Innovate or Enervate: The future of US-Japan alliance collaboration The Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellowship Program PACIFIC FORUM CSIS YOUNG LEADERS Issues & Insights Vol. 13 – No. 8 San Francisco, USA March 2013 Pacific Forum CSIS Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as a non- partisan, non-profit foreign policy research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. The Forum’s programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, and international relations issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with academic, government, and industry leaders from across the Pacific Rim. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the region, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public around the world. Sasakawa Peace Foundation The Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) was founded on September 1, 1986 and is based in Tokyo, Japan. The mission of SPF is to contribute to the welfare of humankind and the sound development of the international community, and thus to world peace, by conducting activities fostering international understanding, exchange, and cooperation, as well as efforts to promote these activities. Their main activities include undertaking surveys and research, developing human resources, inviting and dispatching personnel, organizing international conferences and other forums, and conducting other activities fostering international understanding, exchange, and cooperation, as well as to collect, disseminate, and propagate information in order to carry out these and other activities necessary to accomplish the Foundation's mission. Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellows In 2010, the Pacific Forum CSIS with generous support from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation established the SPF Fellowship Program to nurture the next generation of specialists who are committed to broadening and strengthening the Japan-US alliance. Through a combination of resident and non-resident fellowships, the Pacific Forum CSIS reaches out to emerging leaders in our two countries to reinvigorate the security relationship. SPF Fellows develop and apply innovative and creative solutions to 21st- century problems. They focus on underdeveloped aspects of the relationship to ensure that the alliance is ready to deal with current and future problems. By recognizing and addressing a wider range of issues and actors that are part of this partnership, SPF Fellows ensure the resilience and effectiveness of the alliance into the future. Table of Contents Page Acknowledgements ……………………..………………………..…………….…….. v Introduction by Nicole Forrester ………………….…………………………………... 1 Beyond the Pacific: A Proposal for US-Japan-UK Trilateral Cooperation By John Hemmings ……………………………………………………………………… 3 A New Phase of Japan-Australia Relations By Yusuke Ishihara ………………………….……………….….……………….….... 17 Moving Past the Island Row: Trilateral Opportunities for Japan, Russia and the US By Jonathan Miller ………………………………………………………….…………. 23 Realizing Dynamic Defense via an Amphibious Capability in Japan’s Self-Defense Force By Justin Goldman ……….…………………………………………………………… 29 Addressing Space and Cyber Issues as an Alliance By Vincent Manzo ………………………………………………………………..…… 41 A Long and Winding Road for Cybersecurity Cooperation Between Japan and the United States By Mihoko Matsubara …………………………………………………………………. 45 Getting the Biosecurity Architecture Right in the Asia-Pacific Region By Masamichi Minehata ……………………………………………………….……… 61 Energy Security and Methane Hydrate Exploration in US-Japan Relations By Aiko Shimizu ………………………………………………………………………. 73 US-Japan Alliance after 3/11: A New Sense of Purpose? By Leif-Eric Easley …………………………………………….……………………… 83 Japan-US Cooperation in HA/DR: A Japanese Perspective By Akira Igata ………………………………………………………………………….. 95 Abe’s Push for Collective Self-Defense By Ayako Mie …………………………………………………….…………………… 103 Future of the Japan-US Alliance: Reconfiguring the Japan Self-Defense Force to the Changing Regional Environment By Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi ……………………………………………………………. 107 iii Appendices Appendix A: About the Authors …………………………………………….. A-1 Appendix B: Conference Agenda …………………………………….……… B-1 Appendix C: Conference Participant List …………….…………………….... C-1 iv Acknowledgements The Pacific Forum CSIS would like to extend special thanks to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation for supporting the SPF Fellowship Program for the past three years. Your efforts and support have been an integral part of increasing visibility and knowledge of the US-Japan alliance among the next-generation of thought leaders, policy analysts and government officials. The Pacific Forum CSIS would also like to give special thanks to Ms. Aya Murata, Associate Program Officer at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, for all her efforts and support in making the SPF Fellowship Program a success. We would also like to offer special thanks to the members of the SPF Fellowship Selection Committee, Mr. Ralph Cossa, Dr. Toshihiro Nakayama, Dr. T.J. Pempel, Dr. Yasuyo Sakata, Dr. Sheila Smith and