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Title: The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus Author: William Abbott Oldfather and Howard Vernon Canter Release Date: February 04, 2021 [eBook #64462] Language: English Character set encoding: UTF-8 Produced by: Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE DEFEAT OF VARUS AND THE GERMAN FRONTIER POLICY OF AUGUSTUS *** UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES VOL IV. NO. 2 JUNE 1915 BOARD OF EDITORS ERNEST L. BOGART JOHN A. FAIRLIE LAURENCE M. LARSON Published by the University of Illinois Under the Auspices of the Graduate School Urbana, Illinois Copyright, 1915 By the University of Illinois The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus WILLIAM A. OLDFATHER, Ph. D. Associate Professor of Classics, University of Illinois AND HOWARD VERNON CANTER, Ph. D. Assistant Professor of Classics, University of Illinois [i] [ii] [iii] [iv] PREFACE The present monograph is the outcome of a certain dissatisfaction felt with the traditional view as expressed in some of the literature which appeared six years ago on the occasion of the nineteen-hundredth anniversary of the battle of the Teutoburg forest. The principal theses as here presented were jotted down at the time, and although a variety of circumstances prevented their immediate elaboration, they were not forgotten, collections of literature were made from time to time, as occasion offered, and the general course of argument outlined. In 1912 Mr. Cyrus S. Gentry, then a graduate student in this university, working under the supervision of Mr. Oldfather, prepared and submitted, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Classics, a thesis entitled: “The Effect of the Defeat of Varus upon the Imperial Policy of Rome regarding the Northern Frontier.” We desire to express our thanks to Mr. Gentry for kind permission to use some of his collections of material. The present work is, however, a wholly independent production, being much more extensive and detailed, and differing substantially in plan and scope. Active work upon the present study was begun by us in cooperation in the spring of 1914, and continued, with intermissions, to the present time. In the first part, which deals with the traditional view, we have gone into some detail in the presentation and criticism of current explanations, with the hope that, as a review of present and past opinion, it may not be without value, even if our new interpretation fail to receive general acceptance. A certain amount of repetition in the two parts of the monograph has thus been rendered unavoidable, but though this may at times prove tiresome, it contributes to the clearness of the argument, which is, after all, the chief consideration. To some it may perhaps seem unfortunate that a discussion of such a subject as this should appear at a time when the German nation is involved in a momentous conflict. We do not so feel. Disinterested scholarship should not be affected by transitory or even permanent emotions. We are confident that our work has not been so affected. That we have been compelled in scientific candor to destroy a certain glamor which has been attributed to an early period of German history, has not the slightest bearing upon our attitude toward German character and achievement, for which we entertain the most sincere respect. Our investigation deals not with the quality of the deed of Arminius, but only with its historical consequences, two utterly unrelated aspects. It is surely no discredit that an act of heroism should not be also big with destiny. Over consequences no man has control. The modern German nation needs, perhaps less than any other, the lustre of a long buried past to shed renown upon the present. We take pleasure in acknowledging our indebtedness to Professor A. S. Pease of the Department of Classics, who has kindly read all the manuscript in proof. W. A. O. H. V. C. The University of Illinois May 24, 1915 [v] [vi] CONTENTS PAGE CHAPTER I Introduction and General View of the Question 9 CHAPTER II Sources 21 CHAPTER III Criticism of the Accepted View 35 CHAPTER IV A New Interpretation 82 Appendices 113 Index 117 [vii] [viii] CHAPTER I Introduction and General View of the Question Historians and other writers in discussing the defeat of Varus, and its bearing upon the subsequent history of Rome and Germany, are almost united in the belief that Augustus, until the events of the year 9 A. D., had in view the complete subjugation of Germany as far as the river Elbe. Gardthausen[1] unhesitatingly predicates the emperor’s intention in the following words: “er wollte das Land östlich vom Rhein und nördlich von der Donau mit seinem Reiche vereinigen, um ihm eine bessere Grenze zu geben.” Mommsen everywhere expresses the traditional view. In discussing Drusus’ command of the year 13 B. C. against the Germans he says:[2] “Drusus ... übernahm bei Augustus Rückkehr nach Italien (741) die Verwaltung von Gallien und den Oberbefehl gegen die Germanen, deren Unterwerfung jetzt ernstlich in das Auge gefasst ward.” Further on[3] Drusus’ successor, Tiberius, is represented as having succeeded in making this subjugation: “weit und breit zwischen Rhein und Elbe zeigten sich die römischen Truppen, und als Tiberius die Forderung stellte, dass sämmtliche Gaue die römische Herrschaft förmlich anzuerkennen hätten ... fügten sie sich ohne Ausnahme.” Again, Mommsen[4] calls Arminius the leader in the conflict of despair over the lost national independence, and speaks[5] of the campaign of the year 16 A. D. as the last which the Romans waged in order to subdue Germany and to transfer the boundary from the Rhine to the Elbe. Delbrück’s position on the question is unequivocal[6]. So is that of Schiller.