11~~,J,462740 i ;f !' DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2014-004, document no. 1 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 19, 2016 THE CENTRAL .. INTELLIGENCE .. AND... '°.AGENCY ::QVERHEAO·l!Zl] ~~~~l'' RECONNAISSANCE :T~e U-~ ah~· OXCART . •·~ro·graf'ns, i 9.54 ; 19?4· . . ... . . . .. c~egory·W.::P.E!d1~\\i:~;i1a . · \(.: :<.;;;{~~9~.~~!?t~frrY~~~f.f;~;,:\: .• C01462740 SECRET Warning Notice Jnte~ligence Sources or Methods· Involved (WNINTEL) National Security Information :unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanciions. ;; ··. . .. . ~ ! ..t • ,. ·,·~ ·.'I ... Dissemination Control Abbreviations f i NOFORN (NF) Not releasable to foreign nationals !1. NOCONTRACT (NC) Not releasable to contractors or contractor/ consultants · · · . · · PROP!N (PR) Caution-proprietary information involved ORCON (OC) Dissemination and extraction of informatiorl controlled by originator REL... This information has been authorized for re-· 1ease to... · WN WN!NTEL...:..lntelligence sources and moth· ads involved · · ."· ·· · · · under statutory authority of the Classified byl'=~~I Declassify: OADR ·Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 Derived from multiple sources U.S.C., section 403g) ~~~-'-~~~--'~~~~~~~~~~-\--' All material cin this page is Unclassified. ,I . ! SECRET .. C01462740 SECRET Sec1 et NOFORN ' " : ·. \ The Central Intelligence Agency. .•,) 'J and Overhead Reconnaissance: .· 'i · ,; . : ~: ;, " .J• The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 ·~: ' ' !: .. '. .'; . f . ( • i-. ' Sac1et i '· .'. . . i i'. ~eGRET :i;i ·: .( T I' j/ C01462740 SEGRE: I . i i :-:. Seeret NOFORN ' . ' . ,. ~ The Central -lntelil:ig¢.nce~gerlcy. · Rec()rirYalssance: and Overhead ·.. : .. ·· ...· .. . : ·. ' ' The U-2 arid OXCARTProgr~ms;.. t9s4~l~:74·. .~ " ,, ' f . ! Gregory W. Pedlow · and . Donald E. Welie'nbach \· '. . 1. ,. ... '' ,·' .' History Staff Central Intel/ igence Agency Washingtori, D.C. 1992 SeeFet · SeGRET. C01462740 SECRE'F ' T ., +chapter 1 Sear~hing for a Syst?itt The Need for High ..Altitude Reconnaissance ............................................ 1 · Early Postwar Aerial.Reconnaissance ................................................... 2 New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance .............. :··· ... :. .. .'..... : ......... :. ·4 The Air ForcS Sea.rch. for a Ne~ R_econn':lissan~e Aircraft............... 8 Locktieed CL-282 Supporters an"d the CIA......................................... 13 Scientists and ·ovar'head Reconnaissance ............................................... 17 The BEACON HILL Report ................. ::. ........ :. .......................•.... , ......... 17 . Concern About the Danger' :of a Soviet ·Surprise Attack ............. ;. . 19 ' ·The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel ......................................: .. 21 :1: British Overllight of Kapustin Var......................~................................ 23 ,·., •The· Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282............................... 24 ,, The Technological Capabilities Panel ............ :. ............................... :. .. 26 for l: ,. Project Three Support the Lockheed CL-282 ..................... : .•.••... 2'7 ,. A Meeting With the President_. ................................ ,. .......................... 32 CIP,. and Air Force Agreement on the CL:202 .:................. , .............. 33 +chapte; 2 Developing the U-2 The E.stablishmant of the U-2· Project......................::............................. 39 Funding Arrangements for Project AQUATONE •...•........••......• :. ............ 43 Major Design Features of the U-2............................................................45 The Development. of the Can:iera System .•...: ....•..•........................... , .... 48 Preparations for· Testing the U-2 ............ : ............................: ................... 56 Security .for the U-2 Project............................"............................ :. ............ 59 The 'CIA - Air Force Partners.hip .......................................... :. .............. : ... ·so Technical Challenges to High-Altitude Flight.. ....................................... 61 Delivery of the. First U-2 .... :. .... ,. ............................................................... 66 Initial Testing of tlie U-2 ......................................................:,............•...... 68 . U-2s, UFOs, and Operation B~UE BOOK......... ,. ..................................... 72 ..... ' i . '" I ' 8ECF.iET C01462740 SECRET Sec1 el NOFORN Hiring U-2 Pilots·······~···········································································:..... 73 Pilot Training ......•...•...............•..............•................................................•.... 75 ·" Final Tests of the U-2 ................................................................................ 76 .. Three Fatal Crashes In 1956 ..................................................................... 79 · Coordination of Collection Requirements ....... :. ...................................... 80 "Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions .......................:. 82 The Impact of "the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons ................... 84 AQUATONE Briefings for Selected Member's of Congress .............. : .. 88 The U-2 Cover Story ................... :. ............................................................. 89 ·')' Chapter 3 U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, .1956-1958 The Deployment of Detachme.nt A to Lakenheat:h ............................... 94 The Move to Wiesbaden ........................................................................... 95 President Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights ............................ 96 First Over.flights of Eastern Europe ....................................................... 100 First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union ............................................... 104 Soviet Protest Note .................................................................................. 