THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POLICE POWER Santiago Legarr INTRODUCTION Ever since Chief Justice John Marshall coined the term in Brown v. Mmyland in 1827, the police power has been a pivot of American constitutional thinking. As recently as 1991 the Supreme Court spoke in Barnes v. Glen Theatre of "[t] he traditional police power of the States" as one which "we have upheld [as] a basis for legislation"; this plurality opinion of the Court defined it as "the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals."2 True, in recent times the police power has been under pressure, and the jurisprudence associated with it manifests tensions of several kinds. First, tension results from the contemporary emphasis on constitutional rights, as these are normally seen as, to one degree or another, a trump which the police power cannot easily override. The expansion of the recognition of rights, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states, and the subsequent purported constraint of the police power will not, however, be discussed in any detail within this Article-although indisputably they involve questions of interest and importance. Second, a particular field of police power activity has been under fire in the last few decades, namely the promotion of public morals or public morality. It has even been argued by one current Supreme Court Justice that the Court's decision in Lawrence Professor of Law, Universidad Austral (Argentina); Visiting Professor, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; LL.B., Universidad Cat6lica Argentina; M.St., Oxford; Ph.D., Universidad de Buenos Aires. This Article is based on a thesis submitted for the degree of Mas- ter of Studies in Legal Research at the University of Oxford. I am most grateful to Professor John Finnis, my supervisor, for his support and guidance, and to my examiners, Professor Paul P. Craig and Dr. John Allison, for helpful suggestions. I also wish to thankJohn S. Baker, Rich- ard Ekins, Adam Kramer, Jeffrey J. Langan, Roberto Legarre, Patrick H. Martin, Marc R. Merrill, Joaquin Migliore, Jonathan Miller, William J. Novak, Crist6bal Orrego, Rodrigo Sdnchez Brigido, James Stoner, and Paul Yowell for valuable comments. Finally, I am much indebted to Jeremy Spiegel and the rest of the staff of the Journal of ConstitutionalL aw for their superb editing efforts. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442-43 (1827); see infra notes 206, 214. 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991). JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 9:3 v. Texas3 effectively means that the police power regarding public morality is being eliminated. Although the topic undoubtedly calls for attention, the implications of Lawrence v. Texas and of other cases in which provisions of morals legislation were struck down are outside the object of the present inquiry. Third, it is clear that modern constitutional scholarship, with its characteristic preference for rights, pays less attention to the police power than was the case in earlier times. A cursory glance at the tables of contents of the most authoritative constitutional law treatises and case books reveals the near absence of the entry "police power,"5 which stands in stark contrast to the extensive treatment of the topic by earlier constitutional scholars.6 Again, this Article will not consider the reasons for what seems to be a trend away from the study of the police power. In summary, there are indeed question marks over the future of the police power, but I will not reflect upon the potential uncertainties that they raise, nor will I consider in a systematic way whether American constitutional law could be better conceptualized without the category of the police power. Rather, taking as its 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute making homosexual sodomy a crime, which had been applied to consenting adults acting in private, and overruling Bowers v. Hard- wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 4 See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today's decision... .") (emphasis added). Even assuming that Justice Scalia was right it would still be possible to maintain that some of the conduct he men- tions could be regulated on grounds other than moral disapprobation. For example, Justice Souter has argued that the constitutionality of a statute banning public nudity should be ana- lyzed in light of the detrimental secondary effects of that conduct. See City of Erie v. Pap's, 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582 (Souter,J., concurring in the judgment); see also City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 282, 291 (accepting Justice Souter's secondary effects test in a plurality opinion). A similar point has been made by the editors of the HarvardL aw Review with respect to other forms of conduct described by jus- tice Scalia, such as adultery and incest: "legitimate state interests other than moral disapproba- tion may justify regulating [them]." The Supreme Court, 2002 Term--Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 303 n.62 (2003). The possibility of separating morality from other considerations, which underlies this kind of argument, is not considered in this Article. E.g., GILBERT GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed. 1997); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2000); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter I TRIBE]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988). For occasional references to the police power, see GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra, at 162-63, 459; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 310-12, 401-02; STONE ETAL., supra, at 1635-36, 1660; 1 TRIBE, supra, at 1046, 1342, 1348. 