THE ETHICS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS LEO J. ELDERS, SVD A study of the most important aspects in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas, with special emphasis on its current relevance. Keywords: Thomas Aquinas, Thomism, ethics. It is the purpose of this congress to show the lasting value of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, the patron saint of academic institutions, where theology and philosophy are taught not only at the speculative level but also in their applications for practical life. In this conference, the importance of Thomas’s moral thought should be brought out. Since the subject is immense and the time allotted is limited, I can only briefly touch on what I assume to be the most noteworthy themes, which, I hope, will show the unsurpassed depth and lasting truth of Thomas’s moral thought. 1. DID ST. THOMAS DEVELOP A PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS? A first question is whether we can speak of a Thomistic philosophical ethics. The Angelic Doctor was foremost a theologian, and never taught philosophy at the Faculty of Arts in Paris or in Naples. It is true that he wrote an in-depth commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, but some students of Thomas argue that his Aristotelian commentaries do not express Anuario Filosófico, XXXIX/2 (2006), 439-463 439 LEO J. ELDERS, SVD his own views but are just stating Aristotle’s positions with great clarity. Others, however, say that he is not a reliable interpreter of the Stagirite: he corrects him and introduces Christian viewpoints into his explanation of the text.1 Yet R. Gauthier, the editor of the remarkable Leonine edition of the Sententia in libros Ethicorum, has argued that Aquinas considered the Nicomachean Ethics not as a summary of Aristotle’s views, but simply as the moral philosophy.2 For St. Thomas, Aristotle’s text was a valuable treatise of ethics, whose contents he himself accepted. I must say that I fully agree with Fr. Gauthier’s appraisal.3 However, to perform an exposé of the science of morals according to the correct order of themes, as Thomas himself would write it, we must go beyond the Commentary and turn to the Second Part of the Summae Theologiae.4 It is true that the Summa is a theological treatise. Nevertheless, large sections of the text unfold at the level of natural reason (although they were elaborated in the light of the sed contra arguments, which are mostly taken from divine revelation or the doctrine of the Church, and are clearly subservient to the theology of faith). In the First Part, we find such texts in the articles on the Five Ways, the discussion of the attributes of God, and so forth. Similarly, in the Second Part we have a complete and well ordered exposition of ethics as elaborated by natural reason. When one carefully analyzes the relevant questions and articles this becomes obvious. This is the reason why in this conference I shall rely mainly on what Aquinas writes in the Summa. However, I have no wish to downgrade the theological value of the work, or to create a rupture between philosophical ethics and __________________________ 1. H. V. JAFFA, Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by St. Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics, Chicago, 1952. 2. S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, Sententia libri Ethicorum, ed. Leonina, I, 267*. 3. See “St. Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics”, in L.J. ELDERS SVD; K. HEDWICH, The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Città del Vaticano, 1984, pp. 9-49. 4. Cf. the preface to the Summa Theologiae: “secundum ordinem disci- plinae” and not “secundum quod requirebat librorum expositio.” 440 THE ETHICS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS moral theology.5 Man’s one and only ultimate end is the supernatural vision of God, and this dogma exercises its influence on the entire treatise. Thomas repeatedly stresses that the happiness which Aristotle’s philosophical ethics speak about, is imperfect6 and that man’s real happiness consists in the vision of God. When dealing with the natural law, Thomas continually stresses its dependence on the eternal law. Moreover, the natural law is completed by the Lex Nova, the grace of the Holy Spirit in Christians. But there is more: Thomas connects the intellectual virtues, which Aristotle had mentioned, with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, indicating that the natural virtues find their fulfillment through divine grace. Aristotle’s contemplation of the physical universe is to be replaced by a contemplation of the world of the world as God’s creation, and an understanding and enjoyment of revealed truth, in the presence of God. Although it is possible to construct a philosophical ethics on the basis of the questions of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae, the text remains a theological text because it is ordered to man’s supernatural life.7 Some authors have argued that because of the single, supernatural end of man an authentic philosophical ethics is not posible.8 According to Maritain, philosophical ethics considers man as if he were living in the state of uncorrupted nature, whereas in reality he is a member of fallen mankind. The principles upon which ethics is based, he adds, depend on theological insights and for that reason ethics is a science subject to theology. However, Maritain’s arguments were rejected by several leading __________________________ 5. Perhaps A. D. SERTILLANGES, La philosophie morale de saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris2, 1916, and M. WITTMANN, Die Ethik des hl. Thomas von Aquin, München, 1933, went into this direction. 