Th e F u k u s h i m a N u c l e a r A The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and c c i d e Crisis Management n t a n d — Lessons for Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation — C r i s i s M a n a g e m e n t — L e s s o n s f o r J a p a n - U .S . A llia n c e C o o p e r a t io n — September, 2012 The Sasakawa Peace Foundation Foreword This report is the culmination of a research project titled ”Assessment: Japan-US Response to the Fukushima Crisis,” which the Sasakawa Peace Foundation launched in July 2011. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant that resulted from the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, involved the dispersion and spread of radioactive materials, and thus from both the political and economic perspectives, the accident became not only an issue for Japan itself but also an issue requiring international crisis management. Because nuclear plants can become the target of nuclear terrorism, problems related to such facilities are directly connected to security issues. However, the policymaking of the Japanese government and Japan-US coordination in response to the Fukushima crisis was not implemented smoothly. This research project was premised upon the belief that it is extremely important for the future of the Japan-US relationship to draw lessons from the recent crisis and use that to deepen bilateral cooperation. The objective of this project was thus to review and analyze the lessons that can be drawn from US and Japanese responses to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, and on the basis of these assessments, to contribute to enhancing the Japan-US alliance’s nuclear crisis management capabilities, including its ability to respond to nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the project sought to offer proposals that would contribute to enhancing the capacity of the crisis management system in the Asia Pacific region in the future. At the core of the project was a study group comprised of the five security and nuclear power experts listed below. The group met more than 10 times, and through those meetings as well as through trips to the United States and numerous interviews with relevant actors in the United States and Japan, they reviewed, assessed, and analyzed each country’s prior assumptions, preparations, and responses, as well as their policymaking mechanisms. In carrying out this project, the research team received the unsparing cooperation and advice of many practitioners and researchers in both Japan and the United States. This was based on the shared sincere hope that the lessons of the Great East Japan Earthquake, which took so many lives, and of the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, would not be wasted. We would like to take this opportunity to express our deep gratitude for their kindness and cooperation. At the same time, we would like to offer our heartfelt condolences to all those who lost loved ones, and to those victims who are continuing to face significant hardships as a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation Project Members Nobumasa AKIYAMA, Acting Project Team Chair; Professor, Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University (Introduction, Chapter 6, and Afterword) Heigo SATO, Professor, Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University (Introduction, Chapter3, and Afterword) Kaoru NAITO, President, Nuclear Material Control Center (Chapter 4) Yosuke NAOI, Deputy Director, Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (Chapter 5) Tadahiro KATSUTA, Associate Professor, School of Law, Meiji University (Chapter 1 and 2) Project Team Assistant Note: This project was a self-initiated research project conducted by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation’s Harumi ARAI, PhD Candidate, Takushoku University Japan-US Exchange Program. The contents of this report, however, are the opinion of the study group members and do not reflect the opinions of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, nor do they reflect the opinions of the experts who kindly participated in interviews or meetings during the course of the project. Table of Contents Foreword .............................................................................................................................. 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 1: The Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant ...............................................9 1.1 An overview of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant .............................9 (1) Earthquake and tsunami ..................................................................................................................9 (2) Timeline of the accident ................................................................................................................ 11 (3) The spent fuel pool and other conditions at the plant, and the exposure of workers to radiation ............................................................................................................................................................ 15 1.2 The government response and evacuation of residents: offsite conditions ............................ 18 (1) Government response ................................................................................................................... 18 (2) Evacuation of residents/evacuation zone ..................................................................................... 21 1.3 The inadequacies of the response to the accident................................................................. 24 (1) Were accident prevention measures sufficient? .......................................................................... 24 (2) Were accident mitigation efforts sufficient? ................................................................................ 26 Chapter 2: The Societal Impact of the Nuclear Accident ....................................................... 29 2.1 Response to the contamination problem .............................................................................. 29 (1) Contamination of food and water ................................................................................................. 