Lt. Gen. Noboru Yamaguchi for extending their knowledge and guidance to the Pacific Forum CSIS and the SPF Fellowship Program. v vi Introduction By Nicole Forrester Post-war Japan has made good international citizenry its raison d'être. Whether by design or concordance, it has aligned its interests (almost) seamlessly with those of the United States. It serves the US well to have an effective, well-resourced ally acting as a rules promoter, guardian of the global commons, and partner to likeminded and emerging democracies. Few would then question the centrality of the US-Japan alliance to US and Japanese interests. It is the bedrock of the diplomatic and military cooperation as well as the significant, and growing, economic partnership. In light of the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, the strategic import of the alliance is even greater. The rebalance hopes to deliver deeper engagement allowing the US to contribute to, and benefit from, the region’s prosperity while maintaining influence over its evolving security environment. As a function of US foreign policy, it’s appropriate that the rebalance strategy fits securely within the alliance dynamic. For the alliance to fully realize its potential as a pillar for the rebalance, two issues need to be addressed. First is the destabilizing relationship cycle of precipitous progress followed by steady erosion needs to stop. Second, resources must be reoriented toward nonmilitary challenges. In essence, the alliance must innovate or risk enervation in a rebalanced region. The alliance needs to enhance its resilience to better manage daily relationship annoyances through diversification and innovation. Resources are still clearly focused toward military challenges. Japanese and regional voices reiterate their desire for the US to have an enduring, visible military presence. It provides reassurance and deterrence, helping to maintain regional peace and security. However, in a multipolar, globalized environment, nonmilitary issues are equally important to regional prosperity and security. The rebalance strategy – with its economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions – recognizes this reality. Diversification of and innovation in the US-Japan alliance provides a mutually reinforcing mechanism for the rebalance. Based on the belief that measures beyond mil-to-mil cooperation can be employed to strengthen regional peace, stability, and prosperity, such innovation has been the focus of Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellows. Fellows have explored opportunities for expanded cooperation among the US and Japan in fields and functional areas less directly related to traditional security cooperation. Here they have outlined a way forward by identifying areas for new and enhanced cooperation, proposing initiatives feature collaborations with non-military sectors (including business) on emerging security issues such as space, cyber, and 1 biosecurity, as well as ensuring stable energy supplies through resource development and production projects. Other recommendations look to use military resources in innovative ways, such as building regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capacity. Innovation in functional areas will not only buttress the bilateral Japan-US relationship. Cooperation in areas beyond traditional hard security with new partners in the region could lead to the establishment of new, and strengthening of existing, political, military and institutional ties. As a Pacific nation, US prosperity and security are tied to the Asia-Pacific region. A vibrant, resilient and diverse Japan-US alliance strengthens each partner as well as the rebalance. It also serves the interests of those looking to maintain the international order status quo and the regional peace and stability it has delivered for the past 70 years. 2 Beyond the Pacific: A Proposal for US-Japan-UK Trilateral Cooperation By John Hemmings This paper proposes a new strategic trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom. These three powers constitute two of the most powerful defense alliances in the international system, and the three share an increasing number of common security concerns. Despite this, there has been little interaction between the three on security issues in a trilateral framework. The United States has a long history of developing and maintaining a network of alliances around the globe. Most, if not all, date back to the post war period and find their genesis in stabilizing the postwar international system and in hedging against Soviet expansionism and the onset of the Cold War. As these original functions have withered, the US alliance system has undergone bouts of regeneration and redefinition, as Washington and its allies have seen benefits in maintaining security ties. The global order is undergoing a period of intense transition. First, the concentration of global economic and political power is moving away from the West toward Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs), particularly the latter two states as rising powers. While there are great benefits to humanity over the shift of this capital, questions