The Crimea: Europe’s Next Flashpoint? By Taras Kuzio November 2010 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Published in the United States by The Jamestown Foundation 1111 16th St. N.W. Suite 320 Washington, D.C. 20036 http://www.jamestown.org Copyright © 2010 The Jamestown Foundation All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written consent. For copyright permissions information, contact Jamestown Foundation, 1111 16th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. The views expressed in the report are those of the contributing authors and not necessarily those of the Jamestown Foundation. For more information on this report of the Jamestown Foundation, email [email protected]. Jamestown’s Mission The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and terrorism. Origins Launched in 1984 by its founder William Geimer, The Jamestown Foundation has emerged as one of the leading providers of research and analysis on conflict and instability in Eurasia. The Jamestown Foundation has rapidly grown to become one of the leading sources of information on Eurasia, developing a global network of analytical expertise from the Baltic to the Horn of Africa. This core of intellectual talent includes former high-ranking government officials, journalists, research analysts, scholars and economists. Their insight contributes significantly to helping policymakers around the world understand the emerging trends and developments in many of the world’s underreported conflict zones in Eurasia. Acronyms: CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States EU: European Union FSB: Federal Security Service (Russia) GRU: Directorate on Military Intelligence (Russia) GUAM: Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova (regional organization) MAP: Membership Action Plan (NATO) MVS: Ministry of Interior (Ukraine) NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDP: Peoples Democratic Party (Ukraine) NRBO: National Security and Defense Council (Ukraine) PfP: Partnership for Peace (NATO) SBU: Security Service of Ukraine   1 Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Key Findings 3. The Crimean Conundrum 4. Ukraine, Georgia and Russia 5. The Crimea: Europe’s Next Flashpoint? 6. Russian Security Policy Toward Ukraine 7. Ukrainian Security Policy Toward Russia 8. Can President Yanukovych Reset Relations with Russia? 9. Conclusion This Jamestown Foundation Report on the Crimea is divided into nine sections. The first and second sections present the Executive Summary and Key Findings in the report. The third section explores the Crimean conundrum. The fourth analyzes the Ukrainian- Georgian relationship, Ukraine’s response to the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and Russia’s de facto annexation of two separatist enclaves. The fifth section surveys Russia’s territorial claims over the Crimea and the port of Sevastopol within the context of Ukraine perceived by Russia as an allegedly “fragile,” “artificial” and “failed” state. The sixth section analyzes Russia’s attempts to revive its great power status in the Eurasian region and how this policy affects Ukrainian-Russian relations. The seventh section investigates Ukraine’s security options in the domestic and international spheres in light of the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and Russian territorial claims over the Crimea. The eighth section investigates the possibility of resetting Ukrainian-Russian relations following Yanukovych’s election and how this may impact the Crimea through three potential scenarios: disenchantment with Russia, accidental conflict and removal by the opposition. Lastly, the ninth section provides concluding observations to what has earlier been discussed in the Jamestown Foundation report.   2 3 Executive Summary The Crimea and the port of Sevastopol are potential flashpoints that could negatively impact European regional security to a greater degree than did Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. Instability in the Crimea affects not only Ukraine and Russia, but also many others; Turkey, home to a large Crimean Tatar population and extensive Black Sea coastline; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), via three member-nations with Black Sea coastlines; and the European Union (EU) and Romania due to the domino effect a Crimean conflict would have upon Moldova and Trans-Dniester. Instability in the Crimea could spread to the Ukrainian heartland and close down the transportation of Russian gas, thereby affecting the whole of Europe, causing a situation similar to the 2006 and 2009 gas crises. The Crimea is a potential flashpoint for two interconnected reasons. The first is that Russia has never accepted Ukraine per se as an independent state. Yanukovych is ideologically more pro-Russian and neo-Soviet in his domestic and foreign policies than was President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004), at times bearing similarities to Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Ukraine, however, is not Belarus, which has become frozen as a neo-Soviet republic. Yanukovych’s