The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America Essays by Warren E. Buffett Selected, Arranged, and Introduced by Lawrence A. Cunningham Includes Previously Copyrighted Material Reprinted with Permission THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA Essays by Warren E. Buffett Chairman and CEO Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Selected, Arranged, and Introduced by Lawrence A. Cunningham Professor of Law Director, The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Governance Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University © 1997; 1998 Lawrence A. Cunningham All Rights Reserved Includes Previously Copyrighted Material Reprinted with Permission TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. ............................................... 5 PROLOGUE. ................................................... 27 I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. ........................... 29 A. Owner-Related Business Principles................ 29 B. Boards and Managers............................. 38 C. The Anxieties ofPlant Closings 43 D. An Owner-Based Approach to Corporate Charity. 47 E. A Principled Approach to Executive Pay.......... 54 II. CORPORATE FINANCE AND INVESTING. ............... 63 A. Mr. Market........................................ 63 B. Arbitrage.......................................... 66 C. Debunking Standard Dogma 72 D. "Value" Investing: A Redundancy................. 82 E. Intelligent Investing. ............................... 89 F. Cigar Butts and the Institutional Imperative 93 G. Junk Bonds. ....................................... 97 H. Zero-Coupon Bonds. .............................. 103 I. Preferred Stock 110 III. COMMON STOCK. ...................................... 119 A. The Bane of Trading: Transaction Costs..... ...... 119 B. Attracting the Right Sort ofInvestor. .............. 121 C. Dividend Policy.................................... 123 D. Stock Splits and Trading Activity 127 E. Shareholder Strategies 130 F. Berkshire's Recapitalization 132 IV. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS. ........................ 137 A. Bad Motives and High Prices. .. ........ .. .. .... 137 B. Sensible Stock Repurchases Versus Greenmail 147 C. Leveraged Buyouts 148 D. Sound Acquisition Policies 151 E. On Selling One's Business 154 V. ACCOUNTING AND TAXATION. ........................ 159 A. A Satire on Accounting Shenanigans .............. 159 B. Look-Through Earnings. .......................... 165 C. Economic Goodwill Versus Accounting Goodwill. 171 D. Owner Earnings and the Cash Flow Fallacy 180 E. Intrinsic Value, Book Value, and Market Price. ... 187 F. Segment Data and Consolidation. ................. 191 G. Deferred Taxes.... .... .. .. ..... .................... 193 H. Retiree Benefits and Stock Options......... ....... 196 I. Distribution ofthe Corporate Tax Burden 200 J. Taxation and Investment Philosophy 204 EPILOGUE 207 AFTERWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. ..................... 213 INDEX OF COMPANIES 215 INDEX OF NAMES............................................. 217 CONCEPT GLOSSARY.......................................... 219 INTRODUCTION Lawrence A. Cunningham Experienced readers of Warren Buffett's letters to the share holders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. have gained an enormously valuable informal education. The letters distill in plain words all the basic principles of sound business practices. On selecting man agers and investments, valuing businesses, and using financial in formation profitably, the writings are broad in scope, and long on wisdom. Yet until now the letters existed in a format that was neither easily accessible nor organized in any thematic way. Consequently, the ideas have not been given the more widespread attention they deserve. The motivation for this compendium and for the sympo sium featuring it is to correct an inefficiency in the marketplace of ideas by disseminating the essays to a wider audience. The central theme uniting Buffett's lucid essays is that the principles offundamental valuation analysis, first formulated by his teachers Ben Graham and David Dodd, should guide investment practice. Linked to that theme are management principles that de fine the proper role of corporate managers as the stewards of in vested capital, and the proper role of shareholders as the suppliers and owners ofcapital. Radiating from these main themes are prac tical and sensible lessons on mergers and acquisitions, accounting, and taxation. Many of Buffett's lessons directly contradict what has been taught in business and law schools during the past thirty years, and what has been practiced on Wall Street and throughout corporate America during that time. Much of that teaching and practice eclipsed what Graham and Dodd had to say; Buffett is their prodi gal pupil, stalwartly defending their views. The defenses run from an impassioned refutation of modern finance theory, to convincing demonstrations of the deleterious effects of using stock options to compensate managers, to persuasive arguments about the exagger ated benefits of synergistic acquisitions and cash flow analysis. Buffett has applied the traditional principles as chiefexecutive officer ofBerkshire Hathaway, a company with roots in a group of textile operations begun in the early 1800s. Buffett took the helm ofBerkshire in 1964, when its book value per share was $19.46 and its intrinsic value per share far lower. Today, its book value per share is around $20,000 and its intrinsic value far higher. The 5 6 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1 growth rate in book value per share during that period is 23.8% compounded annually. Berkshire is now a holding company engaged in a variety of businesses, not including textiles. Berkshire's most important busi ness is insurance, carried on principally through its 100% owned subsidiary, GEICO Corporation, the seventh largest auto insurer in the United States. Berkshire publishes The Buffalo News and owns other businesses that manufacture or distribute products ranging from encyclopedias, home furnishings, and