[7] Hübner[8] voices the surprising belief that Augustus in his effort to subdue Germany was merely following in the steps of Julius Caesar! Koepp[9] hazards the same view, and says that not only was the shortening of the Rhine boundary planned by Caesar, but that this plan was to have been carried into execution after the overthrow of the Getae; that nothing but more pressing duties prevented Caesar’s heir, for thirty years after Gaul’s subjugation, from pushing the boundary beyond the Rhine; that the settling of the Ubii on the left bank of the Rhine by Agrippa (19 B. C.) was not a backward step from that taken in crossing the Rhine in 37 B. C., but a mere confession that only in this way could Rome protect the Ubii from the attack of their neighbors. Seeck[10] and many others assert that not only was Germany subdued by Rome, but that Roman administration was actually set up in the new province.[11] This is stated by Knoke as follows:[12] “Das germanische Gebiet konnte bis zur Elbe als unterworfen gelten ... Römische Verwaltung und Gerichtsbarkeit waren eingeführt, die Deutschen zu Heeresfolge und Tribut gezwungen ... nach menschlichem Ermessen musste für das deutsche Volk die Zeit gekommen sein, wo es auf immer der Herrschaft Roms verfallen war.” However, there is no general agreement as to when Augustus conceived the plan of conquering Germany. Hertzberg[13] believes it doubtful whether he had any such intention at the time of Lollius’ defeat (16 B. C.): “Ob er wirklich schon jetzt die Eroberung Deutschlands bestimmt ins Auge gefasst hat, ist uns—wir wiederholen es—freilich zweifelhaft.” Abraham’s conclusion is that as late even as 10 B. C. Augustus had no further purpose than to secure the Rhine boundary, but that later he had larger ambitions which were fully realized: “Später indessen hat Augustus wirklich Deutschland bis zur Elbe ... zur Provinz machen wollen, und vor der Niederlage des Varus sah er die Unterwerfung Norddeutschlands für vollendet an.”[14] Many believe that an effort was made on Augustus’ part to shorten the Rhine-Danube boundary, and they regard this as tantamount to an attempt to subjugate Germany.[15] The campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius in particular are usually cited as proofs of Rome’s purpose with respect to Germany. So by Pelham[16]: “Nor can we doubt that the object of the campaigns carried on beyond the Rhine by Augustus’ two stepsons, Drusus and Tiberius (13 B.C.-6 A.D.), had for their object the extension of Roman rule up to that [the Elbe] river.” Occasionally, however, more caution is shown in discussing Rome’s policy. So Abbott[17]: “To the north the frontier policy of Augustus was, at the outset, less clearly determined. For a time the Romans seem to have intended making the Elbe the line between them and the Germans.” Ferrero, although he devotes a chapter of his well-known work[18] to the “Conquest of Germania,” concedes, nevertheless, that Augustus was opposed to expansion by conquest, and that the first fifteen years of his rule unmistakably contradict such a policy[19]: “he had persistently avoided hazardous adventures beyond the frontiers of the empire and had found a thousand pretexts to deceive the impatience and ambition of the people.” We may observe also that Eduard Meyer’s view[20] is not wholly in harmony with the commonly accepted one. He objects to the assertion frequently made that the victory of Arminius preserved the individuality of the German nation: “Wenn wir ... die Frage aufwerfen, wie es gekommen ist, dass den romanischen Völkern germanische zur Seite stehen, dass ich hier deutsch zu Ihnen rede und nicht in einer romanischen Sprache, so wird einer vorurteilslose Erwägung nicht die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald nennen dürfen.” And although he insists on the necessity resting upon Augustus to war against the Germans in order to preserve Gaul, to maintain peace, and to secure a shorter and more distant frontier at the Elbe, he makes it clear that the war was in no sense prompted by the desire for imperial expansion[21]: “aber auch dieser Krieg ist durchaus nur als Grenzkrieg geführt worden, nicht als ein Reichskrieg an der Art wie Cäsar seinen Geten- und Partherkrieg geplant hatte.” Nevertheless, from a careful consideration of the foregoing opinions, which have been selected merely as representative of a very large number of similar expressions, we may discover a strikingly universal belief that before the battle of the Teutoburg forest Augustus was attempting the conquest of Germany; that the disaster which overtook the legions of Varus in this battle caused him to give up his plans, and to renounce all hope of making Germany a province[22]. Most historians claim in addition that Arminius was the preserver of the German nationality, and that his victory over Varus was a turning point in the world’s history. So Seeck[23]: “Der Sieg des Armin hat es für alle Zeiten verhindert, dass auch die Germanen Bürger des Reiches wurden und so den Keim gerettet, aus dem künftig die [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] Völkerwanderung und mit ihr eine neue Welt erwachsen sollte.” Gardthausen[24] states the same belief in still stronger terms: “Wenn wir daher jetzt, also beinahe nach 2000 Jahren, noch von einer deutschen Nation reden, wenn es noch heute eine deutsche Sprache gibt, so ist das ohne Frage, zum grossen Theile, das Verdienst des Arminius ... kurz, die Entwickelung der deutschen Geschichte und in beschränkterem Masse auch der Weltgeschichte wäre eine andere geworden, wenn Arminius nicht zur rechten Zeit den Kampf mit dem Varus aufgenommen und wenn er nicht später— was noch schwerer war—den Siegespreis der Freiheit gegen Germanicus vertheidigt hätte.” The debt of the German nation, and the world at large, to Arminius, is proclaimed again and again in monographs, remarkable as exhibitions of patriotic fervor, but at times wanting in scientific spirit and in the objective temper that should characterize estimates of historical significance.[25] Mommsen and Koepp may be cited as the most distinguished representatives of the view that the battle of the Teutoburg forest is a turning point in national destinies, an ebbing in the tide of Rome’s sway over the world, a shifting of the bounds of Roman rule from the Elbe to the Rhine and the Danube.