29 (2) Government policy on human radiation exposure ....................................................................... 30 (3) Decontamination efforts ............................................................................................................... 31 (4) Impact on industry and others ...................................................................................................... 32 2.2 Impact on nuclear energy policy ......................................................................................... 33 (1) Impact on power supply stability .................................................................................................. 33 (2) Distrust of past nuclear energy administration and changes in nuclear energy policy ................ 34 (3) Impact on nuclear energy policy abroad ....................................................................................... 36 2.3 Societal impact and issues in the wake of the disaster ........................................................ 38 (1) Social impact of the radioactivity .................................................................................................. 38 (2) Social impact caused by the lack of clear information .................................................................. 40 (3) Compensation issue ...................................................................................................................... 42 Chapter 3: Japan-US Cooperation and Crisis Management after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ................................................................. 46 3.1 The Fukushima nuclear accident and Japan-US cooperation ................................................ 46 3.2 A chronology of Japan-US cooperation and crisis management ........................................... 49 3.3 Military-to-military cooperation ......................................................................................... 52 3.4 Differences in American and Japanese approaches to crisis management and the role of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center ....................................................................... 53 3.5 Overall evaluation of Japan-US cooperation ....................................................................... 56 (1) Information ................................................................................................................................... 57 (2) Channels of Dialogue ..................................................................................................................... 58 (3) Issues on the US side ..................................................................................................................... 59 (4) The transition from normalcy to emergency conditions ............................................................... 60 3.6 Japan-US defense cooperation and nuclear safety .............................................................. 61 Chapter 4: Vulnerabilities in Nuclear Security ...................................................................... 63 4.1 The international background of expanding and strengthening nuclear security policy ........ 63 4.2 International and domestic responses to strengthening nuclear security measures ............. 65 (1) International responses................................................................................................................. 65 (2) Domestic responses ...................................................................................................................... 69 2 4.3 Japan’s response to the nuclear security lessons learned from the Fukushima accident ....... 73 (1) Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety ...... 73 (2) Deliberations and report of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security (Sept. 2011) .............. 74 (3) Deliberations and report of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security (March 2012) ........... 75 (4) Actions taken by regulatory and other bodies in response to the report of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security.......................................................................................................... 77 4.4 Threat perceptions in the United States and Japan prior to and after the Fukushima accident ....................................................................................................................................... 78 Chapter 5: Strengthening Japan-US Cooperation in the Nuclear Security Field ...................... 81 5.1 The history of Japan-US cooperation in the nuclear security field ........................................ 81 5.2 Strengthening Japan-US cooperation .................................................................................. 83 (1) Human resource development...................................................................................................... 83 (2) Japan-US joint outreach efforts .................................................................................................... 85 (3) Development of technology for measuring and detecting nuclear material ................................ 86 5.3 Applying the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant accident in Japan- US cooperation ............................................................................................................................ 92 (1) Preparation for mitigation ............................................................................................................. 92 (2) Insider threat countermeasures .................................................................................................... 92 (3) Research on the synergy between nuclear safety and nuclear security ....................................... 93 (4) Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Revision 5 ................................................................................ 93 (5) Strengthening nuclear security in the transport sector ................................................................ 93 (6) Measures for decommissioning the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant .............................. 