THE ERRING CONSCIENCE: AQUINAS ON FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETY ___________________ A Paper Presented To The Philosophy and Humanities Conference Houston Community College November 3–4, 2017 ___________________ by Timothy Jacobs University of St. Thomas [email protected] Aquinas on Conscience 1 ABSTRACT Today’s political landscape encourages freedom of conscience while maintaining the tolerance of pluralism. But can conscience be wrong? Pervasive emotivism in Western culture defines morality as an expression of opinion elevates conscience to the supreme status of being the only judge of morality. In this view, authenticity is the only criterion for morality and conscience is reduced to peace of mind or reassurance about one’s choices. This view of conscience ultimately undermines the possibility of maintaining basic shared values that are necessary for pluralism. Contrary to the emotivist view, the objectivist view provides a clear and precise definition of conscience that encourages freedom of conscience as well as providing guidelines for its limits based upon a distinction between internal motivation and external objective morality. This position will be presented with recourse to Thomas Aquinas and his advocates as they allow for the possibility of an erring conscience that leaves room to grow and leaves room for society to judge right and wrong behavior. I will cover such questions such as the following: Can conscience be mistaken? Does an erring conscience impose moral obligation? Can doing the right action feel wrong? How can freedom of conscience be encouraged while providing safeguards against moral anarchy? KEYWORDS Pluralism Existentialism Conscience Freedom of Conscience Thomas Aquinas Natural Law Ethic Moral Objectivism Subjectivism Aquinas on Conscience 2 THE ERRING CONSCIENCE: AQUINAS ON FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETY Although the current verbiage of the First Amendment does not explicitly mention conscience, an earlier draft proposed by Samuel Livermore states, “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience,” and the Supreme Court has often interpreted the first amendment to claim that “Freedom of conscience . . . cannot be restricted by law” or that “the individual freedom of conscience [is] protected by the First Amendment.”1 In affirming freedom of conscience, we may ask whether people’s consciences can lead them into intolerable behavior. If they do, social commentators are quick to cry “hate speech” in a modern witch hunt, McCarthyism, or communist blacklisting. If society is to survive pluralism, we must consider whether a conscience can be in error. In other words, it is not enough to say someone’s action is motivated by conscience. It must also be asked whether their action was right. This distinction cannot be established with the emotivist explanation of morality prevalent in American culture today. I will utilize the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Joseph Ratzinger, Pope John Paul II to argue for an objectivist definition of conscience. This explanation will provide a view of the erring conscience that both encourages the freedom of conscience as well as providing guidelines for its limits in a pluralistic society. 1 Samuel Livermore, Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 1st Congress, 1st Session, August 15, ​ ​ 1789; Owen Roberts, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Justice John Paul Stevens, Wallace v. Jaffree, ​ ​ ​ ​ 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Aquinas on Conscience 3 Two Approaches to Conscience: Subjectivism and Objectivism David Hume famously said that morals are expressions of opinion and emotion.2 A.J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell were more recent proponents of this view. If morals are a matter of opinion, then one opinion cannot be more correct than another. This has created the present landscape of irreconcilable pluralism. Bernard Williams says, “We must reject the objectivist view of ethical life as . . . a pursuit of ethical truth. . . . Our conception of the world as the object of our beliefs can do no better than repeat the beliefs we take to represent it. . . . [Science] has some chance of being . . . [an] account of how the world really is, while ethical thought has no [such] chance.”3 Williams says, morals cannot be founded on a description of the world, so we cannot reasonably hope for a convergence of ethical opinion. There is no objective standard by which to judge one opinion as more correct than another. Pluralism impacts civil policies regarding freedom of conscience where law cannot prefer one ideology to another.Yet, civil laws necessarily favor some opinions over others as an extension of the shared values of the culture. In the most controversial cases presented in the Supreme Court, favor is not clearly adjudicated. On June 6, 2017, the Supreme Court reopened a case on religious liberty where a Colorado baker lost lower court battles over his refusal to create a wedding cake for a gay couple. The baker cited his religious beliefs and freedom of conscience. Of course, this comes in the wake of the 2015 Obergefell decision to permit gay marriage nationally.4 2 David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in John Cottingham Western Philosophy: An ​ ​ ​ Anthology, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 500-506. ​ 3 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Collins/Fontana, 1985), 135-155. ​ ​ 4 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 23 (2015) ​ ​ Aquinas on Conscience 4 Further examples of controversy abound. In recent memory Kim Davis, a Kentucky clerk, refused in 2015 to sign marriage certificates for gay couples on the basis of conscience. Similar