Parliamentary Affairs Advance Access published January 20, 2015 ParliamentaryAffairs(2015)1–20 doi:10.1093/pa/gsu028 The Effectiveness of French Immigration Policy Under President Nicolas Sarkozy Joa˜oMiguelDuartedeCarvalho* CentreforResearchandStudiesinSociology,UniversityInstituteofLisbon,Av.dasForc¸asArmadas,Lisbon1649-26, Portugal D *Correspondence:[email protected] ow n lo a d e ThisarticlepresentsananalysisoftheeffectivenessofFrenchimmigrationpolicy d duringPresidentNicolasSarkozy’ssingleterm(2007–2012).Followingarecent from proposal,thisarticlewillexplorethelevelofcongruencebetweenFrenchlegislator’s h ttp objectivesonimmigrationpolicyandtheremainingstagesofthepolicyprocess. ://p Notwithstanding President Sarkozy’s ambitious agenda, a persistent gap bet- a.o x weenrestrictiveobjectivesandthesubsequentliberaloutcomesfrompolicyimple- fo mentationhasbeendetectedbyimmigrationstudies.Theanalysiswillsuggestthat rdjo u Frenchimmigrationpolicyattainedavariablelevelofpolicyeffectivenessthrough- rn a outPresidentSarkozy’sterm.Thisinvestigationemphasisesthatpolicyinputscanbe ls.o drivenbypoliticalconsiderationsinvolvingthemobilisationofsectionsoftheelect- rg b/ orateinspiteofthediminishedfeasibilityoftheproposals.Furthermore,thestrong y g effectsexercisedbyendogenousandexogenouspoliticalfactorsoverPresidentSar- ue s kozy’splanswillbehighlightedinthisarticle,inparticulartheagencyof‘domestic t o n vetoplayers’. A p Keywords:Immigrationpolicy,France,Partisanvetoplayers,Policygaps,Sarkozy ril 2 9 , 2 0 1 5 1. Introduction Francehasalonghistoryofimmigration,andthissocialphenomenonhasbeenat theforefrontofnationalpoliticssincethemid-1980s(Gastaut,2012).Thesingle termofPresidentNicolasSarkozy(2007–2012)wasmarkedbytheintensesalience ofimmigrationinthedomesticagenda.TheFrenchPresidentbecamedeeplyasso- ciatedwiththisissuethroughouthisformertenuresastheFrenchInteriorMinister (2002–2004;2005–2007)(seeMarthaler,2008;Schain,2008).1Duringthe2007 electoral campaign, the candidate for the centre-right party—Union pour un 1Thisnewpolicyinputhadbeenfirstpubliclyannouncedin2005anditwascloselyassociatedwith Sarkozy’stwo-prongedstrategy for the2007presidentialelectionsinvolving:thedetachmentfrom #TheAuthor2015.PublishedbyOxfordUniversityPressonbehalfoftheHansardSociety;allrightsreserved. Forpermissions,pleasee-mail:[email protected] Page2of20 ParliamentaryAffairs MouvementPopulaire(UMP)vowedtodeepenhis‘selectiveimmigrationpolicy’ andtopromote‘selectedimmigration’(immigrationchoisie)ratherthan‘unwanted immigration’ (immigration subie) (UMP, 2007). Furthermore, immigration was associated with a national identity crisis by the centre-right candidate, who pledgedthecreationofaministryofimmigration,integrationandnationaliden- titytotacklethisemergency(Ivaldi,2008).2TheUMPcandidateoptedforthein- formalco-optionoftheextreme-rightpartyFrontNational’s(FN)electoralagenda onimmigration3atthe2002presidentialballot(Carvalho,2013).Thisstrategywas successfulasSarkozywaselectedFrenchPresidentatthe2007ballotanddirectly benefitedfromtheelectoralcollapseoftheFN’scandidate,Jean-MarieLePen,in thefirstroundoftheballot(Mayer,2007). NotwithstandingPresidentSarkozy’sambitiousobjectives,immigrationstudies D o w haveidentifiedapersistentgapbetween therestrictiveobjectivessetbynational n lo governmentsandtheactualliberaloutcomesderivedfrompolicyimplementation, ad e d nurturinganever-growingparadoxinthisareaofpublicpolicy(Hollifieldetal., fro 2014).Thistrendhasfuelledanintensedebateamongscholarsoverthecontempor- m h aryabilityofnation-statestocontroltheirexternalborders.Althoughsomeauthors ttp considerthatthepolicyofbordercontrolhasbeendeeplyunderminedbytheex- ://p a .o pansionoffreetradeandtheemergenceofahumanrightsregime,othersargue x fo that immigration policies have been increasingly effective and sophisticated rd jo (Schain,2008).Nonetheless,immigrationpolicyshouldnotbeinterpretedasthe urn a onlydeterminingfactorovertheintensityofimmigrationbecausethissocialphe- ls .o nomenon is shaped by other endogenous and exogenous factors in a context rg b/ markedbygrowingglobalinterdependence(CzaikaandHaas,2013). y g u Arecentproposalarguesthatthedebateconcerningtheabilityofhoststatesto e s controlimmigrationhasbeendrivenbyconceptualmisunderstandingsover the t on A meaningof‘policyeffectiveness’and‘policyeffects’.Althoughpolicyeffectiveness p referstotherelationshipbetweenthedesiredobjectiveandtheoutcomeoftheim- ril 2 9 plementation stage, policy effects mean the influence of the legislation over the , 2 0 1 shape of social reality (CzaikaandHaas,2013, p.491). Thereby,this article will 5 evaluate the effectiveness of French immigration policy throughout President Sarkozy’s term by employing a fourfold analytical framework of the policy PresidentJacquesChirac’sunpopularlegacytowintheUMPpresidentialelection;andtheattractionof theFN’selectorateinhisfavourinthetwo-roundballot(seeMarthaler,2008). 2TheFN’s(2001,p.22)electoralmanifestoincludedachapterentitled—‘Immigration:alethalthreatto FranceandtheFrenchcitizens.AlethalthreattoFrenchidentity’. 3TheFN’selectoralmanifestoforthe2002presidentialelectionsincludedreferencessuchas‘themass immigrationthatwedonotwantthreatensouridentity,andconsequently,France’sexistence’(FN, 2001,p.26),‘familyreunion:theinstalmentofsettlements’(FN,2001,p.18),rightofasylumand residenceauthorisations:immigrationbecomesuncontrollable’(FN,2001,p.18). ImmigrationPolicyUnderSarkozy Page3of20 process:publicpoliciesdiscoursesorpolicyinputs,migrationpoliciesonpaperor policy outputs, implementation stage and migration outcomes. This approach enables the refinement of policy gaps into three main categories: the discursive gap,theimplementationgapandtheefficacygap(CzaikaandHaas,2013,p.494). By exploring this theoretical framework, this investigation will highlight the exclusionofpoliticalfactorswithintherangeofindependentvariablesenhancing thedifferentpolicygaps,whichcanfosterflawedappraisalsofthepolicyprocess. Thisshortcomingonimmigrationstudieshasbeenassociatedwiththeincreasing specialisation of social sciences that disincentivises interdisciplinary approaches presenting a synthesis of policy evaluation and domestic politics (Bale, 2008). Incontrast,thisresearchonpolicyeffectivenessfocusesonthedynamicofpolitics throughwhichtheFrenchimmigrationpolicywasdevelopedanditwillexplorethe D o w potentialinfluenceofpoliticalfactors.Therefore,thisarticlefollowsthedomestic n lo politicsapproachthathighlightsendogenouspoliticalfactorsasthekeyvariablesto ad e d explainthecontingentconstraintsonthepolicyofbordercontrols(Hollifieldetal., fro 2014).Moreover,thisinvestigationwillhighlightinterpartycompetitionanddo- m h mesticpartisanvetoplayersascausalfactorsbehindsomeofthepolicygapsiden- ttp tifiedintheselectedtimeframe.Toattainthesegeneralobjectives,thisinvestigation ://p a .o employsaqualitativemethodlabelled‘processtracing’(BradyandCollier,2010). x fo This research method enhances the study of processes of political change rd jo throughtheexaminationofcausalprocessobservations(withaqualitativeorquan- urn a titativecharacter)supportedbyin-depthsinglecaseanalysis.Moreover,contextual ls .o knowledgeandqualitativeanalysiswereconsideredindispensabletoidentifywhich rg b/ ofthegapsaremostsalientinexplainingtheoverallpolicyeffectiveness(Czaikaand y g u deHaas,2013).Finally,thearticle’sfirstpartdevelopsthetheoreticalbackground e s thatsupportsthisinvestigationbyexaminingthetypologyof‘policygaps’,aswellas t on A thedomesticandexogenousconstraintsfacedbytheFrenchexecutiveonimmigra- p tion policy. The second part presents the diachronic analysis of policy develop- ril 2 9 mentsstartingbythe2007immigrationlawandtheproposalofaquotasystem. , 2 0 1 ThenextsectionsexploretheEuropeanPactonImmigrationandAsylumaswell 5 astheReturnDirective,theRomaaffair,theGrenoblespeechandtherepercussions oftheArabSpring.Theconclusionsemphasisetherelevanceofpoliticalfactorsto understandpolicydevelopmentsinFrance,aswellastherelationshipbetweenthese findingsandimmigrationstudiesfocusingonpolicyeffectiveness. 