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Title: The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England Author: Shepard Ashman Morgan Release Date: October 1, 2016 [eBook #53189] Language: English Character set encoding: UTF-8 ***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENTARY TAXATION IN ENGLAND*** E-text prepared by Giovanni Fini, deaurider, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) Note: Images of the original pages are available through Internet Archive. See https://archive.org/details/historyofparliam00morgiala [i] THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENTARY TAXATION IN ENGLAND Williams College DAVID A. WELLS PRIZE ESSAYS Number 2 THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENTARY TAXATION IN ENGLAND BY SHEPARD ASHMAN MORGAN, M.A. PRINTED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE By Moffat, Yard and Company, New York 1911 HENRY LOOMIS NELSON OLIM PRECEPTORI [ii] [iii] [iv] [v] D. D. D. DISCIPULUS HAUD IMMEMOR S. A. M. [vi] [vii] PREFACE This is the second volume in the series of “David A. Wells Prize Essays” established under the provisions of the bequest of the late David A. Wells. The subject for competition is announced in the spring of each year and essays may be submitted by members of the senior class in Williams College and by graduates of not more than three years’ standing. By the terms of the will of the founder the following limitation is imposed: “No subject shall be selected for competitive writing or investigation and no essay shall be considered which in any way advocates or defends the spoliation of property under form or process of law; or the restriction of Commerce in times of peace by Legislation, except for moral or sanitary purposes; or the enactment of usury laws; or the impairment of contracts by the debasement of coin; or the issue and use by Government of irredeemable notes or promises to pay intended to be used as currency and as a substitute for money; or which defends the endowment of such ‘paper,’ ‘notes’ and ‘promises to pay’ with the legal tender quality.” The first essay, published in 1905, was “The Contributions of the Landed Man to Civil Liberty,” by Elwin Lawrence Page. The subject of the following essay was announced in 1906 by the late Henry Loomis Nelson, then David A. Wells Professor of Political Science. As first framed it read, “The Origin and Growth of the Power of the English National Council and Parliament to Levy Taxes, from the Time of the Norman Conquest to the Enactment of the Bill of Rights; Together with a Statement of the Constitutional Law of the United States Governing Taxation.” Mr. Nelson subsequently eliminated the last clause, thus restricting the field of the essay to English Constitutional History. The prize was awarded in 1907. Since the death of Mr. Nelson in 1908, the task of editing the successful essay has been given to the undersigned in coöperation with the author. In publishing this volume occasion is taken to state the purpose of the competition. Since it is confined to students and graduates of a college which offers no post-graduate instruction, it is not intended to require original historical research but rather to encourage a thoughtful handling of problems in political science. Theodore Clarke Smith, J. Leland Miller Professor of American History Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., December, 1910. [viii] [ix] [x] [xi] INTRODUCTION In a chapter of Hall’s Chronicle having to do with the mid-reign history of Henry VIII occurs an instance of popular protest against arbitrary taxation. The people are complaining against the Commissions, says the Chronicler, bodies appointed by the Crown to levy taxes without consent of Parliament. “For thei saied,” so goes the passage, “if men should geue their goodes by a Commission, then wer it worse than the taxes of Fraunce, and so England should be bond and not free.” Hall’s naïve statement is scarcely less than a declaration of the axiomatic principle of politics that self-taxation is an essential of self-government. Writers on the evolution of the taxing power are inclined to go a step farther and believe that the liberty of a nation can be gauged most readily by the power of the people over the public purse. With a view so extended a narrative of the growth of popular control in England might easily expand into a history of the English Constitution. In the present essay, however, an effort has been made to exclude all matters which were not of the strictest pertinency to the subject in hand. Feudal dues and incidents, the machinery of taxation, the Exchequer, the forces accounting for the shifting composition of the national assemblies, these and other matters have been treated of in outline rather than in detail, because they appeared to lie beyond the scope of this essay. Only two matters have been taken to be of first rate importance,—the tax and the authority by which it was laid. Taxation has been construed broadly as being any contribution levied by the government for its own support. An endeavor has been made in each instance to find out who or what the taxing authority was, and whether the tax was laid in accordance with it. Under the Normans the taxing authority was unmistakably the king, and by the Bill of Rights it lay as unmistakably in Parliament, with the right of initiation in the House of Commons. The story of the shift from one position to the