[26] Koepp is the more guarded. He says[27], “Seit dieser Niederlage scheint Roms Macht, auf dieser Seite wenigstens, zurückzuebben, und wie ein Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte erscheint diese Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde.” But this view has currency elsewhere than in the writings of German authors. Thomas Arnold voices it[28] with all the extravagance that characterizes rash generalizations: “The victory of Arminius deserves to be reckoned among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the happiness of mankind; and we may regard the destruction of Quintilius Varus, and his three legions, on the bank of the Lippe, as second only in the benefits derived from it to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours over the invading host of the Mohammedans.” We find it, as one might expect, in a text of such unscientific character as that of Creasy[29], the motto for whose discussion is an epigrammatic sentence taken from the epitomator Florus, “Hac clade factum, ut imperium quod in littore oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.” And we need feel no surprise that this view is perpetuated in such a compilation as that of P. V. N. Meyers.[30] Here and there, however, are to be found writers who warn against such a sweeping generalization. So Eduard Meyer, who has been quoted above.[31] Ferrero too shows a saner historical view when he says[32]: “Historians have long been accustomed to regard the defeat of Varus as one of the ‘decisive’ battles of the world, and as an event which may be said to have changed the course of history. It is said, that if Varus had not been overthrown, Rome would have preserved her grip upon the territory from the Rhine to the Elbe and would have romanised it as she did Gaul: the prospects of a Germanic nationality and civilization would have been as impossible as those of a Celtic nationality and civilization after the defeat of Vercingetorix. Thus the defeat of Teutoburg is said to have saved Germanism even as that of Alesia was the ruin of the old Celtic nationalism. This straightforward line of argument, however, touches the sinuous course of reality only at a few points, and those far distant from one another. It is always a dangerous task, in dealing with history, to say what might have happened, in view of the considerable difficulty involved in the attempt to explain what did happen.”[33] It should be observed also that such a generalization involves the assumption that the German nation developed as it did because of its liberation from Roman influence, whereas it may properly be argued that the so-called liberation was instrumental in separating Germany for centuries from civilizing contact with Rome. For it is a fact that the early Germans made no progress whatever, left no literature, no monument, no memory of themselves until they again came into relations with that great transmitter of civilization, Rome, in the person of Rome’s new representative, Charlemagne.[34] Now it is of course obvious that the estimate of Arminius’ achievement will depend upon the significance which impartial criticism will assign to the battle in which Varus was defeated—Arminius’ one great deed. Regarding that we propose in the present monograph to show that the ancient accounts of the battle of the Teutoburg forest are of inferior authority; that while some of them are broadly detailed, they are on the whole meager, inconsistent, and full of errors, exaggerations, and absurdities; that a striving after rhetorical effect is their peculiar characteristic;[35] that frequently what these sources say in express words is not objectively trustworthy, and still less so are the deductions made immediately from the descriptions found there, or from the delineations which the authors of the sources doubtless never intended to serve as objective pictures of reality;[36] that only the less cautious writers assert that Augustus in a spirit of imperialism sought to conquer Germany;[37] that historians who have the best standing as authorities abandon this ground and give as a reason the necessity resting on Augustus of protecting Gaul and Italy from the Germans. An effort will be made to show that Germany was never made a Roman province; that Augustus never had the intention, and never made the attempt, to conquer Germany and organize it as a province; that his operations in Germany consisted merely in making a series of demonstrations in force, in order to impress the barbarians and to facilitate the defense of the frontier by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome a wide strip of the enemy’s territory. It is but natural, when such exaggerated estimates are current regarding the significance of the battle of the Teutoburg forest, that the leading figure on the German side, Arminius, should be elevated to a position of quite fictitious glory, and that he should have been exalted to the rank of one of the world’s greatest heroes.[38] As Koepp pertinently observes, many well-meant accounts of the Teutoburg battle have been written under mere impulse of national feeling.[39] However, that the glorification of heroes at the expense of truth finds no place in sober historical investigation is the warning given by the best trained German scholars themselves, and by none more effectively than by Koepp[40], who said to an assembly of scholars at an Arminius Jubilee celebration held at Detmold, October 22, 1908: “eher dürften wir heute unseren Helden aus der bengalischen Beleuchtung romantischer Schwärmerei in das Tageslicht geschichtlicher Betrachtung rücken, ohne uns gegen die Jubiläumsstimmung zu versündigen. Es ist ja auch Vorrecht und Pflicht der Wissenschaft, auch an festlichen Tagen der Wahrheit die Ehre zu geben.” So Fustel de Coulanges complains that in Arminius’ case historians have taken liberty with historical facts under motives of idealization[41]: “Nous désapprouvons [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] les historiens allemands, qui ont altéré l’histoire pour créer, un Arminius legendaire et une Germanie idéale.” Finally, we may note that the same authority warns also in more general terms of historians who allow patriotic motives to exaggerate the few facts at their disposal.