The Greek Philosophers Routledge Classics contains the very best of Routledge publishing over the past century or so, books that have, by popular consent, become established as classics in their field. Drawing on a fantastic heritage of innovative writing published by Routledge and its associated imprints, this series makes available in attractive, affordable form some of the most important works of modern times. For a complete list of titles visit www.routledge.com/classics W. K. C. Guthrie The Greek Philosophers From Thales to Aristotle With a new foreword by James Warren First published in 1950 by Methuen & Co. Reprinted 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1997 by Routledge First published in the Routledge Classics 2013 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business ©W. K. C. Guthrie 2013 Foreword © 2013 James Warren All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice : Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Guthrie, W. K. C. (William Keith Chambers), 1906-1981. The Greek philosophers from Thales to Aristotle / W.K.C. Guthrie ; with a new foreword by James Warren. p. cm. -- (Routledge classics) Includes index. 1. Philosophy, Ancient. 2. Philosophers, Ancient. I. Title. B171.G8 2013 180--dc23 2012016304 ISBN: 978-0-415-52228-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-10568-9 (ebk) Typeset in Joanna by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk CONTENTS FOREWORD TO THE ROUTLEDGE CLASSICS EDITION BY JAMES WARREN 1 Greek ways of thinking 2 Matter and form (Ionians and Pythagoreans) 3 The problem of motion (Heraclitus, Parmenides and the pluralists) 4 The reaction towards humanism (the Sophists and Socrates) 5 Plato (i) The Doctrine of Ideas 6 Plato (ii) Ethical and theological answers to the Sophists 7 Aristotle (i) The Aristotelian universe 8 Aristotle (ii) Human beings SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING INDEX FOREWORD James Warren The Greek Philosophers was published in 1950, two years before its author, W. K. C. Guthrie, was elected the third Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. It predates his monumental (and sadly unfinished) six-volume A History of Greek Philosophy by more than a decade (those volumes were published between 1962 and 1981) but is always likely to be the more widely read of the two. Few such books bear reading more than sixty years after their publication, particularly those that deal with so wide a topic and manage to cover it with style and in not many more than 150 pages. Nevertheless, despite the great flourishing of scholarship and the appearance of many similar volumes on ancient philosophy since it was written, the pace and tone of this book guarantee its continued interest. As its author points out at the outset, the intended audience are ‘undergraduates … reading any subject other than classics’. And Guthrie writes throughout with care and attention to such an audience, explaining to non-specialists what there is to be found in these ancient authors and thinkers. The text skips along at a pace and never lets the complexity of the ideas being discussed obstruct the principal aim of informing interested readers of what the Greek philosophers were up to, in a manner which Guthrie thinks is free from the potentially distorting effects of the intervening centuries of reception and discussion of their ideas. The aim is to instruct and inform and the primary method of instruction is exposition via a story of development and, for the most part, progress over the period between Thales and Aristotle. Although he has in mind an audience unfamiliar with the texts in their original language, Guthrie explains clearly and succinctly where necessary the importance of understanding the precise nuances and connotations of the terms and concepts under scrutiny. Indeed, he is insistent throughout on differences between his world and that of the Greek philosophers and on the importance of understanding what he calls the ‘cultural soil’ of their ideas. His Greek philosophers, particularly the early Greek philosophers, are a peculiar and unusual bunch. He sees them as great pioneers in questions of science and philosophy but pioneers whose faltering steps should be understood in their proper context. We might, with some caveats, describe Guthrie’s approach as a combination of two principal methods of philosophical historiography. On the one hand, he takes from Aristotle the outlines of the history of Greek philosophy, building from Ionian natural philosophy through Socratic and sophistic approaches to humanity and morals to the great systems of Plato and then Aristotle himself. (Guthrie’s confidence in the Aristotelian account was not shaken by the attack launched on Aristotle’s value as a witness to his predecessors by Harold Cherniss in two volumes published in 1935 and 1944. Guthrie’s elegant retort in 1957 is a useful statement of his overall attitude to the question.) The general story is one of gradual progress and improvement, with Aristotle finally harnessing the best of natural philosophy with the importance of the metaphysics of form and teleology that was first seen by Pythagoras and then refined by Plato himself, and combining this with a developed form of Socrates’ interest in ethics and Plato’s emphasis on the importance of political harmony. The other significant mode of analysis comes more from the anthropological approaches to the ancient world that had made an impact at the time Guthrie was writing. (E. R. Dodds’ influential The Greeks and the Irrational was first published one year later in 1951.) A large proportion of the book is devoted to the philosophers before the great trio of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and much of that section is interested in showing how the cosmological speculations of the early philosophers can be understood in relation to the pre-philosophical past. While there is evident merit in insisting that the early stages of philosophical inquiry took place in a world that was culturally and intellectually very unlike our own, this approach also allows Guthrie a ready-made explanation for what he found to be the otherwise peculiar and disappointing aspects of the philosophers he presents. For example, Anaximander wins plaudits for his speculative cosmology and scientific advances – Guthrie is quite happy