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The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind PDF

176 Pages·1997·3.128 MB·English
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file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm THE CHARACTER OF MIND -i- [This page intentionally left blank.] -ii- THE CHARACTER OF MIND An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind COLIN McGINN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS -iii- OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw http://avaxho.me/blogs/ChrisRedfield file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (1 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm with associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Colin McGinn 1982, 1996 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published in hardback and paperback 1996 Reprinted in paperback 1998, 1999 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data McGinn, Colin, 1950-. The character of mind: an introduction to the philosophy of mind / Colin McGinn.--[New ed.] Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Psychology--Philosophy. I. Title. BF38.M39 1997 128'.2--dc20 96-35172 ISBN 0-19-875209-1 file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (2 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm ISBN 0-19-875208-3 (Pbk) Typeset in Dante MT Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn -iv- Preface to the First Edition This book is intended as an introduction to the philosophy of mind, suitable for the general reader and beginning student. I have accordingly avoided the use of technical terms, except those whose meaning I explain as they are introduced; a dictionary should suffice for other unfamiliar words. I have not, however, sought to protect the reader from the difficulties of the subject, and there are parts of each chapter that are likely to prove taxing to the tyro; but my hope is that these will yield to concentrated attentaon. On many vexed issues I have written with a boldness and absence of qualification I might not allow myself elsewhere; my aim has been to give the reader something definite and stimulating to think about, rather than to present a cautious and disinterested survey of the state of the subject. But while I have tried to say something positive about the topics with which the book deals, I have made a point of accentuating the problems each topic raises; the resulting inconclusiveness is, I think, to be preferred to facile solutions or (even worse) refusals to acknowledge the difficulties. The book contains neither the names of particular authors nor footnotes crediting the ideas discussed to their originators. I must emphasise that this is not to be taken as an indication that the views discussed have no identifiable source, still less that their source is myself. On the contrary, every page of the book shows the influence of other writers, often in the most direct way possible; I claim no especial originality for the ideas put forward, though I dare say my treatment of them has sometimes altered their original form. My excuse for this manner of composition is that to have duly cited particular authors would have greatly impeded and complicated the presentation of the material discussed, unsuiting the book for its introductory purpose. The selective bibliographies for each chapter, to be found at the end of the book, record the sources of the views dealt with, in so far as I can trace them; but it seems in order to file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (3 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm acknowledge the main influences on each chapter here, if only in a general way. These are as follows: Chapter 2, Davidson, Nagel, Kripke, Putnam; Chapter 4, Russell; Chapter 6, Davidson, Fodor, -v- Geach; Chapter 8, Davidson and especially O'Shaughnessy; Chapter 9, Nagel, Parfit, Shoemaker; Epilogue, Dummett. I would also like to thank Anita Avramides for helpful critical comments and Katherine Backhouse for exemplary typing. 12 August 1981 -vi- Preface to the Second Edition It is now fifteen years since the first edition of The Character of Mind was written. At that time the philosophy of mind was beginning its ascent, having wrested primacy from the philosophy of language. Since then it has remained an active and vital area of philosophical interest. Quite a bit has happened in the interim, though I think it would be true to say that the fundamental geography has not altered much. Some new topics have come to prominence, but earlier perspectives have not been superseded. In preparing this new edition I have therefore not seen fit to rewrite the original chapters; instead I have added three completely new chapters that record what seem to me the major developments in the field since the book was written. This seemed the most sensible procedure for a number of reasons: there is nothing significant in the original text that I would like to withdraw; it is in general a mistake to tamper with an earlier piece of finished writing; the new material is more naturally viewed as supplemental rather than revolutionary. I hope that the new edition will preserve the merits of the original, such as they are, while sounding some fresh themes. The history of philosophy must never be forgotten, but equally philosophy should never stagnate. The new chapters are aptly seen as commentaries of a sort on the older chapters, taking further some of the ideas already in play. This was my first