other forms, of course, the major burden of the essay. At the time when the subject was assigned, the power of the House of Commons over money bills had not been brought into question for more than two centuries, and the first drafts had been written and the prize awarded before the Asquith ministry was confronted with the problem of interference by the House of Lords. At this writing the question has not been settled. It has seemed advisable therefore to leave the essay within the bounds originally set for it, and what connection it has with the events of 1909 and 1910 consists chiefly in its consideration of the basic principles involved in that struggle. To the late Henry Loomis Nelson, David A. Wells Professor of Political Science in Williams College, I owe the interest I have had in the preparation of this book. It is an outgrowth of his course in English Constitutional history, and some of the interpretations placed upon events are his interpretations. His death intervened before the second draft of the book was made, and the revisory work had to be done without his suggestions. To my friend, Dr. Theodore Clarke Smith, Professor in Williams College, I am indebted for a painstaking examination of the manuscript and for much valuable advice in the work preliminary to publication. Acknowledgments in the footnotes to Bishop Stubbs, Mr. Medley, Mr. Taswell-Langmead and many others scarcely manifest my obligations. But the essay throughout is based upon original authorities. Shepard Ashman Morgan. New York, December, 1910. [xii] [xiii] [xiv] [xv] CONTENTS CHAPTER I The Saxons: Customary Revenues and Extraordinary Contributions 1 Evolutionary character of the English Constitution—Early ideas of taxation amongst the Germans and Anglo-Saxons—Revenues of the Anglo-Saxon kings —The Danegeld and the authority for it—The Witenagemot and its powers. CHAPTER II Feudal and Royal Taxation: The Norman and the Angevin Kings, 1066- 1215 12 William the Conqueror—His National Council and its part in taxation—Domesday Survey—William Rufus—Henry I and his Charter—Question of assent to taxation in the shire moots and the National Council—Stephen—Henry II—His controversy with Becket over the Sheriff’s Aid—Scutage—Theobald’s complaint—Early step toward a tax on movables—The Saladin Tithe and its assessment by juries of inquest—Richard I—His ransom—The king the authority for taxes—Refusal of Hugh of Lincoln—John—His scutages a cause leading to Magna Carta—Inquest of Service—John’s demand for a thirteenth of movables—Council at St. Alban’s, 1213—Summons to Oxford—Magna Carta—Chapters 12 and 14—Advance toward Parliamentary taxation. CHAPTER III The Custom of Parliamentary Grants, 1215-1272 71 Henry III—Reissues of the Charter—Assessment of a carucage by the Council— Conditional Grants—Rejected offer of a disbursing commission—Supervision of expenditures—Representation as it was in Henry’s National Council— Knights of the shire called, 1254—Provisions of Oxford—Knights of the shire summoned by Henry and Simon de Montfort to national assemblies—In Parliament, 1264—Simon de Montfort’s Great Parliament, 1265—First instance of burgher representation—House of Commons foreshadowed. CHAPTER IV Law of Parliamentary Taxation, 1272-1297 107 Edward I—His first Parliament and its grant of a custom on wool—His second Parliament—Attendance of knights of the shire declared “expedient”— Provincial assemblies at Northampton and York grant taxes—Seizure of wool, 1294—Separate meeting of knights of the shire—The Model Parliament, 1295 —“What affects all by all should be approved”—Parliament of 1296—Struggle with the barons over service in Gascony—Contumacy of Bohun and Bigod— Principle that grants must wait upon redress of grievances—Confirmatio Cartarum—De tallagio non concedendo. CHAPTER V Taxation by the Commons, 1297-1461 154 Character of the period—Parliament of Lincoln—Tunnage and poundage and other customs—Tallage—Edward II—Tentative abolition of the New Customs —The Lords Ordainers—Abolition of the New Customs—Tallage of 1312— Deposition of Edward II—Edward III—Tallage of 1332 and its withdrawal— New Customs a regular means of revenue—The wool customs—Statutory abolition of the Maletolt and of all unauthorized taxation—Parliament the sole taxing authority in law—Checkered history of the wool customs— Appropriation of Supplies—Examination of Accounts—Death of Edward III— Separate sessions of the houses—Richard II—Trouble over audit of accounts —Special treasurers—The Rising of the Villeins—Richard’s despotism and dethronement—Henry IV—Initiation of tax levies in the House of Commons, 1407—Henry V—Henry VI—Declaration for appropriation of supplies— Accession of the Yorkists. CHAPTER VI Extra-Parliamentary Exaction, 1461-1603 213 Edward IV—Benevolences and forced loans—Richard III—Prohibition of benevolences—The Tudors—Henry VII—The “New-found Subsidy”— Morton’s Crotch—Early taxation of Henry VIII—Cardinal Wolsey’s breach of privilege—Henry’s commissions and benevolences—Forced loans—Profits of the Reformation—Parliament the confirming authority in clerical grants— Elizabeth—Liberality of her Parliaments—Assertion by the commons of their right to originate money bills. CHAPTER VII The Stuarts, 1603-1689 236 Divine right as against Parliamentary supremacy—James I dictates the composition of the House of Commons—Tunnage and poundage for life— Royal poverty—The Bate Case—Opinions of the Barons in the Bate Case—The