The Continuity of Explanation: Peircean Pragmatism, Reason, and Developing Reasonable Behavior by Nathan Joseph Haydon A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2017 (cid:13)c Nathan Joseph Haydon 2017 Examining Committee Membership The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the Examining Committee is by majority vote. External Examiner: Rockney Jacobsen Associate Professor, Dept. of Philosophy Wilfred Laurier University Supervisor: Shannon Dea Associate Professor, Dept. of Philosophy University of Waterloo Internal Member: Patricia Marino Professor, Dept. of Philosophy University of Waterloo Internal-External Member: Go¨tz Hoeppe Associate Professor, Dept. of Anthropology University of Waterloo Other Member(s): John Turri Associate Professor, Dept. of Philosophy University of Waterloo ii I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. iii Abstract Charles Peirce, the founder of Pragmatism, is not known for having developed a norma- tive and ethical theory. His remarks on ethics and normativity are scattered and sparse. There is nonetheless increasing interest in developing these aspects of Peirce’s thought. Peirce takes logic to fall under the normative sciences and the open question, as I take it here, is whether the normativity Peirce takes to be present in logic and inquiry can be generalized to form an ethical theory. Most broadly Peirce takes an ethical theory to be a general guide for conduct — it is a guide for conduct in thought, action or behavior more generally, and in feeling. The question becomes whether Peirce’s theory of logic and inquiry can offer a more general guide for conduct. Peirce’s writings on the classification of the normative sciences, as well as his ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,’ have led many scholars to answer in the negative. I think that an ethical theory nonetheless arises from within Peirce’s writings on logic and inquiry. In this dissertation, I lay the foundation for this alternative approach by showing how Peirce’s theory of logic and inquiry serves as a guide for behavior. The basis for the argument can be briefly summarized. Peirce’s logic and theory of inquiry provide normative standards that apply to changes in belief. Peirce takes the for- mation of a belief to be an inference, and Peirce’s logic and theory of inquiry give us the tools (at least the thought goes) to evaluate these inferences. Peirce also supposes a con- nection between belief and action. According to Peirce the meaning of a belief is the mode of action the belief establishes. The conjunction of these two claims suggests how a more general guide for conduct can be motivated from within Peirce’s writings. It suggests that for the Peircean pragmatist the normative standards that apply to belief formation apply directly to established modes of action. This dissertation offers a systematic development of this connection. I show how Peirce takes normative standards to apply to belief, and then show how these standards correspond directly to changes in an individual’s behavior. I begin with a characterization of Peircean pragmatism based on what I call the Con- tinuity of Explanation. The Continuity of Explanation is the commitment that every judgment entails consequences for action that are accountable to scientific investigation. The Continuity of Explanation captures what I take to be the core aspects of Peirce’s iv theory of judgment and inquiry. It follows from situating the role the pragmatic maxim serves in regulating scientific inquiry and distilling this maxim through Peirce’s theory of judgment. I go on to demonstrate how the Continuity of Explanation serves as a guide for developing more reasonable behavior. The characterization of Peircean pragmatism in terms of the Continuity of Explanation yields further advantages. It provides a unified framework to view Peirce’s metaphysics, offers a straightforward account of Peirce’s theory of action, and can account for Peirce’s increasing emphasis on the development of concrete reasonableness. v Acknowledgements It is difficult to acknowledge all of the help I have received in graduate school and in writing a thesis. I want to thank my family — Trish and Aiden — who have both encouraged me and put up with me during the process. I also want to thank my parents, Merry and Steve, and sister, April, who have always encouraged me regardless of pursuit. It is also time that I formally thank two of my earliest philosophy instructors, Gordon Brittan and Jim Allard, who gave me their time and attention when I first started out. Lastly, I want to thank the Department here at Waterloo for their early (and continued) support. This brings me to the current project. I do not know when I first became interested in pragmatism. A pragmatic response might be to say that it was always functioning in my thought in the background. Though I wouldn’t recognize its significance and familiarize myself with its contents until years later, I can credit Rich Haydon for giving me my first collection of Peirce’s essays. As I look back on my coursework over the years almost all of my papers touch on pragmatic themes. The intersection between practice and theory and between the moral and epistemic, in particular, have always been present. Though I was convinced of continuity between these areas, my positive position began meager and vague. Each of my instructors can be thanked for directing and developing this work. Continued interaction and discussion with the graduate student community — including Ian, Peter, and Eric — also aided the completion of the project. This brings me to my supervisor, Shannon Dea. I think my first sustained interaction withShannoncamewhenItookoneofhercourses. SincethenShannonhasalwaysengaged with my work, and has done so with both encouragement and critical commentary. An added benefit of having Shannon as a supervisor is that I also learn as much from her outside of her office as in it — seeing her give talks, workshops, and see her participate in the larger community. Shannon has been a role model throughout. She is a model for what professional philosophy can and should be. Finally, I’d like to thank other members of my committee — Patricia Marino, John Turri, Rockney Jacobsen, and Go¨tz Hoeppe. Each supplied helpful comments and criticisms that will continue to play a role in my work in philosophy to come. vi Table of Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Situating the Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2 Contributions to Peirce Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.3 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2 The Continuity of Explanation 25 An Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.1 Peircean Pragmatism: Introducing the Pragmatic Maxim . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.2 Grounding Regulation: Regulative Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.2.1 Regulation as primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.3 Refine and Defend the Pragmatic Maxim, pt. 1: Belief and Action . . . . . 41 2.3.1 Belief and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.3.2 Regulating Opinions: Reintroducing the Pragmatic Maxim . . . . . 45 2.4 Refine and Defend the Pragmatic Maxim, pt. 2: Method of Inquiry . . . . 50 2.4.1 Belief and Action (again) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2.4.2 Regulating Opinions (again): Belief, Judgment, and a Method of Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 vii 2.5 The Continuity of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 3 The Continuity of Explanation Applied to an Individual’s Behavior 63 3.1 Abduction: Committing to a Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 3.2 Determining a Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 3.2.1 Refining a Practice Through Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 3.2.2 Distinguishing a Practice (deduction continued) . . . . . . . . . . . 74 3.2.3 Affirming a Practice Through Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 3.2.4 Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 3.3 Action Individuation and Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 3.3.1 Deliberate and Intentional Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 3.3.2 Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 3.3.3 Reason and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 4 The Continuity of Explanation Applied to Inquiry 102 4.1 Inquiry and Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4.2 Continuity of Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 4.2.1 Returning to Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 4.3 Continuity of Explanation as a Guide for Developing More Reasonable Be- havior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 4.3.1 (Logical) Guiding Principles of Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 4.3.2 (Logical) Guiding Principles of Abduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 4.3.3 (Logical) Guiding Principles of Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 viii 5 Conclusion 131 References 138 ix Chapter 1 Introduction Charles Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, increasingly came to emphasize the connection between pragmatism (or his pragmaticism, as he would later come to call it) and the more general development of reasonableness. The reasonable, according to Peirce, is an ideal suggested to us by logic: But the saving truth is that there is...an element of Reasonableness to which we can train our own reason to conform more and more. If this were not the case, there could be no such thing as logical goodness or badness; and therefore we need not wait until it is proved that there is a reason operative in experience to which our own can approximate. [CP 5:160]1 As we develop a method of reasoning, and so train ourselves to reason better, we begin to act more and more reasonably. Peirce referred to the development of reasonable behav- ior as the development of concrete reasonableness. Linking the development of concrete reasonableness to pragmatism, Peirce writes: 1Peirce, C. S. (1958-1966).Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- versity Press. Here and throughout referenced by [CP: Volume, paragraph number]. 1