book, written quickly and in some heat. I have since done quite a bit of work in the philosophy of mind, and I have not hesitated to reflect this in the supplemental chapters. These chapters may be viewed by some as idiosyncratic, but file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (4 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm I think they represent the direction in which my earlier discussions naturally tend-- though I was not then aware of some of the twists and turns that would be taken. This is particularly true of the topic of consciousness, which now seems to me even more central and problematic than it did when I wrote the original book. In the new edition I have emphasised this topic and indicated how its intractability bears upon other topics. I have also added to the bibliography, to reflect the burgeoning of literature in the philosophy of mind. One influential contemporary approach to the mind urges that we -vii- pay special--even exclusive--attention to the results of the empirical sciences. As philosophers of mind, we should, on this view, see ourselves as commentators on what the scientists are up to. I have little sympathy for this point of view, then or now. Of course, we should be interested in empirical findings, but I believe that the real philosophical problems are not to be handled in this way. Indeed, I believe that scientists carry with them a good deal of tacit philosophical baggage, which conditions the work they do and their means of reporting it. Philosophy, for me, is still anterior to science, and largely independent of it. This book embodies that (unfashionable) point of view. The book is still offered as a ground-floor introduction to the philosophy of mind, not presupposing knowledge of technical terms and the work of particular authors. But, as before, I should say that it does not purport to be easy reading. My aim in the new edition is the same as in the earlier one: to do some real philosophy in as pithy and direct a way as possible--to get the philosophical wheels turning in the reader's mind, rather than merely providing a superficial survey of who said what when. It is meant to be clear and tough, and clear why it is tough. I must also reiterate my indebtedness to other authors, recorded in the bibliography. As in the first edition, I have sought to keep the main text as smooth and stripped- down as possible by not fussing over precise attributions--including to myself. I cannot help recalling the different circumstances in which the old and new editions were prepared: the former, in Earl's Court, London, on a manual typewriter, at the dining-room table; the latter, on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, on a computer and laser-jet printer, at a proper desk (at last). I am struck, however, at the constancy of philosophical themes, despite these discrepancies of time and place. Philosophy has a remarkable talent for staying the same. file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (5 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm New York 18 June 1996 -viii- Contents 1 MENTAL PHENOMENA 1 2 MIND AND BODY 17 3 CONSCIOUSNESS 40 4 ACQUAINTANCE WITH THINGS 49 5 CONTENT 73 6 THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE 83 7 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 107 8 ACTION 117 9 THE SELF 140 EPILOGUE: THE PLACE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 163 Further reading 170 Index 175 -ix- [This page intentionally left blank.] -x- file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (6 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm 1 MENTAL PHENOMENA O f what nature is the mind? This question identifies the philosophical topic with which we are to be concerned. But the question needs some refinement and qualification before it gives accurate expression to the range of issues with which the philosophy of mind deals. Let us start by guarding against some misleading suggestions carried by this simple way of delimiting our topic, and then proceed to clarify what sort of question it is and how we are to set about answering it. The question 'What is the nature of the mind?' invites the retort 'Whose mind?' We do readily and commonly speak of 'the mind', but (as Aristotle warned) this is apt to confine our attentions to the human mind; we thus conceive our task as that of characterising the mental life of a certain terrestrial species at a certain point in its evolutionary and cultural history. But the craving for generality which typifies philosophy recommends enlarging our area of concern: we must seek an account of the mental which applies to the minds of other animals and indeed to the mind of such mentally endowed creatures as we can legitimately imagine. It is therefore better to rephrase our question by replacing 'the mind' by 'mental phenomena'. And if we keep the intended generality of the question in mind, we shall be less prone to accept accounts of the various mental phenomena which are applicable only to certain of the creatures exemplifying them; indeed it is frequently a good test of a theory of some mental phenomenon to ask whether the proposed theory would be applicable to all actual and possible creatures exemplifying that phenomenon. For example, we should be suspicious of the suggestion that having a pain consists in a propensity to offer -1- file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (7 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm certain sorts of verbal report, in the light of the