109 · The End of the Bomber Gap .................................................................: 111 T_actical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis .................... 112 Renewed Overflights of the Soviet Union ........................................... 122 Radar-Deceptive ''Dirty Birds" ................................................................ 128 The New Detachment C ........................................................................... 133 Detachment B Flights. From Pakistan .... , ............................................... 135 The Decline of Detachment A:.........................· . ..................................... 139 Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142 Declining Overflight Activity .................................................................... 143 ;: Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 .............. 147 More Powerful Engines for the U-2 .............. :. .................... :. ................ 149 Intervention in Lebanon, i958 .......... :. .................................................... 1.52 British Participation in the U-2 Project .................. : .............................. 153 The U-2 Project at the Beginning of 1959........................................... 157 ·.{:·chapter 4 The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960 The U-2 and th~ ''Missile-Gap" Debate ................................................ 159 The Last Overflight: Operation GRAND SLAM .................................... 170 The Aftermath of the U-2 Downing ...................................................... 177 The Withdrawal of the Overseas Detachments ................................... 181 The Fate of Francis Gary Powers .......................................................... 183 Changes in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 ............................ 187 I t. ' ' SECRET C01462740 SECRET Set1 et NOFORN ·:'.·Chapter 5 U-2 ,Operations After May 1960 U-2 Operatioris in Latin America ...................... ; .................................... 197 U-2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion .............................. ,. ........ 197 Aerial Refueling Capability for. the U-2 .......... :. ................................ 198 U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Cris!s .............................. 199 U-2s Over South America .....•......•.....................................•...•........... 211 U-2 Operatio.ns hi Asia .......................................................... :. ................ 211 Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958........................ 211 China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 ..............~·........................... 215 U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet ....... :. .............................. 216 U-2Cs for Detachment C. .................................................................... 217 U-2 Crash in Thailand ..........................................., ............................. 219 End of Detachment C Operations ..................................................... 219 Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam .............. 221 New Detachment on Taiwan ............................................................. 222 Use of Detachment H Aircraft by U~ Pilots .................................... 230 U-2s in India ................................................: . ...: ................................... 231 Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate Resources in Asia ........... 233 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H. ................................ 237 Use of Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238 I 25Xl, E.0.13526 .. 1 L,_________________,..................: .................... 240 The End of U-2 Overflights bf Mainland China ............................. 242 Peripheral Missions by Detachment H_............................................. 244 Operation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vieinam ............................. 246 Improvements in U-2 Technology ....................................................: ··· .247 Modifiqa!ion of U-2s for Aircraft C~rrier Deployment ........... :. ...... 247 Use of Ca.rrier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site ... 249 A New Version of the U-2 ................................................................. 251 (leplacement of the Original U-2s With U-2Rs ............................... 253 The Final Years of the U-2 ................................................: ............. , ...... 253 ·, Support to Other Agencies ................................................................ 254 Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions ............................... 255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities .. '..........................257 ··.­...Chapter 6 The U-2's Intended Successor; ProjEict <?XCART, 1956-.1968 The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 ....•.......•....... 260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design ... :. ....................................... :. ... 270 I Efforts To Reduce the A-12's ·Radar Cross Section ............., .............. 274 The OXCART Contract ........................... ,. ......., ........................................ 277 qbQR,.,,E,_,_T______________ _J C01462740 SECRET SeCI et NOFORN ,. New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's High Speed ............. 279 pesigning the OXCART's Cameras ........................................................ 2!31 Choosing Pilots for OXCART .................................................................. 283 Selection of a Testing Site for the. OXCART....................................... 283 Delivery of the First OXCART ....................... , ..., .................................... 286 Changes in the froject Mana9ement .................................................... 286 OXCART's First Flights ........................................ :. .......... ~ ........................ 