A torpedoed tanker burns off the U.S. coast. The U-boats virtually halted coastal merchant traffic in the early months of 1942 and burning tankers lit up the sky from New York to Florida. T he cold North Atlantic shows no tion of Europe. If they had been cut, the trace of the struggle that took Axis powers might have won the war. But place on and beneath its surface Allied naval forces, including the Coast more than 50 years ago. Unlike Guard, defeated them in a running campaign battlefields on land, where the across the treacherous seas of the North scars of combat can last for centuries, the Atlantic. sea shrouds all traces of the "Battle of the The Coast Guard's participation in that Atlantic," which was the longest sustained campaign has been generally overlooked. campaign of World War II. Subsumed by the Navy in November 1941, The Axis powers tried to sever the ocean where it stayed until January 1946, the supply lines between America, Great Britain Coast Guard's activities were overshadowed and the Soviet Union. These supply lines by the larger sea service. Indeed, a Coast fed and equipped the Allies and permitted Guard officer, aboard the CGC Ingham, relat­ the military buildup that led to the libera­ ed that during a North Atlantic rescue one The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign is a Commandant's Bulletin insert for November 1994. For information about the Coast Guard, visit your local library or write to the Coast Guard Histo­ rian's office at: Commandant (G-CP-4), 2100 2nd St, SW., Washington, DC 20593. Historical overview by Scott T. Price. Editing, design and layout by CW03 Paul A Powers. Photos courtesy of the Coast Guard Historian's office. Front Cover: Coast Guardsmen on World War II convoy patrol watch the explosion of a depth charge. Back Cover: The Coast Guard-manned destroyer escort USS Chambers, one of 30 Coast Guard­ manned DEs, escorts a convoy across the North Atlantic. The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign and rescued survivors from torpedoed ships. A Coast Guard-manned patrol bombing squadron, VP-6, operated over the North At­ lantic from its home base in Greenland during the war as well. COASTAL ATTACKS Following the Dec. 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, ADM Karl Doenitz, comman­ der of the German U-boat force, opened the offensive against the United States by sending five long-range U-boats into American waters. Although their numbers were small these five, and other V-boats that followed, were capable enough to give the United States a pasting as severe as the Japanese had that Sunday. In late 1941, available Coast Guard forces included 56 aircraft, seven relatively new 327­ foot Secretary-class cutters, eight other large cutters, 23 165-foot cutters, 31 125-foot cut­ ters, plus a wide assortment of lightships, ten­ ders, tugs, smaller patrol craft and lifeboats. Three lucky British merchant seamen prior to being res­ cued on the North Atlantic by a Coast Guard cutter. The icy waters claimed thousands of seamen. survivor asked, "What ... is the Coast Guard doing picking me up out here?" While the Coast Guard continued its tradi­ tional lifesaving duties along the nation's shores during the war, its ships and aircraft ventured well out to sea, protecting convoys along the U.S. coast, across to Europe and Africa, and throughout the Pacific. Even the Coast Guard's port-security and captain-of the-port duties contributed to keeping the Al­ lied sea lanes open and functioning. Coast Guard operations on the North At­ lantic began before the United States entered the war and included neutrality and weather­ patrol cruises. The Coast Guard also began operations in Greenland, a Danish colony, soon after Denmark fell to the Germans in 1940. By October 1941 all Coast Guard and Navy forces in Greenland waters were consol­ idated into a unified "Greenland Patrol" and placed under the command of Coast Guard CDR Edward "Iceberg" Smith. The patrol established bases, escorted convoys, destroyed German weather stations, The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign· 1 -----------~---- The type VII U-251, sister U-boat to the U-255 which torpedoed and sank the USS Leopold, arrives at Narvik, Norway, in June 1942, after a patrol. This class of U­ boat made up the majority of the U-boat fleet. The enemy ADM Karl Doenitz, commander of the German submarine force, succinctly de­ scribed his V-boats and their tactics as: "V-boats are the wolves of the sea: at­ tack, tear, sink!" The majority of the V-boats were the Type VII: a 22Q-foot-long, 749­ ton submersible warship that one V-boatman described as "nothing but a steel cigar tube crammed with machinery and weapons." The typical patrol lasted for nearly two months, and the cramped conditions and harsh odors aboard made life difficult. A German officer observed, "The heat, The stench of oil. Lead in my skull from the engine fumes ... I feel like Jonah inside some huge shellfish whose vulnerable parts are sheathed in armor." Their most effective tactics earned the nickname "wolf pack." Deployed in lines across suspected convoy routes, single V-boats would make contact with a convoy, follow it closely, and make constant position reports to other V-boats to home-in