The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Fall of the Great Republic (1886-88), by Henry Standish Coverdale This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. Title: The Fall of the Great Republic (1886-88) Author: Henry Standish Coverdale Release Date: April 25, 2018 [EBook #57049] Language: English Character set encoding: UTF-8 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FALL OF THE GREAT REPUBLIC *** Produced by Larry B. Harrison and The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) THE FALL OF THE GREAT REPUBLIC. BOSTON: ROBERTS BROTHERS. 1886. Copyright, 1885, By Roberts Brothers. University Press: John Wilson and Son, Cambridge. THE FALL OF THE GREAT REPUBLIC. (1886–88.) BY SIR HENRY STANDISH COVERDALE (Intendant for the Board of European Administration in the Province of New York.) “O Liberty! Liberty! How many crimes are committed in thy name!” By Permission of the Bureau of Press Censorship. NEW YORK: 1895. CONTENTS. PAGE I. Introductory.—The “Hard Times” of 1882–1887 7 II. The Moral Interregnum 15 III. The Socialistic Poison 27 IV. The Rule of Ireland in America 32 V. The First Eruption 51 VI. Anxious Forebodings 77 VII. The Revolutionists’ Master-stroke 86 VIII. The Reign of Anarchy 96 IX. Attempts to save the Government 103 X. The last President of the United States 115 XI. A Precious Triumvirate 124 XII. War with England 128 XIII. Capture of Boston 141 XIV. The European Coalition 159 XV. The Allies attack New York 171 XVI. The Final Struggle 192 XVII. Foreign Occupation 198 5 APPENDIX. I. The Socialistic Spirit in 1885 207 II. A Revolution near at Hand.—“It must come” 209 III. A Female Socialist’s Advice 211 IV. Atheism, Communism, and Anarchy 212 V. The Forces arrayed against Civilization 213 VI. The Prospects of an Alliance between Dynamiters and Communists 214 VII. Two Contemporary Criticisms 215 VIII. The Courts.—One Journalistic Warning out of many 217 IX. The Unprotected Atlantic Coast 218 X. A Single Illustration of the Irish-American Spirit 219 XI. The Army of the Discontented 222 XII. Defending Dynamite Assassination 223 THE FALL OF THE GREAT REPUBLIC. I. INTRODUCTORY.—THE “HARD TIMES” OF 1882–1887. It is my purpose to relate the fall of the Great Republic. I shall be brief, yet shall omit no detail necessary to a perfect comprehension of the causes which underlay the catastrophe and the events through which it came to pass. I shall set forth the curious sequence of ignorance, wickedness, and folly which led to the terrible result. I shall show how the boasted wisdom of the fathers became the inherited curse of their descendants. I shall describe the political and social revolution by which in a few months a nation of grand promise, and with a history unequalled for its century of growth and achievement, was transformed into the most pitiful wreck of all time. I shall narrate the story whose outcome has proved to the world the utter futility of the experiment of popular self-government, until men shall have attained a richer knowledge and a sweeter morality than thus far exist. The citizens of the United States felt at the close of the Civil War of 1861–1865 that they had demonstrated their ability to govern themselves wisely and successfully. They considered the experimental stage of their history passed, the volume completed and closed, the verdict rendered. They imagined the possibility of no greater strain on their institutions than had already been triumphantly endured. In truth, there was the appearance of reason in their conviction. No nation had ever more successfully passed the ordeal of civil strife. The magnanimity shown to the conquered rebels after the war, even after the assassination of Lincoln; the temperate endurance with which the country suffered the incubus of Johnson’s maudlin administration; the rapidity and ease with which the enormous war-debt was paid off; the general good-nature which averted bloodshed during the disputed election of 1876; the smoothness with which the administrative machinery bore the shock of Garfield’s murder,—all these events, coming closely after the vindication of the national idea and of personal liberty in the suppression of the Southern rebellion, convinced the people of the United 6 7 8 9 States, and those of other lands as well, that “the experiment of popular self-government” had really achieved success. And yet there had been warnings enough of the volcano smouldering underfoot, if the eyes and ears of public men had been open to see and hear. Beginning at the time of President Garfield’s assassination, the one cry which went up from the common people, the working people of the land, was for years that of “Hard Times.” Business received a blow in that year from which it did not recover. Trade was slow and meagre; purchases of all sorts were made “from hand to mouth;” workshops and factories lay idle because there was insufficient demand for their products; men who felt keenly the disgrace of failure to support their families were compelled to beg for public aid to keep their humble homes and to supply even the most sordid demands of life. For years the country’s economic policy had been such as to poison the air with false doctrine and enervate the energies of commerce by vacillating action. It would be a bootless task to discuss now the relative merits of “Free-trade” and “Protection” to the United States. Perhaps either policy, adhered to with reasonable fidelity and administered, as to its details, with such common-sense as men are accustomed to use in the conduct of their private affairs, would have obviated the loss of work and the consequent poverty and want which filled the land, from 1882 to 1887, with a constantly deepening tide of misery. But the whole subject was made the shuttlecock of petty politics and pitiful politicians, until the nation ceased to have a policy which could be recognized or was of any avail as a stay before the sweep of commercial failure and pecuniary distress. It is asserted that no less than two and a half million operatives and working-men were idle in the fall of 1887, when the first serious outbreaks occurred. By far the