position of Parliament—The Book of Rates—Remonstrance from the Commons—Cowel’s “Interpreter”—The Great Contract—Petty extortion after the dissolution of Parliament—The “Addled” Parliament—Case of Oliver St. John—James’s Third Parliament—Delay of a supply pending redress of grievances—Revival of impeachment by the Commons—James’s last Parliament—Charles I—His early Parliaments—Forced loans—Threats of non- Parliamentary exaction—The Petition of Right—Omission of the customs— Tunnage and poundage—Charles’s eleven years without Parliament—His financial expedients—Ship Money—Extra-judicial opinions—Hampden’s Case —Judgment for the Crown—The Short Parliament—The Long Parliament— Royal exaction of tunnage and poundage declared illegal—The Ship Money Act —The Grand Remonstrance—The Puritan Revolution—Charles II— Appropriation of Supplies—James II—William and Mary—The Bill of Rights. Index 309 [xvi] [xvii] [xviii] [1] Amongst the Germans Amongst the Anglo-Saxons Revenue of the Anglo- Saxon kings Evolutionary character of the English Constitution Early ideas of taxation PARLIAMENTARY TAXATION I THE SAXONS: CUSTOMARY REVENUES AND EXTRAORDINARY CONTRIBUTIONS The English Constitution looks ever backward. Precedent lies behind precedent, law behind law, until fact shades off into legend and that into a common beginning, the Germanic character. Standing upon the eminence of 1689, one sees the Petition of Right, and then in deepening perspective, Confirmatio Cartarum and Magna Carta. The crisis of 1215 points to the Charter of Henry I, and behind that are the good laws of Edward the Confessor. The Anglo-Saxon polity looks back of the era of Alfred, to the times when Hengist and Horsa were yet unborn, and the German tribesmen were still living in their forests beyond the Rhine without thinking of migrating westward. And there, behind the habits of those barbaric ancestors of Englishmen, lies the national character, the Anglo-Saxon sense of right and wrong, of loyalty, justice, and duty. The growth of the English Constitution has been as subject to the laws of evolution as the development of man himself. The germ of national character evolved habits of thought and action, and these habits, or as they are better termed, institutions, were beaten upon by conditions and fused with the institutions of another people, until at last they took on the shape of free government. An account of the advance toward the laying of taxes by representatives of the people must begin with some notice of the idea of taxation which actuated the German tribesmen. Tacitus writing of them as they were at the beginning of the Second Century A. D. makes this remark: “It is customary amongst the states to bestow on the chiefs by voluntary and individual contribution a present of cattle or of fruits, which, while accepted as a compliment, supplies their wants.”[1] Here, then, is the earliest idea of a tax, a voluntary contribution for the support of the princeps. It was prompted by the essentially personal relationship existent between people and chieftain, the sense of attachment of the people to the leader. Direct taxation laid by the princeps upon the tribe, was as unknown in Germany as it was foreign to the Germanic spirit. When the conquering Saxons, therefore, swept westward across the German Ocean, they carried with them scarcely more than a semblance of taxation. Between men and leader the personal relationship still subsisted, but as time went on, the Anglo-Saxon king became less the father of the people, and more their lord. Lord of the national land he was as well, but he did not rule by reason of that fact. The two claims upon popular support were therefore distinct, the one as personal leader, the other as lord of the national land; and during the major part of the Anglo-Saxon era they afforded a sufficient means for the maintenance of the king and his government. Until the moment of a supreme emergency the king did not have to seek extraordinary sources of income. As lord of the national land, the king had a double source of revenue. The folkland, or land subject to national regulation[2] and alienable only by the consent of the Witenagemot, presented the king with its proceeds, much of which went for the maintenance of the royal armed retainers and servants. Deducible from this right to the public lands, was the claim of the king to tolls, duties, and customs accruing from the harbors, landing-places, and military roads of the realm, and to treasure-trove. Aside from this, the king was one of the largest private landowners in the kingdom, and from it he derived rents and profits which were disposable at will. The other sources of the royal revenue, which at least in the beginning may be said to have accrued to the king by reason of personal obligation, were the military, the judicial, and the police powers. By reason of the military power vested in him, the king could demand the services of all freemen to fulfill the trinoda necessitas,—service in the militia, repair of bridges, and the maintenance of fortifications. Further, in accordance with the system of vassalage incident to his military power, he had the right of heriot,[3] according to which the armor of a deceased vassal became the property of the king. The judicial authority, also, was a fruitful source of income; from it the king adduced a right to property forfeited in consequence of treason, theft, or similar crimes, and to the fines which were