[42] FOOTNOTES Augustus und seine Zeit, Leipzig, 1891, I, p. 1069. Röm. Gesch., V. p. 24 (6th ed. 1909); cf. Die germanische Politik des Augustus (originally in Im Neuen Reich, 1871, pp. 537-556), p. 14: “Die Unterwerfung Germaniens, kräftig begonnen, und sieben Jahre hindurch beharrlich ... geführt.” Other representative expressions of opinion among recent writers may be found: R. von Poehlmann (in Pflugk-Harttung’s Weltgeschichte, 1910, I, p. 516); E. Kornemann (in Gercke-Norden’s Einleitung in die Altertumsw., 1912, III, p. 208); E. Kornemann, “Zu dem Germanenkriege unter Augustus,” Klio, IX (1909), p. 449. On the basis of Tiberius’ campaigns (4-6 A. D.) he speaks also of “die gewaltigen Anstrengungen Roms zur Unterwerfung Germaniens”; H. F. Pelham, Outlines of Roman History, 1905, p. 460; H. Stuart Jones, The Roman Empire, 1913, p. 34; C. H. Hayes, Sources Relating to the Germanic Invasions, 1909, p. 64. Ibid., p. 28. So J. Beloch, Griech. Gesch.², I, 1 (1912), Einleit., p. 14, says that not only was the attempt made but that Germany was actually subjugated: “Denn Augustus hat diese Eroberung ja versucht trotz der Verfassung, die er dem Reiche gegeben hatte, und er hatte die Eroberung des Landes bis an die Elbe vollendet, als in der Teutoburger Schlacht alles Errungene zusammenbrach.” Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. 50. See the chapter “Die Unterwerfung Germaniens durch die Römer” in his Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Berlin, 2nd edit., 1909, II, p. 47 f. Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit, Gotha, 1883, p. 221 f. Röm. Herrschaft in Westeuropa, Berlin, 1890, p. 110. Die Römer in Deutschland (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XXII), 1912, p. 8. Fischer (Armin und die Römer, Halle a. S., 1893, p. 4) is entirely correct in saying that Julius Caesar’s conflicts with the Germans were intended merely “die Germanen von Einfällen in Gallien abzuschrecken,” i. e. to frighten them and to flatter Roman pride. However, inconsistently enough, he adds that Augustus saw a hope of expansion in this direction, “und demgemäss sah er, als Adoptivsohn Cäsars, die Unterwerfung Germaniens als eine ihm vermachte heilige Pflicht an” (p. 25). See Kaiser Augustus (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XVII), 1902, p. 111: “bedrängte Drusus vom Unterrhein her die freien Germanen, und hatte sie bis zur Elbe unterworfen ... Tiberius ... vollendete dann in den beiden folgenden Jahren die Eroberung und ordnete die Verwaltung der neuen Provinz.” See also Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, 31 f.; Schiller, op. cit., p. 222. Riese (Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit, Frankfurt am Main, 1889, p. 11), while believing that subjugation was made, shows that no province was established; cf. pp. 6, 7, 12. Mommsen’s statement that proof of such organization is seen in the fact that, when Drusus consecrated for Gaul the altar of Augustus at Lyons, the Ubii were not included, but a similar altar was erected for the German cantons, is answered by Riese, who points out that the emperor’s worship was by no means confined to a single place in a province. For proofs of this statement see examples given by Riese, p. 7 f.; also by Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverwaltung², I, p. 504. Ferrero (Characters and Events of Roman History, New York, 1909, p. 165) reaches the conclusion that, owing to the absence of Tiberius at Rhodes, Germany was not organized into a province; that the Germans were not bound to pay tribute, but were left to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws. Armin der Befreier Deutschland, Berlin, 1909, p. 6 f. Die Feldzüge der Römer in Deutschland, Halle, 1872, p. 49. Zur Gesch. der germanischen u. pannonischen Kriege unter Augustus, Berlin, 1875, p. 7. Cf. Koepp, op. cit., p. 9: “der Wunsch, eine solche Grenze zu verkürzen, den einspringenden Winkel zum Reiche zu ziehen, erscheint fast selbstverständlich. Das bedeutete aber die Eroberung Germaniens bis zur Elbe”; Idem, Westfalen, I (1909), p. 35: “Dieses Ziel hat nun Augustus ohne Zweifel erstrebt.” See also Schiller, op. cit., p. 214: “Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt, von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberungen zu mehren, abzugehen und für Gallien die Grenze nach der Elbe, für Italien und Macedonien nach der Donau vorzuschieben und auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen, welche leichter zu verteidigen und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende.” Op. cit., p. 460. History of Roman Political Institutions, Boston, 1910, p. 282. The Greatness and Decline of Rome, New York, 1909, V, p. 142 f. So Mommsen, Die germanische Politik des Augustus, p. 9: “Caesar Augustus wollte womöglich, und insbesondere in dem ersten Drittel seiner Herrschaft, den Frieden.” Kleine Schriften zur Geschichtstheorie, Halle, 1910, p. 444. Ibid., p. 471. Niese, Grundriss der röm. Gesch. (4th ed. 1910), p. 299: “Eine Wiedereroberung des Verlorenen [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] ward nicht versucht. Mit Ausnahme der Küstenvölker, Bataver, Friesen, und Chauken, gingen die Eroberungen in Germanien verloren, und an Stelle der Elbe ward der Rhein Grenze.... Das römische Germanien beschränkte sich in Zukunft auf die dem Rhein benachbarten Gegenden”; Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. 