for the kill. Typically they attacked on the surface at night, taking advantage of their low silhouette and high surface speed, advantages eventually negated by radar. Daylight attacks were made while submerged. When first used, wolf-pack tactics proved to be effective but nevertheless called for heavy radio use, a vulnerability that the Allies exploited. Attacking an escorted convoy typically meant receiving a depth-charge attack in retribution. It was a terrifying experience, as one German officer explained: "All eyes looked upward. The swishing of propellers reached a crescendo as the destroyer passed over our boat ... three charges exploded .... After each shattering roar, the hull moaned, the floor plates jumped and kicked our feet, wood splintered, glass disintegrated, food cans flew through the boat; then all was black for long seconds until the emergency lighting came on again." A combination of technological and tactical factors defeated the V-boat offensive by May 1943. Nevertheless, the V-boats continued to sail forth against Allied ship­ ping through the end of the war. As a result, their losses were heavy. More than 700 V-boats were lost, and with them nearly 28,000 men. In return, they sank about 2,900 ships, killing more than 42,000 Allied merchant seamen and nearly severing the ocean supply line between America and Europe. Their desperate efforts tied up precious Allied resources, and perhaps prolonged the length of the war. 2 • The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign Although many of the cutters hailed from Guard units, augmented by reserve and tem­ the days of Prohibition or earlier, they porary reserve vessels, rescued survivors proved to be effective escorts. Various and chased down suspected V-boat smaller craft and other vessels were also contacts. commissioned into service as emergency Coast Guard cutters and aircraft de­ acquisitions. stroyed three V-boats along the coast dur­ A shortage of escorts, "conflicting priori­ ing this German offensive. The 165-foot CGC ties" in the allocation of those escorts, and Icarus sank the more heavily armed U352 off poor planning combined to delay the intro­ the coast of North Carolina. Its sister cutter, duction of a convoy system along the coast the CGC Thetis, sank the U157 off Key West, until May 1942. As the V-boats attacked the Fla., and a Coast Guard aviator destroyed unescorted merchant ships, many Coast the U166 off the coast of Texas with a single well-placed depth charge. Other Coast Guard aircraft made 61 unsuccessful bomb­ ing attacks on V-boat contacts by the end of the summer of 1942. They also sighted and reported the location of more than 1,000 survivors and rescued 95 on their own. The Coast Guard's tenders and tugs also helped keep the coastal trade routes open. Along the coast of Florida, for instance, they salvaged four torpedoed vessels that spring and summer of 1942. Tenders, such as the CGC Juniper, had the solemn task of marking the wrecks of ships sunk by V-boats as hazards to navigation. One tender, the CGC Acacia, fell victim to the onslaught when it was shelled and sunk by the U161. The Acacia was the only Coast Guard tender lost to enemy action during the war. When finally established, the convoy sys­ tems along the coast deterred the V-boats and ship losses declined. By the summer of 1942, the V-boats left American waters in search of easier prey. Occasional forays by individual submarines continued however, and the escorts of the local convoys, aug- The CGCs Alexander Hamflton. (left. above) and the Escanaba. (left) were lost on the North Atlantic. Only two of the Escanaba'screw of 703 survived the sinking. Three other ships. the Leopold. Acacia and Muskeget were also lost to U-boat attack. The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign· 3 mented by newly constructed 83-foot patrol The dangerous nature of escort duty was craft, were forced to remain vigilant. made plain after the cutter Alexander Hamil­ Meanwhile, on the North Atlantic convoy ton fell victim to a torpedo attack in January routes, Secretary-class cutters were escort­ 1942, but the other five, along with Navy de­ ing convoys prior to the official American stroyers, continued to be the "mainstay" of entry into the war. The first to begin open­ the American escort effort through ocean convoy duty was the CGC Campbell, mid-1943. when it joined the escort force for convoy HX-159 in November 1941. The CGC Ingham INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY followed, and by April 1942 four more joined The Allies had a number of decisive ad­ their sister cutters on the North Atlantic vantages over the V-boats. Among those convoy runs. was high-frequency radio direction finders, (Top to bottom) The Secretary-class CGCs Taney, Duane, Bibb, Campbell, Ingham and Spencer as well as the Alexander Hamilton (previous page) all saw seNice as escorts, For a time they were the largest warships in the escort task groups and were the only U.S, warships to sink a U-boat in the North Atlantic routes until mid-/943, The Taney was in Honolulu Harbor Dec, 7, /942, and seNed in the Pacific initially. 