over global governance institutions and their transformation, as well as shifts in military power, add an element of instability to the global system. Second, new technologies and social media are transforming politics and the power of subnational actors. Third, the revolution in transportation and shipping technologies and their associated costs from the 1960s onward, and their computerization and automation, have made the global economy a maritime-based one. This brings actors into closer contact, both at the state and nonstate level. It is the contention of this paper that the old alliance structures that linked narrow US security objectives to global security concerns – such as NATO in the Atlantic and the US ‘hub and spokes’ system in the Pacific – require updates and in some cases, augmentation. This is not a new observation: since the end of the Cold War a succession of US policymakers have made changes to the old alliance structure, implementing ad hoc structures – such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the US-Japan trilateral relationships with Australia, South Korea, and more recently, India. In a sense, US policy-makers are reacting to the fluid state of global politics by remolding US security institutions at home and abroad. Extra-regional Alliance-building Alliances have traditionally been regional, with bilateral and multilateral relationships developing around local threat perceptions. Until the end of the Cold War, the US alliance system fell easily into this framework, with the exception of SEATO, which included European states in what was a predominantly Asian-focused alliance. Following the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, US policymakers began to re-envision the 3 alliance system for the newly conceived Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The success of the first Iraq War in 1991 had indicated that the US allies were willing and able to operate extra-regionally to help with US global security objectives. This was further amplified by the involvement of Asia-Pacific allies in Operation Enduring Freedom and reconstruction activities in Iraq. The fact that US Department of Defense planners could at times request and anticipate troop contributions from Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Mongolia, the UK, and Denmark among others is a testament to this trend. The aim of this paper is to examine the trilateral structure and look at the benefits of expanding it from a regionally oriented body to a globally oriented structure. The trilateral as a type of alliance structure is not an entirely new one, but its current incarnation dates to the post-9/11 period, when the US sought new partnerships in its campaign on the GWOT and mechanisms for added stability in the Asia Pacific. The US- Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) is arguably the most advanced example of a trilateral developed in recent times.1 Initiated in sub-Cabinet-level talks in 2002, it was then upgraded to ‘strategic dialogue’ level in May 2005 under the Bush administration, and has been maintained by the Obama administration under the auspices of the US ‘rebalance’ to the region. Trilateral conversations also exist between the US, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the US, Japan, and India. This paper argues the US, Japan and UK should develop a trilateral dialogue. The trilateral structure is flexible, bringing with it a level of adaptability not found in larger alliance structures, where consensus rules often act as a break on alliance adaption. Given the range of common security concerns, military interoperability, and developed alliance relationships, the UK and Japan are suited to a global trilateral strategy forum (TSF). The core functions of a US-Japan-UK trilateral strategy forum would be to more efficiently coordinate the efforts of each in nontraditional areas of security. While there are a multitude of areas for possible cooperation between the three, the authors of this paper have focused on three areas considered to be ‘low-hanging fruit’: cybersecurity, stabilization, and biosecurity. We believe that track 1.5 dialogues in these three areas could lead to close cooperation between the government agencies responsible for these areas. While the development of US-Japan-UK activities seems to run against the ‘tyranny of geography,’ this is no longer as true as it once was. First, the limits imposed by geography are lessening, with maritime trade and the centrality of South Asia spanning the once-formidable distances. The Gulf of Aden and Afghanistan may be far from London, Tokyo, and Washington, but both are central to the security of all three. Second, geography as a concept is less useful in a number of key security areas. This paper for example considers biosecurity and cybersecurity, in which geography plays little or no part. Such a grouping could prove an essential tool in the security objectives of the United States and its allies. 1 This is because the links between the two non-allies, Japan and Australia, have become increasingly institutionalized with an MOU on peacekeeping and a (military) information sharing agreement. 4