94 Chapter 6: Lessons and Recommendations: Improving Crisis Management and Response Capability—Capacity Building for Japan and the Japan-US Alliance ............................................... 95 6.1 Decision-making and crisis-response mechanisms ............................................................... 95 <Lessons> ........................................................................................................................................... 98 <Recommendations> ........................................................................................................................ 101 6.2 The role of information in effective decision making ......................................................... 105 <Lessons> ......................................................................................................................................... 106 <Recommendations> ........................................................................................................................ 107 6.3 The role of Japan-US joint action frameworks: the barrier of a vertically divided system of Japan-US counterparts ............................................................................................................... 109 <Lessons> ......................................................................................................................................... 110 <Recommendations> ........................................................................................................................ 112 6.4 Efforts by the United States and Japan (the alliance) toward the international community..... 115 <Recommendations> ........................................................................................................................ 116 Afterword ......................................................................................................................... 120 Appendix 1: Timeline of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant (Units 1–4) ................. 125 Appendix 2: What is nuclear power generation? ................................................................................. 128 Appendix 3: What are radioactive contamination and radiation exposure? ....................................... 129 Appendix 4: About the project members ............................................................................................. 133 3 Frequently Used Abbreviations BWR boiling water reactor CTBTO Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization DPJ Democratic Party of Japan ERC Emergency Response Center (METI) IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IC isolation condenser JAEA Japan Atomic Energy Agency INES International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology MHLW Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NGSI Next Generation Safeguards Initiative NISA Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency NRC (US) Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSC (Japan) Nuclear Safety Commission NSWG Japan-US Nuclear Security Working Group RCIC reactor core isolation cooling system SDF Self-Defense Forces SPEEDI System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company WINS World Institute for Nuclear Security 4 Introduction The immediate cause of the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant was the melting of the reactor cores and the hydrogen explosions that occurred after the tsunami knocked out all of the plant’s electrical supply. In response to this major accident, all relevant actors including the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) and the government authorities have devoted their full energies to cooling the nuclear reactor, receiving cooperation from the United States and France in the process, and currently the situation is calming down. However, there is still a great deal to be done before the reactors can be decommissioned, and with many obstacles still to overcome, the outcome remains unpredictable. Nuclear power generation is a system in which electricity is generated using the enormous energy created through the nuclear fission of uranium fuel. The enormous energy from nuclear fission was first utilized practically for the atomic bombs in 1945. Then, technology was first used for generating electricity in 1951 in an experimental breeder reactor (EBR-1). The world’s first functioning nuclear power plant was the Obninsk power plant, which began operating in 1954 in what was then the Soviet Union. Subsequently, nuclear power plants were commissioned in England in 1956 and in the United States in 1957. In Japan, the first commercial nuclear reactor went online in 1966 at the Tokai Power Station. In part influenced by the first oil crisis that struck the international community in 1974, the introduction of nuclear power proceeded at a rapid pace from the mid-1970s, as industrialized nations became increasingly concerned about the instability of fossil fuel supplies, but from the mid-1980s on, the growth of nuclear energy seemed to stagnate. Recently, however, with the rapid economic growth in newly emerging nations, there has been a noticeable upturn in the construction of nuclear power plants. During this time, there have been three major accidents at nuclear power plants worldwide. The first occurred in the United States in March 1979 at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. The incident occurred when the reactor’s main feedwater pumps, valves, and other equipment failed, and the operators mistakenly shut down the emergency core cooling device. That led to a loss of water in the core container, thereby damaging the fuel. However, because the plant’s system for containing the release of radioactive materials was operational, only a minimal amount of radioactivity was released and there was no significant impact on the surrounding region. The proximate cause of this accident was said to be the operators’ lack of knowledge, training, and regulations, and after reflecting deeply on this incident, the United States implemented broad-ranging reforms. The second accident was Chernobyl. It occurred in April 1986, at a time when the reactor had been shut down and a test was