controversies continue as the United States legal system attempts impartiality in cases where a clear judgment must be made, and that clear judgment will necessarily offend someone’s conscience. If Western culture is to survive pluralism, some consensus must be established regarding the limits of conscience. Pope John Paul II says, "The dignity of the human person is a concern of which people of our time are becoming increasingly more aware." It is upon this proper value that there is a "demand that people be permitted to 'enjoy the use of their own responsible judgment and freedom, and decide on their actions on grounds of duty and conscience, without external pressure or coercion.' In particular, the right to religious freedom and to respect for conscience on its journey towards the truth is increasingly perceived as the foundation of the cumulative rights of the person.”5 John Paul affirms modern progress in encouraging the freedom of conscience, but, it has seen widespread misapplication. He states: Certain currents of modern thought have gone so far as to exalt freedom to such an extent ​ that it becomes an absolute, which would then be the source of values. . . . The individual ​ conscience is accorded the status of a supreme tribunal of moral judgment which hands down categorical and infallible decisions about good and evil. . . . But in this way the inescapable claims of truth disappear, yielding their place to a criterion of sincerity, authenticity and 'being at peace with oneself,' so much so that some have come to adopt a radically subjectivist conception of moral judgment.6 John Paul observes that conscience has gained a supreme status such that authenticity is valued at the exclusion of truth. If authenticity is the only test for moral validity, we will find 5 Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor: Encyclical Letter, (Boston, MA: St. Paul Books & Media, 1993), ​ ​ chapter 2, section 31. 6 John Paul II, chapter 2, §§ 31-32. Aquinas on Conscience 5 ourselves in an irreducible pluralism and “a radically subjectivist conception of moral judgment.” Conscience, in an emotivist culture, is simply “being at peace with oneself.” Hume said, “Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, and satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are circumstances very requisite to happiness.”7 Without anchoring conscience to an external standard, all manner of sociopathy will be permitted.8 John Paul says further, Once the idea of a universal truth about the good, knowable by human reason, is lost, inevitably the notion of conscience also changes. Conscience is no longer considered in its primordial reality as an act of a person's intelligence, the function of which is to apply the universal knowledge of the good in a specific situation and thus to express a judgment about the right conduct to be chosen here and now. Instead, there is a tendency to grant to the individual conscience the prerogative of independently determining the criteria of good and evil and then acting accordingly. Such an outlook is quite congenial to an individualist ethic, wherein each individual is faced with his own truth, different from the truth of others. Taken to its extreme consequences, this individualism leads to a denial of the very idea of human nature.9 John Paul here defines the implications of emotivism for two distinct views of conscience. Emotivism considers the conscience to be a subjective emotion of reassurance that ​ ​ equates to a supreme judge of morality while objectivism considers the conscience to be an ​ ​ application of the knowledge of general external truths to particular situations. There are many varieties of these two approaches to conscience, but a broad characterization will suffice for the present discussion. 7 David Hume, 506. 8 For more on the relationship between conscience and authority, see Reinhard Hutter, “Conscience 'Truly So Called' and Its Counterfeit: Newman and Aquinas on What Conscience is and Why it Matters," Nova et Vetera ​ 13:3 (2014): 701-767; and Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, "Conscience and Truth," presented at the 10th Workshop for Bishops, February 1991, Dallas, Texas. 9 John Paul II, chapter 2, §§ 31-32. Aquinas on Conscience 6 Conscience and Rational Nature John Paul attaches the objectivist view to human nature, affirming essentialism and denying existentialism. The moral law, or natural law, is the external moral standard discoverable by all humans in virtue of their rational nature. Citing the Second Vatican Council, John Paul quotes, “In the depths of his conscience man detects a law which he does not impose on himself, but which holds him to obedience.”10 In common human experience, conscience is not merely one’s emotional preference but often works against one’s emotional preference, leading the person to sacrifice their desires for the greater good. The conscience as defined by John Paul is a practical judgment “which applies to a concrete situation the rational conviction that one must love and do good and avoid evil. This first principle of practical reason is part of the natural law.”11 The conscience is analogous to the Supreme Court applying the general, constant moral principles of the Constitution to new particular situations. In the objectivist view conscience forms practical judgments as an expression of reason where the will may choose to affirm or deny it the counsel of conscience. In the existential view, the distinction between knowledge and choice becomes thin as one cannot distinguish between one’s opinion about morality and the external standard of morality.12 In existentialism, we cannot ask if someone’s conscience “measures up” to the moral standard but can only say that a person’s decision is moral if it is authentic. In the objectivist view, since conscience is an application of knowledge, ignorance of moral principles can lead to an error of conscience. 