larger number of these had been unable to earn enough, during the preceding two years, to pay the rents demanded for their cottages and hovels, and were constantly in danger of ejection, without the hope of finding another home. The land was filled with idle workmen, many of them foreigners unaccustomed to free institutions, and bitter in their denunciations of all government, which was to them the synonym of tyranny. Few, of either foreign or native birth, were possessed of sufficient discrimination to discover the underlying causes of their misfortunes, or of wisdom enough to set about remedying them. Despite the world-wide knowledge of this lack of remunerative employment in the United States, the ranks of the unemployed and dissatisfied there were constantly recruited by immigrants from the most dangerous classes of Europe. The vigorous action which had been taken in 1886 and 1887 by the Governments of Germany, Russia, and Austria, looking to the extirpation in their dominions of socialism, nihilism, and their kindred poisons, and the refusal of Switzerland, England, and France to afford asylum to the expelled fanatics, had forced them to take refuge in America. One or two of the wisest and bravest among the statesmen of the land raised their voices against receiving and harboring these men. But the public had few statesmen in its service. Mere politicians and demagogues were in greater popular favor than statesmen who despised the cheap tricks and unworthy flattery which won the common ear. Public men generally had come to think more of majorities than of principles; to labor for their own election to office rather than for the good of the country. The newspapers were commonly partisan and devoted to purely partisan ends,—the chief of which was, naturally, partisan success. None dared to do or say anything which might offend and alienate voters; and so every steamship from Europe continued to bring to the Atlantic ports of the country full steerage-loads of men who were not thought fit to live under the Governments of Europe, but who, almost on their landing, became citizens and voters in the Republic. Added to these were the tens of thousands of Irishmen whom the stringent measures of Parliament, adopted after the dynamite explosions of 1884 and 1885, had driven from their native island. Over half a million able-bodied men, without mention of women or children, expelled outlaws of Europe, landed at New York, Boston, and Philadelphia in the two years of 1885 and 1886. They swelled the ranks of workmen without work, and helped reduce by competition and division the already scanty wages of labor. Every one of them was a poisonous ferment dropped into the already over-stimulated mass of popular discontent and agitation. They invariably united with the existing centres of socialism and Fenianism, making these organizations, even without other converts, tenfold more dangerous than they had ever been before. II. THE MORAL INTERREGNUM. It was in many respects a strange era; it justified the phrase which an eminent writer had suggested for it,—of the “moral interregnum.” Immersed in the cares of private business, and chiefly actuated by an insatiable craving for money or the luxury and social distinction which money brought, the majority of those men who should have been the stay and support of good government paid little heed to public affairs, but rather left them to the control of adventurers, of professional politicians who followed politics as gamblers follow cards,—for the sake of what they could steal from more honest men,—of the least intelligent and least moral members of the state. Their common pleas were, either that they were invariably out-manœuvred in the political battle by these veteran strategists, and that they could do no real good at the primaries and the polls, or that the solid good sense and honesty of the country could be relied upon to come out and assume control whenever things passed beyond endurance, and that, meantime, all effort was simply thrown away. It is a natural assumption, now that the end has been seen of all men, that those who used these arguments must have been either fools or selfish knaves. Yet they comprised within their number a large proportion of 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 the successful business and professional men of the country, who could not have thus succeeded had they been devoid of all ability, and who certainly regarded themselves as honest men. The result of their neglect of their country in behalf of their pockets was that while domestic morality, both ideal and real, remained in many parts of the land upon a lofty plane, public morality practically ceased to exist. Men were elected to office, not because they were fitted for the positions to which they aspired, nor because any one believed them fitted, but because they were “available;” because they happened to have few active enemies; because they were comparatively unknown, and nothing could be said against them; because they were rich enough to contribute liberally to corruption funds for the purchase of venal voters; because, in short, they were especially unfit for either honor, trust, or responsibility. The tone of public life became deplorably low. Officials of every station accustomed themselves to ask, when any course of action offered itself, not “Is it right? Is it wise?” but “How will it affect my continuance in office? Will it hurt the party’s prospects?” Saddest of all and most disheartening was the almost universal extent to which this feeling spread among the people. They came to consider this dishonorable and cowardly attitude on the part of Government officers as natural and quite to be expected. The few who remonstrated or pleaded for a more honest official spirit were regarded with good-natured contempt as men meaning well and having lofty ideals, but too visionary for “practical politics;” as “doctrinaires,” “theorists,” etc. There has been corruption in other lands and under other forms of government. But the demoralizing fact in the United States was, not so much that official corruption and cowardice was the rule, as that