6 The two most complete works on the police power date from the early twentieth century. They are Ernst Freund's magisterial treatise, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Arno Press 1976) (1904), and W. G. Hastings's thorough and lengthy essay, The Development of Law as Illustratedb y the DecisionsR elating to the Police Power of the State, 39 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 359 (1900). Nothing of the sort has been written since then. Feb. 2007] THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POLICE POVWER 747 starting point the classical understanding of the police power as illustrated for instance in Brown v. Maryland and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, this Article will trace the historical background of this key notion of American constitutional law.7 Even if it were to be argued that because of the aforementioned tensions the police power is no longer a cornerstone of American constitutional law,8 this enterprise would still be worthwhile. On the one hand, the understanding of the historical origins of a legal institution is always of interest for its own sake insofar as it illuminates the past; on the other, it can reasonably be expected that that understanding will shed light on the status quo, whatever it may be. The police power suffers from a surprising problem. Though it has been in constant use for many years and has proved important in the vocabulary of American constitutional law9 (indeed, it has been said to be "one of the most important concepts in American constitutional history"0), it is, or stands for, one of the most misunderstood ideas in constitutional law." The meaning and implications of the term are far from clear; hence Thayer's oft-quoted remark made as long ago as 1895: "[d]iscussions of what is called the 'police power' are often uninstructive .... It is my hope that, by inquiring into the historical origins of the police power, this Article will help to clarify the meaning of the phrase. Where does the term "police power" come from? How and why was it incorporated into American constitutional law? What does it mean? These are the questions that I will address. It will become clear that in its broad, original meaning, which can be traced to the concept of internal police, the police power is a constitutive principle of American federalism. It will become clear too that American federalism cannot be fully understood without reference to the police power, for, as will be shown, "police power" was the name Americans ' The concept of police power has been imported from American constitutional practice by countries which, like Argentina, drew inspiration from the American Constitution when draft- ing their own constitutions. 8 Contra David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 501 (2004) ("[The police power] is a concept at the center of profound developments in the American law."). 9 FREUND, supra note 6, at iii. '0H arry N. Scheiber, State Police Power, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1744, 1744 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986). n See 2 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136 (1893) ("[T]he police power.., is the 'dark continent' of our jurisprudence. It is the conven- ient repository of everything for which our juristic classifications can find no other place."); Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322, 322 (1907) (stating that "[n]o phrase is more frequently used and at the same time less understood" than the police power). I12 J AMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 693 n. 1 (1895). JOURNAL OF CONSTFUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 9:3 chose in order to designate the whole range of legislative power not delegated to the federal government and thus retained by the states.'3 That broad notion, it will be argued, is at the root of what seems today an unexplained head of power, namely the narrower concept of police power as the promotion of public health, safety, and morals. My inquiry will conform to the following structure: Section I will deal with the formation of the idea of "police" in the writings of Vattel, Blackstone, and other eighteenth-century European thinkers. One of the most important findings of this research is that the early notions of police, or those associated with the term "police," are of particular relevance for the later development of the police power. Section II will analyze the meaning and scope of the concept of "police," one of the more slippery terms in the English language.4 Section III will consider the origin of the formative analogy between king and father and briefly sketch its philosophical underpinnings. The analogy, it will be argued, provided the context for the original theorizing about police (in the relevant sense of "police"). By means of a survey of the relevant portions of early American constitutional history, Section IV will show how the concept of "police" was adopted in the United States. Exploring the meaning that the word "police" had in