cleaning sys tems, to chocolate candies, ice cream, footwear, uniforms, and air compressors. Berkshire also owns substantial equity interests in major corporations, including American Express, Coca-Cola, Walt Disney, Freddie Mac, Gillette, McDonald's, The Washington Post, and Wells Fargo. Buffett and Berkshire Vice Chairman Charlie Munger have built this $50 billion enterprise by investing in businesses with ex cellent economic characteristics and run by outstanding managers. While they prefer negotiated acquisitions of 100% of such a busi ness at a fair price, they take a "double-barreled approach" ofbuy ing on the open market less than 100% of such businesses when they can do so at a pro-rata price well below what it would take to buy 100%. The double-barreled approach has paid off handsomely. The value of marketable securities in Berkshire's portfolio, on a per share basis, increased from $4 in 1965 to over $22,000 in 1995, a 33.4% annual increase. Per share operating earnings increased in the same period from just over $4 to over $258, a 14.79% annual increase. These extraordinary results continue, in recent years in creasing at similar rates. According to Buffett, these results follow not from any master plan but from focused investing-allocating capital by concentrating on businesses with outstanding economic characteristics and run by first-rate managers. Buffett views Berkshire as a partnership among him, Munger and other shareholders, and virtually all his $15-plus billion net worth is in Berkshire stock. His economic goal is long-term-to maximize Berkshire's per share intrinsic value by owning all or part of a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and above-average returns. In achieving this goal, Buffett foregoes ex pansion for the sake ofexpansion and foregoes divestment ofbusi nesses so long as they generate some cash and have good management. 1997] THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT 7 Berkshire retains and reinvests earnings when doing so deliv ers at least proportional increases in per share market value over time. It uses debt sparingly and sells equity only when it receives as much in value as it gives. Buffettpenetrates accounting conven tions, especially those that obscure real economic earnings. These owner-related business principles, as Buffett calls them, are the organizing themes of the accompanying essays. As organ ized, the essays constitute an elegant and instructive manual on management, investment, finance, and accounting. Buffett's basic principles form the framework for a rich range of positions on the wide variety of issues that exist in all aspects of business. They go far beyond mere abstract platitudes. It is true that investors should focus on fundamentals, be patient, and exercise good judgment based on common sense. In Buffett's essays, these advisory tidbits are anchored in the more concrete principles by which Buffett lives and thrives. Many people speculate on what Berkshire and Buffett are do ing or plan to do. Their speculation is sometimes right and some times wrong, but always foolish. People would be far better offnot attempting to ferret out what specific investments are being made at Berkshire, but thinking about how to make sound investment selections based on Berkshire's teaching. That means they should think about Buffett's writings and learn from them, rather than try to emulate Berkshire's portfolio. Buffett modestly confesses that most of the ideas expressed in his essays were taught to him by Ben Graham. He considers him self the conduit through which Graham's ideas have proven their value. In allowing me to prepare this material, Buffett said that I could be the popularizer of Graham's ideas and Buffett's applica tion of them. Buffett recognizes the risk of popularizing his busi ness and investment philosophy. But he notes that he benefited enormously from Graham's intellectual generosity and believes it is appropriate that he pass the wisdom on, evenifthat means creat ing investment competitors. To that end, my most important role has been to organize the essays around the themes reflected in this collection. This introduction to the major themes encapsulates the basics and locates them in the context of current thinking. The es says follow. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE For Buffett, managers are stewards of shareholder capital. The best managers think like owners in making business decisions. 8 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1 They have shareholder interests at heart. But even first-rate man agers will sometimes have interests that conflict with those of shareholders. How to ease those conflicts and to nurture manage rial stewardship have been constant objectives of Buffett's forty year career and a prominent theme of his essays. The essays ad dress some of the most important governance problems. The first is not dwelt on in the essays but rather permeates them: it is the importance of forthrightness and candor in commu nications by managers to shareholders. Buffett tells it like it is, or atleast as he sees it. That quality attracts an interested shareholder constituency to Berkshire, which flocks to its annual meetings in increasing numbers every year. Unlike what happens at most an nual shareholder meetings, a sustained and productive dialogue on business issues results. Besides the owner-orientation reflected in Buffett's disclosure practice and the owner-related business principles summarized above, the next management lesson is to dispense with formulas of managerial structure. Contrary to textbook rules on organizational behavior, mapping an abstract chain ofcommand onto aparticular business situation, according to Buffett, does little good. What matters is selectingpeople who are able, honest, and hard-working. Having first-rate people on the team is more important than de signing hierarchies and clarifying who reports to whom about what and at what times. Special attention must be paid to selecting a CEO because of three major differences Buffett identifies between CEOs and other employees. First, standards for measuring a CEO's performance