being implemented to determine whether backup generators would be operational in the case of an external power failure. The plant was operating at low power levels over an extended period of time, which was prohibited, and when the tests began, almost all of the control rods had been extracted. They then attempted to reinsert the control rods all at once (probably because the power output spiked), which resulted in a nuclear burst that ignited the graphite moderator, melting the core and dispersing radioactive materials. Because there was no containment vessel for this reactor (Unit 4), the radioactive materials were not contained in this case and were released into the surrounding area. This was a major accident that affected not only Russia but the broader European region. Although design flaws also played a role, here again the proximate cause was a fundamental deficiency among the reactor operators in terms of knowledge, regulations, training, and other factors, and in that sense this accident was also a man-made disaster.1 The third accident was the Fukushima nuclear plant accident that occurred in March 2011. In this case, the proximate cause was the power failure at the reactor caused by a natural disaster—the earthquake 1.The reactor was designed with a positive void coefficient (i.e., if boiling occurs for some reason, the power output rises dramatically, which further accelerates boiling, thereby accelerating the output—or in other words, it creates a vicious cycle and leading to a power burst), which is prohibited in Western reactors. 5 and tsunami—and thus it was fundamentally different in nature than the accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States or at Chernobyl in Russia, which were caused by errors committed by the operating personnel. However, the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (The National Diet of Japan) determined that “despite numerous opportunities to come up with countermeasures, successive generations of regulatory authorities and TEPCO’s management resorted to delay tactics.” The commission therefore concluded that the accident “cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster.” In other words, the indirect causes of the Fukushima accident can be assumed to be an accumulation of offsite mismanagement in terms of disaster prevention and mitigation. However, the relationship in terms of the accident’s cause and effect has yet to be determined, and many of the wide-ranging issues that the accident raised both within Japan and abroad will require greater efforts to resolve. Detailed analysis and study is required on the indirect causes of this accident to determine where precisely the deficiencies in crisis management reside. Needless to say, the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant has raised serious questions not only for Japan but for the entire international community about safety management at nuclear power plants and about nuclear security. In Japan, it has had a major impact on industry and energy, but also on Japan’s society and lifestyle as the people have been forced to change their fundamental conception of safety management for nuclear power. The issues are far-reaching and many have yet to be resolved, but the key issues include (1) the response to nuclear accidents and safety management; (2) the revision of energy policy; (3) the handling of radioactive contamination and reparation issues; (4) concerns related to electrical power production and supply (PPS); (5) the restructuring of nuclear power safety management (the launch of a new Nuclear Regulation Authority and nuclear regulation agency in September 2012); (6) onsite nuclear power safety measures, and the strengthening of nuclear security; (7) the question of maintaining nuclear power–related technology and personnel and the question of nuclear exports; and so on. Each of these issues in turn contains many subsidiary or related issues, but we will avoid going into detail here. Most of these issues need to be resolved first within Japan, but international cooperation will be required on many issues as well. Naturally, however, in order for Japan to pursue international cooperation, it must first show that it has sufficient nuclear safety management and crisis management systems in place to lead other countries. It is unlikely that it will be able to win the trust of other countries if it attempts to undertake international cooperation without first taking these steps. In other words, if Japan is going to maintain its nuclear power program, then it will need to take drastic measures to shore up its safety management. Of course, ensuring the safety of nuclear power requires that safety management at nuclear plants be combined with nuclear security measures. Nuclear security refers to comprehensive measures to ensure the safety of nuclear-power facilities and nuclear materials against illegal or malicious acts. The Fukushima accident was of course not a nuclear security–related accident. It was not a terrorist attack on the nuclear plant nor an accident that occurred as a result of the theft of nuclear materials. However, there were certain factors behind the accident at Fukushima that might have been prevented had greater consideration been paid to nuclear security in advance. The accident has also created a new problem by exposing a vulnerability—i.e., that major disasters can be caused by power failures not only at the reactors themselves, but also at the surrounding critical facilities. It is thus clear that Japan must pursue a combination of measures to ensure both nuclear security and nuclear power safety management. Since the accident, the Japanese government has been strengthening its initiatives to enhance nuclear security. The current status of such initiatives should be outlined and more in- depth discussions should also be held on their future direction. Meanwhile, as of January 2012 there were 427 nuclear reactors in operation in about 30 countries around the world, as well as 169 reactors that are either under construction or in the planning stages.2 Of those, a total of 111 are in Asia: 50 in Japan (not including Units 1–4 at Fukushima Daiichi), 21 in 2. “Generating Capacity of Nuclear Power Plants in the World,” Japan