eighteenth-century North America will help us to understand the use of the term in documents and court decisions of that time. Section V will explain the transformation of police into what we know as "the police power." Since it was mainly the courts that brought about this transformation, the pertinent early cases will be analyzed. Section VI will advance the idea, already hinted at, that there are broad and narrow definitions of police power remaining in American constitutional law, especially in the case law of the Supreme Court. Each definition will be studied here. For the purposes of the cases to be considered in Sections V and VI, a cut-off date will be established in the early twentieth century, with the rise of the so-called Lochner era, although I will make incidental references to some post-Lochner decisions. I. THE HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF POLICE The term "police" originally meant something other than law enforcement. It is instructive to look at its etymology first. "Police"- and its cognates "policy" and "polity"-come from the Latin poitTa, which itself is a descendant of the Greek word politeia and, ultimately, " Compare with the legislative power of British colonies, which, it seems, does not have a name. See infra note 139. " "Police" is a slippery term in other languages, too. See infra notes 22, 94. Feb. 2007] THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POLICE POWER 749 of polis."5 Potl-ta meant civil administration or government, and, according to Peirce and Cook, "It]he Romans conceived the word... as meaning the condition of the State."' 6 Ayto explains that in Medieval Latin a variant politiae merged, which became the French term "police" that was to be taken over by English. 7 From the sixteenth century onwards "police" was used in English as a synonym of "policy," in the sense of commonwealth or organized state. It also signified civil organization and civilization."' These meanings, however, became obsolete in the nineteenth century.'9 By the early eighteenth century "police" started to denote what pofft-a meant in Suarez's late Latin, namely the regulation, discipline, and control of a community; civil administration and public order.20 This use had prevailed even earlier in the European continent, especially in France2' and Spain.22 It was also to be found in Scotland where '5W ALTER W. SKEAT, ETYMOLOGYCAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 461-62 (new ed. rev. and enlarged 1935). The same is true of other romance languages, such as Spanish. See 4 JOAN COROMINAS & Jost A. PASCUAL, DICCIONARIO CRiTICO ETIMOL6GICO CASTELLANO E HISPAkNICO 548 (1981). 16j. LEONARD PEIRCE & HARRY CLAYTON COOK, MANUAL TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED 52 (1938). In the seventeenth century the Spanish theologian Francisco Suarez used the term "politia"i n his De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore as a synonym for the Latin terms regimen and gubernatio. The three words were used to connote human government and civil administration. See, e.g., 3 FRANCISCO SuAREz, DE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE 145 (1975) ("Unde necesse est ut vel sentiat finem canonici iuris esse tantum externam politiam humanam, quod valde absurdum est, vel oportet ut sentiat finem iuris civilis non sistere in hu- mana politia et externa pace ac iustitia reipublicae, sed etiam tendere ad veram felicitatem hu- manam.") (emphasis added) ("Therefore [Fortunio Garcfa de Ercilla] must hold that the end of canon law consists solely in external human government, which is quite absurd, or that the end of civil law is not just that order of human government, external peace and justice of the state, but also pursuing the true human felicity."). " JOHN AYrO, DICTIONARY OF WORD ORIGINS 402 (1990); see CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 812-13 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988) ("The English form police in the modern sense of law enforcement was borrowed from modern French police, but in its older sense of civil organization was borrowed from Old French policie."). "S These now obsolete senses of police were not differentiated from earlier use in the form policie in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY, supra note 17, at 812-13. 9 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 22 (2d ed. 1989). 'o Id. 2 Id.;s eeC HRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 44 (1993) (citing Claude Sayssel's early-sixteenth-century use of the term la Police to refer to one of the restraints on royal power in France); M. Raeff, The Well Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe, 80 AM. HIST. REV. 1221, 1235 (1975) (noting the emergence of the concept of police in eighteenth-century France heralded by Nicolas de LaMare's treatise TRAITI DE POLICE, first published in 1722). 2 In the fourteenth century the Spanish term "policia" meant politics. 4 COROMINAS & PASCUAL, supra note 15, at 548. The Spanish Dictionary of Authorities of 1737 records a differ- ent meaning: "the good order that ought to be preserved in the cities and republics through the observance of the laws and ordinances established for their good government." 