1910, p. 2: “And though, on the first attack they [the Germans] seemed to yield to the weight of the Roman power, they soon, by a signal act of despair, regained their independence, and reminded Augustus of the vicissitudes of fortune.” Op. cit., p. 117. Cf. von Ranke, Weltgeschichte, III, 1, Leipzig, 1883, p. 28: “Und auch die Geschichte muss bestätigen, dass dem Ereigniss eine allgemeine und auf immer nachwirkende Bedeutung zukommt.” Op. cit., I, p. 1202 f. See F. Knoke, Armin der Befreier Deutschlands, 1909, p. 80: “Dass uns die Eigenart erhalten blieb, dass wir unsere Sprache retteten, dass wir ein freies Volk geblieben seien, dass wir eine Geschichte erleben durften, dies alles haben wir Armin zu verdanken ... ja selbst fremde Völker hätten alle Ursache mit uns zusammen ihn zu ehren. Gäbe es doch, um vom anderen zu schweigen, ohne seine Taten weder ein Volk der Franzosen, noch der Engländer, selbst nicht der Amerikaner in den Vereinigten Staaten. Ihnen allen hat er die Möglichkeit ihres Volkstums erst geschaffen. Das wird ihnen freilich schwerlich zum Bewusstsein kommen. Um so mehr wollen wir ihn feiern, als den Befreier Deutschlands, als den ersten Helden unseres Vaterlandes”; Felix Dahn, Armin der Cherusker, München, 1909, p. 43: “ohne ihn [Arminius] und sein Meisterstück der Kriegskunst wären wir Germanen eben romanisiert worden wie die Kelten in Gallien.... Wir danken für Kant und Schiller und für Erhaltung unseres deutschen Art und Sprach Armin und der Varus-Schlacht.” See Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 53: “wir stehen hier an einem Wendepunkt der Völkergeschichte. Auch die Geschichte hat ihre Fluth und ihre Ebbe; hier tritt nach der Hochfluth des römischen Weltregiments die Ebbe ein”; Idem, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 19: “Die Katastrophe ist ... von den weitgreifendsten Folgen geworden, ja man kann sagen ein Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte.” “Die Varusschlacht in Geschichte und Forschung,” Westfalen, I (1909), p. 34. History of the Later Roman Commonwealth, London, 1845, II, p. 317. The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, London, 1859, pp. 179, 195: “Had Arminius been supine or unsuccessful our Germanic ancestors would have been enslaved or exterminated in their original seats along the Eyder and the Elbe. This island would never have borne the name of England.... Never was victory more decisive, never was liberation of an oppressed people more instantaneous and complete ... within a few weeks after Varus had fallen the German soil was freed from the foot of the invader.” Rome: Its Rise and Fall, Boston, 1901, p. 323: “The victory of Arminius ... was an event of the greatest significance in the history of European civilization ... the Teutonic tribes were on the point of being completely subjugated and put in the way of being Romanized, as the Celts of Gaul had already been. Had this occurred, the entire history of Europe would have been changed. Had Rome succeeded in exterminating or enslaving them Britain, as Creasy says, might never have received the name of England, and the great English nation might never have had an existence.” Note 20. Op. cit., p. 325. Oskar Jäger (Deutsche Geschichte, München, 1909, I, p. 28) is correct in denying any significance to Arminius’ victory further than that it showed the Germans that the dreaded Roman legions were not invincible: “Aber weitere Erfolge hatte das Ereignis nicht. Es erwuchs keine dauernde Organisation aus diesem Erfolg, und im römischen Hauptquartier erholte man sich bald von dem Schrecken, den die Nachricht in Rom hervorgerufen hatte. Tiberius, der nach dem bedrohten Punkt geschickt wurde, fand keine geeinigte germanische Macht zu bekämpfen. Er konnte sich damit begnügen, wie einst Cäsar, über den Rhein zu gehen, um dem jenseitigen Lande zu beweisen, dass die Macht des Imperiums durch die Niederlage dreier Legionen nicht erschüttert sei. Es geschah nichts weiter; die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer eigenen Zwietracht zu überlassen, bewährte sich.” Cf. also Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 125: “Mais la victoire d’Arminius n’eut point d’autres résultats que de refouler les Italiens jusqu’au Rhin. Il ne put rien entreprendre de plus contre Rome, ni rien fonder en Germanie”; p. 127: “Les temps n’étaient donc point venus ni de la défaite pour l’Empire romain ni de l’unité pour la Germanie.” Ch. Gailly de Taurines, Les Légions de Varus, Paris, 1911, p. 312: “Grâce à Arminn, sept siècles plus tard, Charlemagne, conquérant latin, champion de la Rome nouvelle, retrouvera, sur le même sol, les tribus germaniques de l’interieur dans l’état même—ou peu s’en faut—ou les avait laissées Germanicus. De leur existence, durant ces sept siècles, elles n’avaient été capables de laisser à la postérité ni un monument, ni un souvenir, ni une inscription, ni une pierre.” Cf. also Fustel de Coulanges, Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France, Paris, 1891, II, p. 227: “Nous ne possédons aucun document de source germanique ... nous n’avons pas un livre, pas une inscription, pas une monnaie.” Delbrück, op. cit., p. 53: “Viel schlimmer ist der Geist der Literatur dieser Epoche, der ganz und gar von Rhetorik beherrscht ist. Diese Schriftsteller wollen nicht erzählen, wie es gewesen ist, oder wie sie möchten, dass die Leser glauben sollen, dass es gewesen sei, sondern sie wollen vor allem durch die Kunst ihrer Rede Empfindungen erwecken und Eindruck machen. Mir scheint, dass bei zahlreichen Untersuchungen, die den Schlachten des Arminius und Germanicus bisher gewidmet worden sind, diese Charakter-Eigenschaft unserer Quellen, wenn auch oft hervorgehoben, doch kritisch noch lange nicht stark genug in Rechnung gezogen worden ist.” For a glaring example of how history should not be written, as though all the labors of scholarship [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] had been in vain, and Florus or Dionysius of Halicarnassus were models of historical style, one might cite the highly dramatic account of the battle as repeated by Leighton, History of Rome, New York, 1891, p. 436: “Without troubling about military measures he [Varus] travelled over the country, imposed taxes and pronounced decisions as if a praetor in the forum at Rome. Among the bold and turbulent Germans the spirit of freedom and independence only slumbered; it was not broken. The national hero Arminius raised the standard of revolt. Under this prince a confederacy of all the tribes between the Rhine and the Weser was formed to throw off the yoke of Rome. The governor collected three legions and advanced in 9 A.D. to quell the revolt. The Germans retired; but the Romans pushed on until they had advanced into the Teutoberger [sic] forest. Then Arminius turned and defeated them with tremendous slaughter. The defiles of the woods were covered far and wide with the corpses of the army, for nearly 40,000 soldiers perished. The eagles were lost