THE CRISIS OF FRENCH SEA POWER 1688-1697 FROM THE GUERRE D'ESCADRE TO THE GUERRE DE COURSE ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 73 GEOFFREY SYMCOX THE CRISIS OF FRENCH SEA POWER 1688-1697 FROM THE GUERRE D'ESCADRE TO THE GUERRE DE COURSE Directors: P. Dibon (Paris) and R. Popkin (Washington Univ. St. Louis) Editorial Board: J. Aubin (Paris); J. Collins (St. Louis Univ.); P. Costabel (Paris); A. Crombie (Oxford); I. Dambska (Cracow); H. de la Fontaine-Verwey (Amsterdam); H. Gadamer (Heidelberg); H. Gouhier (Paris); T. Gregory (Rome); T. E. Jessop (Hull); P. O. Kristeller (Columbia Univ.); Elisabeth Labrousse (Paris); A. Lossky (Los Angeles); S. Lindroth (Upsala) ;J. Orcibal (Pari5); I. S. Revaht (Paris) ;J. Roger (Paris); H. Rowen (Rutgers Univ., N.J.); Ch. B. Schmitt (Warburg Inst. London); G. Sebba (Emory Univ., Atlanta); R. Shackleton (Oxford); J. 'Tans (Groningen); G. Tonelli (Binghamton, N.Y.). THE CRISIS OF FRENCH SEA POWER 1688- 697 I FROM THE GUERRE D' ESCADRE TO THE GUERRE DE COURSE by GEOFFREY SYMCOX • MAR TINUS NI]HOFF / THE HAGUE / 1974 @ 1974 by Martinus Nijhojf, The Hague, Netherlands Softcover reprint olthe hardcover 1st edition 1974 All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-I3: 978-94-0 I 0-2074-9 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-0 I 0-2072-5 001: 10.1007/978-94-010-2072-5 For Linda TABLE OF CONTENTS List oj Abbreviatzons VII Acknowledgements IX Introduction 1 The Instrument 12 Seignelay and the Colbertian Legacy 72 Pontchartrain's First Years 1691-1693 103 The Crisis of the Main Fleet and the Shift to the Guerre de Course 1694-1697 143 Conclusion 221 Appendices 234 Bibliography 249 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AE: Departement des Affaires Etrangeres AN: Archives N ationales BN: Bibliotheque Nationale BSHM: Bibliotheque du Service Historique de la Marine, Paris Guerre: DepOt des Archives du Ministere de la Guerre NOTE ON DATES, PLACE-NAMES AND ORTHOGRAPHY All dates are given in New Style; where necessary, other sources have been corrected to New Style. As far as possible, place-names are given according to English usage. Where there is no accepted English fonn, the modem local spelling is used. In quotations from documentary sources, the original orthography has been preserved, except in cases where confusion might possibly arise. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book owes its origin to the research that I did for my doctoral disser tation, Louis XIV and the War in Ireland 1689-91 (University of Cali fornia, Los Angeles, 1967), during which I was supported by grants and fellowships generously provided by the University. The work I did then provided the basis for much of the first part of this book. I must also record my gratitude to a number of friends and colleagues for their invaluable help during the preparation of this work. To Stella Menatos and Mary Millsap, for typing the manuscript with speed and care. To those who read the manuscript, or parts of it, and offered many ideas for its improvement: Alain Henon, Bill Sater, Paul Sonnino and Gene Asher. Particularly among these last, to my friend and mentor, Andrew Lossky, for procuring yards of vital microfilm at a time when I could not get to the Archives, for answering my questions, and going over the text with that scholarly care that is so specially his own. To Ron Martin, for advising me about Chamlay's attitude to naval power, and letting me see his dissertation and microfilms of Chamlay's papers. To Professor John Bromley of the University of Southampton, for sharing with me his unrivalled knowledge of naval history and the lore of privateering. To Professor Paul Dibon, the series editor, whose generous help and en couragement to me at a crucial time are in the finest traditions of the Republic of Letters. Finally, and above all, to my wife, Linda, without whose help this would all have been impossible. G.W.S. Los Angeles, August 1973 INTRODUCTION The French navy that fought in the Nine Years War was essentially Colbert's creation. Earlier in the century Richelieu had given France the beginnings of a navy: ships, ports, a corps of officers and an administra tive structure. But most of his work was undone by neglect in the years after his death, and the task of making France a maritime power had to begin again under Louis XIV. Colbert's efforts to build a navy were distinguished by the same stubborn energy that he brought to all his other tasks. Behind his desire for naval might lay his vision of France as the first commercial power in Europe, for he saw clearly that mercantile preponderance could never be achieved without the backing of a strong fleet of warships. Trade would follow the flag, as he believed it had for his envied models and perpetual rivals, the Dutch. Soon after Louis XIV's assumption of power, Colbert set about the enOImOUS labour of resurrecting the navy founded by Richelieu; he soon found that the task was really one of creation, virtually ex nihilo. Ships were purchased or built, sailors recruited, captains enticed home from service under foreign flags, bases planned and constructed, an adminis trative system established. By the time Colbert died in 1683 the French navy was as powerful as the Dutch or the English, and expanding more rapidly than either of its rivals; in 1960 it was to defeat their combined forces at the battle of Beachy Head, and make France for a short while supreme at sea. Within less than a generation, therefore, Colbert's work raised his country from nothing to a position of dominance at sea. But this triumph was very shortlived. Only two years later, in 1692, the French navy suffered a grave defeat, and began to fall behind its op ponents who were now expanding their forces very rapidly; after the campaign of 1694 it hardly showed itself again as an organised force for the rest of the war. The circumstances surrounding the precipitous decline of French naval power during the Nine Years War will fOIm the subject of this study.