5 REAL ACADEMIA ESPAfqOLA, DICCIONARIO DE AUTORIDADES 311 (photo. reprint 1976) (1737) (trans- lated from Spanish). This sense of policia is similar to Vattel's "police." See infra text accompa- JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W [Vol. 9:3 "Commissioners of Police," for the general internal administration of the country, were appointed by Queen Anne in 1714. This was apparently the first official use of the word in Great Britain.3 Scotland, in fact, had a lot to do with the development of the idea of police in the British Isles. Standard modern reference works on Scottish laws and institutions take it for granted that "police" always referred to municipal police forces,24 but this is not the case. In eighteenth-century Scotland "police" had a very different meaning. The term appeared as a heading of miscellaneous regulations and in the context of a class of crimes, namely "offences against the police." In Statute Law of Scotland, published in 1757, Lord Kames included a category of laws called "police" which comprised a whole variety of regulations. The following are but a few examples: That ladders, and other instruments to extinguish fire, be kept in every burgh .... That common women be put at the utmost ends of the town, where least danger of fire is; and that none set them houses in the heart of the town .... That none be found in taverns after nine at night .... 15 Most of the other regulations included by Lord Kames under the heading of police are of an economic type.26 These economic rules, together with the non-economic ones mentioned above, instantiate an emerging pattern in the conceptualization of police that is recognizable in the elaborations of eighteenth-century writers like Vattel and Blackstone. 7 The category of "offences against the police" was apparently used for the first time in Scotland in John Erskine's An Institute of the Law of Scotland, published posthumously in 1773.28 It was not present in nying note 57. The aforementioned dictionary adds that policia also meant cleanliness. For more on this meaning, see infra text accompanying note 41. 23 CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY, supra note 17, at 812-13; 12 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 23; 3 LEON RADZINOWICz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 1 (1948). For the idea of "police" in the Scottish Enlightenment, see W.G. Carson, Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing 1795- 1900 (pt. 1), 17 AUSTRALIAN & N.Z.J. CRIMINOLOGY 207, 209-10 (1984). 24 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND 376 (1931); 16 THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 233 (1995). LORD HENRY H. KAMES, STATUTE LAW OF SCOTLAND ABRIDGED: WITH HISTORICAL NOTES 271 (1757). See id. at 270, 274 ("To avoid dearth of corn, those who have not 1000 merks yearly of free rent prohibited to keep their horses at hard meat .... For the encouragement of the linen manufactures of this kingdom, enacted, That no corpse of any person whatever shall be buried in any shirt, sheet, or any thing else, except in plain linen, made and spun within this king- dom .... "). This economic dimension of police is also illustrated in the title of a book by PATRICK LINDESAY, THE INTEREST OF SCOTLAND CONSIDERED, WITH REGARD TO ITS POLICE, IN IMPLOYING OF THE POOR, ITS AGRICULTURE, ITS TRADE, ITS MANUFACTURES, AND FISHERIES (1733). 27 See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 21 JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 116, at 705 (Edinburgh, J. Bell 1773). Probably on the correct assumption that An Institute of the Law of Scotland was based on Feb. 2007] THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POLICE POWER 751 either Erskine's previous work, Principles of the Law of Scotland (1754), or in George Mackenzie's Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1684). The latter is especially noteworthy as Erskine followed Mackenzie's order in his own Institute. According to Erskine, crimes can be broadly divided into three categories. "Certain crimes are committed more immediately against God himself, others against the state, or the public peace, and a third sort against particular persons."29 Offenses "against the laws enacted for the police or good government of a country" belong to the second class. 3 "Police" is here equated to "good government." As to these laws, Erskine explains: The chief of those laws are calculated for the providing all the members of the community with a sufficient quantity of the necessaries of life at reasonable rates, and for the preventing of dearth.... This crime was committed, either by landholders who refused to sell the produce of their land at ajust price; or by merchants who bought up great quantities of corn, in the view of again selling it at a higher price, when the crop should be more scanty. In Scottish law this crime was known as "forestalling," and with that name it had previously appeared in Mackenzie's Institutions3,2 but it was not there included in a category of offenses against the police as it would be in Erskine's Institute. Immediately after explaining the crime of forestalling, Erskine expounds the laws "restraining idleness, and punishing sturdy beggars and vagabonds. 33 Although he does not expressly say so, it is safe to take these to also be instances of laws enacted for the police or good government of the country. As indicated below, 34 Blackstone likewise counted idleness and vagrancy as offenses against the public police. Finally, Erskine affirms that "[t]here are many slighter offences against the penal laws, relating to the peace of the country, which ... [are] rather trespasses than crimes. "35 Among these, he includes offenses against the laws preserving the game, another earlier notes of Erskine's lectures, the Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the term "police" had been used by him not later than 1768, while Blackstone was finishing his Commentaries. 