and Varus perished with his own hand. The news of the disaster caused the utmost alarm in Rome. The Emperor himself was astounded. In his despair he dashed his head against the wall and exclaimed ‘Varus, Varus! give me back my legions.’” Creasy, op. cit., p. 182: “It is a great fallacy, though apparently sanctioned by great authorities, to suppose that the foreign policy of Augustus was pacific. He certainly recommended such a policy to his successors, either from timidity, or from jealousy of their fame outshining his own; but he himself, until Arminius broke his spirit, had followed a very different course.” Cf., e. g., the poem Hermann (in twelve books, 2nd ed., 1753) by Christopher Otto von Schönaich, beginning: “Von dem Helden will ich singen, dessen Arm sein Volk beschützt, Dessen Schwert auf Deutschlands Feinde für sein Vaterland geblitzt; Der allein vermögend war, des Augustus Stolz zu brechen, Und des Erdenkreises Schimpf in der Römer Schmach zu rächen.” See also J. E. Riffert, “Die Hermannschlacht in der deutschen Literatur,” Herrigs Archiv, 63 (1880), pp. 129-76; 241-332; W. Creizenach, “Armin in Poesie und Literaturgeschichte,” Preussische Jahrbücher, 36, pp. 332-40. Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 24: “Mag dem Patrioten bei dem Namen die Brust schwellen: dem Geschichtsschreiber muss der Mut sinken beim Gedanken an so manche Bemühungen seiner Vorgänger um dieses Ereignis! Mit Beschämung gedenkt er der alten Kollegen, die es so ungenau, mit Beschämung vieler neuen, die es so genau erzählt haben, so mancher wohlgemeinten Schriftstellerleistung, der man kein besseres Motto geben könnte als Scheffels Vers: ‘In Westfalen trank er viel, drum aus Nationalgefühl hat er’s angefertigt.’” A good instance of blind adulation is that of Hertzberg, op. cit., p. 307: “Niemals wieder spiegelten sich die Adler der Legionen in den gelben Wellen der Weser oder in dem breiten Spiegel der Elbe. Und das ist das niemals welkende Verdienst des Armin gewesen ... das Bild des ersten grossen Mannes deutscher Nation ... die eherne Heldengestalt des Arminius.” Westfalen, I (1909), p. 34. How timely this warning by Koepp is may be seen from the following extraordinary burst of spirit, at a similar celebration, by T. Beneke, Siegfried und die Varusschlacht im Arnsberger Walde (Ein Beitrag zur neunzehnten Jahrhundertfeier), Leipzig—Gohlis, 1909, p. 84: “Sechsundzwanzig Jahre war Siegfried alt, als er diese Tat vollbrachte, die in ihren Folgen den grössten weltgeschichtlichen Ereignissen gleichzustellen ist, indem er dem Welteroberer eine Niederlage beibrachte, die fast einzig bis dahin in der sonst so ruhmreichen Kriegsgeschichte dieses Volkes dasteht ... Die Varusschlacht rettete mit der reinen Rasse alle ihre Vorzüge in leiblicher und geistiger Hinsicht, germanische Treue, Freiheit, Religiosität, Innigkeit, Gediegenheit, Schaffensfreudigkeit, Tüchtigkeit und Zähigkeit, kurz das, wodurch im Laufe der folgenden Jahrhunderte die Germanen in Civilization und Kultur an die Spitze der Völker des Erdkreises traten. Siegfrieds Tat ist der erste geschichtliche Beweis der Ueberlegenheit einer jungen tatkräftigen Rasse, von der eine Neubelebung der Welt ausgehen sollte.” Quoted by Gardthausen, op. cit., II, p. 793. Histoire des Institutions politiques, etc., II, p. 247: “Il y a une école historique en Allemagne qui aime à parler des anciens Germains, comme une école historique en France se plait à parler des anciens Gaulois. On ne connait pas mieux les uns que les autres; mais on se figure que le patriotisme éclaire ces ténèbres et qu’il decuple le peu de renseignements que l’on posséde.” [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] CHAPTER II Sources The only ancient accounts that have come down to us which throw light on the battle of the Teutoburg forest are: Cassius Dio, 56, 18-23; Velleius, II, 117-120; Florus, II, 30, 21-39; Tacitus, Annales, I, 60-62. These we must now compare with each other, with the purpose of determining their weight and credibility in the light of what we know of the authors, of the time and circumstances under which they wrote, and of the purpose had in view.[1] Cassius Dio (ca. 150-ca. 235 A. D.) is the only one of these ancient writers who has given us anything like a connected account of the catastrophe.[2] Although he wrote in Greek, Dio must be regarded as a Roman, being the son of a Roman senator, and himself filling the office of praetor and consul. His industry—he spent ten years (200-210 A. D.) in accumulating material for his history—and his various activities, as a practical soldier and politician, made his work much more than a mere compilation. While not remarkable for historical insight it represents what Dio sincerely believed to be the truth. Nevertheless, Dio was a product of the rhetorical schools and under the spell of their influence he wrote. His battle scenes are rhetorical exercises.[3] Noticeable also is his inclination toward a lively narration of events of a military character, a tendency which causes him to depart from the bare truth of his sources, and to ornament them with sensational descriptions after the rhetorical manner.[4] Delbrück notes that our sources for the wars of the Romans with the Germans are almost all from second, third, or fourth hand, and that Dio’s account was written at the very time when the rhetorical spirit most completely dominated literature. Dio, as well as our other sources for these years, is to be used with caution, since these writers regarded historical composition as preeminently an opus oratorium, and sought first of all to hold the reader’s attention by brilliant characterizations and striking descriptions. To Velleius (ca. 19 B. C.-ca. 30 A. D.), the only contemporary author who tells of the Varus disaster, we are indebted for a brief account.[5] A loyal officer with a military record behind him, a dilettante with undeniable studium, Velleius, in the reign of Tiberius, turned to the writing of history. As prefect of horse he accompanied Tiberius to Germany, where he served “per annos continuos novem praefectus aut legatus.”