THE HISTORYOF SEA WARFARE by Gervis Frere-Cook and Kenneth Macksey A GUINNESS BOOK SUPERLATIVES THROUGH THE AGES SHIPS' DISPLACEMENTS DATE TYPE DISPLACEMENT 38000 42000 46000 50000 BC 2000 20 tons 800 m 100 tons 100 E3 100 tons 77777777777777777^ 150 tons 1800 2000 tons 1900 14 14000 tons 1940 40 40000 tons .it*. 2461 lb 1960 "75 75000 tons 1970 *5 5000 tons 2$00 r)iile i THE GUINNESS HISTORY OF Sea Warfare THE GUINNESS HISTORY OF Sea Warfare by Gervis Frere-Cook and Kenneth Macksey with special maps and diagrams drawn by Michael Haine GUINNESS SUPERLATIVES LIMITED 2 CECIL COURT, LONDON ROAD, ENFIELD, MIDDLESEX i<)75 Guinness Superlatives Limited < Published in Great Britain by Guinness Superlatives Limited, 2 Cecil Court, London Road, Enfield, Middlesex sbn 900424 29X Set in Monophoto Baskerville Series 169 printed and bound in Great Britain by Jarrold and Sons Limited, Norwich Contents Introduction Acknowledgements OARS AND SPEARS Section i Prehistory 157 1 CANNONS AND CULVERINS Section 2 488- 588 1 1 WOODEN WALLS Section 3 1589-1856 IRONCLADS AND EXPLOSIVES Section 4 THE DECADE OF THE DREADNOUGHT Section 5 THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER ERA Section 6 THE AGE OF NUCLEAR POWER Section 7 APPENDICES Section 8 Sea Warfare ofthe Future 1 2 The Elements ofCombat in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries Guns and Men Select Bibliography Index Introduction When man exhausted his imagination in resolving the problems ofpower and survival on his natural — — environment the land he turned to the sea as an alternative approach to expansion and the satis- — faction ofhis desires both for predatory and trading purposes. At once he encountered the limitations imposed by the technology required to overcome the difficulties of seafaring: immediately he was frustrated by the paucity ofavailable materials and the knowledge ofhow to assemble them in order, firstly, to construct a seaworthy platform, secondly, to give it motive power and, finally, to attach means ofoffence and defence to it. In a primitive world that was circumscribed by lack ofcommunica- tions, except in the strictest local sense, the evolution of naval technology was slow in the extreme. Before long voyages demanding accurate navigation could be attempted, seaworthy vessels had to be developed with whatever came to hand. The discovery ofmetals at first played a minor part in developing sea power, less than it did on land. Bronze appeared in 1400 bc, iron was not common until 800 bc in Egypt, but ships contained very few metal components. Until the fourteenth century only weapon tips were made from metal and until the nineteenth wood was the basic constructional material and rope, muscle orsail-power the chief means of giving propulsion. For generations, navies sought to arrive at close combat (as did armies on land rather than sink each other at long range—a perfectly reasonable aim when it is recalled that wooden ships were quite difficult to destroy, except by fire; that a captured ship was useful; and that the existing long-range weapons could only shoot solid missiles, or cast flame over extremely short ranges. Yet, from the outset, men had to recognise that a naval engagement was condi- tioned by fundamentally different conditions than those regulating land battles. Whereas variations of terrain were crucial on land, the ocean's flat surface offered neither advantages of observation nor concealment. But winds and tides at sea intruded in a way that could easily upset the calculations of pun K military men. The first successful commander at sea was he who combined the ability of the soldier with the skill ofthe seaman. Battles at sea were, however, subordinate to the demands ofa landward strategy: it is not by chance that many great battles have been fought in the approaches to major ports which were important administrative or industrial centres or which supplied the opposing n.t\5 and handled vital merchandise. Thus naval power was indirect rather than direct in its political application. Though the invention of gunpowder in the early fourteenth century hardly altered the principles ofapplication ofsea power, its effects upon combat were revolutionary. Explosives harnessed to special missile-throwers the first cannon at once provided radical means ofengaging the enemy at longer range and imposinga decision without necessarily resorting to hand-to-hand combat. The engagement between the Spanish Armada and the British fleet in 588 wasthefirstlarge-scalenavalcampaign wonbya combatant whorefusedto cometoclo1sequartersandshaped the natureofsea warfare ofthe future. From this moment, even though boarding and hand-to-hand combat would frequently take place as a final phase in combat between ships (and capture was still highly desirable for financial reasons), fleets preferred to exchange shots at a distance from each other and to assert a superior technologyifpossible, instead ofbruteforceofmanpower. Projectile firing weapons became thearbiters ofdecision and all the more effective with increases in their range and destructive capability. The roots of decision became more firmly implanted in the industrial inventiveness and production of a few nations which engineered these weapons. With the advent ofthe Industrial Revolution and its attendant wars ofpolitical revolution, navies assumed a new and more illustrious mantle