10 John Paul II, chapter 2, § 54. 11 John Paul II, chapter 2, § 59. 12John Paul II, chapter 2, § 55. Aquinas on Conscience 7 Thomas Aquinas on Conscience Pope John Paul II receives his view of conscience from Thomas Aquinas, to which I will now turn for a detailed explanation of conscience. In Summa Theologiæ and De Veritate, ​ ​ ​ ​ Aquinas asks several questions about the nature of the conscience. He defines conscience as an ​ act of practical reason that applies general knowledge of general moral principles to particular situations.13 It applies knowledge to situations in two important ways: (1) we prospectively judge ​ ​ ​ that something should or should not be done in the future, (3) we retrospectively judge that ​ ​ something was done well or not well as our conscience excuses or accuses us. It is important to distinguish between an intellectual act and an act of the will, which are two distinct powers or abilities that a person has. A person may be smart and use their free-will to do harm, like an evil genius. An agent may know perfectly well what is right and choose otherwise. This brings us to Aquinas’s next question. Can Conscience be Mistaken? Can conscience be mistaken? Aquinas says that there are two ways the conscience may err: (1) an error in content and (2) an error in application.14 The act of conscience may be seen as a syllogism of practical reason with two premises: (1) an assertion of a general moral principle, and (2) application of this generality to a particular situation.15 The syllogism will look like this: 13 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Benziger Bros. ​ ​ ed., (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1947), Prima Pars, Question 79, Article 13, henceforth abbreviated in the form ST I.79.13; see also Thomas Aquinas, Question 17, Article 1 of De Veritate, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J., ​ ​ ed. Joseph Kenny, O.P. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), accessed from http://www.dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer17.htm on April 19, 2017. Henceforth abbreviated in the form DV 17.1. 14 DV 17.2 15 Steven J. Jensen, "The Error of the Passions," The Thomist 73 (2009): 349-79. ​ ​ Aquinas on Conscience 8 P1: “I must not commit murder.” P2: “Killing this person is murder.” Therefore: “I must not kill this person.” Mistakes of the major premise come when a person thinks a general principle is good when it is in fact bad. The second form of error occurs when the general principle is known, but conscience applies it wrongly in poor judgment. For example, I would commit an error in the first premise if I say that murder is permissible. I have the general moral principle wrong. I would err in the second premise if I apply the general moral principle in the wrong way. I might claim some exception in this one particular circumstance, saying, “What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas.” I rationalize and excuse my behavior or simply think the principle applies differently. People generally agree that murder is wrong, but people disagree on whether abortion, capital punishment, or euthanasia count as murder. The conscience can err in both general principles and application. Does a False Conscience Bind? If the conscience is fallible, then we may ask whether an erring conscience binds us with moral obligation. This is Aquinas’s third question regarding conscience. He answers that an erring conscience still imposes moral obligation on the agent.16 The conscience presents a conditional necessity, “If I want to achieve A, then I must do B, but if I do not want to do A, then I have no reason to do B.” Because conscience is not coercive, it cannot force the will to choose, which is why people can choose to act against their conscience. 16 DV 17.3. Aquinas on Conscience 9 “A correct conscience and a false conscience bind in different ways,” Aquinas says.17 “The correct conscience binds absolutely and for an intrinsic reason; the false binds in a qualified way and for an extrinsic reason.” A correct conscience binds without caveat and in every circumstance. It cannot be set aside without evil because it is correct in both the primary and secondary premise. When a person has an erring conscience, insofar as the person thinks his conscience is correct, he is morally obligated to follow it. While a person has an erring conscience, he will not be aware of the error and he is still bound to follow what he thinks is right.18 Violating an erring conscience is equivalent to intentionally doing evil, acting contrary to the moral law he thinks he knows. If he accidentally does the right thing, then he is still at fault, for he acted in a “spirit of rebellion.” If his motive was to follow conscience and do the right thing, he will still be blameworthy because he follows a false conscience. He can either intentionally do evil or accidentally do evil, but he cannot do good until he becomes aware of the ​ ​ error in his conscience. For example, if a false conscience tells someone “murder is good,” he is morally obligated to do what he thinks is right. If he accomplishes the murder, he is still blameworthy because although he had good motive, he had false propositions about the moral law. If the agent realizes the error of his conscience, this realization is a new act of practical judgment. The person is no longer bound to their old conscience but is now bound to their new conscience. Aquinas says that the conscience is always binding and people must always follow their conscience in order to do what is right, thus affirming the necessity of freedom of conscience in 17 DV 17.4. 18 DV 17.4.