4 • The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign or "huff-duff," which determined the bear­ huff-duff paved the way to locating them ings of radio transmissions. The Coast based on their constant radio use. It took Guard had been involved with radio direc­ time, however, to notify convoys of bearings tion finding since 1919 and had gained fur­ obtained by shore-based stations. There­ ther experience by the use of both ship and fore, ship-based huff-duff was especially crit­ shore-based stations chasing rum runners ical because the convoys, notified almost in­ during Prohibition. The Coast Guard took stantaneously that a U-boat was nearby, over the operation of 22 shore-based sta­ could quickly change course to evade the U­ tions in the United States from the Navy in boat or send an escort down the bearing of 1941. the radio signal to attack it. The escort, Since German U-boat tactics called for more heavily armed than a submarine, . centralized control of the U-boats by radio, forced the U-boat to submerge and prevent- , <. • r' I I .. i': .' r; , The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign· 5 ed it from directing more U-boats to the con­ duff, "aggressive" escort tactics, and anoth­ voy's location. The Campbell and the er Allied advantage - radar - to keep the Spencer had the distinction of being two of wolf packs at bay. the first American warships equipped with Radar, such as the sets installed on the ship-based huff-duff equipment. cutters before they began escort duty, per­ Another advantage, code-named "Ultra," mitted Allied ships to keep to their designat­ was the effort to break the German's mili­ ed stations within the convoys during harsh tary and naval radio ciphers. When the Al­ weather, but more importantly it could lo­ lies were successful in breaking those ci­ cate nearby surfaced U-boats. phers, they were able to plot the locations Escorts tracked submerged U-boats with of wolf packs and route the convoys around sonar, an acoustic location and ranging de­ them. Ultra information proved to be deci­ vice. The ability to locate a submerged U­ sive but there were blackouts of information boat was an important weapon in the Allied when the Germans changed their ciphers, arsenal because it robbed the U-boat of one thereby depriving the Allies of this impor­ of its most important advantages: the ability tant resource until once again Allied to hide beneath the ocean's surface. Once intelligence broke the new cipher. an escort located a submerged U-boat, it at- Another problem com­ plicated the picture. The Germans broke Allied merchant radio codes. With the information they obtained, they were able to determine the sailing routes of some convoys and accurately place their wolf packs for inter­ ceptions, even when the Allies were reading Ger­ man messages. On these occasions and others when the U-boats located a convoy through circum­ stance, the convoys re­ lied on ship-based huff- (Above) A welcome sight to any convoy was protection from aircraft. Here a British Vickers Wellington bomber flys near a Coast Guard cutter. I Aircraft proved to be a crucial element in the defeat of the U­ boats. (Note the 1 radar antennas on the upper fuselage.) (Bottom) The defeat of the U-boats was a 1 combined Allied effort. The cutters served ably along­ side British and Cana­ dian warships, among others, during the campaign. Here a Canadian corvette prepares to receive medical supplies from the Spencer while on an escort mission across the Atlantic. 6 • The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign tacked with depth charges, hedgehogs, or trough ... sending shock waves other anti-submarine weapons. Learning to throughout the ship." use these advantages to their fullest poten­ The heavy seas also rendered radar and tial took time and experience and losses sonar practically useless. The storms of the were consequently heavy during the winter of 1942 and 1943 were the worst to interim. hit the North Atlantic in more than 50 years. The weather, in conjunction with a renewed NORTH ATLANTIC CONVOYS U-boat offensive on the North At[antic con­ Through March 1943, only one North At­ voys, led to the period being nicknamed the lantic escort group, Ocean Escort Group A-3, "Bloody Winter." was under American command. That dis­ The cutters' first North Atlantic victory tinction was nominal, however, because of came when the Ingham, under the command the mingling of Allied navies in these of CDR George E. McCabe, located a sub­ groups. Group A-3, for instance, command­ merged U-boat while screening ahead of ed by Navy CAPT Paul R. Heineman, initially Convoy SC-112 the night of Dec. 17, 1942. consisted of the Spencer and Campbell, and The Ingham attacked, laying depth one British and four Canadian corvettes. charges at varying depths to create what Many of the ships were transferred be­ tween groups, and Group A-3, along with the Convoys others, was reinforced when under threat of U-boat attack with escorts of various nation­ The British instituted convoys, a alities, or the cutters Bibb, Duane and well-tested defensive tactic, to pro­ Ingham. tect their merchant shipping at the These three Secretary-class cutters also start of World War II. Convoys gener­ escorted smaller convoys from the main ally consisted of 40 or more ships sail­ convoy routes to Iceland and back again. As ing in columns 1,000 