the people who had the power to rebuke and reform such a condition of things condoned it, took it for granted, continued the corrupt and cowardly time-servers in office and responsibility, or changed them for other equally unfit but shrewder rogues. It was not strange, in this condition of public sentiment, that other trusts than those of Government were abused. The last decade of the Republic was signalized by an unprecedented number of defalcations, embezzlements, and similar crimes against private trust. In the treatment of these crimes, even more clearly than in regard of public dereliction, the utter demoralization of public opinion was demonstrated. It is true that the public prints teemed after each new rascality with virtuous demands for the infliction of condign punishment. It is true that prosecuting officers commonly made complaints and issued warrants with exemplary promptness, taking good care that the newspapers were duly informed of their energetic action. It is true that occasional embezzlers were actually punished by sentences of imprisonment fixed at the minimum extreme of lax and unjustly lenient laws. But these were exceptional cases. Many of the embezzlers were men of social standing or of political importance; they had numerous friends; and, no matter though their guilt was clear as the day, it was assumed by the nonchalant public,—taken for granted, even by those who had suffered most,—that these friends would use all their influence to obstruct or prevent merited punishment. In a majority of cases they were too successful. Officials who should have stood faithful sentinels over the public weal to compel the enforcement of justice, generally bowed before the influence which might be exerted to oust them from their offices if they should prove inconveniently virtuous. Sometimes the embezzler was allowed to bribe his custodian and escape. Sometimes he was admitted to bail in such a trifling sum that a percentage of his stealings paid the cost of a default. Sometimes he was allowed to bargain with those whom he had robbed. It was not considered disgraceful or wrong, if a bank cashier had stolen enough to ruin his bank, for the directors to accept his offer to repay half the amount stolen, in consideration of their agreement not to prosecute him. Public sentiment admitted that this compounding felony was objectionable, but refused to condemn the directors who committed the crime for trying to save some of their property from complete wreck. It was taken for granted that men cared more for their wealth than for their honor or the public weal. Even such embezzlers as were actually imprisoned seldom failed to secure from pliant pardoning boards such commutations as rendered their punishment farcical. It came to be a common saying that it was safer to rob a bank of a million dollars than to steal five dollars from a merchant’s till to buy food for a starving wife or child. The courts, which should have remained the trust and reliance of the people, became as untrustworthy as public sentiment itself. Lawyers adopted the rule that it was their part to win causes for their clients, right or wrong. “Get money! honestly if you can; but get money,” was the motto of the business element. “Win your case! by fair means, if possible; but win your case,” was the motto of the legal guild. The advocate who won his client’s case by taking advantage of technicalities or by securing an incapable or prejudiced jury, or by the introduction of false witnesses whose perjuries could not be exposed at the moment, was sure to attain wealth and a high position at the bar. Actual jury-bribing was suspected in many cases; but those who should have been the first to ferret out such offences cared not enough about the purity of the courts to trouble their leisure with the matter. The judges aided in many States to make the courts over which they presided inefficient and to bring them into public contempt by their blind adherence to outworn precedent and their indiscriminating affection for technical pleadings. Though generally men of the highest personal probity, they might be relied upon in any trial to ignore the spirit of the law and the interests of society if a clever attorney could point out in the letter of the law or in some century-old precedent anything to justify them in so doing. A misplaced comma was sufficient to overthrow the intent of an entire statute. This characteristic of the courts found ample room and verge enough for the most fantastic tricks in a society which was governed by annual legislatures, pouring forth with each succeeding session a very flood and freshet of ill- considered and crudely expressed legislation. So complicated and unintelligible at last became the law that those judges and counsellors who really loved Justice and persistently sought after her, were seldom able to discover her form or 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 features through the mist and fog of statutes and codes and revisions and amendments and precedents which filled the atmosphere in every court devoted to law and, ostensibly, to justice. The wisest men and those who devoted their life- long study to the subject were not always able to tell what the law really meant, or whether it meant anything, under the varying interpretations put upon it by different expounders. Thus it came to pass that any suitor or defendant, provided he was rich enough to secure adroit and learned counsel, was generally able so to delay and hamper the naturally loitering steps of the courts as, by the very law of chance, to bring about opportunities for escape which time could not help affording him. The rich man, whether in a civil or a criminal trial, was much more likely to win his case, whatever its merits, than the man who was unable to employ counsel familiar with the quips and crookednesses of the law. In truth, the prisoner accused of crime who was unable to pay large counsel fees or to bring “influence” to bear in some way or other upon the prosecuting officials, was apt to be treated with comparative severity. Within the same year a bank cashier of New York stole $800,000 from