payable upon every breach of the law. The third great power vested in the royal person was the police [2] [3] [4] [5] The Witenagemot and its powers Danegeld, 991 Authority for the Danegeld control; under it the king turned to account the privilege of market by reserving to himself certain payments; also the protection offered to Jews and merchants was paid for, and the king pocketed the bulk of the tribute. Beyond these,—and here we have the analogy of the later royal claim to purveyance,—the districts through which the king passed or those traversed by messengers upon the king’s business, lay under obligation to supply sustenance throughout the extent of the royal sojourn. It is apparent that an extraordinary occasion had to arise before this large ordinary revenue should prove to be inadequate to meet all reasonable royal necessities. The whole matter is shrouded in obscurity, yet it is unlikely that this extraordinary occasion arrived before the onslaught of the Danes. There is no record of an earlier instance. It was in 991[4] that the Saxon army under Brihtnoth, Ealdorman of the East Saxons, suffered decisive defeat at the hands of Danish pirates. King Ethelred the Unready found himself at the mercy of foreign enemies, and his only recourse was bribery. Under this necessity, a levy[5] of £10,000 was made, and secured momentary peace from the truculent Danes. But it was only momentary; they returned in 994 and took away £16,000. They repeated, under various pretexts, their profitable incursions in 1002, 1007, and 1011.[6] In 1012, having been bought off for the last time, the Danes entered English pay, and the Danegeld instead of being an extraordinary charge, became a regularly recurrent tax. It continued until 1051, when Edward the Confessor succeeded in paying off the last of the Danish ships.[7] The chronicler[8] accounts for the abolition of the Danegeld after the manner of his time. Edward the Confessor, so goes the story, entered his treasure-house one day to find the Devil sitting amongst the money bags. It so happened that the wealth which was being thus guarded was that which had accrued from a recent levy of the Danegeld. To the pious Confessor the sight was sufficient to demonstrate the evil of the tax and he straightway abolished it. But the history of the origin of the Danegeld and the mythical tale of its abolition are of trifling importance as compared with the authority whereby the impost was laid. In 991 it was apparently the Witenagemot, acting upon the advice of the Archbishop Sigeric, which issued the decree levying the tax.[9] Three years later it was “King Ethelred by the advice of his chief men” who promised the Danes tribute.[10] Similarly in 1002, 1007, and 1011 it is Ethelred “cum consilio primatum” who fixes the amount of money to be raised.[11] The deduction is not hard to make: it was at least usual if indeed it was not felt to be a necessity for the king to take counsel with the Witenagemot before he went about the preliminaries of taxation. It is not unlikely, however, that in practice the assent of the Witan was less or more of a formality varying according to the weakness or strength of the king. A strong king’s will would dominate the Witan, whereas a weak king would be subservient to its desires and interest. In order to arrive at a clear comprehension of the taxing power of the Witan as compared with that subsequently exercised by the English Parliament, it is essential that one understands the make-up of the Anglo-Saxon body. As its name implies, the Witan was an assembly of the wise. Its organization was not based upon the ownership of land, nor was there any rule held to undeviatingly which prescribed qualifications for membership. Generally speaking it was composed of the king and his family, who were known as the Athelings; the national officers, both ecclesiastical and civil, a group which included the bishops and abbots, the ealdormen or chief men of the shires, and the ministri or administrative officers; and finally, the royal nominees, men who are not comprehensible in the above classes, but who recommended themselves to the king by reason of unusual or expert knowlege.[12] It is observable, then, that this assembly was by the nature of its composition aristocratic. That it was not representative in the modern sense of the term is as readily apparent. With certain restrictions the official members—the bishops, ealdormen, the ministri—were coöpted by the existing members, while the remainder were either present by right of birth or invited to attend by reason of peculiar attainment. Nevertheless, the Witenagemot was commonly believed to be capable of expressing the national will. It had the power of electing the king and the complementary power of deposition, and exercised every power of government, making laws, administering them, adjudging cases arising under them, and levying taxes for the public need.[13] Such in brief was the body which in 991 assented to the levy of the Danegeld. The act was of great importance; by it the Witan both exercised a right which was not to be vindicated in its completeness for the space of seven hundred years, but it laid a trap for those who, in the time of Charles the First, should be struggling for the attainment of that right, for in their action lay the precedent which the Stuart lawyers should warp into a pretext for the levy of ship-money. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] His National Council Instance of the Danegeld, 1084 Character of the Norman Rule William the Conqueror 1066-1087 Its part in taxation II FEUDAL AND ROYAL TAXATION THE NORMAN AND THE ANGEVIN KINGS 1066-1215 Under the Saxon kings the structure of government was only half built. The foundation, laid in the shire and hundred moots, the townships, and the incidental organisms of local government, was solid and capable of upholding a heavy superstructure. But the Saxons scarcely built further. They left to the Norman kings, peculiarly fitted to their work by temperament and habit, the task of setting up a strong central government. The price which the nation paid for it was the loss of what right it had possessed of assenting to taxation. During the whole period from the coming of the Normans in 1066 to the signing of Magna Carta in 1215 there can be brought forward only two or three instances of assent by the National Council to taxes levied by the king, and these few instances are at best equivocal. They are insufficient to justify the belief that the National Council had any final power over the levying of taxation. But the period is not altogether gray; it concludes with the enunciation in Magna Carta of rights which cast a halo of color over the whole subsequent narrative of the struggle for parliamentary taxation. William the Conqueror was precisely the man most likely to exercise supreme control over taxation. Elected to the kingship according to the Saxon forms and with his title to the crown backed up by force of arms, he created a system of government of which he himself was the center and in which his authority, even to the vassals of vassals, was supreme.[14] With his thirst for power thus satisfied he was given a free hand to indulge his besetting sin of avarice. Small wonder was it therefore that he clung to the revenues of his predecessors and added new imposts of his own. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the absolutist character of the king, William retained the theory and for the most part the form of the Saxon Witan. Never, however, did the Norman assemblies exercise independent legislative or executive functions.[15] The holding of land, as a prerequisite to membership in the National Council, was under William an uncertain factor; the membership continued to include, generally speaking, the same officers, ecclesiastics, and nobles as composed the Witenagemot. The powers of this assembly were probably not great; at any rate, the magnates of the period considered attendance not as a right or a privilege or even as an advantage, but merely as a necessary duty toward the royal person. The king consulted the magnates on almost every piece of legislation, and stated in the subsequent promulgation of the laws that he had obtained their advice. But in the case of a strong king, such as was the Conqueror, the consultation must have been scarcely more than a statement of the royal will and a formal acquiescence. The holding of these assemblies took place at the crowning days of the king, at Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide, generally in London, Winchester, and Gloucester. In the matter of taxation, it is probable as in the case of other legislation that the Conqueror advised with his Council, though the evidence pointing toward such a conclusion is entirely of a later date. But in so far as practical advantage to the payers of the taxes was concerned, the power might quite as well have lain solely in the hands of the king; if indeed the Conqueror did secure the assent of the Council, it was no more than an instance of his policy of adhering to the forms of law while making the practices under it serve his own purposes. The reimposition in 1084 of the Danegeld which William revived as an occasional instead of a regular tax, is not stated by the chronicler as receiving assent from the Council; the king is said to have “received six shillings from every hide.”[16] Roger of Wendover’s Chronicle of the same year brands this exaction as an “extortion,”[17] by which we are scarcely to understand a tax granted in any modern sense by the chief legislative body of the kingdom. The Saxon Chronicler speaking of the same imposition says, “The king caused a great and heavy tax to be raised throughout England, even seventy-two pence on every hide of land.”[18] The amount of such an impost, if drawn from two-thirds of the hidage of the kingdom, would be a sum approximating £20,000.[19] It is unlikely that an exaction of so great magnitude could have been levied without the assent of the Council if the Conqueror was under any obligation to obtain their consent or even their advice; and it is still more unlikely that four chroniclers of the events of that year should have let pass unnoted a vote of assent if it had been passed by the National Council. We are therefore to conclude that either the Conqueror levied the tax without consulting his Council at all, or that he did consult them, and that their assent was of so formal and valueless a nature as not to deserve notice in the records of the year.