THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS This page intentionally left blank The Emotional Construction of Morals JESSE J. PRINZ 1 1 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxfordox26dp OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. 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This page intentionally left blank Preface David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature is divided into three books: ‘‘Of the Understanding’’,‘‘OfthePassions’’,and‘‘OfMorals’’.Onemightwonderhow thesedisparatetopicsarerelated,otherthanbyvirtueofthefactthattheyhave somethingtodowiththemind.Butthelinksbecomeclearonreadingthetext. Humedevelopsa theoryof concepts(or‘‘ideas’’) in thefirst bookand atheory of emotions in the second book, and then he integrates these in the third by arguing that our moral concepts have an emotional foundation. The project is alsounifiedbyHume’sallegiancetoempiricism.Histheoryofconceptsisbased onthepremisethatideasarestoredcopiesofsensoryimpressions,andhistheory of emotions is designed to be compatible with this empiricist view (he defines emotionsasimpressionsofimpressions).Hume’smoraltheoryisempiricisttoo. Moral conceptsseem especially problematic for an empiricist because there can benoimageofvirtue,notasteofgoodness,andnosmellofevil.Byappealingto sentiments,Humeis ableto arguethat allconceptsbottomout in impressions, after all. The concept of goodness consists in a feeling of approbation and the concept of badness consists in a feeling of disapprobation. The class of virtues has no common appearance, but good things just feel right; the class of vices wouldbeimpossibletopaint,buteachinstanceelicitsapalpablepangofblame. In sum, Hume’s Treatise has a coherent structure, and the culminating moral theorycanbereadastheresolutionofanapparentcounter-exampletohistheory of concepts, or as the payoff for those who take the time to understand how the mind works. No matter where you place the emphasis, Hume’s theory of conceptsandhistheoryofmoralshangtogether,andpassionsaretheglue. Philosophersliketoreinventwheels,andIamnoexception.TheviewsthatI defendhereoweatremendousdebttoHume.Thisbookdefendsasentimentalist theory of morality that builds on the ideas developed by Hume and some his contemporaries. I depart from Hume in various ways, but the basic thrust of thetheoryisHumean,and,inthisrespect,myproposals arefootnotestoBook III of the Treatise. And this is not the first Humean footnote I’ve written. My first book, Furnishing the Mind, defends an empiricist theory of concepts, and my second book, Gut Reactions, defends an empiricist theory of emotions (which is more Jamesian than Humean, but, with Hume, my goal there is to show that emotions are a kind of impression). So here, in my third book, I am simply completing a trilogy that parallels the structure of Hume’s Treatise. Theseworksareindependentinonesense—youcanrejectonewhileaccepting theothers—buttheyhangtogetherinjustthewaythatHume’s Treatise hangs together.Iviewthemaspartsofawhole,andIviewthatwholeasatributeand modestextensionofHume’smasterwork. viii Preface I have three main goals in extending Hume’s project. The first is to provide empirical support for a theory that was first developed from an armchair. The second is to add some details to Hume’s theory, including an account of the sentimentsthatundergirdourmoraljudgments,andanaccountoftheontology thatresultsfromtakingasentimentalistviewseriously.Mythirdgoalistoshow that this approach leads to moral relativism. Hume resisted relativism, and I arguethatheshouldn’thave.Ialsoinvestigatetheoriginofourmoralsentiments, and I suggest that Nietzsche’’s genealogical approach to morality has much to contributehere.TheresultingstoryishalfHumeanandhalfNietzschean,butI taketheNietzscheanparttofitnaturallywiththeHumeanpart. I mention Hume and Nietzsche by way of acknowledgement. Within the pantheon of dead philosophers, they are ones to whom I owe the greatest philosophical debts. I must also mention Edward Westermarck, because he recognizedthelinkbetweensentimentalismandrelativismahundredyearsago, and recognized the value of anthropology and history in investigating morals. ThisbookcontinuesinthetraditionofWestermarck.Amonglivingphilosophers, IhavebeenespeciallyinspiredbyGilHarman,ShaunNichols,DavidWiggins, andJohnMcDowell.SteveStichalso deservesspecialmentionforhiseffortsto promote an approach to philosophy that makes liberal use of empirical results. On that note, I also owe tremendous debts to the scientists who have been providing data to help assess philosophical theories. Among psychologists, Jon HaidtandJamesBlairhavebeenanespeciallyinfluential,andIwouldalsosingle out the late Marvis Harris, whose cultural materialism leaves its mark on the secondhalfofthisbook.Theseauthorshaveeducatedmethroughtheirpublished work, but many others have offered guidance through discussion and written commentariesonmaterial fromthisbook.I have benefitedfromgivingtalksat numerous philosophy departments and conferences, spanning four continents and twice that many countries. I wish I could list the name of everyone who offered suggestions or objections along the way. I also want to thank all the membersoftheMoralPsychologyResearchGroup,whohavecreatedoneofthe mostconduciveenvironmentsforexchangingphilosophicalideasthatIhaveever seen. I have also benefited from written feedback, which led to improvements large and small throughout. In this context, let me first mention participants in seminars taught by Steve Stich, Eric Schwitzgebel, and John Mikhail who endured earlier versions of this manuscript or related papers. I also received philosophicalandtypographicalcorrectionsontheentiremanuscriptfromNigel Hope, Mark Jenkins, and Jonathan Prinz, as well as helpful comments on selectedpartsorrelatedmaterialsfromRuthChang,MatthewChrisman,Justin D’Arms, Karen Jones, Matt Smith, Valerie Tiberius, Teemu Toppinen, Brian Weatherson,andotherswhomIamundoubtedlyforgetting.Amongreaders,my biggestdebtgoestoShaunNichols,RichardJoyce,andtwoanonymousreferees forOxfordUniversityPress,whoprovidedmewithdetailedcommentsondrafts of themanuscript. They each caught embarrassing mistakes and pressed me on Preface ix dozens of philosophical issues. The book is much better because of them, and itwouldhavebeenbetterstillhadIbeenmoresuccessfulinaccommodatingall of theirsuggestions. I willremain forever grateful. Of course, I would not have receivedsuchhelpfulfeedbackwereitnotformypatientandoutstandingeditor, PeterMomtchiloff.Peterhasbeenagreatsourceofsupportateverystage. In writingthisbook,I also benefitedfromseveral institutions.I was a fellow at the Collegium Budapest and did some writing there. Tamar Gendler was instrumental in orchestrating that visit, and in assembling a wonderful group of summer colleagues. I also owe special thanks to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, in Palo Alto. CASBS is a magical place, and I finished this manuscript there. In so doing, I benefited from the abundant intellectualresourcesand theoutstandingstaff,whocontributetomakingitan idealenvironmentforresearch.IwasabletogotoCASBSbecauseofaresearch leave from my home institution, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.IamgratefultoUNCforthat,butalsoandespeciallytomystudentsand colleagues.Thereisnobetterplacetowork. Finally, I wanted to mention my family. I feel fortunate to have been raised bytwoparentswithstrongmoralconvictions,andIgrewupalongsideanolder brotherwithakeenmoralsense.Myviewsaboutrightandwrongwouldbevery differentwithoutthem,andtheycontinuetoprovidesupportinmanyways.As always, my deepest gratitude goes to Rachel, who was nearby as I wrote almost every page of this book, and she has patiently endured every mood swing that comesalongwiththewritingprocess.Hersupporthasbeenessential.