OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi The Great Riddle OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi The Great Riddle Wittgenstein and Nonsense, Theology and Philosophy The Stanton Lectures 2014 Stephen Mulhall 1 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. 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OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi Contents Preface vii LectureOne NonsenseandTheology:ExhaustingtheOptions? 1 LectureTwo TheFlounderandtheFisherman’sWife:Tractarian Ethics,theMystical,andtheReligious 23 LectureThree GrammaticalThomism:FiveWaysofRefusing toMakeSense 42 LectureFour AnalogicalUsesandtheProjectivenessofWords: Wittgenstein’sVisionofLanguage 61 LectureFive PerfectionsandTranscendentals:Wittgenstein’s VisionofPhilosophy 81 LectureSix AuthorityandRevelation:PhilosophyandTheology 106 Epilogue 128 Bibliography 133 Index 137 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi Preface It was a great honour to be invited to give the Stanton Lectures in the PhilosophyofReligionintheLenttermof2014.Theinvitationwasalso particularly well timed from my point of view; for it arrived soon after IhadparticipatedintheAquinasColloquiumorganizedbyBlackfriarsin Oxfordduring2012,whichhadbroughttomyattentionforthefirsttime the theological school or movement named ‘Grammatical Thomism’, and given me a real desire to understand it better, and in particular to understand the legitimacy of its claims to inherit Wittgenstein just as muchasAquinas.SoIwouldliketotakethisopportunitytoexpressmy thanks to the organizers of the Colloquium, and in particular to David BurrellandJanetSoskice,whoalsoparticipatedinit,andwereextremely generous in their response to my initial attempts to get Grammatical Thomismintofocus.InowappreciatefarmorethanIdidthenjusthow influential and much-admired David’s work is by theologians whose judgement I respect; and I would be very pleased if these lectures not only bring his work to the attention of a wider philosophical audience, butremindtheologiansandphilosophersofreligionthatlyingbehindhis well-known writings on the monotheistic religions of the book, and on Aquinas,isaverypowerfulanddistinctiveconceptionofphilosophy. IwouldalsoliketothanktheElectors totheStantonLectureshipfor providing me with the opportunity to take the further steps in my theological education that are recorded in the following pages. Eamon Duffy was the Chair of the Electors, and a genial host at the dinner followingmyfirstlecture:he,togetherwithSarahCoakley,JanetSoskice, Tim Crane, Catherine Pickstock, and Judy Lieu, also provided gracious introductionstoeachofthesixlecturesintheseries.Despitemyfollyin choosingtodeliverthelecturesduringafullteachingtermatmyhome university,whichsorelytruncatedthetimeIcouldspendinCambridge outsidethetwohoursinvolvedindeliveringthelecturesthemselvesand answering questions from the audience, the Theology Faculty were extremelygenerous hosts;andvariousmembersofthePhilosophyFac- ulty also exerted themselves to make me feel at home. Amongst the theologians, I would particularly like to thank once again Janet Soskice OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi viii PREFACE andSarahCoakley,bothofwhomhelpedmewithusefulreferencesand pertinentresponsesasthelecturesunfolded;IamparticularlyinSarah’s debt,sinceshemadethetimetoreadandrespondinveryhelpfulwaysto the initial drafts of the whole series. Amongst the philosophers, Tim Crane, Arif Ahmed, Michael Potter, and Nicholas Boyle were welcome faces among the regular audience members, and charitable in their responses to my peculiar ways of doing philosophy, and of trying to findfruitfulguidanceinthistaskfromtheologicalsources.Iwouldalso like to thank Peter Harland, the Theology Faculty’s administrative offi- cer,andhiscolleagues,whodealtefficientlyandcourteouslywithallthe practicalmattersarisingfrommytenureasStantonLecturer. Although each of the lectures has been revised, and in some cases significantly expanded, I have tried to retain the style and tone of their original mode of presentation. Amongst colleagues who have taken the timetoreadandrespondtothetextofmylecturesoutsidethecontextof theirdelivery,orhaveotherwisehelpedmetopursuelinesofthoughtor references related to them, I would particularly like to thank Cora Diamond, Judith Wolfe, Stanley Hauerwas, Brian Klug, David Burrell, JoshuaFurnal,MartinKusch,andIainMcPherson. LecturesOneandTwoincorporaterevisedversionsofportionsofmy essay ‘Wittgenstein on Religious Belief’, first published in O. Kuusela andM.McGinn(eds),TheOxfordCompaniontoWittgenstein(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2012). Aswithanyandallofmyacademicduties,Icouldnothavecarriedout theresponsibilitiesassociatedwiththislectureship,oreffectedthetrans- formation of the lecture texts into a short book, without the domestic support of Alison Baker, and the willingness of our two children (Ellie and Matt) to go without access to the study (and its computer) for significantportionsoffartoomanydays. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi Lecture One Nonsense and Theology Exhausting the Options? The starting point of this series of lectures was the recent discovery on my part of an approach to the task of reflectively comprehending religioususesoflanguagethatgoes,orwent,bythenameof‘Grammat- icalThomism’.Theideathattheremightbefruitfulpointsofcontact,or even substantial areas of overlap, between Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigationsofmindandlanguageandThomasAquinas’treatmentof thosesametopics—callthis‘AnalyticThomism’—hadlongbeenfamiliar to me, primarily through my familiarity with the work of Anthony Kenny and Herbert McCabe. What was new (and deeply intriguing) to me was the idea that a text such as the Summa Theologiae might be fruitfully interpreted as, or at least controlled from the outset by, a grammatical investigation of the nature and limits of (what McCabe would call) the human capacity to know and name God, and that McCabe’s way of carrying out this mode of reading Aquinas formed part of a broader interpretative project to which the work of David Burrell and Fergus Kerr (to name but two theological companions) could be taken to contribute, with the groundbreaking work of Victor Prellerasanacknowledgedinspiration. It is my understanding that this project is now generally regarded as being part of the history of theology rather than of its vital present—as very much a project of the 1960s and 1970s, when Wittgenstein’s later writings were at their most influential, and appeared to hold out to philosophically minded theologians a sympathetic alternative to the settled hostilityoflogical positivism—despite the factthatthoseassoci- atedwithitcontinuedtheirworkwellbeyondthatperiod,andtheirbasic orientation continues to receive occasional expressions of collective