pro-Russian/Soviet policies are out of step in Ukraine, a country that has been independent for two decades, held an Orange Revolution six years ago and is an internationally-recognized democracy with a free market economy. The second reason is Russia’s two-decade long inability to accept Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimea and Sevastopol. In the Boris Yeltsin era (1991-1999), Ukraine could defend itself against Russian irredentism because it was not supported by Yeltsin. Following the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000, the threat of irredentism has become greater due to the nature of the autocratic, nationalist regime in Russia coupled with the return to KGB-style intelligence and subversive operations undertaken by the Russian siloviky against foreign countries, particularly towards the former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Georgia. In the 1990s, Crimean separatism and conflict between Ukraine and Russia over dividing the Soviet era BSF (Black Sea Fleet) were peacefully resolved. A twenty year treaty providing for a ‘temporary’ naval base in Sevastopol had widespread legitimacy in Ukraine as a peaceful way out of a difficult predicament, how to divide up the Soviet BSF, that arose from the disintegration of the USSR. Crimean nationalists and separatists were marginalized between 1995 and 1996 through non-violent policies implemented by President Kuchma and Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk. Ukraine also had a favorable international environment, with President Yeltsin not providing presidential support to Russian irredentism towards the Crimea while the US and NATO strongly backed Ukraine following its de-nuclearization process. Problems with the BSF treaty and separatism re-emerged between Vladimir Putin’s election in 2000 and Yanukovych’s election a decade later. The Russian presidency began to build support for irredentism that had seemingly always been in place in the Russian parliament. Former Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, a prominent proponent of Russian irredentism towards the Crimea, is a senior member of the Unified Russia Party led by Prime Minister Putin. Russia reverted to Soviet style tactics pursued by the KGB, with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Russian diplomats resuming   4 subversion and intelligence operations against Ukraine, particularly during the Viktor Yushchenko presidency (2005-2010). This was followed by the Party of Regions, led by Yanukovych, giving its indirect support to the revival of Crimean separatism by including two Russian nationalist parties in the For Yanukovych! Bloc in the March 2006 Crimean elections. Two years later Russia invaded Georgia and annexed South Ossetia and Abkhazia, leading many in Ukraine and Europe to wonder if the Crimea was to be the next target. The BSF question was re-opened in April 2010 when the 1997 twenty year base treaty in Sevastopol was extended to 2042, with a possible five year prolongation in exchange for an allegedly thirty percent discount on Russian gas. The extension was highly controversial in and outside of Ukraine, where it led to a riot in parliament, and would be overturned if the opposition were to take back power. The final change from the 1990s has been the weakened support given by the Obama administration to Ukraine, returning the US to the ‘Russia-first’ policy, last pursued by the first Bush administration of the early 1990s. Between 1993 and 2008, NATO and the Clinton and Bush administrations gave strong support to Ukraine’s national security interests. The Obama administration seeks to reset relations with Russia at the expense of not opposing the re-assertion of Russia’s sphere of influence in Ukraine. One motive for the US-Russian reset is to obtain Moscow’s support of action to halt Iran’s nuclear program. This plan, however, fails to recognize that Tehran would have no reason to halt its nuclear program if it were to look at how Ukraine’s security assurances, granted after it agreed to its own denuclearization in between 1994 and 1996, have been largely forgotten by Washington and Brussels.   5 Key Findings  Viktor Yanukovych is the most pro-Russian and neo-Soviet president to have been elected in Ukraine. These are two factors that influence his domestic and foreign policies. A majority of domestic and foreign specialists on Ukraine, as well as Western policy makers who cover Ukraine and the region, mistakenly believed that Yanukovych would be ‘Kuchma II’: that is, a pragmatic pro-Russian who would return Ukraine to a multi-vector foreign policy. This view, which was critically analyzed by Jamestown Foundation analysts during Ukraine’s 2010 elections, has proven to be widely incorrect, as seen by the foreign policies undertaken during Yanukovych’s first one hundred days in office. Yanukovych, like Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka, is ideologically pro-Russian, while his voter base rests in Donetsk and the Crimea, where large majorities hold allegiance to Soviet political culture. It is therefore analytically incorrect to place presidents Kuchma and Yanukovych in the same category.  