are inadequate or easy to manipulate, so a CEO's performance is harder to measure than that of most workers. Second, no one is senior to the CEO, so no senior person's performance can be mea sured either. Third, a board of directors cannot serve that senior role since relations between CEOs and boards are conventionally congenial. Major reforms are often directed toward aligning management and shareholder interests or enhancing board oversight of CEO performance. Stock options for management were touted as one method; greater emphasis on board processes was another. Sepa rating the identities and functions of the Chairman of the Board and the CEO or appointment of standing audit, nominating and compensation committees were also heralded as promising re forms. None ofthese innovations has solved governance problems, however, and some have exacerbated them. 1997] THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT 9 The best solution, Buffett instructs, is to take great care in identifying CEOs who will perform capably regardless of weak structural restraints. Outstanding CEOs do not need a lot of coaching from owners, although they can benefit from having a similarly outstanding board. Directors therefore must be chosen for their business savvy, their interest, and their owner-orientation. According to Buffett, one of the greatest problems among boards in corporate America is that members are selected for other rea sons, such as adding diversity or prominence to a board. Most reforms are painted with a broad brush, without noting the major differences among types of board situations that Buffett identifies. For example, director power is weakest in the case where there is a controlling shareholder who is also the manager. When disagreements arise between the directors and management, there is little a director can do other than to object and, in serious circumstances, resign. Director power is strongest at the other ex treme, where there is a controlling shareholder who does not par ticipate in management. The directors can take matters directly to the controlling shareholder when disagreement arises. The most common situation, however, is a corporation without acontrolling shareholder. This is where management problems are most acute, Buffett says. It would be helpful ifdirectors could sup ply necessary discipline, but board congeniality usually prevents that. To maximize board effectiveness in this situation, Buffett be lieves the board should be small in size and composed mostly of outside directors. The strongest weapon a director can wield in these situations remains his or her threat to resign. All these situations do share a common characteristic: the ter rible manager is a lot easier to confront or remove than the medio cre manager. A chiefproblem in all governance structures, Buffett emphasizes, is that in corporate America evaluation ofchiefexecu tive officers is never conducted in regular meetings in the absence ofthat chiefexecutive. Holding regular meetings without the chief executive to review his or her performance would be a marked im provement in corporate governance. Evaluating CEO performance is even harder than it may seem. Both short-term results and potential long-term results must be assessed. If only short-term results mattered, many managerial decisions would be much easier, particularly those relating to busi nesses whose economic characteristics have eroded. For an ex treme but not atypical example, consider Al Dunlap's aggressive plan to turn around ailing Sunbeam. Dunlap fired half of Sun- 10 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [VoL 19:1 beam's workers and closed or consolidated more than halfits facili ties, including some engaged in the textile business in New England. Boasting that he was attacking the entire company, Dun lap declared that his planwas as carefullyplotted as the invasion of Normandy. Driven solely by the primacy ofthe short-term bottom line, that decision was easy. The decision is much harder, however, if you recognize that superior long-term results can flow from earning the trust of social communities, as Buffett's consideration of the anxieties of plant closings suggests. The economic characteristics of Berkshire's old textile business had begun to erode by the late 1970s. Buffett had hoped to devise a reversal ofits misfortunes, noting how important Berkshire's textile business was to its employees and local commu nities in New England, and how able and understanding manage ment and labor had been in addressing the economic difficulties. Buffett kept the ailing plant alive through 1985, but a financial re versal could not be achieved and Buffett eventually closed it. Whether Buffett would approve of Dunlap-style short-termism is not clear, but his own style of balancing short-term results with long-term prospects based on community trust is certainly differ ent. It is not easy, but it is intelligent. Sometimes management interests conflict with shareholder in terests in subtle or easily disguised ways. Take corporate philan thropy, for example. At most major corporations, management allocates a portion of corporate profit to charitable concerns. The charities are chosen by management, for reasons often unrelated either to corporate interests or shareholder interests. Most state laws permit management to make these decisions, so long as aggre gate annual donations are reasonable in amount, usually not greater than 10% of annual net profits. Berkshire does things differently. Shareholders designate charities to which the corporation donates. Nearly all shareholders participate in allocating millions of dollars per year to charitable organizations of their choice. This is an imaginative practical re sponse to a tension that is at the core of the management-share holder relationship. It is surprising that other American corporations do not follow this model of corporate charitable giv ing. Part of the reason may be the lack of long-term ownership orientation that characterizes the shareholder profiles of many American corporations. Ifso, this demonstrates a cost ofthe short term mentality of America's investment community.