2. Policygaps A key theoretical question driving immigration studies concerns the ability of Western states to control immigration after the persistent observation of policy gapsbetween‘officialimmigrationpoliciesandactualpolicyoutcomes’(Hollifield etal.,2014,p.4).Despitebeingassociatedwiththeprocessofhalting‘undesired’ Page4of20 ParliamentaryAffairs inflows,policygapscanbesimilarlyobservedintheprocessofpromotinganentire new flow, such as the active recruitment of highly skilled immigrants (HSI) by advancedindustrialcountries.Theassessmentofpolicyeffectivenessimpliesex- ploringthecongruencebetweentheobjectivesornumericalgoalssetbynational governments and the developments observed on the three remaining stages of the policycycle. Nevertheless, this task is complicatedby the recurrent presence of covert interests of the social actors involved in the policy-making process, whichenhanceadiscrepancybetweenthe publiclystatedandtherealobjectives on migration policy (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). The measurement of policy gapsdemandsthatadistinctionbemadebetweengeneralandspecificpolicyobjec- tives,whichtargetaparticulargroupofimmigrants(CzaikaandHaas,2013). Therefore, the objectives and ability of policy-makers to attain those goals D o w should be evaluated according to the different types of immigration flows n lo (labour migration; family reunion; asylum; and irregular immigration) to ad e d accountforpotentialvariations.Accordingtothetypologyofpolicygaps,the‘dis- fro cursivegap’framestheincongruencebetweenpolicyinputsandpolicyonpaper. m h Theobservationofthesepoliticalprocesseswasassociatedwiththemultipleobjec- ttp tivesof political actors andinterestgroups, legalconstraints, as well as with the ://p a .o broad-sweeping character of migration discourses (Czaika and de Haas, 2013). x fo Alternatively, this investigationwill emphasise the way inwhich discursive gaps rd jo canalsoreflectthepoliticalconsiderationsofthepartiesingovernmentinvolving urn a themobilisationoftheelectorate,regardlessofthefeasibilityofthepoliticalinputs. ls .o The ‘implementation gap’ captures the level of congruence between the policy rg b/ outputsandtheirenforcementthroughouttheimplementationstage.Thesegaps y g u aremostlikelytooccurwhenalargedegreeofdiscretionisinvolvedinthelatter e s stageofthepolicyprocessandtheiroccurrencedependsonthestate’scapacityto t on A implementbordercontrols(CzaikaanddeHaas,2013). p Lastly, the ‘efficacy gap’reflects the degree to which the implemented policy ril 2 9 outputs have the desired effects on the development of inflows. This policy gap , 2 0 1 wasassociatedwithstructuralfactorsinhostandsendingsocieties,aswellasthe 5 internal dynamics of the migration networks and systems (Czaikaand de Haas, 2013).Surprisingly,factorsrelatedwiththe‘politicalstream’havebeenoverlooked bythistheoreticalproposal.However,pastresearchonpublicpolicydemonstrated thatthepolicyprocesscanbeaffectedbyvariablessuchaspublicbehaviour,elect- oralcyclesandoutcomes,changesinthegovernment’scomposition,cabinetdivi- sions,interdepartmentalconflictortheagencyof‘partisanvetoplayers’(Kingdon, 1995;Tsebelis,2002).Theseareindividualorcollectiveactorsthathavetoagree with the proposed legislative change and are specified by the political system (Tsebelis,2002,p.2).Toovercomethisshortcoming,thisarticlewillexplorethepo- tentialinfluenceofdomesticpoliticalfactorsontheeffectivenessofFrenchimmi- grationpolicyduringPresidentSarkozy’sterm.Thenexttwosectionscontextualise ImmigrationPolicyUnderSarkozy Page5of20 theendogenousandexogenousconstraintsrecurrentlyobservedinthepolicyof bordercontrolsinFrance. 