288 Speed-Related Problems .......................................................................... 290 New Versions of the OXCART ......................., ....................................... 291 The Question of Surfacing a Version ·of the OXCART ................."..... 292 Additional Problems During Final Testing ............................................ 295: Discussions on the OXCART'S Future Employment ........................... 297 First A-12 Deployment: Operation BLACK SHIELD ........... :. ................ 304 The End of the OXCART Program ..................................................... ,. . 307 Possible Successors to the OXCART..................................................... 312 Summary of the OXCART Program ....................................................,. 313 -$>Chapter 7 Conclusion U-2 Overflight$ of the Soviet Union ..................................................... 315 Participation of Allies in the U-2 Program ......................... :. ................. 319 · U-2s as Collectors of Tactical lntelligencie ......... :. ................ ."............... 319 Advances in Technology.......................................................................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact -of the Overhead ReconnaisSance Program on the CIA........ 321 •ApPendix ·A: Acronyms ............................................................................ 325 <if} Appendix B: Key Personnel .................................................................... 327 -0 Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 .......................... 335 ~Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, ............................ 337 · 4 July 1954-1 May 1960 '11-Appendix _E: Unmanned Recorinaissance Projects .............................. 339 ~Bibliography..................... : ......................................................................... 347 ~Index ............................................................................................................ 355 -···-·-·----------=~8E~C~R!!:E:;:!T~_ __.:_______~---"--_J C01462740:·_;' . .' ..~ .. .···· ·"· ;. FOREWORD .. ; This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita­ tive history of the CIA's manned ove.rhead reconnaissance program, which from 1954 to 1974 developed and -Operated· two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi­ cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program 1 along with other overhead systems that emerged from il, changed the CIA's work and structure in ways that were both revolutionary and permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and Technology in the I~60s, principally to develop and direct reconnais­ sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in· this study.· The authors tell an engrossing story. The struggle between· the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART pr0jects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an. enormous technofogical success:" its first flight over the USSR in July ... ·: .... o1n9 5t6h em Saodvei eitt Uimnimone.d iUatseinlyg itth ~a gmaionsstt itmhep oSrotvaniett stoarugrecte ito wf ians tedlelsigigennecde . ···.· ··'·.·.~,.; . . for nevertheless produced a persistent "tension between its program -:·.:·.--. ··,:, ·,, .. managers and the President The program managers, eager for cover­ .... age, repeatedly urged the ·President to authorize frequent missions :.· over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt­ ·..--: . ;:-'--~- ' : ful of the ·prudence and propriety of invading Soviet airspace, only :, :' ; .> '. .:._.:. ...·. . .. reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down ·. . ., ' -~ Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower '.''j; .•, •' forbade any further U-2 flights over· the USSR. Since the Agency must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the .::_.. diplomatic or l!lilitary cost if it fails, this account of the U-2's em­ ·,·.·· ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond :.,'.' overhead reconnaissance progra111s. . .. ,'·, Indeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA . records and extensive classified interviews of its participants: The authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave in· .' formation available nowhere else. Although the story of tlie manned :I Scc1.et reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno­ logical challenges and their implications' for inielligence and national· policy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today. Many people made important ccintributions to the production of r-~--_IJ this volume .. In the History Staff's pre aration of 'the manuscript, Withheld under statutory authority of the Gerald Haines 'did the final revision, a· ain demon- Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 .straled her high talent as acopy editor, and provided U.S.C., section 403g) staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to more members Lhan we can riame from Lhe Publications, Design, and Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic . . Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far.beyond the call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this handsome volume. Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W, Pedlow, who completed it, brought complementary strengths to this work. A veteran of CIA service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began researcli on this study in 1983, when he joined the DC! History Staff on a rotational· assignment from the Directorate of Science and Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter ­ viewing, he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning to his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member of the DCJ History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized, edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to. be ­ come NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly benefited from .both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history of the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program.+ l Kenneth. McDonald Chief, CIA History Staff April 1992