Atomic Industrial Forum website, http://www.jaif.or.jp/ja/nuclear_world/overseas/f0103.html. 6 South Korea, 20 in India, 14 in China, and 6 in Taiwan. There are also plans for new construction in the region, as China plans to build additional 48–80 reactors by 2020, South Korea will add 3–6, and India is planning on building 20–26. Vietnam is planning on introducing nuclear power plants as well, with 13 reactors scheduled to be constructed by 2030. As a result, the number of nuclear power plants in Asia is expected to nearly triple by the year 2035. The reason that the number of countries wanting to adopt nuclear power is so high despite the risks of a nuclear accident is that nuclear power enables countries to gain an enormous supply of electricity from a small quantity of uranium fuel. The advantage of possessing a high-density energy with a very large effect in terms of fuel reserves is becoming attractive to countries that are seeking economic growth and economic development. It also has a number of other advantages: the suppliers of natural uranium (the raw material needed for nuclear power) are politically stable countries such as Australia and Canada, making it a highly stable fuel supply; the low level of CO emissions is good for the 2 environment; and the price is relatively low compared to other sources of energy. Emerging nations are thus becoming increasingly interested in adopting nuclear power not only for economic reasons, but also from the perspective of energy security and environmental protection. However, nuclear power also brings problems such as the risk of nuclear accidents and the treatment and disposal of radioactive waste, and it entails many issues on both the safety management and security fronts. Many problems exist, above all the fact that some developing countries that already possess nuclear power plants do not have a sufficient level of technology or nuclear-related engineers to meet the requirements of their planned new construction and expansion of nuclear power plants, the personnel and responsibilities for operations management and crisis management are unclear, and it is possible that they will be reluctant to share information or accept assistance from other countries when an accident does occur. In any event, the crises that one can foresee occurring in the future in the operation of nuclear power plants include the loss of power or cooling systems (including by subversive acts), illegal actions in the administration of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials or illegal actions against the means of transport of nuclear materials (disruption, illegal photographs, etc.), failures in crisis management (including the protection system), information sharing, and mistakes or internal threats in terms of information manipulation. Those countries that possess nuclear power capabilities have an enormous responsibility to address these problems. Serious consideration must be given to ensure that these types of accidents never happen again in Japan or in the international community. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is making various efforts to that end, South Korea hosted a nuclear security summit in March 2012, and the Japanese government will hold an international conference at the end of this year on nuclear safety management, all of which contribute to the necessary efforts. Looking back on the handling of the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the close way in which the United States and Japan cooperated is striking, and it is no exaggeration to say that it was thanks to the Japan-US alliance that the damage caused by the Fukushima accident was kept to a minimum. The close exchange of information and mutual cooperation between the two countries produced many lessons, and one could say that it has created a foundation for future Japan-US cooperation on issues related to nuclear safety management and nuclear security. Over the past half-century, the Japan-US alliance has consistently contributed to the peace and stability not only of the United States and Japan, but also of the Asia Pacific region as a whole. This alliance relationship extends beyond the fields of security, diplomacy, and defense, to such fields as economics and finance, and the trustworthiness of the alliance has enabled the relationship to develop through mutual effort to a point where we can pursue cooperation in crisis management and response as the most trusted of allies. In the handling of the Fukushima incident as well, although there were some mutual misunderstandings seen in the initial management of information, in the end Japan-US cooperation produced results and the issues were resolved. This project examined and analyzed the American and Japanese responses to the Fukushima nuclear plant accident and the lessons to be drawn from those experiences. The objective was to draw on those lessons to help strengthen the capacity of the Japan-US alliance to deal with nuclear crises, 7 including nuclear safety management and nuclear terrorism, and improve the capacity of the world’s nuclear management and crisis management systems. In particular, with respect to the accident at Fukushima, all Japanese institutions—the government, the electric utilities, the Self-Defense Forces, the police, the firefighters, local governments, and others— made a tremendous effort to handle the situation, but as a result, many questions arose with regard to the way in which the Japanese side responded. Above all, if we look at this as a crisis management situation, then clearly there are many issues that must be resolved in order to promote measures that cover both (1) nuclear safety management (i.e., measures to prevent nuclear accidents), and (2) nuclear security (i.e., measures to protect nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel). These include problems with the policymaking process and mechanisms for measures to prevent certain situations from arising, the guidelines for responding to situations, the guidelines on damage limitation, crisis management, and so on. In this context, US cooperation based on the Japan-US alliance played an extremely important role in helping to localize and control the situation surrounding the nuclear