his bank, but escaped all punishment by negotiating with the directors for the return of $400,000; while a young street thief of the same city was sent to the penitentiary for twelve years for stealing a penknife worth twenty-five cents! The needy mechanic who purloined a few dollars worth of old junk and sold it to buy either bread for his family or liquor for himself was fairly sure to be punished with as long a term of imprisonment as the defaulter who made away with millions. He was, moreover, certain of punishment, if detected; while the greater thief had at least three chances in four of escaping untouched. In all directions public sentiment had become corrupted; the popular aspiration had declined to low and sordid levels: yet men looked calmly on the sham and humbug and selfishness and dishonesty and injustice which made up the social order of the time, and felt neither fear nor disgust. Even those whose moral senses were acute enough to perceive the rottenness around them stopped their moral olfactories and blinded their moral vision with the unworthy reflection that the existing fabric would last out their time; and then the deluge might sweep whither it would. III. THE SOCIALISTIC POISON. Meanwhile, below the thin and treacherous surface, the volcanic fires of a socialistic agitation were blazing up with daily increasing fierceness. The failure of work to laboring men; the widespread and intense suffering consequent thereupon; the conviction that this was not due to any lack of zeal or industry on their part, but to the unequal workings of an artificial and false social order; the growing belief that poverty had become a bar to civil rights, even in the courts, and that wealth had become a sufficient protector of injustice and crime,—all these things combined to add an irresistible weight in the minds of thousands of the less discriminating among the laboring class, especially those of foreign birth, to the arguments and appeals of the socialistic leaders in behalf of a complete overturn,—a “revolution.” Some of these socialistic apostles were simply theorists who could not comprehend why their lofty ideals were in any way impracticable. Others were fanatics,—honest, zealous, earnest, and illogical as fanatics have always been. Others were really maniacs, whom a long life spent under the oppression and tyranny of foreign monarchies had driven into a fierce and virulent hatred of all government and all order. Others were men who would have been unwilling to earn their daily bread by honest industry, had the means been placed at their hands, but who foresaw in great popular disturbances possibilities for self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment. All worked harmoniously, however, in the common direction of social anarchy. They had utterly unlike conceptions of the new order which ought to be established on the ruins of the old, but they were united in the one conviction that the old must be wholly demolished before the task of reconstruction could be properly begun. And so idealists of noble but impracticable aspirations, and brawling fanatics, and beery mountebanks, and maniacs ambitious for unbridled and orderless anarchy, though perhaps not on speaking terms with each other personally, worked together for one common end, and that end revolution and destruction. The vigorous measures which had been taken by all the nations of Europe between 1885 and 1887 to clear their own borders of these revolutionists had been effectual in driving hundreds of thousands of them to America. They brought with them their theories, their fanaticism, their fierce hatred of all orderly society. Belonging for the most part themselves to the working-class, they mingled freely with the discontented and suffering workmen whom they found already too numerous in the land for the work which was offered either to labor or to skill. Everywhere they spread the infection of their destructive theories. Socialistic organizations sprang up, under one name or another, in almost every city and town and village. Beginning with the Hocking Valley riots in 1884–1885, and, like those disturbances, in constantly closer alliance with the trades-unions, these socialistic societies caused numerous local outbreaks in the districts where workmen were most numerous and work hardest to obtain. Pittsburg, Wheeling, and Fall River suffered especial loss in these riots. So early as the winter of 1884–1885 it was estimated that in New York city alone eighty-five thousand would-be industrious workmen lay idle, in addition to other thousands never estimated, because outside the pale of any possible 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 census-taking, who would not have worked had the opportunity been offered them. A little more than a year later it was freely asserted among the socialists of the country that twice this number were enrolled in their organizations within a radius of ten miles from the New York city hall. In the outbreaks which occurred at other places the officers to whom was committed the task of restoring order generally found themselves opposed most vindictively by men who, a few years before, would have been regarded as the “bone and sinew” of the land. It was noted, too, that these men were always the last to yield to force; that they were always the most sullen and revengeful when finally compelled to do so; and that, even when convicted and undergoing imprisonment, they never showed repentance or sorrow except for failure, constantly boasted of their determination to “try it over again,” and steadily adhered to the belief they would ultimately triumph. IV. THE RULE OF IRELAND IN AMERICA. But neither in the importation of exotic socialistic germs nor in the fungus-like growth of indigenous disaffection and corruption lay the only dangers of the Republic. The heterogeneous elements which made up the population of the United States had suffered a great and wholly unfortunate race-change since the foundation of the Government. At the close of the Revolution which separated the colonies from England the country was populated with a sparse but homogeneous people, possessing