ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: PHENOMENOLOGY Volume 3 THE DUAL VISION THE DUAL VISION Alfred Schutz and the myth of phenomenological social science ROBERT A. GORMAN OR Routledge GDELTU Taylor & Francis Group E LONDON AND NEW YORK Firstpublishedin1977 Thiseditionfirstpublishedin2014 byRoutledge 2ParkSquare,MiltonPark,Abingdon,Oxon,OX144RN SimultaneouslypublishedintheUSAandCanada byRoutledge 711ThirdAvenue,NewYork,NY10017 RoutledgeisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroup,aninformabusiness ©1977RobertA.Gorman Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereprintedorreproducedor utilisedinanyformorbyanyelectronic,mechanical,orothermeans,now knownorhereafterinvented,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orinany informationstorageorretrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwritingfromthe publishers. Trademarknotice:Productorcorporatenamesmaybetrademarksorregistered trademarks,andareusedonlyforidentificationandexplanationwithoutintent toinfringe. BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary ISBN:978-0-415-83854-2(Set) eISBN:978-0-203-79854-6(Set) ISBN:978-0-415-85967-7(Volume3) eISBN:978-0-203-79459-3(Volume3) Publisher’sNote Thepublisherhasgonetogreatlengthstoensurethequalityofthisreprintbut pointsoutthatsomeimperfectionsintheoriginalcopiesmaybeapparent. Disclaimer Thepublisherhasmadeeveryefforttotracecopyrightholdersandwould welcomecorrespondencefromthosetheyhavebeenunabletotrace. The dual vision Alfred Schutz and the myth of phenomenologicasl ocial science Robert A. Gorman Routledge & Kegan Paul London, Henley and Boston First publishedi n 1977 by Routledge& KeganPaul Ltd 39Shore Street, London WC1E 7DD, Broadway House, Newtown Road, H enley-on-Thames, Oxon RG91 E N and 9 Park Street, Boston,Mass. 02108,USA Manuscript set by Computacomp Printed and boundin GreatBritain by Morrison & GibbLtd Copyright Robert A. Gorman1977 Nopart of thisbook may bereproduceidn any form without permission from the publisher, except for thequotatioonf b,.ief passagesin criticism ISBN 0 71008450 1 Contents Introduction 1 1 Phenomenologya nd methodologyo f social science: the origins 5 I Max Weber's methodologiyn its historical context 5 2 Schutz's critiqueo f Weber 16 3 Edmund Husserl's phenomenology 20 Summary and conclusions 33 2 Phenomenologicals ocial science 36 I Thesocial structureo f individuality 36 2 Theintersubjective common-sensew orld 44 3 Individualaction in society 49 4 Thesocial determinantso f individualaction 52 5 A sociological method 55 Summarya nd conclusions 65 3 Phenomenology,f reeaction, empirical social science: some theoretical and practical problems 67 I Thetensionswithin Schutz'sp hilosophical anthropology 67 2 Theimpersonal worldo f'das Man' 75 3 Theoperationalizationo fp henomenologicals ocial sciencein decision-making theory 85 4 Ethnomethodologya nd the'humanizationo' f social science 104 Summary and conclusions 106 4 The 'objectivity'o f empirical social science: a philosophical perspective 108 1 Naturalism as a philosophoyf science 108 2 Phenomenologya srigorous science 122 3 Twoorganicviewsof 'science' 129 4 Phenomenologya nd themethodologoyf natural and social science 133 5 Schutz's attempt at synthesis 136 Summary and conclusions 141 5 Epilogue: an alternative phenomenologicala pproactho social inquiry 142 1 Phenomenologyr evisited: anexistentiavli ew 143 2 Existential ontology 146 3 Social ontology 148 4 Phenomenology,s ocial science and radicalism 152 Appendix 166 References 172 Bibliography 215 Index 229 Introduction The contemporarys tudy of society is fired by our quest for scientific truth. The very spirit of our age is tangible evidence of the fruits of science: by superimposingi ntellect on natural forces and processesw e mobilize our energies for creating a mechanized civilization oriented towards the needs and desires of omnipotent humanity. Worldly phenomenaa re isolated, studied, and explained; and, through this procedure, brought under the effective control of inquisitive intellect. The same, it is hoped, can be accomplishedi n our attempts at understandinga nd harnessingf orces underlying social interaction. Social scientists superimposet he scientific framework on a reality that is thoroughly soaked in human experience, always assuming their efforts will eventually initiate a stage of cultural developmenta llowing us to mold SOCiety in responset o expressedd esires. Social science, like natural science, strives to intellectually decipher an unrestrained, directionless, domineering environment, choreographingt he future to the rhythm of operationalh uman goals. However, this similarity in intention is not paralleled by similar results. While our ability to explain natural phenomenah as grown dramatically, social scientists find themselvesw ithout any universally valid generalizations to facilitate explanation, prediction, and control. The fruits of social science do not yet justify the intense effort. Although natural catastrophesa re explained in terms of pre- and post-dictive laws, and at least partially controlled through our vast technological capabilities, social catastrophesa nd crises seem immune to either scientific explanationo r human manipulation. As our body of natural scientific knowledge and technological skills increases,w e are confrontedb y a simultaneousg rowth in social conflict, tension, and 1 2 Introduction violence - none adequatelya ccountedf or by methods and proceduresw hich accomplisheds o much in the non-human natural world. We seem helpless in the face of social unrest that cries out for attention and remedy. The traditional responsef rom the scientific community is the belief and contention that more research- more time - will yield social knowledge comparablei n significance to the facts of natural science. But not everyone accepts this rationale. A group of social scientistsh as recently emerged contending basic structural changesa re needed in scientific technique. The inadequacieso f contemporary social science indicate far more than merely a need for new researcha nd more patience: social science, as it is and has been practiced is qualitatively deficient, incapable - in principle - of adequatelye xplaining society. In particular, it fails to recognize and take into considerationt he foundational, irreducible nature of social actors, inherently free agents who define for themselvest he world they perceive and act in. Social science is doomed to failure unless it evolves a revised method appropriate to this phenomenologicalu nderstanding of knowledge and reality. It is not that the effort to scientifically explain society is misconceived; only the method must be altered to suit the actual quality of human interaction. The phenomenologicalr eformulation of social scientific method is the dominant theme of this book. This unfolds in a heuristic critique of the single most important and influential figure in the movement to phenomenologicallyr e-define, or 'humanize,' social science: Alfred Schutz. My inclination to concentrateo n Schutz in explaining phenomenologicals ocial science as a whole is invited by the lack of critical scholarly attention he has heretofore attracted. Fellow phenomenologistsh ave treated Schutz with an aura of admiration and subserviencew hich, though deservedi n respectt o the seriousnessa nd scholarshipo f his work, is not justified by its actual quality. This contention will be defended and pOinted towards an indictment of the whole effort at phenomenologically re-defining scientific method. An analysis such as this seems particularly appropriatea nd timely in view of the actual evolution .of methodological theory and the increasingly important role Schutz occupies. The book rigorously describesS chutz'sp henomenologicalm ethod and attempts to situate it within an unfolding historical and analytical context. It maintains, briefly, that Schutz endeavorst o solve the fundamental predicamento f