3. Domesticconstraints ThepowerofjudicialcourtshasbeenacommonthemeintheliteratureonFrench immigrationpolicydatingbackalmost20years(Joppke,1998;Hollifield,2014). Attemptstohaltparticulartypesofimmigrationflowswerefirstobservedinthe mid-1970s, when the French government imposed a three-year ban on family reunion. However, this decision was vetoed by the Council of State (Conseil d’E´tat) that invoked the constitutional prerogative protecting individuals’right to conduct a normal family life. A similar episode was observedin 1993 during D o w CharlesPasqua’ssecondtenureastheInteriorMinister(Weil,2005).Thesejudi- n lo ciaryvetoesweresupportedbytheFrenchRepublicanmodel,whichincludesprin- ad e d ciples of universal rights and absolute equality between individuals since the fro Revolution of 1789, laterenshrined in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in m h 1958 (Schain, 2008). Categorisations or discrimination of any individual on an ttp ethnic or religious basis are, thus, forbidden under the French constitutional ://p a .o text, reducing the scope of policy options available to the French government x fo (Hargreaves,2007). rd jo Consequently,Franceisrecurrentlypresentedasastrongcaseof‘embeddedlib- urn a eralism’,where‘self-imposedconstraints’placestronghindrancesontheapproval ls .o of restrictions on undesired flows of immigration and even more difficulties to rg b/ enforce them (Schain, 2008). Nonetheless, there are additional ‘veto players’ in y g u the French political system that can intervene in the policy process. While the e s FrenchNationalAssembly(Assemble´eNationale)andtheSenate(Se´nat)constitute t on A ‘institutional’vetoplayers,themajorityinthesechamberscanabortentirepiecesof p legislation or parts thereof and constitute the ‘partisan veto players’ within the ril 2 9 Frenchpoliticalsystem(Tsebelis,2002).IntheFrenchbicameralpoliticalsystem, , 2 0 1 theFrenchexecutivepossessesdirectcontrolofthepolicyagenda,buttheconver- 5 sionofpolicyinputsintooutputsisdependentonagreementbetweenthesetwo legislativechambers.Thenextsectionexplorestheexogenousconstraintsidentified onFrenchimmigrationpolicy. 4. Externalconstraints TherearetwocategorisationsofimmigrationattheEUlevelthatcomprisedirect political, social and legal repercussions on the French immigration policy: intra-EU immigration (formed by nationals of other EU member-states), and non-EUimmigration(composedofimmigrantsoriginatinginnon-EUcountries who enter and settle in member-states) (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). At the Page6of20 ParliamentaryAffairs intra-EUlevel,mobilityrightsinstitutingthefreedomofcirculationforEUcitizens wereenshrinedintheTreatyofRome(1957)andhavebeenacornerstoneoftheEU treatiesandlegislationhenceforth.Therefore,therightoffreemovementisrecog- nisedforallcitizensofthe27EUmember-statesandprotectedbysupranational law.Non-EUimmigrationwasincludedintheEU’smainlegalandpoliticalframe- workaftertheratificationoftheAmsterdamTreaty(1999)anditisdeprivedofright tofreemovement.AlthoughpolicydevelopmentsattheEUlevelregardingnon-EU immigration have directconsequences on the member-states’ policies of border controls,asylumandirregularimmigration,nationalgovernmentsenjoysufficient discretionarypowerstomanagelabourimmigrationaccordingtodomesticprior- ities. This autonomy reflects the lack of harmonisation of admission policies towardslabourinflows(BoswellandGeddes,2011). D o w AnotherimportantconstraintontheFrenchpolicyofbordercontrolsderives n lo fromthisstate’sparticipationintheSchengenAgreement(1985)andratification ad e d of the Schengen Convention (1990), later incorporated into the Amsterdam fro Treaty(1999).Thisinternationalagreementencompassedtheabolitionofinternal m h