[6] His fervid loyalty and extravagance cause him to magnify everything that concerns Tiberius to such a degree that he is scarcely more than a partisan memoir writer. In his hasty sketches of military campaigns in Germany and Pannonia, full of blunders and inconsistencies, it is clear that he is but little concerned with the exact establishment of facts. With no appreciation of the internal connection of things, and no ability to sift evidence, he centers his interest almost entirely upon individuals for purpose of praise or blame, and excels as a rhetorical anecdotist, and as a delineator of individual actors. His inflated style, his straining after effect by hyperbole, antithesis, epigram, and piquancies of all kinds, mark the degenerate taste of the Silver Age, of which he is the earliest representative.[7] His reflections and observations generally outweigh the information given. Velleius’ training, the occasion of his composition, the attempt to satisfy the taste of his age, all make him a source, which, because of distortions and overemphasis, cannot be accepted at full value. L. Annaeus Florus, usually identified with the rhetorician and poet of Hadrian’s time, wrote (probably in 137 A. D.) an abridgement in two short books of Rome’s wars from the foundation of the city to the era of Augustus. As to Florus’ purpose in writing, and his rating as a rhetorician, scholars are agreed.[8] He composed solely from rhetorical motives[9], hence historical truth is frequently misrepresented, both intentionally and unintentionally, in a work full of errors, confusions, and contradictions.[10] Florus’ work is declamatory in tone, shows no traces of independent investigation, and little of the calm, even temper demanded of the historian. In his search for the surprising, the unusual, and the spirited, he is frequently led into exaggerations. He is given to the use of superlatives and enhancing epithets, as ingens, immensus, incredibilis, perpetuus, etc., and that he was himself conscious of exaggerations is clear from his free use of such words as quippe, seventy-five times, and quasi, more than a hundred times. In Florus each event is presented as a marvellous fact, and no better commentary on the poverty and unsatisfactoriness of our sources for the Varus disaster could be found than the fact that to Florus many writers have given the honor of being our chief authority.[11] It is apparent to the most superficial reader that the accounts given by our sources—especially those by Cassius Dio and Florus—are contradictory[12], notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to show that there is no conflict between them.[13] According to Dio, supported by Tacitus, the attack was made on Varus while he was on the march, whereas Florus says that Varus was seated in his camp quietly dispensing justice, when he was surprised by the German host.[14] Further, a detailed examination of the several accounts, sundry particulars of which we have no other means of testing, reveals so many inconsistencies and improbabilities that we are scarcely justified in accepting more than the bare defeat of Varus, the popular tradition of which was later incorporated into the studiously dramatic sketches of the rhetorical historians who serve as our sources. For example, Dio tells us[15] that the Germans craftily enticed Varus away from the Rhine and by conducting themselves in a peaceful and friendly manner lulled him into a feeling of security. This enticement is not mentioned by the other writers, and is in itself improbable[16], as Roman generals had frequently down to this time marched much further into the interior without any enticement whatsoever. It becomes doubly suspicious when we note the excellent rhetorical effect it produces by bringing into greater relief the setting of the disaster, and Varus’ sudden reversal of fortune. Again, Dio makes the statement that Varus and all his highest officers committed suicide.[17] If this remarkable event took place, it is almost wholly inconceivable that it should have found no mention in Velleius and Florus, the former of whom stood much nearer in time to the event. On the other [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] hand, both of these writers relate that Varus’ body was treated with indignity by the savage foe, and according to Velleius, one prefect died honorably in battle, and one preferred to surrender, while Varus’ legate, Numonius Vala, treacherously deserted. Dio’s description of the battle, moreover, is in sharp contradiction to that revealed by Tacitus’ account of conditions in Varus’ camp, as discovered by Germanicus in the year 15 A. D. The first camp that he came upon was one which, by its wide circuit and the measurement of its headquarters, showed the work of three legions, i. e. of an undiminished army; then came a second camp, with half-fallen rampart and shallow trench, where the diminished remnant were understood to have sunken down, i. e. the camp was laid out after a day’s loss with heavy fighting. Finally, Germanicus found in the plain the whitening bones, scattered or accumulated, just as Varus’ men had fled or made their stand in the final catastrophe.[18] Tacitus’ description of a regular camp, the “wide circuit and headquarters” on a scale suitable for the whole force, is utterly inconsistent with the statement of Dio that the first camp was pitched “after securing a suitable place so far as that was possible on a wooded mountain.” And so is there contradiction in Tacitus’ statement that the legions suffered loss only after moving on from the first encampment. For according to Dio their greatest suffering and losses were on the first day’s march before their first encampment; on the second the loss, he tells us, was less because they had burned or abandoned the greater number of their wagons, and hence advanced in better order. According to Florus it was while Varus was in his summer camp holding court that suddenly the Germans broke in upon him. Mommsen is undoubtedly correct in saying that this ridiculous representation does not reflect real tradition, but a picture of sheer fancy manufactured out of it. Doubtless it is nothing but a rhetorical exaggeration of the silly security