in an eminent degree the sterling virtues and the robust common-sense which characterize the Anglo-Saxon race. The freedom which these men won and had no capacity for abusing they felt would be safe forever in the hands of descendants sprung from their loins. The government they formed was exactly fitted for themselves and for a succeeding nation possessing their sense of order and their intelligence. But they saw a vast unexplored continent opening its wealth before them. Their numbers were but few for its conquest and reclamation. They felt the need of more men. Relying upon the freedom of the institutions they bequeathed and upon the virtue and vigor with which they endowed their heirs, they invited immigration from Europe. They took it for granted that the immigrants would be few in comparison with the native population, and that they would be absorbed and assimilated by the majority as snow-flakes falling in the ocean are absorbed by the great waters and made a part of them. At first the stream of immigration which flowed westward was no larger than they had anticipated, and gave cause for little fear, either by reason of its size or of the classes and races which composed it. But before the first fifty years of the Republic had passed, it became clear that the asylum which it offered was being taken advantage of chiefly by the Irish, and by the very worst portion of the Irish at that. They found their own little island too narrow for them, and flocked to the United States by the hundred thousand. Coming, the most of them, from the lowest ranks of a degraded and ignorant peasantry, they found themselves, in the United States as at home, in a position of inferiority in everything save citizenship. Clannish by race and religious prejudice, they brought with them all their insular and ethnic narrowness and exclusiveness, and remained up to the end of the chapter a class by themselves. Other nationalities sent immigrants who threw off their old allegiances upon touching American soil, became in fact as well as in name Americans, intermarried with Americans, and brought up their children to become wholly American in deed and aspiration. But the Irish seldom married outside their own race; they brought up their children to be first Catholic and then Irish as themselves; they remained, and their descendants after them to the third and fourth generation, as much Irishmen as their cousins who continued to inhabit Leinster and Munster. But they seized with greater eagerness than was exhibited by any other immigrants every political privilege which was within their reach. In politics as in all other interests, their clannishness kept them mainly confined to one party; but even in that they stood as far as possible aloof from the real and patriotic Americans serving in the same organization. Coarse of feature and coarser of mind; servile in their devotion to religious forms, which were never any better than forms to them; superstitious to the last degree; blunted in moral sense so as to be amenable to fear alone as a restraining sentiment; utterly illogical and the slaves of ignorant prejudice,—it would be difficult to conceive of immigrants from any modern race less fitted than they for self-government or for exercising a share in the government of others. There were occasional brilliant and noble exceptions; but of the majority this picture is not over-colored. Wherever they touched the political garment they defiled it. In the cities, where their increase by steady immigration and by their own amazing procreative fertility gave them the majority, their power was invariably signalized by a corruption and local tyranny greater than that against which Adams and Jefferson and Washington revolted. As their numbers increased and they became more assured of their political power, their arrogance and reckless abuse of public trust became daily more and more exasperating. Through all the political changes to which other voters were subject, they remained in practical effect an organization by themselves. As has been said, they grasped with insatiate greed every political right and privilege which the laws afforded them, but refused to become any the less Irishmen. They stubbornly persisted in putting loyalty to the land they had abandoned above loyalty to the land they had adopted and which had opened its hospitality to them. Instead of becoming in reality as well as name American citizens, they remained Irish citizens, an imperium in imperio, and spoke of their life in the United States, even while they were exercising the franchise or sharing in the emoluments of 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 office there, as an “exile.” They boldly proclaimed themselves “patriots,” because, having fled to the United States and accepted its protection and its asylum, they still professed greater devotion and a heartier loyalty to the fatherland they had forsworn than to the country to which they had solemnly pledged, by becoming citizens of it, their voluntary and complete allegiance. In immense numbers these “exiles” united in more or less secret and criminal associations for the “freeing of Ireland.” At first their schemes were comparatively peaceful and their meetings open; but as time passed on, and little visible progress was made in the task of abrogating English supremacy in Ireland, the plots of the wilder zealots grew in acceptance, and the machinations of the plotters took on deadlier aspects. Not only did nine tenths of the later immigrants hasten into these various societies, but fully as great a proportion of the American-born sons of Irish refugees went with them. Whatever may have been their original intentions, such societies as the “Ancient Order of Hibernians,” the “Clan-na-Gael,” the “Emmet Clubs,” the “National Leagues,” and the like became in the end a series of widely ramifying conspiracies. In their meetings the wildest schemes of vengeance against England were planned, and bloody plots deliberately woven, not only for the commission of the most fiendish and inhuman crimes against English men and English women and children, but also aiming at the