bordersbetweenparticipantstatestostrengthenthesingle-marketinexchangefor ttp the harmonisation and reinforcement of external border controls (Boswell and ://p a .o Geddes, 2011). Under this agreement, the participant states ought to recognise x fo automaticallytheentryvisasgrantedtonon-EUcitizensbyanyoftheremaining rd jo member-states. Consequently, the decisions of a single state have immediate urn a ‘knock-on’ effects in other associated countries (Carrera et al., 2011). After this ls .o overview of the structural background in France, the remaining sections of this rg b/ article will probe the policy developments which took place during President y g u Sarkozy’sterm. e s t o n A p 5. The2007immigrationlaw ril 2 9 Following the 2007 legislative elections, President Sarkozy appointed Franc¸ois , 20 1 5 FillonasPrimeMinisterandestablishedtheMiniste`redel’Immigration,del’Int´egra- tion,del’Identite´nationaleetduCo-D´eveloppement(MIIINC)4inJuly2007under thecontrolofhisclosecollaborator,BriceHortefeux(Gastaut,2012).Thisaction provokedwidespreadcontroversyduetotheinstitutionalisationoftheassociation betweenthetwoissues,whichlegitimisedperceptionsofimmigrationrepresenting athreattonationalidentity,asproposedbytheFNeversinceitscreationinthe mid-1970s(Ivaldi,2008).Nonetheless,thenewministerwelcomedthismeasure duetotheadministrativeconcentrationofallissuesdealingwithforeigncitizens in a single ministry (Hortefeux, 2007). In the mission letter to Hortefeux, the FrenchPresidentrestatedhis‘selective’immigrationpolicyandaddedaspecific 4MinistryofImmigration,Integration,NationalIdentityandCo-Development. ImmigrationPolicyUnderSarkozy Page7of20 D o w n lo a d e d Faingdu2re0111.bAyuttyhpoeriosaftsioetntsleomfreenstid.eSnocuercger:aSnGteCdICbyI(t2h0e0F8re,n2c0h1s2t,apte.t4o1n).on-EUcitizensbetween2003 from h ttp ://p targetofincreasingtheshareoflabourinflowsto50percentofthetotaloflong- a .o x termresidenceauthorisationsannuallygranted(Sarkozy,2007).Thiswasavery fo rd ambitioustargetatatimewhenlabourinflowsonlyrepresented7percentofthe jo u total inflows (Figure 1). In order to attain this goal, Hortefeux presented the rn a 2007immigrationlawtotheNationalAssembly. ls.o rg ThisnewlegislationimplementedtheCartedeCompetencesetTalents(Cardof b/ y CompetencesandSkills,CCT),anentryvisaforHSIthatgrantedaccesstolong- g u e termsettlementandfamilyreunionaccordingtothegeographicoriginofcandi- st o dates,topreventthe‘brain-drain’effect(Carvalho,2014).5Accesstothislabour n A p visa was dependent on the evaluation of a candidate’s contribution to France, ril 2 whichleftbroaddiscretionarypowerstonationalauthoritiesandlimitedtheau- 9 , 2 tonomy of French employers to hire HSI (Challof and Lemaˆıtre, 2009). Conse- 0 1 5 quently, only 1175 immigrants were granted the CCT between 2007 and 2011 (SGCICI,2012,p.23).AreportelaboratedbytheUMPSenator,Andre´ Ferrand, highlighted the lack of information on the CCT across French embassies and 5PermanentsettlementwasdeniedtocitizensfromcountrieswithwhichFranceplanstosignprivileged solidarity and sustainable development partnerships, such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Palestinian Territories, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone,Sudan,Tanzania,Togo,Tunisia,SouthAfrica,Suriname. Page8of20 ParliamentaryAffairs recommended the relaxation of access requirements. An initial implementation gapwasthusidentifiedby theFrenchSenatoronthepolicy towardsHSIdueto the inadequate dissemination ofthepolicyoutputacrosstheFrenchnetworkof diplomaticmissions. Moreover, this document suggested the suppression of the selective criteria according to the geographic origin of candidates, especially to those of Franco- phoneorigintoexpandthenumberofcandidates(Ferrand,2008,p.65).Anim- portant level of incongruence was therefore identified between President Sarkozy’sinputstoexpandtheproportionof‘selected’inflowsandtherestrictive