[20] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] In the Shire Moots In the National Council Domesday Survey, 1086 William Rufus, 1087- 1100 Henry I, 1100-1135 His Charter Question of assent to taxation The year 1086 witnessed the Domesday Survey. By it William obtained a detailed register of the land and its capacity for taxation. To the administrative side of taxation the Survey is of supreme importance, since the valuation of land thus arrived at was never entirely superseded as a definite and fair basis for the laying of taxes; to the actual granting of the tax, however, its importance is of much less degree. In such light the interest centers chiefly on the fact that representatives were elected from every hundred upon whose sworn depositions the information that William wanted was obtained. The unlucky thirteen years of the reign of William Rufus, who succeeded to the throne upon the death of the Conqueror in 1087, are almost negligible in considering the progress toward parliamentary taxation. William Rufus, or more particularly his brilliant and perverted justiciar, Ranulf Flambard, determined upon the profitable program of getting together as much money as possible by whatever means seemed most convenient. In the nature of things the church and the great feudatories were the most available sources for extortion and toward them Flambard chiefly directed his energies. He did not, however, overlook the Danegeld and he seems to have levied it with perfect absolutism. The chronicler Florence gives an instance of the petty extortion which the justiciar practiced upon the people. Flambard was in the habit of enforcing military service from the shires. On one occasion, so says Florence, he met the array, informed the militiamen that there was no necessity for their appearance, and then proceeded to mulct them of the ten shillings which their shires had given to each by way of providing for their maintenance.[21] Against plunderings of that sort the people were too weak and too disunited to make resistance. In such a reign, with one side unwilling to progress and the other unable, it is apparent that no steps could be taken toward the granting of taxes by a responsible body. The reign of Henry I is of greater importance, not only because of the long forward strides which the king and his justiciar Roger of Salisbury took in the direction of judicial and financial organization, but because we find in the records of his time certain pieces of evidence which seem to support the contention that the Council gave some measure of consent to taxation. The former is palpably beyond the scope of this essay, but the latter is more pertinent. The first of these instances is the eleventh section of the Charter of Liberties which Henry I issued at the moment of his accession. The significant passage is this: “To those knights who hold their lands by the cuirass, of my own gift I grant the lands of their demesne ploughs free from all payments and all labor.”[22] The king goes on to state the reason; it was “so they may readily provide themselves with horses and arms for my service and for the defense of my kingdom.” The relief thus granted was by way of protection against the extortionate demands which Ranulf Flambard had laid upon the lands of vassals in the time of William Rufus. But Henry did not grant the liberty freely out of hand. He appended the clause that for his service and the defense of the kingdom, the vassals should supply themselves with horses and arms. Thus remotely and in effect rather than in fact did the Charter touch upon taxation. It contained no reference to assent by the vassals, either individually or in the National Council. In accordance with the feudal theory of individual contribution for the support of the lord, and in view of the provision in the Charter against payments, the inference can be drawn that individual assent would be in order. But to find an answer to the question as to where the collective assent of the barons was obtained, if at all, one must look further. In a letter addressed to “Samson the Bishop and Urso d’Abitat,” who were respectively the bishop of the diocese and the sheriff of the county of Worcester, Henry says, in speaking of the county courts, “I will cause those courts to be summoned when I will for my own proper necessities at my pleasure.”[23] That these county courts were utilized by the Norman kings for purposes of extortion, is attested by the reluctance of the suitors to attend their sessions,[24] and in the light of that fact, the “proper necessities” of the king are apparently none other than the royal need for money. But why, if the assent of the taxed was not required, should the courts be summoned to meet the “proper necessities” of the crown? Would that purpose be subserved merely by making a demand for money? Had that been the fact, the courts might well have been left to carry on their peculiar functions untroubled, for extortion can be the more readily practiced king to man than king to people. The conclusion is reasonable, notwithstanding the very large part which conjecture plays in it, that some form of assent was usual in the county courts in response to the royal demands. But there is another piece of evidence which points to the National Council itself giving assent to taxation. In the Chronicle of the Monastery of Abingdon occurs a quotation of an order from Henry to his officers exempting the lands of a certain abbot from the payment of an “aid which my barons have given me.”