as the naturalistic theorists sug- gest, or science is “only one way of knowing,” as the constructivist theorists believe, with many other disjunct truths arising from cultural and personal happenstance. The naturalistic theorists have at the very least clarified and framed the issue. If they are right and not only human nature but its outermost literary pro- ductions can be solidly connected to biological roots, it will be one of the great ! events of intellectual history. Science and the humanities united The opposing opinion is equally interesting. If the naturalistic quest consistently fails to the extent that the constructivist default position earns general acceptance, that would be an ! even greater advance in intellectual history. Existence is not consilient In this case, the constructivists guessed right, but the would-be unifiers will have forced the issue and provided the crucial evidence. There is only one way to settle the issue: Go there and find out; utilize Francis Bacon’s dictum that truth comes more easily out of error than out of confusion. Confusion is what we have now in the realm of literary criticism. The natu- ralistic (“Darwinian”) literary critics have an unbeatable strategy to replace it. They do not see the division between the great branches of learning—the natural sciences on one side and humanities and humanistic social sciences on the other—as a fault line between two kinds of truth. They do not consider it a line at all but rather a broad expanse of mostly undiscovered phenomena awaiting coop- erative exploration by scholars from both sides. This conception has the enor- mous advantage that it can be empirically proved to be either right or wrong or, at worst, unsolvable. An analogy exists between the current contest of ideas and the history of geographic exploration. The first geographic explorers were Columbian: they searched for continents and archipelagoes. The second wave of explorers were vii viii FOREWORD FROM THE SCIENTIFIC SIDE Magellanic; synthesizers by nature, they encompassed the whole. The third wave were cartographic: they pressed on into the details of coastlines and rivers, of cordilleras and inland tribes. The naturalistic literary theorists are would-be Columbians. Embattled, even scorned, by tenured constructivists, they have launched their frail caravels on an uncertain sea. Who will gamble against them? If there is any chance of success, who with any courage and ambition would not want to join them—or at least lend support? Their ultimate key to success is the understanding of mind. Twenty-five cen- turies of philosophy have not succeeded in what Darwin once aptly termed the assault on the citadel. Indeed, much of the history of philosophy up to present day has consisted of failed models of the brain. Freud, Jung, and the psychoana- lytic schools they inspired were naturalistic in approach. But they also failed. There was not enough neuroscience and evolutionary biology in their time to build sound models of the brain. The psychoanalytic theorists also sought inde- pendence from biology, causing them to go further astray (see Dylan Evans’s “From Lacan to Darwin,” this volume). Nowadays neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists, and evolutionary biolo- gists appear to have gained an entrée in the assault. Their painstaking, bottom-up approach—process by process, circuit by circuit—is at last disclosing the multi- ple workings of the brain. They seem likely to attain, perhaps within a decade or two, at least a rough answer to the question universally regarded as premier in the natural sciences: What is the mind? As the properties of mind are clarified empirically, it will also be possible to define human nature with greater precision. That there is a human nature is no longer in doubt. Until recently great controversy raged over the question of whether the brain is wired to predispose certain patterns of learning and behav- ior, or the brain is a blank slate, free of all but the most elemental drivers and ready to be molded almost entirely by culture and personal history. The blank- slate model could be tested empirically. It lost. The evidence from the biological and behavioral sciences converged to establish that the brain is in fact intricately wired from birth. Human behavior is determined by neither genes nor culture but instead by a complex interaction of these two prescribing forces, with biology guiding and environment specifying. In the light of modern biology, what is then human nature? It is not the genes, which prescribe human nature. Nor is it just the universal traits of culture, such as the creation myths, incest taboos, and rites of passage, possessed by all societies. Rather, it is the inherited regularities of sensory and mental develop- ment that animate and channel the acquisition of culture. The number of genes in the human genome, about thirty-six thousand, is too small to encode more than a minute fraction of the variants of human behavior. Obviously the spectacular efflorescence of cultures is based on learning. Yet for all its achievements, and for Foreword from the Scientific Side ix all its prodigious variety, human behavior is severely constrained relative to the combined behavioral repertories of other animal species. At base we have remained true not only to our origins as primates but as savanna-dwelling African catarrhines. We possess no ability to see the ultraviolet light that guides butter- flies, no electrical sense by which electric fish organize their lives, none of the echolocation by which bats and whales hunt and orient, and not a trace of the magnetic sense by which songbirds migrate at night. We are also microcosmic idiots, having almost lost the sense of smell so exquisitely refined in the vast majority of animals. Our cultures and values seem highly variable to us but in fact are very specialized and very epigaeic and diurnal mammalian. Here, for example, are several of the values that we could expect to characterize termite cultures if they had attained the intelligence threshold of civilization: loving dank darkness, photophobic, with a refined taste for lignin and cellulose and for music consisting of sophisticated pheromonal song, faithful to the taboo against reproduction by any caste but royalty, and devoted to the duty of consuming injured and dead nestmates. Civilized termites, I feel certain, would consider the very conception of human existence a nightmare. The mind is a narrative machine, guided unconsciously by the epigenetic rules in creating scenarios and creating options. The narratives and artifacts that prove most innately satisfying spread and become culture. The societies with the most potent Darwinian innovations export them to other societies. In the process of gene-culture evolution, genes affect which scenarios and memes are created, and the cultures thereby generated affect which genes survive. The long-term interaction of genes and culture appear to form a cycle, or more precisely a for- ward traveling evolutionary spiral, of the following sequence: Genes prescribe epigenetic rules, which are the regularities of sensory perception and mental development that animate and channel the growth of culture. Culture helps to determine which of the prescribing genes survive and multiply from one gen- eration to the next. The brain develops its activity and thence mind and culture by epigenetic rules of thumb that channel learning. Incest is avoided, for example, by the West- ermarck effect, an automatic inhibition that occurs between two people who live in domestic proximity during the first thirty months in the life of either one or both. That imprinting is the foundation of an important part of our moral code— and the production of literary themes. In another realm, that of aesthetics, the brain is activated most sharply by abstract patterns with about 20 percent redun- dancy, which perhaps not coincidentally is the amount put into much of abstract art. Also, as color vocabularies grow more complex across cultures, those with two terms usually designate black and white; those with three colors black, white, and red; green or yellow makes a fourth; next comes green plus yellow; and so forth.