THE DOMAIN OF LOGIC ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS THE DOMAIN OF LOGIC ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS by ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, S.]. Xavier University, Cincinnati • THE HAGUE MARTINUS NI]HOFF 1966 ISBN 978-94-015-0367-9 ISBN 978-94-015-0939-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-0939-8 Copyright 1966 by Martinus NijhoJf, The Hague, Netherlands. All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form. Imprimi potest: John R. Connery, 5.J. Provincial, Chicago Province January 7, 1966 N ihil obstat: Daniel E. Pilarczyk, 5.T.D., Ph. L., Censor January 7, 1966 Imprimatur: Most Rev. Paul F. Leibold Vicar General, Archdiocese of Cincinnati January 15, 1966 PREFACE Ever since philosophy became conscious of itself, there has been a problem of the relations between the real world which philosophy sought to understand and explain, and the thought by which it sought to explain it. It was found that thought had certain requirements and conditions of its own. If the real world was to be understood through thought, there was a question whether thought and the real correspond ed in all respects, and therefore whether they had the same conditions and laws, or whether some of these were peculiar to thought alone. For the solution of this problem it was necessary to study thought and the process of knowing and the conditions which the manner of know ing placed upon our interpretation of the real. With a consciousness of the peculiarities of thought and of its laws, philosophers could then more surely make use of it to arrive at the knowledge of the real world which they were seeking, without danger of reading into the real what is peculiar to thought. This necessity gave rise to the science of logic, a science which is still necessary, and for the same reasons. It has an importance in philosophy which it is disastrous to overlook. In the last three or four decades interest in logic has been revived and has grown enormously. While most of the renewed effort has gone into the development of new techniques and instruments, there has been an accompanying discussion of the foundations and nature of the whole enterprise caIled logic. To some extent this has led to a re examination of the logical doctrine of the great philosophers of the past; but for most of these the investigation remains insufficient even to the present. In the wake of the current heightened evaluation of logic there have come some excesses as weIl as benefits. Some philosophers have gone so far as to equate logic with the whole of philosophy. The present fashionable excess is almost the contrary of that of Hegel, who ex panded logic until it embraced all of philosophy and became especially vi PREFACE a constructive metaphysics. Many currently reduce all of philosophy to logic, understood as the analysis of language. This is something like confusing chemical formulae with the physical world. Since it is important to understand logic and its place in philosophy, it would seem to follow necessarily that, for the understanding of any man's philosophical teaching, it is important to know what he con ceived logic to be and just what he assigned as the field of its labors. This is what the present study attempts to do for the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. I ts aim and scope is to determine what St. Thomas considered logic to be, exactly what its domain is, and, more speeifically in Thomas' own terminology, what constitutes the "subject" (the genus subiectum) ofwhich this seience oflogic treats. Any attempt at original, independent philosophizing or even of critieism and judgment upon the teachings of Aquinas in this matter would be beyond its scope. This study is an exegetical and historical one. H seeks to discover and ex pound the doctrine of St. Thomas on the domain of logic, not to speculate independently on what the domain of logic should be or to evaluate the speculations of Aquinas. Hs direct concern is historical truth rather than absolute philosophical truth. Whether the two coin eide or diverge in this case is a question that can be left for some other more strictly philosophical study or for the private conclusions of the reader. In view of the many treatises on logic which profess to follow the doctrine of St. Thomas, it may be questioned whether there is any further need for such a study, or whether there are any exegetical and doctrinal problems left unsolved. The purpose for which most of these treatises were written, however, distinguishes them radically from the present study. Most are intended as manuals of logic for classroom use; and because logic is almost universally taught at the beginning of any course in philosophy, they must be adapted to philosophical beginners, who are not yet equipped to digest any detailed discussion of the nature oflogical being, its relations to real being, and its dependence upon the manner of human knowing. Logic manuals for beginners must usually be content to give a very brief statement of what logical being is, then go on to expose its various kinds, its prineiples, and some of its applications. Even if the capaeity of the readers for whom they are intended were no limitation upon these