[25] Whether or not this statement can be taken as substantiating the theory of assent depends upon a point of time; was the gift of the barons before or after the laying of the tax? If the gift was indeed prior to the levy, then the evidence [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] Henry II, 1154-1189 Controversy with Becket over the Sheriff’s Aid Stephen, 1135-1154 is conclusive that the barons assented to taxation; if, on the other hand, the barons gave the aid after the levy had been made, the statement refers solely to the actual payment of the tax. The tense of the Latin verb, however, and the circumstances in which the king writes, seem to point to the former alternative; Henry directs that the Exchequer exempt the abbot’s lands from the collection of an aid, not which the barons were giving him, but which they have given him. It is possible to infer, then, that sometimes, at least, the barons formally assented to the levying of an extraordinary aid. But this assent must not be taken as proof that the barons discussed taxation in formal session or that they had any generally recognized power of choice. None of the records of the time, though they speak emphatically of the oppressiveness of the taxes,[26] suggest that at any time the barons refused to give the king what he asked for. The probability is that Henry I sought baronial assent merely as a matter of form, and that he did it out of respect, more or less conscious, for the theory that contributions of a feudatory toward the support of the crown should be of a nature voluntary. The perfunctory character of the assent, together with the absence of evidence looking to a refusal, points to nothing so much as the firmness of the royal grip upon the purses of the nation. During the major part of King Stephen’s nineteen turbulent years, feudalism and anarchy ran hand in hand. Such progress as had been making toward parliamentary taxation ceased. Stephen showed himself an adept at misgovernment and succeeded in nothing so well as in his own discomfiture. Things went by contraries. Stephen allowed the nobles to make themselves impregnable in the royal castles and then sought to dislodge them by raising up a new and hostile baronage. The nobles, needing money to carry on war amongst themselves and against the king, extorted it from the people. “Those whom they suspected to have any goods they took by night and by day, seizing both men and women,” says the Saxon Chronicle,[27] “and they put them in prison for their gold and silver, and tortured them with pains unspeakable, for never were martyrs tormented as these were.” And then, “They were continually levying an exaction from the towns, which they called Tenserie (a payment to the superior lord for protection), and when the miserable inhabitants had no more to give, then plundered they and burnt all the towns, so that well mightest thou walk a whole day’s journey nor ever shouldest thou find a man seated in a town, or its lands tilled.” Henry of Huntingdon adds a detail which fills out the picture of wretchedness. Speaking of Stephen’s promise to abolish the Danegeld in 1135, shortly after his accession, the chronicler says, “The king promised that the Danegeld, that is two shillings for a hide of land, which his predecessors had received yearly, should be given up forever. These ... he promised in the presence of God; but he kept none of them.”[28] By the treaty of Wallingford in 1153, Stephen agreed that the crown should descend at his death to Henry of Anjou,[29] the son of the Empress Matilda, and great-grandson of the Conqueror. The treaty provided, also, for comprehensive reforms which Stephen, a melancholy figure in contrast with the vigorous Henry, tried to work out. Stephen died at the end of a year’s attempt to put in operation the new programme and Henry came to the throne. Henry’s reign was marked by a regular and peaceful administration of the government which had its rise in the genius of the king for organization. It witnessed too the struggle with Thomas à Becket, a conflict which has been pointed to as “the first instance of any opposition to the king’s will in the matter of taxation which is recorded in our national history.”[30] The story of it is full of dramatic interest. At the Council of Woodstock in 1163, “the question was moved,” so goes the Latin narrative, “concerning a certain custom.” This custom, which amounted to two shillings from each hide, had previously fallen to the sheriffs, but this “the king,” so continues the Latin account, “wished to enroll in the treasury and add to his own revenues.”[31] In response to this, Becket is recorded as saying, “Not as revenue, my lord king, saving your pleasure, will we give it: but if the sheriffs and servants and ministers of the shires will serve us worthily and defend our dependents, we will not fail in giving them their aid.”[32] This was from the chancellor turned archbishop. In his former estate Becket had not shrunk from pressing money composition for military service from prelates holding land of the crown on the ground that they were tenants-in-chief and therefore owed service of arms to the king. But now he had changed his masters and stood champion of the church. To him Henry returned, “By the eyes of God, it shall be given as revenue, and it shall be entered in the king’s accounts; and you have no right to contradict; no man wishes to oppress your men against your will.” “My lord king,” Becket declared, “by the reverence of the eyes by which you have sworn, it shall not be given from my land and from the rights of the church not a penny.” [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] Scutage The issue in the Woodstock Controversy, 1163 