characterofthenewentrychannelforHSI,leadingtotheobservationofadiscur- sivegap.Thispoliticalprocesswasextensivetothepolicytowardsunskilledlabour inflows, considering the limited range of jobs available to potential candidates. D o w Ashortagelistpublishedby theFrenchauthoritiesinDecember2007presented n lo 152occupationsavailabletocitizensoftheA-8member-states,6whileonly30occu- ad e d pationswereavailable to citizens fromnon-EUcountries(Lochak andFouteau, fro 2008).Consequently,the2007legislationcontainedverylimitedeffectsonthein- m h tensityoflabourinflows(Figure1).Thediscursivepolicygapsregarding labour ttp inflowsseemedtoreflectthecontradictorypolicyintentionsoftheUMPgovern- ://p a .o ment, asHortefeux publicly statedthat‘Francewouldremainclosed’toinflows x fo andsimultaneously‘encouragelabourimmigration’(Hortefeux,2007). rd jo The 2007 immigration law was distinctive for the bureaucratic hindrances urn a placeduponfamilyreunionbecausediverseintegrationrequirementswereintro- ls .o ducedascriteriafortheadmissionofcandidates(Table1).Inaddition,thelegisla- rg b/ tor expanded the scope of the Contrat d’accueil et d’insertion (CAI, Contract of y g u Accommodation andIntegration) forfamilies settled in the country to enhance e s theintegrationofimmigrants(Schain,2008).Theassociationbetweenimmigra- t on A tion with a supposed integration crisis, in particular family inflows, and urban p declinewasevidentintheparliamentaryaudienceofHortefeux(2007),asifnew- ril 2 9 comersrepresentedathreattothehostsociety.However,theparliamentarydebate , 2 0 1 ofthesemeasureswasovershadowedbyacontroversialamendmentproposedbya 5 UMPdeputy,ThierryMariani,regardingtheintroductionofoptionalDNAtestson familyreunion(Loyer,2008).Afterwidespreadoppositionofleft-wingpartiesand immigrantassociations,thisproposalwasfinallydroppedbythenewimmigration minister,EricBesson,in2009duetothelegalobstaclesplacedonitsimplementa- tion(Rovan,2009).Correctionswereoperatedintheasylumsystemtowaterdown thehighlyrestrictiveproceduressetinthe2003asylumlaw,whilerestrictivemea- sureswereintroducedtowardsirregularimmigration(Table1). Tacklingirregularimmigrationthroughtheescalationofforcedremovalswasa topprioritysinceSarkozy’stenuresastheInteriorMinisterbefore2007(Schain, 6TheCzechRepublic,Estonia,Hungary,Latvia,Lithuania,Poland,SlovakiaandSlovenia. ImmigrationPolicyUnderSarkozy Page9of20 Table1 ModificationsintroducedinimmigrationpolicybyFrenchLAWNo.2007-1631of20 November,2007concerningimmigration,integrationandasylum Primary Secondaryinflows Asylum Irregularimmigration inflows Turnsthe Candidatesforfamily Introducestherightof Authorisesregularisationof CCToper- reunionmustprove asylumseekersto irregularimmigrantsin ational knowledgeofFrenchlan- appealagainstdenialof areasaffectedbylabour guageandRepublican entry;delegatesman- marketbottlenecksupon values;increaseoffinan- agementoftheasylum proofofregularworkcon- cialrequirements systemtotheMIIINC tract;exceptionalregulari- demandedonimmigrant sationsofirregular accesstofamilyreunion. immigrantsrestrictedto D ImpositionofCAIfor humanitarianreasonsonly. o w families,withone-year Anypersonwhoprovides n lo validity.Infringementcan directorindirectassistance a d entailthesuspensionof toirregularimmigrantscan ed renewalofauthorisation bepunishedbyuptofive fro m ofresidence yearsimprisonment h ttp ://p a .o 2008).7Thisapproachpersisted duringPresidentSarkozy’stermandthe rateof xfo rd forced removalsof irregularimmigrantsclimbed from29,796 in 2008 to 32,912 jo u in2011(SGCICI,2012,p.74).8Notwithstandingthisgrowth,theUMPgovern- rn a ls ment announced the goal of 35,000 forced removals for 2012 to demonstrate .o rg the executive’s emphasis to crack down on this unwanted immigration flow b/ y (Chanine, 2011). Recent data indicate that 39,822 immigrants were forcibly g u e