6. In I Ethic., lect. 9. 7. Cf. A. PATFOORT, “Morale et pneumatologie chez Saint Thomas. Une observation de la Ia-IIae”, in La teologia morale nella storia e nella problematica attuale, Roma, 1960, 63-92. L. ELDERS, “La morale de saint Thomas, une éthique philosophique?”, Doctor Communis, (1977), pp. 192-205. 8. J. MARITAIN, De la philosophie chrétienne, Paris, 1933, pp. 101 ff.; Science et sagesse, Paris, 1935, pp. 327 ff.; Du savoir moral, Paris, 1936. See also J. PIEPER, Hinführung zu Thomas von Aquin, p. 211. 441 LEO J. ELDERS, SVD Thomists.9 Moreover, it is obvious that there does exist an impressive philosophical ethics. One only has to read the Nicomachean Ethics to convince oneself. Where Aristotle’s treatise was incomplete, St. Thomas has completed it; he presented its contents in a coherent form, in particular by introducing the natural law, the first principles of the practical intellect and by reordering the virtues. 2. THE SOURCES OF AQUINAS’S MORAL THOUGHT With regard to the question of the sources of Aquinas’s ethics one must mention in the first place Holy Scripture, the doctrine of the Church, the writing of the Church Fathers, especially St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostome, St. Gegory of Nyssa (Nemesius), St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, St. John Damascene, Ps.-Dionysius, et al. These thinkers exercised a direct influence on St. Thomas’s moral theology and an indirect influence on his ethics. In regards to this question, we must point out that several of the Fathers, and indeed Aquinas himself, noted that that which the divine law demands from us in the field of ethics, is in agreement with what our human nature tells us to do-10 At the philosophical level the Nicomachean Ethics is of fundamental importance to Thomas. He is in agreement with Aristotle as to the nature of ethics, the role of contemplation, and the doctrine of the virtues. He takes over several definitions, but delves deeper into the intelligibility of human acts and uncovers fundamental __________________________ 9. See J. M. RAMÍREZ, “Sur l’organisation du savoir moral”, Bulletin Thomiste, 4 (1935), pp. 423 ff.; TH. DEMAN, “L’organisation du savoir moral”, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, (1934), pp. 258-280; R. MCINERNY, The Question of Christian Ethics, Washington D.C., 1993. See also V. J. BOURKE, “Moral Philosophy Without Revelation”, The Thomist, 40 (1976), pp. 555-570. 10. Summa contra Gentiles, III, c. 129: “Ea quae divina lege praecipiuntur rectitudinem habent, non solum quia sunt lege posita, sed etiam secundum naturam.” 442 THE ETHICS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS structures. He transforms Aristotle’s not always coherent survey of virtuous acts, and in particular of prudential activity, into a moral philosophy based on the first principles of the practical intellect.11 In this connection one should also mention the doctrine of the Stoa, with which Thomas was acquainted through Ambrose, Augustine, Cicero and Seneca. In the last few years some have spoken of a far-reaching influence of the Stoa on Aquinas, in particular with regard to his doctrine on the natural law. However, if we leave aside the doctrine on natural law, a careful study of the passages where the Stoics are mentioned shows that in the great majority of cases Thomas rejects their views and prefers the position of the Peripatetics.12 3. THE NATURE OF ETHICS A next point to be mentioned is the nature of ethics. Ethics is a practical science, concerned with human actions in so far as they are related to each other and ordered to the end. Aristotle stressed the practical nature of ethics: it does not tell us so much what virtue is, as much as it aims at making us good persons.13 St. Thomas, on the other hand, emphasizes the cognitive nature of ethics more than Aristotle. In order to lead our life as we ought, knowledge of the end is necessary;14 however, this knowledge should be the basis for right acts. But how one ought to act in concrete circumstances is determined by prudence, rather than by the inevitably general knowledge of moral __________________________ 11. See our “St. Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics”, in L. ELDERS; K. HEDWICH, op. cit., p. 47. 12. Examples are the following dicta: “Omnia peccata esse paria”; “omnes passiones esse malas”; “omnem delectationem esse malam”; “bona temporalia non esse hominis bona”; “necessitate quadam fatali hominis vitam duci,” etc. See also M. SPANNEUT, “Influences stoïciennes sur la pensée morale de saint Thomas d’Aquin”, in L. ELDERS; K. HEDWICH, op. cit., pp. 50-79. 13. Ethic. Nich. 1103b3. 14. In I Ethic., lect. 2, p. 8, lin. 52-71 (Leonine edition). 