embroilment of the United States in actual war with the other great Anglo-Saxon Power. A large proportion of the most brutal crimes committed in England and Ireland during the long agitation were planned in the United States by these organizations. By far the larger part of the money with which the agitation was fomented and the crimes paid for came from contributions made in the United States, openly and without any attempt to conceal the purposes for which they were made. At the head of one of the worst of these Irish organizations was an agitator who had been driven out of Ireland on account of his persistent attempts against the Government, named Patrick O’Halloran, but more commonly known as “Patsy.” It was by this assumed addition to his name that he was best known. The gang of which he was the acknowledged leader conceived the idea of using dynamite, either in its crude form or made up into “infernal machines,” for the destruction of property and life in England. It was the natural weapon of cowards, who fancied they saw in it a means to inflict serious injury on their enemy without his being able to strike back. It was eagerly adopted by numerous Irish “patriots,” and a school of murderers and destroyers arose, calling themselves “dynamiters.” These American societies collected the necessary funds and sent emissaries to England to purchase or carry with them dynamite for use in blowing up public buildings. During 1884 two explosions, thus planned, took place in London railway-stations. They were so calculated as to render probable the greatest loss of life among the travelling public; but by lucky chances failed to do anything more than cause much destruction of property and a few slight wounds. In the winter of 1884–1885 explosions of a similar nature occurred in the Tower and the Parliament buildings. By these several innocent sight-seers, including a number of little children, were shockingly mutilated. Shortly afterwards the police discovered and frustrated a plot to blow up the entire auditorium of the Princess’s Theatre during an expected visit of the Prince of Wales to that place of amusement. The details were kept secret, however, in the hope of finding some clew to the perpetrators of the villany. Beyond the discovery that an unknown Irishman had brought the explosive with him from America in a crowded steamship, thus endangering the lives of several hundred passengers, nothing was definitely found out. It was inevitable that these events should have the effect of hardening the English heart towards Ireland and increasing the unwillingness of the English Government to grant anything like home rule to a people which showed itself capable of such crimes, and which almost unanimously applauded them. Nor, considering the Irish character and the utter inability of the Irish mind to reason where its prejudices are involved, could it be thought strange that the English severity which these outrages compelled was accepted by the entire Irish populace as a sufficient excuse to throw aside every figment of humanity to which they had thus far laid claim, and to join themselves, heart and soul, to the most barbarous schemes of the vilest wretches who professed affection for “Poor Ireland.” In the early winter of 1886–1887 a state dinner had been prepared at Windsor Castle. A large number of titled and prominent guests had been bidden, and it was announced that the Queen would honor the banquet by her presence. Owing to a detention of a few minutes in the arrival of the train from London, bringing several members of the Cabinet, the hour originally set for the dinner was, at the last moment, changed, and a short postponement of the dinner ordered. In this interval, and not ten minutes after the time at which, had the original arrangements been carried out, the guests would have entered the dining-hall, there occurred under it a terrible explosion, by which it was utterly wrecked. As it happened, no one was in the room except a servant, who was engaged in arranging the flowers upon the table. His death was instantaneous; and it was hours before the mangled remains of his body were exhumed from the smoking ruins. The news of this direct attempt on the Queen’s life filled England with a perfect fury of revenge. Popular sentiment demanded the adoption of stringent measures for the suppression of “dynamitism” and the punishment of criminals engaged in it. A flood of bills was let loose upon Parliament, the enactment of the mildest of which would have resulted in the depopulation of Ireland and its transformation into an English colony. Meetings were held in every part of England and Scotland to express detestation of this attempt to murder the Queen. The newspapers were filled with the most sensational appeals and the most scorching invective aimed at Irishmen. In the midst of this turmoil the police arrested Timothy Gallivan, an American, born in Massachusetts and educated in its common schools, but the son of an Irish immigrant, full of half-crazy ideas about his “duty” to Ireland, and fevered with anxiety in some way to “revenge” her upon her “oppressors.” Secreted in one of the hiding-places to which Gallivan was tracked were found papers constituting an extensive correspondence. They proved that Gallivan was an 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 American; that he was a member of an Irish society in New York; that he held office in that society; that he had been sent to London as its accredited agent and representative and at its expense; that his instructions had been to cause the death, by dynamite explosion, of some member or members of the royal family, “the nearer the top the better;” and that he had associated with him, either before or after his arrival in London from New York, some twenty kindred spirits. The names of his fellow-conspirators were obtained, either from Gallivan’s papers or from the confessions of those whose identity had been therein disclosed. When once any Irish conspiracy began to be unravelled, there never failed to appear at least half as many “informers” as conspirators, eager to betray their associates for reward or safety. This