consideration that creatures without language are capable of pain sensations. Similarly, but less obviously, we should question theories which make sense perception a matter of the acquisition of beliefs, in view of the point that some creatures seem capable of perceiving the world yet are hardly equipped to form beliefs about what they perceive. Or again, there are theories of emotion and of action which, while they seem appropriate to the case of human beings, fall down when we ask how they work for other creatures to which these concepts apply--in particular, theories that put (propositional) thought at the heart of those mental phenomena. We do well, then, for heuristic purposes as well as for the sake of generality, to allow our enquiry to take in minds other than the human. Perhaps the minds of all creatures will turn out, upon close examination, to be fundamentally alike, so that concentration on the human case will not misrepresent the nature of mind in general; but we should be alive to the possibility that minds may be of many kinds. Our initial formulation of the question carries another implication which should not be taken uncritically for granted, namely that all types of mental phenomena are of the same nature. Not only may the mind of any particular kind of creature, say the human mind, have seams--in the sense that its component attributes are conceptually separable and hence could occur independently--but there may be nothing common and peculiar to all that we call mental. In other words, we should not let the initial naïve formulation of the question lull us into just assuming that the mental is a unified domain--or, as it is often put, that there is a single and universal 'criterion of the mental'. If there were no shared feature of all that we attribute to 'the mind', then the project of elucidating the nature of mental phenomena would be doomed to frustration--each type of mental phenomenon would have its own distinctive nature. Later we shall try to find a workable criterion of the mental and enquire whether we can do anything to level the variety with which mental phenomena present us; but we should be open to the prospect of discovering that what we commonly classify as mental has no significant unity of nature--indeed that our customary classification of various phenomena as belonging to 'the mind' is a mere historical or cultural accident. Certainly philosophers (and others) have shown less than full consensus, through the centuries, on the question of what belongs to the realm of the properly mental. Less drastically, it -2- file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (8 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm may turn out that the concept of mind approximates to what is sometimes called a 'family resemblance' concept, similar to the concept of a game: that is, calling a phenomenon mental is not recording the possession of some interesting single property on the part of all and only phenomena so called, but is rather a matter of drawing attention to a large number of similarities and connections which are incapable of summary capture in any simple formula. It is not--or not just--that there exists no concept, aside from the family resemblance concept in question, under which all and only instances of that concept fall; it is rather that there is no substantive or conceptually innovative necessary and sufficient condition for falling under the concept--or none that is not itself a family resemblance concept. But before we address this question as to the logical character of the concept of mind, we should say something about the status of our enquiry into the nature of mental phenomena and about the method of its prosecution. A further defect in our original question is that it does not, as so expressed, present us with a distinctively philosophical field of investigation; for it says nothing to distinguish the philosophy of mind from the study of mental phenomena undertaken by scientific empirical psychology. Putting aside certain deviations in the conception of psychology adopted during its chequered history, it is surely true to say that it is the business of psychology to investigate the nature of mental phenomena--to develop theories of what these phenomena are and of the principles or laws that govern their operations. How then do the two subjects differ? Answering this question requires us to take a stand on the nature of philosophy itself--what its method is and what the status of its results--as well as on the question of how the philosophical study of mind relates to its scientific study. Some have supposed the philosophy of mind to be strictly continuous with psychology, being merely more speculative; others that it represents a primitive stage of enquiry into the mind, to be left behind when experimental methods are extended to cover areas of the mental hitherto insusceptible to properly scientific study; still others that the task of philosophy of mind is to analyse and clarify the theoretical concepts and methods employed by the science of psychology. None of these views will be adopted in this book. We get closer to the conception of the philosophy of mind adopted here by saying that we are concerned to articulate what is involved in mental concepts. This is not quite close enough, however; for it is a demerit of -3- file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (9 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08]

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