443 LEO J. ELDERS, SVD philosophy.15 Ethics considers man’s actions as directed to his ultimate end. Aristotle distinguishes between three branches of ethics: the study of human acts as directed to man’s end, man’s obligations in the context of family life, and man’s task in political society. In his treatment of the main virtues Aquinas deals with these various tasks, obligations and rights of human beings. The ethics of Aquinas is dominated by the fact that all beings strive for the good. All our choices and actions must be directed to what is really good for us. Metaphysics shows that the good, the object of our appetite, is being. It is our task to realize ourselves by uniting ourselves with the good. Ethics does not aim at perfecting us as individuals, so that we might stand in solitude amid a neutral environment. The end of man is to be united with the good, that is with reality as it is in itself.16 This means that ethics instructs us to direct our appetite to those things which really perfect us.17 Being perfects us,18 and God does so in a superlative way, since he is the cause of all good things.19 4. THE INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER OF ETHICS: RIGHT REASON AND THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT As Aristotle had done, Aquinas stresses the role of reason in establishing the norms of conduct. On several occasions he quotes the saying of Dionysius: “Bonum autem hominis est, secundum __________________________ 15. Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 6, proem.: the science of morals is first elaborated in general, next it is applied to particular actions. 16. Q. d. de veritate, q. 1, a. 2: “motus appetitus terminatur ad res”; q. 8, a. 4, ad 5: “affectus terminatur ad res ipsas.” 17. S. c. G. III, c. 109: “Quaelibet voluntas naturaliter vult illud quod est proprium volentis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse perfectum.” Cf. M. C. DONADIO MAGGI DE GANDOLFI, Amor y bien. Los problemas del amor en Santo Tomás de Aquino, Buenos Aires 1999, p. 105-147. 18. Q. d. de veritate, q. 21, a. 1: “Ens est perfectivum alterius ...” 19. In I Ethic., lect. 7. 444 THE ETHICS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS rationem esse.”20 However, he notices a problem here. Reason does not become right reason just by itself. Reason considers something to be good when it agrees with our basic natural inclinations. At this particular point the intellect formulates the first principles of moral life. Subsequently reason judges our actions with the help of this set of first principles of the moral order. Nature places these principles in us, as it also does for the first principles of the speculative order. These principles come to man naturally on the basis of the most fundamental inclinations of the appetite, so that we can say that these principles are seeds of the virtues.21 A person makes himself virtuous by acting in conformity with these principles.22 When one acts repeatedly according to reason, the “form of reason” is impressed in the appetite and the virtues are formed. There are a number of fundamental inclinations in us, such as keeping ourselves alive, seeking shelter, associating with others and forming communities, developing ourselves, respecting our parents and leaders, securing the survival of mankind by procreation, looking for the meaning of life and venerating the highest principle and origin of things. In a luminous text, Thomas writes that we experience as good those things to which we have a natural inclination.23 Our reason establishes that such objects are good. Now that which falls under the order of reason, also falls under the order established by God himself.24 Reason is the measure of what is moral.25 Although to a certain extent this doctrine had been prepared by Plato and __________________________ 20. De divinis nominibus, c. 4 (the wording of the original text is negative: PG 3, 733). 21. Q. d. de virtutibus, q. 1, a. 8, ad 10. 22. In VII Ethic., lect. 8. 23. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2: “Omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda.” 24. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 72, a. 4: “Quaecumque continentur sub ordine rationis, continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei.” 25. S. c. G. III, c. 3: “Moralium autem mensura est ratio.” 445 LEO J. ELDERS, SVD Aristotle, Thomas developed it in a new way. However, reason, insofar as it determines the morality of our acts, must not be seen as a self-sufficient and arrogant power; it remains dependent on the order of nature. The entire treatise of the moral virtues in the Secunda Secundae is dominated by two theses: First, that we ourselves must determine what, in the different fields of human activity, is according to right reason, and second, that actually practicing the virtues must also be accompanied by reason,26 since reason must determine the mean of the virtues. In doing so it has a certain margin.27 In the activity of reason one may distinguish between that of higher reason (ratio superior) and that of lower reason (ratio inferior). The former evaluates actions and situation in the light of God’s plan, the latter considers them from a human point of view. Another distinction is that between universal and particular reason: the wife of a murderer on death row and a judge may have a different appraisal of what the man’s punishment should be. When considering a particular good one must always take into account the common good.28 It is obvious that the doctrine of reason as determining the morality of our actions is the very center of the ethics of Aquinas.29 But this conclusion entails also the doctrine of the first principles. __________________________ 26. In VI Ethic., lect. 11: “Virtutes sunt secundum rationem et cum ratione.” Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 58, a. 4, ad 3. 27. Q. d. de virtutibus, q. 1, a. 13, ad 18: “Medium virtutis secundum rationem aliquam latitudinem habet.” 28. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 19, a. 10: “Non est autem recta voluntas alicuius hominis volentis aliquod bonum particulare nisi referat illud in bonum commune sicut in finem, cum etiam naturalis appetitus cuiuslibet partis ordinetur in bonum commune totius.” 29. Cf. our essay “Bonum humanae animae est secundum rationem esse”, Lugano Theological Review, (1999), pp. 75-90. 446 THE ETHICS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 5. THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT: THE NATURAL LAW All acts of the intellect and the will in us are derived from that which is according to our nature,30 since any reasoning depends on the principles which are known to us by nature, while tending to good things depends on the natural inclination to the last end. The natural law consists in the first principles of the practical intellect, which the intellect apprehends immediately because of our fundamental inclinations. Thomas holds that the order man must follow is based on human nature, and therefore on ontological structures: the “ought” is derived from the “is”.31 However, differing from a widely held view in his time, Thomas stresses that the natural law as such is not inborn in man, although its principles are given with human nature. He is referring to the basic inclinations and their perception by the intellect, which by spontaneous acts formulates the contents of the natural law. Since it is rooted in human nature, the natural law is universal and permanent.32 St. Thomas’s argument makes man’s natural inclinations the foundation of the natural law precepts, formulated by the intellect, and so connects them to the eternal law. On several occasions he quotes Psalm 4, 6: “The light of your face, Lord, shines upon my mind” to stress that the insights of our reason go back to God.33 Certain authors, as G. Grisez, J. Finnis and J. Boyle, attempted to safeguard these precepts of the natural law while denying their basis in man’s natural inclinations. With regard to this point they subscribed to David Hume’s empiricist position, according to which it is illicit to attempt to derive the “ought” from __________________________ 30. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2. 31. See U. KUHN, Via caritatis. Theologie des Gesetzes bei Thomas von Aquin, Göttingen, 1965, p. 106. 32. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 4 & 5 33. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 3: “... quasi lumen rationis naturalis quo discernimus quid sit bonum et quid malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura.” 447 LEO J. ELDERS, SVD the “is”,34 while for Aquinas a human act is morally good when conform to man’s nature and ultimate end. However, for Finnis and his followers these inclinations are morally neutral. What really happens, Finnis says, is that man experiences certain objects as good, such as eating reasonably. Finnis enumerates several such basic goods which contribute to man’s human fulfillment. In directing oneself to these goods, one acts morally. On the other hand, Thomas explicitly states that the insights corresponding to these inclinations are the natural law.35 Although Finnis appears to maintain the contents of the natural law, he separates himself from Thomas in denying their foundation in our natural inclinations, and so he undermines some of its precepts. For instance, it may happen that in certain fields, such as that of procreation, some people no longer experience certain goods as Basic.36 Some philosophers have suspected that Finnis and the authors within his group have yielded ground to a widespread contemporary distrust of human nature as the foundation of morality, as well as to Kantian philosophy. Other critics argue that human nature is not immutable and, therefore, cannot be the foundation of a permanent natural law. However, despite any changes which may occur in man’s attitudes and ways of life, man’s nature as a rational animal remains the same. St. Thomas’s doctrine of the natural law stands unshaken. As Cardinal Newman says in his The Idea of a University, the basic precepts of moral life are reflected in our conscience as the mountains surrounding a lake reflect upon the surface of the water. Storms may temporarily disturb this reflection, but when the weather, i.e. man’s inner life, becomes quiet again, they re-appear. This doctrine of the natural law is the basis of man’s natural rights. In the early Middle Ages the relation between the spiritual order, as represented by the Church and man’s secular life was not __________________________ 34. Treatise of Human Understanding, II, 1, 1. 35. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2: “... et secundum hanc inclinationem pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur.” 36. On Finnis’s theory see his Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford (several reprints). 448