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 22 (meaning 3.a). 9 ERSKINE, supra note 28, 116, at 705. 'o Id. 138, at 714. 31 Id. 32 SIR GEORGE MACKENZIE, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 223 (4th ed., Edin- burgh,J. Watson 1706). 13 ERSKINE, supra note 28, 39, at 714. See infra text accompanying note 89. 15 ERSKINE, supra note 28, 39, at 715 (discussing crimes of a less severe nature). JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 9:3 typical example of what Blackstone will call offences against the public police. Adam Smith also contributed to the Scottish development of the idea of police with a definition that was slightly different from the ones we have seen. In his Lectures on Jurisprudence,d elivered at the University of Glasgow between 1762 and 1764,37 Smith confirms the French origin of the term: "[t]he name [police] is French, and is originally derived from the Greek iro3ireta [politeia], which properly signified the policey of civil government. .. ." Jurisprudence-"the theory of the general principles of law and government"3g-has four great objects or divisions, one of which is Police, the others being Justice, Revenue, and Arms.40 According to Smith, police no longer carried the Greek meaning: "now it only means the regulation of the inferiour parts of government, viz. cleanliness, security, and cheapness or plenty. 41 The latter "inferiour part" considers "the most proper way of procuring wealth and abundance, 42 or, in other words, "the opulence of a state.,43 For when internal peace is secured-thanks to the respect for justice, the first end of every system of government 4 -"the government will next be desirous of promoting the opulence of the state. This produces what we call police. Whatever regulations are made with respect to the trade, commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country are considered as belonging to the police."45 Smith attributed considerable importance to this economic meaning of police, intertwined in "the inferiour parts ofi gror vernr meonf6t; a meaning that we have already observed in contemporary Scottish jurisprudence.47 It should be noted, however, that it has become See infra text accompanying note 89. " The edited manuscript of the lectures was published for the first time in 1896 by Edwin Cannan. See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 5 (R. L. Meek et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1978) (1896). Id. at 486. Id. at 398. Id. " Id. at 486. Id. at 487. " Id. at 398. 4 Id. " I d. at 5 (citation omitted). 46 Id. at 486. ,7 KAMES, supra note 25, at 269-77; supra text accompanying note 26. These references to economic police regulations show that Crosskey is wrong when he contends that Adam Smith's use of the term "police" is not to be found in that of any other writer. See WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1303 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1953); see also infra note 95 (quoting Lieber's definition of "police," which includes refer- ence to the role of maintaining "cleanliness"). Feb. 2007] THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POLICE POWER 753 obsolete." Before analyzing Blackstone's contribution, let us focus on the work of a continental writer who wrote a few years before the Commentaries on the Laws of England was published. In 1758, the Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel published his Le Droit des Gens.49 Although the author confessed in the Preface that his treatise was not an original work but a popularization of Christian Wolff s philosophical Jus Gentium,50 Vattel's book "made a profound impression upon the mind of the time; and especially, upon the mind of America."'" This was made possible by an English translation of the book appearing the year after the original publication in French.52 For Vattel the sovereign ought to watch over the nation "as a tender and wise father, and as a faithful administrator.- 3 Insofar as he is a father, the sovereign ought to procure the true felicity of the 48 See 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 22 (meaning 3.b) ("In commercial legislation, Public regulation or control of a trade; an economic policy. Obs."). The dictionary quotes Smith's "Police of Grain" for the earliest example of "police" being used in that sense. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF WEALTH OF NATIONS, Ch. XI, III (1776). 