President Yanukovych is fulfilling all of the demands laid out by President Dmitri Medvedev in his scandalous letter written to President Viktor Yushchenko in August 2009. The Russian leadership demanded and received appointments in the Nikolai Azarov government in the humanities and security policy that suited Moscow’s interests. In the eyes of many Ukrainians, Yanukovych is transforming their nation into a Russian protectorate. This is leading to a groundswell of discontent that will inevitably translate into political and regional instability.  The Black Sea Fleet (BSF) has always, and will continue to be, an agent of destabilization in the Crimea and Ukraine. The BSF routinely ignores Ukrainian legislation, occupies additional land and installations outside its base, transports rockets through densely populated areas without Ukrainian permission and sends its vessels to participate in invasions of Ukraine’s allies (i.e. Georgia in August 2008). BSF personnel undertake subversion and espionage missions against Ukrainian interests, participate in anti-NATO and anti-American protests, assist in disrupting joint military exercises and seek to recruit Ukrainians. FSB counter-intelligence officers expelled from Sevastopol in 2009 by President Yushchenko were welcomed back in May 2010 by President Yanukovych.  The April 2010 extension of the BSF is, in of itself, destabilizing, as it is not seen as legitimate by a majority of the Ukrainian public, whose support was ‘gained by a lie that it would bring cheaper Russian gas; in fact, a new July 2010 agreement with the IMF mandated Ukraine to increase utility prices by a staggering fifty percent on August 1, 2010, and another fifty percent in April 2011. The Ukrainian opposition have stated their support of overturning the treaty. The 1997 treaty granting the BSF a ‘temporary’ base of twenty years was accepted by all sides of Ukraine’s polity as a legitimate compromise. The Stability and Reforms coalition that voted for the 2010 treaty is illegitimate because it rests on only 220 deputies from three factions, with   6 the remaining twenty-five deputies having been blackmailed, bribed or coerced to defect from the opposition. The 2010 treaty was railroaded through parliament without parliamentary or public discussion and after ignoring votes against it in three important committees (two of which had negative majorities). The treaty also violates the constitution, which bans permanent military bases, and it was not discussed prior to a vote in the National Security and Defense Council as the constitution requires.  The threat of the Ukrainian opposition receiving a majority in the 2012 parliamentary elections and subsequently annulling the 2010 BSF treaty gives Russia an incentive to assist Yanukovych in dismantling Ukraine’s democracy. The only manner in which the 2010 treaty can be maintained is by ensuring Yanukovych remains in power indefinitely. This will necessitate Ukraine’s return to the semi-authoritarian political system of the late Kuchma era along with the muzzling of the media, which already began soon after Yanukovych’s election, and the holding of fraudulent elections. Both the Russian and Ukrainian leadership understand that the 2010 treaty will not survive scrutiny if Ukraine remains a democracy with a legitimate opposition and free media. Therefore, Ukraine’s democracy is a major obstacle to Russia’s long- term presence in Sevastopol.  The 2010 BSF treaty was not included in Yanukovych’s 2010 election program, nor was it included in any of the programs of the Party of Regions during his leadership from 2003 to 2010. Yanukovych’s 2010 program supports a ‘non-bloc status’ for Ukraine that a de facto permanent naval base contradicts. The president’s understanding of ‘non-bloc status’ is clearly aimed against NATO membership - but not against a security alliance with Russia. Yanukovych is the first Ukrainian president to not rule out joining the CIS Collective Security Organization.  The Yanukovych administration will fail to reset relations with Russia, as no manner of concessions will be enough to satisfy Russia’s appetite. The BSF treaty was followed by a large number of Russian requests for further Ukrainian concessions, such as the merger, or more accurately ‘swallowing up,’ of the state run gas company Naftohaz Ukrainy by its Russian equivalent, Gazprom.  The Crimean conundrum today is very different than it was in the 1990s. In the past, the Russian president did not overtly support his country’s irredentism against the Crimea. Since 2000, both the Russian president and prime minister have joined other Russian institutions in giving their support of the Crimea to become part of Russia. Between 1993 and 2008, Ukraine received strong support from the Clinton and Bush administrations and NATO. This is very different from the current situation, considering the fact that the Obama administration has de facto consigned Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence in return for Moscow agreeing to a reset of relations with the US.   7