was no exception. In less than two weeks from the date of the explosion in Windsor Castle, every detail of the plot was in the possession of the public, and twenty of the “dynamiters,” including their leader and chief, were in custody, with amply sufficient evidence in the way of documents, confessions, and corroborating circumstance to send them all to the gallows. By far the most important and significant feature, however, in the whole murderous affair was the amount of proof it put into the hands of the police that the crime was exclusively Irish-American in its inception, its details, its payment, and even the personnel of the criminals. Armed with this proof, the British Government peremptorily demanded of the United States that the Irish societies within its jurisdiction which were engaged in this crime be put down, and that action be taken to prevent further attacks on England by their associate organizations. The Secretary of State unquestionably appreciated the justice of the British demand. Unfortunately, however, for both parties, the British note was couched in a dictatorial and offensive style. Even this a man of the Secretary of State’s common sense would doubtless have excused as the natural outcome of a justifiable indignation, had not an incautious employé in his department allowed a copy of the note to fall into the possession of a New York daily newspaper. In twenty-four hours it had been read by every dynamiter in the country capable of spelling out words. Congress and the executive departments were promptly made to feel that upon the tone of the answer to England’s demand depended the political support of more than a million voters, whose withdrawal would insure the crushing defeat of the party then in power. It was the same position in which the men who ruled in Congress and in the administration had been placed many a time before, confronting the question whether to do that which was clearly right and trust to a future public sentiment to justify them, or to throw conscience and judgment overboard, trim sails to the political squall of the moment, and hope for the chance at some indefinite future of using the power thus retained to undo the wrong committed in holding it. Popular sentiment had often enough shown that the man who did right to his own detriment was regarded as an impractical fellow, a theorist, a “doctrinaire.” It was the man who succeeded, who attained power the soonest and retained it the longest, no matter by what tricks or sacrifices of conscience, who was looked upon as “smart” and admired for his “ability.” So, when this time again the question came home to the men in place and station whether they could afford to do right and lose the support of the only element which gave their party hope of success in the North and West, or bow to the blast and continue in possession of the Government for four or eight years more, they yielded as they had become accustomed to yield in all similar dilemmas. A curt and sarcastic reply was despatched from Washington to the English note, and care was taken that it should be published as widely in the United States as that document had been. It was received with a roar of Irish triumph. A few journals criticised it; but they soon found that there was so much resentment at the offensive tone of the British letter even among men who sympathized least with the Irish plot that the Secretary’s snub caused fully as much quiet enjoyment as annoyance. Other correspondence followed between the two foreign offices in constantly angrier spirit, and the spring of 1887 found both nations standing on the very verge of war, waiting only for some overt casus belli to draw the sword against each other. Such was the domestic condition of the country, such the elements of convulsion and upheaval fermenting beneath the thin crust of its social order, such its relations with the greatest naval Power of the world, in the month of April, 1887. From that time the march of events was rapid to the final disaster. V. THE FIRST ERUPTION. The 19th of April was a fateful day in the history of the Republic. On the 19th of April, 1775, was fought the battle of Lexington, from which the nation dated its birth as an independent Power. On the 19th of April, 1861, the Massachusetts Volunteers, hurrying to Washington to protect the national capital from the threatened attacks of Southern rebels, were fired upon in the streets of Baltimore by a mob of rebel sympathizers. On the 19th of April, 1887, began in bloody earnest the revolution which was fated to end in the utter extinction of the Republic and the erasure of its once proud name from the list of nations. The socialist leaders took to heart and profited by the lesson which the Cincinnati riots of 1884 had taught. Those disturbances began in the indignation of an outraged public, angered beyond endurance by the shameful, repeated, and 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 demoralizing defeats to which justice had been subjected in the local courts of law. But they soon took on a different cast. What had at first been the protest of good citizenship was transformed into a saturnalia of crime and ruffianism. Yet the very fact that good citizens had been concerned in the first day’s imprudences made the task of putting down the outlaws and criminals who continued the riots on the second and third days so much the more difficult. The suggestion contained in this was not to lie fallow in the secret councils where anarchy was plotted. Long after the conspirators were ready to strike, they delayed the blow, till an occasion should arise in which they might seem, for a time at least, to be the allies of good and patriotic citizens. Had a leader with a purpose been behind the Cincinnati riots, they saw that the work of suppressing them, after their initial success, would have taxed the resources of the country as well as the State. They waited for an opportunity. Composed of men whose grievance was against all law and order, and whose dream was of untrammelled personal liberty and license, the socialistic organizations had yet been gathered together, at this time, into a