49 See generally EMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOi NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS (1749-1750), re- printed in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (J. Brown Scott ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1916). See C. G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel (pts. 1 & 2), 7 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 395 (1913), 8 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 375 (1914) (evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of LE DROIT DES GENS). "' CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 147. Crosskey adds, moreover, that: "In consequence of this.... [Vattel's book] was constantly cited by the politicians of our formative period; by the lawyers of the day; and by pamphleteers and newspaper essayists, of every shade of opinion and description." Id. Fenwick makes a similar point: A century ago not even the name of Grotius himself was more potent in its influence upon questions relating to international law than that of Vattel. Vattel's treatise on the law of nations was quoted by judicial tribunals, in speeches before legislative assemblies, and in the decrees and correspondence of executive officials. It was the manual of the student, the reference work of the statesman, and the text from which the political phi- losopher drew inspiration. Publicists considered it sufficient to cite the authority of Vat- tel to justify and give conclusiveness and force to statements as to the proper conduct of a state in its international relations. Fenwick, supra note 50, at 395. A significant example of the point made by Crosskey and Fen- wick is the oral argument in the famous case Gibbons v. Ogden. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 85 n.29 (1824) (citing to Vattel for authority on the potential for sovereign states to unite and still maintain their independence). There are further illustrations of Vattel's authority in American legal history. See Fenwick, supra note 50, at 407 (noting other American references to Vattel); see alsoJ. M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 299-300 (1992) (illustrating how Vattel's work "developed enormous authority in the later eighteenth and nineteenth cen- turies .. "). 52 See generally EMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF NA_ TIONS] (London, Newbery et al. 1759-60) (Vol. 111759) (Vol. I 1760). 53 1 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 42, at 21. In another passage, while dealing with private property and its limitations, he reiterates this idea of the sovereign as father: "as the father of his people, [he] may, and ought to set bounds to a prodigal, and to prevent his running to ruin .... " I Id. bk. I, ch. XX, § 254, at 104. JOURNAL OF CONS TFTUTIONAL LA W [Vol. 9:3 nation, which is one of the principal objects of a good government. To name this object of government Vattel uses the French word police, which was translated as "polity" in the first English edition.54 Some later English editions, however, chose the term "police" instead of "polity."5 At any rate, these two words are cognates and were used interchangeably in the eighteenth century.56 What does "polity" or "police" mean for Vattel? Polity consists in the attention of the prince and magistrates to preserve everything in order. Wise regulations ought to prescribe whatever will best contribute to the public safety, utility and convenience, and those who have the authority in their hands, cannot be too attentive to their being observed. By a wise polity, the sovereign accustoms the people to order and obedience, and preserves peace, tranquility and concord among the citi- 57 zens .... This may well be the d6but of the English term "polity" or "police" in a treatise of political theory.8 Vattel elaborates on the term "police" by giving various examples of regulations. First, he gives the example of the prohibition on duelling, 9 which would become commonplace amongst police norms. Secondly, he mentions the rules that the sovereign, as a good father, ought to lay down to prevent the economic ruin of his "prodigal" sons.60 These too are police regulations. Finally, Vattel adds further examples in the context of the limits of private property: It must also be observed, that individuals are not free in the oeconomy or government of their affairs as not to be subject to the regulations of polity, made by the sovereign. For instance, if vines are greatly multiplied in a country, which is in want of corn, the sovereign may forbid the planting of the vine in fields proper for tillage, for here the public welfare and the safety of the state are concerned. When a reason of such importance re- quires it, the sovereign, or the magistrate, may oblige an individual to sell An anonymous translation of the 1793 edition also uses the term 'polity' for the French police. For a complete bibliography of the different editions of Vattel's book in different lan- guages, see VATrEL, THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 49, at Ivi-lix. See EMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF NA- TIONS] bk. I, ch. XIII, § 174, at 82 (Joseph Chitty trans., Sweet et al. eds., 1834) (using the term "internal police" instead of "polity"); id. bk. I, ch. XX, § 255, at 115 (referring to "regulations of police" instead of "regulations of polity"). See CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 149 (noting the parallel meaning of "polity" and "police"). 57 1 VAT-EL, supra note 52, bk. I, ch. XIII, § 174, at 76-77 (emphasis added). m By way of contrast, Grotius had not touched upon the topic of police. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES [Of the Law of War and Peace, in Three Books] (photo. reprint 1984) (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625). 59 1 VATTEL, supra note 52, bk. I, ch. XIII, § 175, at 77 ("A duel.., is a manifest disorder contrary to the welfare of Society."). 60 Id. bk. I, ch. XX, § 254, at 104; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (analogizing the sovereign to a father figure).