to call Anaximander a scientist – but is nevertheless still unfortunately bound to a ‘primitive’ notion of the universe as being a living whole, a notion ‘to which anthropologists have found parallels among savage people all over the world’ (29). Sometimes, his attitude to these Greek philosophers is a curious mixture of admiration and condescension. They are regularly applauded for making early steps away from a naïve or ‘primitive’ outlook but then marked down for being unable entirely to shake off the shackles of their intellectual inheritance. Elsewhere, Guthrie is too quick to find fault and his judgement is surely questionable. For example, he diagnoses what he thinks are the ‘tiresome’ arguments of the Eleatic philosopher Parmenides as stemming from an unfortunate logical naivety to which even ‘the least philosophical of us’ would not be prone: ‘One idea which the Greeks at this stage found it difficult to absorb was that a word might have more than one meaning. Their difficulty no doubt had something to do with the proximity of the primitive magical stage at which a word and its object formed a single unity’ (44). Current understandings of early Greek poetry and even philosophers such as Heraclitus show quite clearly that Guthrie’s diagnosis is at best a misunderstanding. Modern readers would perhaps do well to read such comments with a very critical eye. In short, we should certainly recognise the importance of Guthrie’s clear and confident insistence on the importance of cultural context, even if we might not accept his tendency to attribute anything he finds mistaken or foolish to a legacy from ‘primitive’ thought, nor the manner in which he is inclined to describe those traditional societies. There are some heroes in Guthrie’s story. Pythagoras looms larger than he might in a more modern account of the development of Greek philosophy, in part because Guthrie is relatively optimistic about the amount that can securely be attributed to the earliest phases of the Pythagorean movement. Pythagoras is a champion of order and of form, a distinctive voice in the otherwise overwhelmingly materialistic outlook of the Presocratic philosophers. Socrates is a humanist ahead of his time and a defender of good sense in the face of ‘an atmosphere of scepticism’ encouraged by Presocratic natural philosophy and peddled by the sophists who flocked to Athens and benefitted from the licence generated by a buoyant and democratic Athens. And Plato – perhaps most surprising of all – is a defender of ‘the idea of the city-state as an independent political, economic, and social unit’ (75) in the face of Macedonian conquest and imperialism. Aristotle is, for Guthrie, ‘an Ionian with the blood of scientists in his veins’ (113), a man of robust common sense and therefore averse to Plato’s flights away from the everyday to a mysterious transcendent reality, but who nevertheless remained committed to some of the central tenets of Platonism, principally teleology and the priority of form. Guthrie even takes his picture of Aristotle the scientist so far as to claim that Aristotle turned to practical philosophy in the Ethics and Politics only out of a sense of duty; he would, we are told, much rather have remained with ‘the delights of the laboratory’, but even philosophers find their lives affected by the governance of the society around them (142). This unusual emphasis aside, it is worth remarking that the account of Aristotle in the final three chapters is a magnificent example of clarity and concision; Guthrie manages in just over forty pages to cover all the major areas of Aristotle’s thought with a confident authority. (Consider, for example, the account of Aristotle’s theory of perception at 136–9: a topic that continues to generate a great deal of interpretative controversy.) There are also some important omissions from the story. In a text of this kind it is perhaps understandable that there are relatively few references to other scholars, besides courteous nods to his senior Cambridge colleagues F. M. Cornford and R. Hackforth (both also Laurence Professors) and relatively little sense of scholarly disagreement. But there are other choices worth emphasising. There is little interest in the methodological questions that arise from the difficulties of interpreting texts written in often oblique forms – verse, for example, or dialogues – or which survive only in fragments or later reports. There is a brief note about the literary richness of the Platonic dialogues (111–12) but for the most part these concerns are set aside in favour of the pace of exposition. Guthrie also decides not to pursue the story of ancient philosophy beyond the time of Aristotle, on the questionable grounds that the Hellenistic world was not, after all, purely Greek any more. Instead, and perhaps reflecting concerns about his own age, Guthrie saw it as a world of individualism and despair in the face of increasingly dominant international powers. A volume on Hellenistic philosophy was apparently planned for inclusion in his later A History of Greek Philosophy but he was unable to begin work on it before his death. Guthrie conceived of the study of ancient philosophy as a branch of Classics and there is little evidence in this book that a modern philosopher should have any more interest in his Greek predecessors than a modern biologist would in the early pioneers in his particular field. Certainly, there is much less emphasis on the intricacies of argument and the cut and thrust of dialectical thinking than can be found in modern books and journal articles on ancient philosophical texts. And we might also note little interest on Guthrie’s part in certain Platonic dialogues – Parmenides, Sophist, Theaetetus – that lend themselves more readily to such analytical styles of philosophical engagement. The Greek philosophers are to his mind not so much philosophers with whom we might now begin a fruitful conversation but are rather important historical figures whose writings are to be understood and placed each in their proper place in relation to one another. The job at hand is to understand and appreciate the Greek philosophers’ views in their own historical and cultural context. Some further reading: H. Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (1935); Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy (1944), Johns Hopkins Press. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (1951), University of California Press. W. K. C. Guthrie, ‘Aristotle as a Historian of Philosophy: Some Preliminaries’, Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957), 35–41. —— A History of Greek Philosophy Volume I: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans (1962); Volume II: The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus (1965); Volume III: The Fifth-Century Enlightenment – Part 1: The Sophists; Part 2: Socrates (1971); A History of Greek Philosophy Volume IV: Plato – the Man and his Dialogues: Earlier Period (1975); A History of Greek Philosophy Volume V: The Later Plato and the Academy (1978); A History of Greek Philosophy Volume VI: Aristotle: An Encounter (1981), Cambridge University Press. G. E. R. Lloyd, ‘William Keith Chambers Guthrie, 1906–1981’, Proceedings of the British Academy 68 (1983), 561–77. James Warren is a Senior Lecturer in Classics at the University of Cambridge and Fellow and Director of Studies in Philosophy at Corpus Christi College. 1 GREEK WAYS OF THINKING To indicate the scope and aim of the following pages it will be best to say at once that they are based on a short course of lectures designed for an audience of undergraduates who were reading any subject other than Classics. It was assumed that those who were listening knew no Greek, but that an interest in some other subject, such as English, History or Mathematics (for there was at least one mathematician among them), or perhaps nothing more than general reading, had given them the impression that Greek ideas were at the bottom of much in later European thought and consequently a desire to know more exactly what these Greek ideas had been in the first place. They had, one might suppose, encountered them already, but in a series of distorting mirrors, according as this or that writer in England, Germany or elsewhere had used them for his own purposes and tinged them with the quality of his own mind and age, or, it may be, was unconsciously influenced by them in the formulation of his views. Some had read works of Plato and Aristotle in translation, and must have found parts of them puzzling because they arose out of the intellectual climate of the fourth century B.C. in Greece, whereas their readers had been led back to them from the climate of a later age and a different country. Acting on these assumptions I tried, and shall now try for any readers who may be in a similar position, to give some account of Greek philosophy from its beginnings, to explain Plato and Aristotle in the light of their predecessors rather than their successors, and to convey some idea of the characteristic features of the Greek way of thinking and outlook on the world.1 I shall make little or no reference to their influence on thinkers of later Europe or of our own country. This is not due only to the limitations imposed by my own ignorance, but also to a belief that it will be more enjoyable and profitable for a reader to detect such influence and draw comparisons for himself, out of his own reading and sphere of interests. My object will be, by talking about the Greeks for themselves and for their own sake, to give the material for such comparison and a solid basis on which it may rest. A certain work on Existentialism shows, so I have read, a ‘genealogical tree’ of the existentialist philosophy. At its root is placed Socrates, apparently on the ground that he was the author of the saying ‘Know thyself’. Apart from the question whether Socrates meant by these words anything like what the twentieth-century Existentialist means, this ignores the fact that the saying was not the invention of Socrates but a proverbial piece of Greek wisdom whose author, if one must attribute it to someone, can only be said to have been the god Apollo. At any rate it was known to Socrates, and every other Greek, as one of the age-old precepts which were inscribed on the walls of Apollo’s temple at Delphi. That it belonged to the teaching of Apolline religion is not unimportant, and the example, though small, will serve to illustrate the sort of distortion which even a brief outline of ancient thought may help to prevent. The approach which I have suggested should have the advantage of showing up certain important differences between the Greek ways of thought and our own, which tend to be obscured when (for example) Greek atomic science or Plato’s theory of the State are uprooted from their natural soil in the earlier and contemporary Greek world and regarded in isolation as the forerunners of modern atomic physics or political theory. For all the immense debt which Europe, and with Europe England, owe to Greek culture, the Greeks remain in many respects a remarkably foreign people, and to get inside their minds requires a real effort, for it means unthinking much that has become part and parcel of our mental equipment so that we carry it about with us unquestioningly and for the most part unconsciously. In the great days of Victorian scholarship, when the Classics were regarded as furnishing models, not only intellectual but moral, for the English gentleman to follow, there was perhaps a tendency to overemphasize similarities and lose sight of differences. The scholarship of our own day, in many respects inferior, has this advantage, that it is based both on a more intensive study of Greek habits of thought and linguistic usage and on a more extensive acquaintance with the mental equipment of earlier peoples both in Greece and elsewhere. Thanks in part to the progress of anthropology, and to the work of classical scholars acute enough to see the relevance to their studies of some of the anthropologists’ results, we can claim without arrogance to be in a better position to appreciate the hidden foundations of Greek thought, the presuppositions which they accepted tacitly as we today accept the established rules of logic or the fact of the earth’s rotation. And here it must be said frankly, though with no wish to dwell on a difficulty at the outset, that to understand Greek ways of thinking without some knowledge of the Greek language is not easy. Language and thought are inextricably interwoven, and interact on one another. Words have a history and associations, which for those who use them contribute an important part of the meaning, not