treatises oflogic, a mere question of size would be; for if one is to write a complete treatise on logic, one must either restrict the discussion of each of the many points involved, or write PREFACE vii many volumes. No one, it seems, has chosen the latter course. Among the most voluminous of the avowed Scholastic treatises is Coffey's, with two large octavo volumes of nearly four hundred pages each.1 Even with this size, not much philosophical discussion is devoted to the precise domain of the science or the nature of logical being. And furthermore, this work does not pretend to be an exegesis of the writing of St. Thomas. Few of the manuals, even those professing to follow the teaching of St. Thomas, enter into an exegetical exposition of his doctrines. Most, as that ofMaritain, give few citations or none.2 Some, such as the Latin manuals of Hugon3 or Pirotta,4 give some textual quatations, but necessarily few because of their small size and brief treatment of each of the questions. The best manual from the point of view of exegesis in the logic of St. Thomas is the old work of Alamannus, which dates from 1618.6 As the first section of the first volume of a Summa Philosophiae which is compiled from the works of St. Thomas, it uses many texts which it joins together with relatively little original discussion interspersed. But the mere collocation and ordering of the matter involves in itself a considerable amount ofinterpretation. In its general aspect this work differs notably from our current manuals, which seem little but cata logues of terms and distinctions and rules compared to its scholastic discussions in the form of questions and articles. Even its more philosophical approach, however, does not permit it within its limita tions of space to go into much detail regarding the subject of the science oflogic. For the questions treated in the first chapter and in part ofthe third of this present study Alamannus' work has been somewhat helpful. As an interpreter of St. Thomas' logic John of St. Thomas (1589- 1644) is considered by modern Thomists to hold the first place. His Ars Logica, a weighty tome of eight hundred and thirty-six two-column royal octavo pages, forms apart of his Cursus PhilosoPhicus Thomisti cus, which, according to its subtitle, is "according to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas": "secundum exactam, veram, genuinam 1 P. Coffey, The Science 0/ Logic (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green, 1918). I Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Logic (New York: sheed & Ward, 1937). 8 Edouard Hugon, P. 0., Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticus (6 vols.; Paris: Lethielleux, 1927). 4 Angelo Pirotta, O.P., Summa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae (3 vols.; Turin: Marietti, 1931). 6 Cosmus Alamannus, S.J., Summa Philosophiae (3 vols. quarto; edited by B. FelcWin and F. Beringer; Paris: Lethielleux 1885). viü PREFACE Aristotelis et Doctoris Angelici mentem."6 After the brief first part, on formallogic (Hde dialecticis institutionibus quas summulas vocant"), in which a didactic method is followed, the rest is treated philosophi cally, discussing many difficulties, problems, or questions, among which are included many of the questions which are examined in the present study. Of these some are treated at length, others receive little atten tion. Still other questions are not treated. What chiefly distinguishes John's work, however, from the present investigation of even the same questions, is its author's aim and method. His work, though Haccording to the mind of St. Thomas," is not an exegetical investigation, but a philosophical exposition of the matter for its own sake. Though a fair number of texts from St. Thomas are brought in, there is not much effort at exegesis and the explanation of one text by another text; but the author proceeds on his own, and the quotations are incidental to his own development of the doctrine. Hence, even if John of St. Thomas had covered all of the same ground sufficiently from the point of view of philosophical truth, there would still be room left for an investiga tion of the historical truth regarding just what St. Thomas taught. It may even be added that, on the supposition that a careful textual examination of the works of St. Thomas had already been made con cerning the domain of logic, that would not necessarily preclude an other independent exegetical study; for a single discussion seldom succeeds in saying the definitive work or in giving absolute assurance of the accuracy of all its interpretations. But very little detailed exegesis has been done in the writings of Aquinas on our question. Among Thomistic studies monographs on logical questions are few,7 and of these most are devoted to particular logical problems rather than to the general problem of what logic iso 8 J oannes a Sancto Thoma, O.P., Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus (3 vols.; new edi tion, edited by Beatus Reiser, O.S.B.; Turin: Marietti, 1930-37). 7 How few they are is revealed in a glance at the Thomistic bibliographies. In P. Mandonnet, O.P., and J. Destrez, O.P., Bibliographie Thomiste (Kain, Belgium: Revue des sciences philosophiques et tMologiques, 1921) of the 806 titles in philosophy only eight are devoted to logic; ten times as many are listed under epistemology and almost fourteen times as many under theodicy. In Vernon J. Bourke, Thomistic Bibliography: 1920-1940 (St. Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1945) against 350 items listed for meta physics, 285 for ethics, and 265 for epistemology and the theory of knowledge, there are only 48 listed for logic, logistics, and mathematics together, of which five deal with mathematics and eleven are logic manuals. Several titles which hold out some promise regarding the domain of logic may serve as examples ofthe frustration that meets the researcher. Odon Lottin, O.S.B., "L'ordre moral et l'ordre logique," Annales de l'Institut Superieur de Philosophie, V (1924) (Louvain, and Paris: Alcan) , 310-399, is much more interested in the moral order (as might be expected from its author) than in the logicalorder, which is brought in only incidentally and for purposes of comparison (on logic: pp. 303-308, 323-328, 348-354). PREFACE ix Because the present study is intended to be textual and exegetical, the doctrine evolved must follow the texts. This means, first of all, that the doctrine expounded must be that of St. Thomas rather than any private opinions of the exegete; secondly, that this doctrine must be shown to be St. Thomas' from the texts brought forth; and thirdly, that the order of the exposition must grow from the texts. In regard to the first, an exegete must be on his guard against reading any preconceived notions of his own into the interpretation of the author. With the writings of Aquinas there is particular danger because very many of the questions upon which he touches have not been given any extended ex professo treatment. The nature of logic is one of these, for he never wrote a treatise on logic as such. To discover his doctrine it is therefore necessary to gather texts from many sources and many different contexts, supplementing one text by the other. When a point has not at all been treated by the author, it is not legiti mate for the exegete to attempt to fill in the gaps with his own conclu sions, taking perhaps one premise of the arguments from the author and supplying another himself. When, however, a point of doctrine is implicit in the author, it seems legitimate to make it explicit; as, when two premises are given by the author, it seems permissible to draw the conclusion that naturally follows from them, even though it was never explicitly drawn by the author, but only on the condition that nothing contrary to such a conclusion is anywhere said. In a study of this kind when what is said in one passage needs further Andre Hayen, S.]., L.intentionnel dans la philosophie de saint Thomas (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1st ed., 1942; 2nd ed., 1954), though distinguishing different meanings or kinds of intention, one of which is the coguitive intention, takes no notice of logical intentions or of logic. Lucien Dufault, O.M.1. , "The Concept of Being Which Is the Proper Object ofLogic," Proceedings olthe Am. Cath. Phil. Assn., XXI (1946),77-83, seems to be directly on the topic at hand; but in addition to its brief compass (six pages) it turns out to be almost completely a study of J ohn of St. Thomas rather than of St. Thomas Aquinas. ] oseph J. Sikora, "The Art and Science of Formal Logic in Thomistic Philoso phy," The Thomist, XXII (1959), 533-541, is the discussion of a problem with little pre tense of documentation from St. Thomas or of the explanation of his texts. Among recent works one of the best treatments of the question is a short chapter (twelve pages) in Ralph M. McInerny, The Logic 01 Analogy: An Interpretation 01 St. Thomas (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961), chap. 3, "The Nature of Logic," pp. 37-48, plus 100-106 and 118-122 from the following chapter. But being very brief, this can present only a few passages from St. Thomas and omits many of the principal and most explicit statements by Aquinas on logic; those brought in are not much explicated; and the doctrinal back ground or presuppositions of these statements are not examined. At about the same time there appeared an excellent article on almost the same topic, Edward D. Simmons, "The Nature and Limits of Logic," The Thomist, XXIV (1961), 47-71. Without being expressly an exposition of the doctrine of St. Thomas, it does follow him rather closely and makes a few incidental references to his works. But it is not an exegetical study; and, in so far as it acknowledges any inspiration or basis, this would be J ohn of St. Thomas as much as St. Thomas himself. x PREFACE explanation, that explanation also must be found in the author: text must be explained by text, with due regard all the while for the con text so that no violence is done to the real sense of the texts brought forth Such a procedure dictates to a certain extent the order that is to be followed. The passages from which astart is made reveal points for further investigation and elucidation, which must then be examined in the light of other texts; and these may in turn lead to others. From this there arises a great difficulty in keeping a clear order in such an exeget ical study, especially when the works of the author