accident, and the main reason the United States was able to contribute in the area of crisis management was the fact that the alliance- based cooperative framework functioned so effectively. However, when one looks carefully at the situation, as already emphasized above, it must be frankly recognized that there were many areas such as information sharing, communications, and mutual understanding where the cooperative efforts were not necessarily without flaws. Moreover, given the nuclear safety management and nuclear security vulnerabilities that became evident as a result of this accident, it is clear that improvements are not only needed within Japan; regulations at the global level must be stronger and more effective as well. In that context, Japan and the United States should cooperate to promote stronger regulations and to carry out capacity building for those regulatory agencies and plant operators in each country that are tasked with safety management and nuclear security. In order to more effectively share the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident with the international community, the question is how Japan-US collaboration can be applied not just in Japan’s own initiatives, but in universal rule-making. Also, in terms of improving the effectiveness of nuclear security, given that both Japan and the United States are carrying out cutting-edge technological research, they should carry out joint research to build the technological foundation for lowering the risk of nuclear terrorism and other security threats. By examining in detail both those areas in which Japan-US cooperation functioned smoothly and those in which it did not, this project has attempted to provide important hints for improving cooperation in the future. Another primary objective was to gain knowledge on the methods and key points for promoting future Japan-US collaboration on preventing and handling nuclear disasters, and on strengthening nuclear security, including the protection of nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel. Accordingly, in carrying out this project we directly interviewed many of the practitioners involved in responding to the accident and in Japan-US collaborative efforts, and through exchanges of opinions between Japanese and American experts, we explored the lessons learned from the accident and areas for improvement. We believe that this process has resulted in a highly efficient and practical set of project findings. The government, Diet, and Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident are among those who have launched investigations into the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and their reports are being made public. Much of the content of this report is based on those sources of information. For that reason, as these diverse investigations bring to light new facts and data, it may be necessary to revise certain portions of this report. However, it is imperative that thorough examinations of this accident continue to be conducted by Japanese society as a whole, and it is important that Japan continue to seek ways in which the lessons from the Fukushima accident can be shared with the world. This report represents one attempt to play that role, using the framework of “crisis management and Japan-US cooperation” as a way to convey those lessons. 8 Chapter 1: The Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant The earthquake that struck Japan on March 11, 2011, caused a tsunami that resulted in the meltdown of three nuclear reactors. It was one of the three worst nuclear reactor accidents in history, following in the path of Three Mile Island in the United States and Russia’s Chernobyl.3 This chapter will examine how the accident occurred and what responses were undertaken, and it will consider the issues that arose at the time as well as the issues that remain to be addressed in the future. 1.1 An overview of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (1) Earthquake and tsunami At 2:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck Japan—the largest in recorded history to strike the country. The Great East Japan Earthquake produced a large-scale tsunami that covered 561 km2 of land, leaving approximately 25,000 dead or missing (as of February 20124). As shown in figure 1-1, an extremely high tsunami reached the coastlines of Miyagi Prefecture and Fukushima Prefecture. TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was situated 178 km from the epicenter of the quake. Figure 1-2 shows the position of the plant relative to the epicenter, while the following photo shows the conditions at the Fukushima Daiichi Plant prior to the disaster. Figure 1-1. The height and location of the tsunami’s impact Soma city [Legend] Maximum wave height (m) [Note] Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) report, as of March 13, 2011, 08:00. Source: TEPCO, “Tohoku-chiho Taiheiyo-oki Jishin ni okeru jishindo oyobi tsunami ni tsuite” [On the seismic motion and tsunami of the Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake], August 11, 2011, http://www.pref.niigata.lg.jp/HTML_Article/334/751/110811_26-1,0.pdf. 3. The former accident occurred on March 29, 1979, at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. The upper portion of the reactor core was exposed, damaging the fuel. The radiation exposure of residents within an 80-km radius was an average of 0.01 mSv. The latter case occurred on April 26, 1986, at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant’s Unit 4. Of the 135,000 residents within a 30-km radius of the plant, 16,000 people received external exposure. A total of 31 deaths were reported at the site and 203 were hospitalized with acute radiation exposure. The effects of internal radiation exposure are still being studied. See Shigehiro An, ed., Genshiryoku jiten [Dictionary of nuclear science and technology] (Tokyo: Nikkan Kogyo Shinbunsha, 1995). 4. Emergency Headquarters for Disaster Response, “Heisei 23-nen (2011) Tohoku-chiho Taiheiyo-oki Jishin (Higashi Nihon Shinsai) ni tsuite” [On the 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake], February 7, 2012 (5:00 p.m.), http://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/pdf/201202071700jisin.pdf. 9