into which Varus is represented as having been inveigled, and by which the disaster is dramatically brought about. It is past credibility that the Germans in such numbers could have broken into the Roman camp without arousing suspicion, or without having come into contact with the Roman sentries. And the more so if Varus had already been warned by Segestes of the enemy’s plans. Further, the storming of a single camp is out of harmony with the two camps mentioned by Tacitus, and clearly implied in Dio’s narrative. And it is difficult to believe that Varus would choose such a place for his summer camp—one shut in by forests, swamps, and untrodden ways. The entire description of the place where the battle was fought is far more in keeping with a camp pitched by an army on the march, than with a summer camp, in which Varus exercised the functions of a judicial office. Moreover, Florus’ account is contradicted by Velleius[19], who says that Ceionius, one of the prefects of Varus’ camp, wished to surrender to the enemy just at the time when a large part of the Roman army had fallen in battle. Now if this refers to the first camp, in which the Romans must have left a detachment (for which there is no direct evidence), then the main part of the army must have come out in orderly wise, and no unexpected surprise at the hands of the Germans could have occurred. Or, if it refers to the second camp, it was clearly not the summer camp, as Florus relates. Florus’ account is by no means a bare narration of events, nor does he bring forward events in their sequence. His choice both of materials and the grouping of facts is with reference to the leading thought. The very words introducing the story of the Germanic wars show that they serve as the theme for the part that follows: “Germaniam quoque utinam vincere tanti non putasset! magis turpiter amissa est quam gloriose adquisita.” The same is true of the words by which he passes on to the events under Varus’ rule: “sed difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere.”[20] Having assumed that Augustus conquered Germany, Florus seeks to maintain the thesis that the government of a province is a difficult undertaking; that Varus took the task all too lightly, and as a result Germany was ignominiously lost. It is significant that Florus is the only author who asserts that Augustus wished to conquer Germany. And the reason assigned for this conquest is as follows: “set quatenus sciebat patrem suum C. Caesarem bis transvectum ponte Rhenum quaesisse bellum, in illius honorem concupierat facere provinciam.”[21] It is absurd to believe that Augustus ever intended to make a province of Germany for so puerile a reason as merely to honor Julius Caesar, for the latter “had not charged the heirs of his dictatorial power with the extension of Roman territory on the north slope of the Alps and on the right banks of the Rhine so directly as with the conquest of Britain.”[22] If Augustus had desired to make a province in honor of his father, he would doubtless have conquered Britain instead, in accordance with Caesar’s supposed wish. Julius Caesar’s expeditions against the Germans were, as stated by Mommsen himself[23], merely forward movements of defense. And it seems reasonable to assume that Augustus did not, as Florus tells us, wish to conquer Germany, but was merely continuing in a more extensive manner the policy of his father. How untrustworthy Florus is as an authority may be seen from the following: “quippe Germani victi magis quam domiti erant moresque nostros magis quam arma sub imperatore Druso suspiciebant; postquam ille defunctus est, Vari Quintilli libidinem ac superbiam haut secus quam saevitiam odisse coeperunt.”[24] That is, according to Florus, Varus follows Drusus directly as commander in Germany, in spite of the fact that there intervene between them three commanders, and a long series of important events.[25] The reason for this statement is Florus’ indifference to mere facts, and his desire to harp on the theme “difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere,” and hence to bring into sharp contrast the man who won that territory and the man who was directly responsible for its loss.[26] Florus’ method is observable elsewhere. According to Velleius the Germans purposely introduced a series of fictitious lawsuits and legal contests to throw Varus off his guard. It suits Florus’ purpose, however, to represent them as having recourse to arms at once, as soon as they saw the toga, and felt that laws were more cruel than arms. He thus illustrates in a rhetorical way the sudden and unexpected perils which beset one who attempts the difficult task of maintaining authority over a province. Further evidence of Florus’ inaccuracy is found in his statement that “to this day the barbarians are in possession of the two eagles.” They had as a matter of fact been recovered long before the time at which he wrote, two in the time of Tiberius[27], and the third during the reign of Claudius.[28] With this fact established, Florus’ story to the [26] [27] [28] [29] effect that one of the standards was saved at the time of the disaster is seen to be without any basis of truth. Finally, attention may be called to Florus’ concluding statement: “hac clade factum est ut imperium, quod in litore Oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.” This has no value save that of a glittering rhetorical antithesis, but like other statements in the account, has exercised far more than due influence upon writers who discuss the effect of Varus’ defeat upon Rome’s imperial policy. Velleius’ undisguised flattery of Tiberius warns us that even a contemporary source must be used with caution. His account shows that his one great purpose is to praise Tiberius, and place him in a favorable light. To shed the greater luster on his hero he reveals a marked animus against Varus, whose command in Germany immediately preceded Tiberius’ second term of service there. Note the depreciatory tone in which Varus is spoken of, a man who in his stupidity imagined that the inhabitants of Germany were not human beings save in voice and body, and that men who could not...