removedfromthecountryin2012suggestinganimportantlevelofpolicyeffective- st o ness (Johanne`s, 2014). In 2009, the criminalisation of individuals who provide n A p ‘assistance’ to irregular immigrants included in the 2007 immigration law ril 2 (Table 1) became a politicised issue after the national screening of a movie on 9 , 2 thistopicnamed‘Welcome’.Immigrantassociationslaunchedacampaignagainst 0 1 5 thelegalprovisionnamed‘d´elitdesolidarite´’(crimeofsolidarity)anddemandedits restriction to individuals who profited from irregular immigration (Chastand, 2009).ThislegalprovisionremaineduntouchedandbecameasymbolofPresident Sarkozy’scommitmenttocurbirregularimmigration.9 7Therateofforcedremovalsexpandeddramaticallyfrom10,067in2002to23,831in2006(SGCICI, 2012,p.74). 8Reflectingtheoveremphasisontacklingirregularimmigrationthroughasecurityrelatedapproach,the nationaljudicialauthoritiesissued112,010obligationstoleavetheFrenchterritoryin2007against 62,233in2002(Bancel,2011,p.5). 9Thislegalprovisionwassuppressedbythecentre-leftInteriorMinisterManuelVallsinJanuary2013 (NouvelObservateur,2013). Page10of20 ParliamentaryAffairs Overall,the2007immigrationlawpossessedarestrictivecharacter,inparticular towards family reunion. Notwithstanding the presence of strong judicial con- straints, this legislation contained an important degree of policyeffects towards the designated‘unwanted’ inflow.Consequently,theintensityof family reunion declined significantly after 2007,reinforcing the trendobservedsincethe enact- mentofthe2006immigrationlaw(Figure1).10Nonetheless,theoveralleffective- nessofthe2007immigrationlawwasunderminedbytheobjectivessetbyPresident Sarkozyonlabourinflowsandtheoutcomesoftheimplementationstageby2011 (Figure1).Thistrendwasassociatedmostlywithadiscursivegapand,toalesser extent, with an implementation gap. The ambiguous character of the policy inputs of the Immigration Minister suggested the presence of covert interests related to the intense interparty competition between the UMP President and D o w the FNonrestrainingthe intensityof‘unwanted’ inflowsrather thantoexpand n lo the intensity of immigration (Gastaut, 2012). Attending to Sarkozy’s electoral ad e d successin2007,the‘selective’immigrationpolicycanstillbeperceivedasacase fro of ‘words that succeed and policies that fail’ (Edelman, 1973). Thus, policy m h inputswithlowlevelsofeffectivenessinpracticecan,nevertheless,besuccessful ttp in the electoral arena suggesting that the 2007 policy paradigm may have been ://p a .o drivenbycovertpoliticalobjectives. x fo rd jo u rn a ls .o 6. Thequotasystemtomanageimmigrationflows rg b/ y Shortlyaftertheenactmentofthe2007immigrationlaw,PresidentSarkozypro- g u e posed an annual quota system to manage immigration (Schain, 2008). In the st o contextofanoverallreformoftheConstitutionaltext(thisprocessendedinJuly n A p 2ti0o0n8n)e,ltdheelIamnmoiugvrealtlieopnoMlitiiqnuisetedr’iamppmoiignratetdionth(eCCCoCmNmPisIs)i1o1nusnudrelrectahderleeacodnesrtsihtuip- ril 29 , 2 of the UMP Senator, Pierre Mazeaud. Hortefeux nominated this advisory body 0 1 5 tostudyamendmentstotheConstitutionaltexttoallowtheimplementationofim- migration quotas accordingto ‘areasof origin of immigration flows’(CCCNPI, 2008, pp. 3–4). This same objective was restated by the President himself in a speech to the South African Parliament in February 2008. President Sarkozy addedthattheannualcaps‘wouldincludesub-categoriesofmotivesforimmigra- tion—labourorfamilyreunion’,suggestingitwouldbeapolicytooltocurbthe intensityofthelatter‘unwanted’inflow(Sarkozy,2008). 10Accordingtothe2006immigrationlaw,non-EUcitizens‘wouldonlybeallowedintothecountryif they could prove that they had sufficient financial means to support family members and their eligibilityforwelfarebenefitswouldbegreatlyreduced.’(Marthaler,2008,p.391). 11CommissionfortheConstitutionalReformtoImplementaNewImmigrationPolicy.