are as complex as those of Aquinas. Because most of the logical doctrine is incidental to some other explanations, related points may occur in a variety of con texts, which complicate the exposition. The various related texts, furthermore, though mutually supplementary, will often be relatively complete summary treatments by themselves, according to the imme diate needs of the context. From this two chief inconveniences follow. First, the progression of the argument in a given passage is often more rapid than is desirable for a lengthier and more detailed explanation; and secondly, when the supplementary texts are quoted for the addi tional information or new point of view contained in each of them, there will be a certain amount ofrepetition and overlapping. An even greater difficulty in the order of presentation arises from explaining text by text, because the first may contain more than one point that needs further development, then the text brought forward for this purpose itself contains one or more points requiring clarification, and so on until it is difficult to know what point was originally being explained. Some workable compromise must in each case be found between following the lead of the texts into an inextricable maze and multiplicity of points within points, on the one hand, and, on the other, imposing a rigid apriori order on the exposition regardless of the texts of the author. The prudence of the compromise will inevitably be debatable and its success at best relative. It has not been judged necessary to follow a historical order in the presentation of the doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter. First of all, the whole project has not been conceived as a literary and chronological inquiry but rather as a doctrinal one. And what is more important, no appreciable change or evolution has been discerned in Aquinas' doc trine on the nature of logic, and conse'quently no significance has been found in the chronological sequence of the works. The general procedure followed in this study is a natural one. First PREFACE xi those texts in which Aquinas gives some ex professo and explicit ex planation oflogic by name, saying what it is or does, however brief the statement may be, are found and set forth. Then, since the explanations will necessarily be made in terms other than logic itself, those terms must be examined for a fuller explanation of what logic iso The treatment is divided into three parts, each containing three chapters. In Part I the explicit statements about logic are examined, ineluding both absolute statements of what logic is or does, and relative statements about logic made by comparing it with something else. In Part II the general terms used to explain logic are themselves investi gated in detail. And in Part III the particular kind of logical entity belonging to each of the three operations of reason respectively is examined inorderto present more concretelythe natureoflogical being. In the choice of passages adduced a few are cited or even quoted in the text from opuscula whose authenticity is questioned or even denied by some. These are De Natura Generis, De Natura Accidentis, De Prin cipio I ndividuationis, De Propositionibus M odalibus, and De F allaciis. Regarding their authenticity the opinion which has been followed is that of Grabmann, who upholds it, rather than of Mandonnet, who denies the authenticity of the first three and hesitates to ac cord fully that of the last two.8 In almost all cases, however, these works are merely cited in the notes along with other texts; or if they are quoted in the body of the work, it is usually with parallel passages. In the few instances in which such quotations stand by themselves it will be found that no essential point of the argument depends upon them alone, but that the texts quoted be fore or after them in the argument are suffi ciently elose in meaning for the doctrine to stand as explained even without the passages from works of questioned authenticity. No notice whatever is taken of certainly spurious works, particularly the Summa 8 P. Mandonnet, O.P., Des ecrits authentiques de S. Thomas d'Aquin (Fribourg: L'oeuvre de Saint-Paul, 1910) holds all spurious beeause not in the "official eatalogue." See the table, p. 108, for De Prop. Modal. (n. 84), De Fallaciis (n. 88), De Nat. Ace. (n. 90), De Nat. Gen. (n. 92), and p. 109 for De Prin. Indiv. (n. 104), and supplementary notes onDe Nat. Gen. (p. 105) and De Prin. Indiv. (p. 151). In his edition ofthe Opuscula (Paris: Lethielleux, 1927) he gives in vol. IV among the vix dubia the De Prop. Modal. (p. 505) and the De Fallaciis (p. 508); the rest he plaees in vol. V among the spuria. In an article of 1925 ("Thomas d'Aquin, Noviee Preeheur," IV, Revue Thomiste, n.s. VIII, 406-409) and in his introduetion to the Opuscula (pp. xxxviii, xl, & xlvii) he holds the De Fallaciis and the De Prop. Modal. to be "almost surely authentie." M. Grabmann, Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin (in "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters," XXII, 1-2, 3rd ed.; Munster: Asehendorff, 1949), holds them all authentie (De Prin. Indiv., p. 342; De Fallaeiis, pp. 348-352; De Prop. Modal., pp. 352-353; De Nat. Ace., p. 354; De Nat. Gen., 354-353).