Early instances of Scutage The Great Scutage, 1159 Apparently for the moment the archbishop won his point, but from that time on, Becket and the king stood apart. The continuation of the struggle between them at Westminster the following October; the Constitutions of Clarendon, sweeping away much of the exclusive authority which previously had characterized ecclesiastical jurisdiction; the flight of Becket into France; the coronation of the young Henry by the Archbishop of York to the prejudice of Becket, and the latter’s declaration of illegality; these and the martyrdom of the archbishop, are parts of another story. Exactly what were the motives of Becket in making his stand against the king at the Council of Woodstock, are somewhat difficult of determination. The interest of the king was obvious; he wished to increase his revenue by annexing the “auxilium vicecomitis” or “Sheriff’s aid,” which had not gone into the royal treasury at all but had served to swell the private income of the sheriffs. Whether Becket, “standing on the sure ground of existing custom,”[33] objects to change merely because it was a change; or whether he had in mind some lofty democratic principle, and took his stand against the royal power in favor of the lesser folk through some flush of democratic fervor, is not only impossible of being decided, but the decision would not be of strict relevance to the subject. The two points to observe, and they are perfectly evident, are that Becket’s stand against the king did not concern a new levy of taxes, but an imposition already customary; and that the king asserted Becket’s incompetency to interfere. Becket had presumed to take a hand in a matter connected with taxation; the king had denied him that right, though the archbishop was the chief member of his National Council. Therein lay a great issue. A number of other incidents of the reign of Henry II, though they lack the color of a controversy between archbishop and monarch, are nevertheless worthy of consideration. The imposition in 1159 of the Great Scutage, despite the fact that it came as a feudal charge rather than as a form of regular taxation, assumes great importance in view of the part that scutage played in the evolution of the taxing power. Scutage is generally considered as one of the forms of “commutation for personal service,” and commutation was undoubtedly the underlying idea of the imposition.[34] The payment was made for every knight owing military service. Each knight holding of the king was expected to serve in the field for forty days. Eight pence a day in the reign of Henry II was the usual wages of a knight, and for forty days the wages would amount to two marks, which was the sum most commonly paid in lieu of personal service. It was in its earlier phase distinctly a feudal charge. Payment of scutage, like most of the other forms of feudal and general taxation, struck its roots far into the past. Bishop Stubbs fixes 1156 as the year in which the term scutage was first employed.[35] Others find counterparts in various payments to the sovereign in the time before and shortly after the Conquest. In the reign of Henry I the practice of allowing ecclesiastics to compound at a fixed rate for the knight-service due from their estates was generally followed. The privilege was sometimes extended to mesne tenants.[36] One writer[37] points to Ranulf Flambard’s device in 1093, when he took from the men of the fyrd the money which had been given them for the purchase of supplies while on the march. Others[38] suggest the Anglo-Saxon fyrdwite, the payment made by the king’s men when they were absent from the royal train in war time as the analogy and precedent for scutage. It seems more likely that the king and his vassals adopted a money payment in lieu of service because it was convenient for both of them.[39] The king thereby got the means for the enlistment of a body of mercenaries, subject to his absolute will, and the barons were relieved, if so they pleased, of the burden of military service. The levy commonly spoken of as the Great Scutage was made in 1159. Henry II was considering an expedition into France against the Count of Toulouse. He had a claim to the latter’s lands through the inheritance of his wife, the Duchess of Aquitaine. The English baronage, by the terms of their feudal tenure, were bound to follow their lord into the field. Nevertheless a distaste had arisen of late among them for service abroad, and it was natural enough, therefore, that they should fall in with the scheme of Henry and his adviser, Thomas à Becket, for a commutation in money. Henry levied a charge of two marks (£1, 6s. 8d.) on the knight’s fee of £20, annual value, from such of his vassals as chose not to follow him into France.[40] The authority by which this payment was demanded was apparently solely that of the king. It is probable that the levy was unquestioned. In view of the facts that this was merely a change, and possibly no very great change, in the method of meeting a regular feudal obligation, and that many of the barons were willing to avail themselves of a means of escaping the burden of foreign service, the want of a recorded protest is not to be wondered at. The chronicler puts it plainly and probably with accuracy when he says that Henry “received” a scutage.[41] It was profitable for the king. The chronicler puts the proceeds at [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34]