ofpower. From the late eighteenth century to mid-nine- teenth century, when long-range communications by water were often superior to those on land, ships could apply significant (andveryoccasionallydirect) pressures upon theeconomic and political centres of those many opponentswhowerecompelled to locate themselvesadjacent toriversandoceans. It was — no fluke that Great Britain maintained the so-called 'Pax Britannica' throughout the nineteenth century: she had the most powerful fleet ofsailing-ships in the world and with these could strike at the heart ofan enemy's existence. Alternatively she could disrupt a land nation's economy by blockade, and all the more easily as the sophisticated nations became increasingly dependent upon seaborne trade. The introduction ofsteam propulsion throughout the nineteenth century was truly revolutionary even though the changes it caused did not arrive overnight. Inexorably everything about warfare — let alone sea warfare was put upon a totally different footing. At last ships could manoeuvre without recourse to the wind and this gave tactical freedom. But while a proliferation oftactical and strategic innovations became possible, fundamental and gigantic logistical problemsarose: whereassailing-ships demanded huge supplies of timber for hulls and spars (a demand which was denuding the world's forests ofsuitable trees) their successors fed on coal and, later, oil stocks which had to be hauled to suitable fuelling stations and maintained, usually by increased maritime transportation. At the same time iron and steel industries had to be greatly enlarged to cope with the manufacture of plate in — lieu oftimber for ship's fabrication and soon that plate would require special treatment in order to give it armoured properties. For dangerous threats were also being caused by the augmentation of striking power, threats which could usually best be deflected by armour. Guns became bigger and heavier in proportion with improvements to their range and destructiveness. But whereas guns struck home chiefly above the water-line and battered rather than sank ships, the invention of underwater weapons, mines and torpedoes (the first guided weapons), redoubled the danger ofsinking and posed a terrific menace to the future ofsea power. All these things had been demonstrated in battle by the end of 1904. Then yet another dimension was introduced by the invention of radio communications and flying-machines. While the former immeasurably raised the ability ofan admiral to control the move- ment of ships in battle, (and also enabled the enemy to overhear his instructions) the latter gave him facilities to track an opponent's deployment and, in due course, multiply the range and effective- ness of projectiles to the extent that, during the First World War, careful consideration had to be given to fleet movements in order to avoid aerial detection and, in the Second, caused most major fleet engagements to take place without the opposing capital ships coming within sight ofeach other. Weaponsofadvanced technologyaided by radar,a hostofotherelectronicdevicesandacomprehensive array ofsignal communications allied to well-planned command and control, began to add remoteness to the implementation ofsea warfare. But the fundamental difference between land and sea warfare remained. War on land could be waged for its own purpose with the aim ofoverthrowing a nation, usually by physical occupation of territory and the resultant exploitation of the subjected peoples by their conqueror. Apart from the — takingofenemyshipsfor prize-money, naval warfare had only twofunctions toacquire the free useof seaways and to deny that facility to an enemy. So far nothing has ever been achieved by 'occupying' an area ofsea unless it achieves one or other of those and, in any case, permanent occupation ofa tract of water is particularly hazardous in war and frequently expensive. Thus naval warfare has been a means toan end and not an end initself. The battlesofSalamis (480 bc), Lepanto (1571), TheArmada (1588), Trafalgar (1805), Midway (1942) and the Atlantic (1939-45) were all fought to deny the seaways to some nation which could not achieve its object without using sea transport. Jutland (1916), the last great fleet action directly between line-of-battle ships, was inconclusive and had no direct effect upon the outcome ofthe First World Warsince neither the Germans nor the British needed to use the North Sea as a maritime highway; then, as in the Second World War, it was the battle for the Atlantic sea- lanes which mattered as a struggle for blockade. 11 is possible, however, that yet another new dimension is about to be introduced into naval conflict. Advances in oceanography linked to the exploitation of what is on and under the sea-bed begin to bestow far greater importance upon occupation of areas covered by salt-water. The many off-shore oil-rigs, in particular those in the Persian Gulf and North Sea, will become attractive to predators and therefore demanding ofdefence. As sea-farming becomes more important, the guarding — ofthese shallow-water territories will become increasingly desirable as the Icelanders have recently demonstrated. Atomic power and rocket missiles have also wrought immense changes. Not only does a nuclear warhead pose a terrible threat to warships but, carried by long-range missiles launched from thedepths