yards apart, with one Bibb crewman recalled, "Since we had a 600 yards separating ships within the 12,000 (mile) cruising range we headed back columns. Thus, they sometimes occu­ and forth across the Atlantic, never quite pied as much as 20 square miles of getting to the States or England." In fact, ocean. Around these vulnerable ships they were in such demand that, as he noted, sailed their escorts, which searched "we never spent one night ashore in over a the surrounding seas with radar and year." sonar to prevent U-boats from attack­ Long-range aircraft were not assigned to ing. Depending upon the route taken convoy protection duties in sufficient num­ and the convoy's average speed, the bers to cover the convoys across the entire voyage across the North Atlantic Atlantic until the middle of 1943. Conse­ could take up to two weeks. quently there was an "air gap" south of The ultimate effectiveness of the Greenland. It was here that most of the up­ convoy system and Allied defenses coming ocean battles were waged, and the against the U-boats are apparent area earned the nicknames "Torpedo Junc­ through one telling statistic. Of the tion" from the Allies, and the "Devil's Gorge" 870 U-boats that served on operational from the Germans. patrols, 550 of them "sank nothing." To make matters worse, weather along Ultimately, attacking an escorted con­ the North Atlantic convoy routes bordered voy became virtually a suicide mission on hellish and proved to be equally danger­ for U-boats; most of the merchant ous as the Germans. [n January 1943, the In­ ships that sailed in convoys after gham escorted a convoy part way across the mid-1943 arrived at their destination At[antic in the teeth of a winter gale. ENS unscathed. John M. Waters Jr., aboard the Ingham, de­ scribed what it was like: CONVOY DESIGNATIONS "Though the bridge was 35 feet above HX: North America/Great Britain, Fast the waterline, the seas towered up at SC: North America/Great Britain, Slow a 45-degree angle above that. As a ON: Great Britain/North America, Fast new wave loomed up, Ingham rose to ONS: Great Britain/North America, Slow meet it, climbing steeply up the front; UGS: United States/Gibraltar, Slow as the sea slid past, her bow was left GUS: Gibraltar/United States, Slow momentarily hanging in the air before dropping sickeningly into the next The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign· 7 McCabe called a "hammer effect." Aboard Another rescue demonstrated the brutal the cutter deck plates rattled as the charges nature of combat on the North Atlantic. A exploded, causing ocean spray to shoot sky­ wolf pack attacked the eastbound convoy ward. Ultimately they found their mark, 5C-118. The cutters Bibb and Ingham were and the U-626 went to the bottom with all temporarily attached to a British escort hands. force for the convoy's trans-Atlantic jour­ In January 1943 the weather was so bad ney. It was fortunate for the passengers and that the U-boats had difficulty locating and crew of the troopship 55 Henry Mallory that attacking convoys, but by February more the Bibb and Ingham were there. than 100 were stationed in the air gap. With The U-402 torpedoed the Mallory as it so many U-boats in the area the Allies had straggled behind the convoy. The passen­ difficulty in dodging them all, even with the gers panicked and leapt overboard. Those information provided by Ultra. who did not make it into a life raft died from U-boats wreaked havoc among the mer­ hypothermia. chant ships during February and the escorts Lookouts aboard the Bibb sighted one of were kept busy attacking the enemy and the Mallory's lifeboats and, ignoring an order pulling survivors from the water. One such to return to the convoy, the Bibb's com­ rescue typified the Coast Guard's role dur­ manding officer, CDR Roy Raney, ordered ing the "Bloody Winter" when a U-boat at­ his cutter to begin rescuing survivors. tacked a passenger ship escorted by cutters Many of the Bibb's crewmen leapt into the of the Greenland Patrol. water to assist the nearly frozen survivors, During the night of Feb. 3, 1943, the U-233 and the cutter Ingham assisted. One of the torpedoed and sank the troop-carrying pas­ Ingham's crew described the scene, a dread­ senger ship 5.5. Dorchester, bound for Greenland. Its escorts, the CGCs Tampa, Es­ canaba and Comanche, and later supported by the CGC Duane, worked in the darkness to save 229 of the 904 passengers and crew. The frigid waters claimed the rest. This rescue was the first recorded use of the "retriever" technique. A crewman, insu­ lated against the frigid water by a rubber suit and tethered to the ship, was lowered into the sea where he would grab a survivor. Crewmen aboard would then haul both in, recover the survivor, and throw the rescuer back in to retrieve another. (Above) CDR James A. Hirshfield, (right) commanding officer of the Campbell, directed the success­ ful attack on the U­ 606, for which he received the Navy Cross. Here he checks a message delivered by ENS Bar­ ing Coughin, USCGR. (Right) Men of the Campbell's crew attempt to patch the gaping hole in the cutter's hull after it rammed the U-606. The Campbell was towed safely into port and returned to service. 8 • The Coast Guard and the North Atlantic Campaign