certain union. They aspired after anarchy, but had reason enough left to see that if they would destroy an organized government, they must themselves organize. They had a head, a mysterious centre known among outsiders and to the most of the socialists themselves as “The Council of Seven,” but whom the few fully initiated knew to be a single individual. Even to this day the name of this person is unrevealed. Like “The Man in the Iron Mask,” his identity promises to become one of the mysteries of the ages. Those who were permitted to share his counsels were few in number, and bound to him and to each other by terrible oaths requiring them to preserve eternal silence. Among themselves his name was never uttered or written. He was referred to sometimes as “Number One,” sometimes as “Ben Hassan,” sometimes, with an approach to familiarity, as “The Old Man.” Whoever he was, it is certain that he must have been a man of vast executive ability, of iron will, of amazingly fertile resources, and of a hatred of civilization and of the amenities of humanity which would have done credit to the prime minister of hell. He received the advice of his “cabinet” of confidential associates; he was in constant correspondence with socialistic societies all over the Union and in Europe: but it is the testimony of all the correspondence of this period so far unearthed that his rule was autocratic, and that even those who protested most fiercely against all distinction of rank and position yielded him for the time being a slavish obedience, holding in complete abeyance their dearest theories until such time as their schemes of disorganization and anarchy should have become successful. His headquarters were never mentioned, and his orders emanated from widely separated parts of the Union; but it was commonly believed that his principal abiding place was in Chicago. For years Chicago had been noted for the inefficiency and corruption of its courts, which were so manifest as to call down censure even from men who saw nothing serious in the decadence of courts elsewhere. Frequent miscarriages of justice had made the people of the city angry beyond measure; and the prophecy had been in many mouths that a repetition there of the Cincinnati riots, starting from a similar cause, was only a question of time. On the morning of the 19th of April, 1887, the jury which had been sitting in the case of Alfred McKenna, a young man charged with the murder of John P. Quillinan, returned a verdict finding McKenna guilty of assault and recommending him to mercy. The murder had been a peculiarly atrocious one. Quillinan and McKenna had been rivals for some minor local office, and had quarrelled. McKenna had followed Quillinan to his home and shot him in the presence of his wife and daughter, seriously wounding the little girl, who endeavored to protect her father’s life. There was no denial of these facts by the defence. But McKenna was a man of some social position, of considerable wealth, of handsome person and winning address. Moreover, he and his friends wielded a powerful political influence. The case had required three trials. Twice the jury had disagreed. The third trial lasted nearly a month, and the jury took five days to agree upon their scandalous verdict. It was handed to the clerk of the court in writing during a temporary adjournment, and the jury separated, first allowing it to be known that they had originally stood seven for acquittal to five for murder in the first degree, and that the seven had refused to accept any compromise more severe upon the prisoner than the one finally adopted. In less than an hour after the verdict had been announced, its character was known over the entire city. McKenna’s political friends rejoiced; but the vast majority of better citizens felt outraged beyond endurance. Angry knots of men gathered at every street corner. A fierce wave of indignation swept over the city. Into the midst of this public excitement came the news that McKenna had paid the fine of fifty dollars and costs which the court had imposed, and had left the court-house a free man, while Quillinan’s widow had been removed in a fainting-fit, her wounded daughter clinging to her dress, to the county poor-house. This news was like a shaft of lightning falling upon an oil-tank. In an instant the city blazed up with inextinguishable fury. A crowd of maddened men, including in their number many of the best and most respected citizens of Chicago, hurried with frenzied yells to the court-house. They filled its lobbies and surged into the room in which the judge who had fined McKenna was presiding over another case. He saw mischief in the faces of the very first who burst unceremoniously upon the speech of the drawling advocate before him. He heard something worse than mere mischief in the roar of passion and vengeance which swelled in the courtyard and the street. Hastily adjourning the court, he fled, barely in time to save his own life. Finding the jurymen who had returned the verdict in McKenna’s case already separated, the mob divided. A portion hurried in search of McKenna; others set out for the residences or places of business of the obnoxious jurymen; others remained to dismantle the court-room and hustle the officers who were unlucky enough to fall into their hands. McKenna heard of the mob and fled the city. Four of the seven jurymen who had voted “not guilty” also received warning, and escaped. Three were caught by the mob. Two were hanged to lamp-posts without a minute’s delay or the 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 opportunity being given them to say a word. The third, who was reported to have said, before going on the jury, that “hanging was played out in Chicago as well as New York,” was compelled to watch the execution of the other two, and taunted with his remark. His terror and abject pleas for mercy finally prevailed with his captors, who spared his life and set him free, with a few sharp cuts from a heavy whip which a dealer in saddlery had seized as he ran out of his store to join the crowd. But a second party coming up, enraged because so many of the unjust jurors had es...