NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS WHY FAILING TERRORIST GROUPS PERSIST: THE CASE OF AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB by Richard A. Nessel June 2012 Thesis Co-Advisors: Randy Burkett Mohammed Hafez Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2012 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Why Failing Terrorist Groups Persist: The Case of Al- 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 6. AUTHOR: Richard A. Nessel 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943–5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number NPS.2012.0003-IR-EP7-A. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is less likely to reach its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Algeria than at any time since its earlier history as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Yet the group endures. The apparent resilience of AQIM relies less on its actual organization than the environmental factors that have allowed it to persist. By co-opting local anti-government groups, Algerian jihadists have long been allowed to live among and collaborate with Berber and Tuareg separatists. Turning to international notoriety to augment its local jihad the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) became AQIM even though an Al-Qaeda link had long since been established. Effective Algerian security measures have pushed portions of AQIM to ungoverned spaces where regional security pressure is less existent and illicit networks are numerous. Potential ends for AQIM rely heavily on Algeria to bear the weight of the effort, whereas Sahelian initiatives are peripheral to a complete end. U.S. strategy should subordinate the Sahel focus, as a Sahelian solution is not sufficient, while an Algerian solution is both necessary and sufficient to AQIM’s demise. AQIM represents a lower priority challenge that, if not dealt with properly, can become a major priority or drag on indefinitely, like the FARC in Colombia. The U.S. must strive to meet AQIM with the most appropriate solution with the least force possible to expedite its departure, so that U.S. CT efforts can be engaged elsewhere against remaining Al-Qaeda affiliates. 14. SUBJECT TERMS AQIM, OEF-TS, JSOTF-TS, USAFRICOM, Algeria, Sahel, Maghreb, Al- 15. NUMBER OF Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, GSPC, GIA, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Mali, Niger, PAGES Mauritania, Arab Spring, Salafism, U.S. policy and jihad. 134 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK i i Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited WHY FAILING TERRORIST GROUPS PERSIST: THE CASE OF AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB Richard A. Nessel Major, United States Army B.S., Purdue University, 2000 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2012 Author: Richard A. Nessel Approved by: Randy Burkett Thesis Co-Advisor Mohammed Hafez Thesis Co-Advisor John Arquilla Chair, Department of Defense Analysis ii i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is less likely to reach its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Algeria than at any time since its earlier history as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Yet the group endures. The apparent resilience of AQIM relies less on its actual organization than the environmental factors that have allowed it to persist. By co- opting local anti-government groups, Algerian jihadists have long been allowed to live among and collaborate with Berber and Tuareg separatists. Turning to international notoriety to augment its local jihad the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) became AQIM even though an Al-Qaeda link had long since been established. Effective Algerian security measures have pushed portions of AQIM to ungoverned spaces where regional security pressure is less existent and illicit networks are numerous. Potential ends for AQIM rely heavily on Algeria to bear the weight of the effort, whereas Sahelian initiatives are peripheral to a complete end. U.S. strategy should subordinate the Sahel focus, as a Sahelian solution is not sufficient, while an Algerian solution is both necessary and sufficient to AQIM’s demise. AQIM represents a lower priority challenge that, if not dealt with properly, can become a major priority or drag on indefinitely, like the FARC in Colombia. The U.S. must strive to meet AQIM with the most appropriate solution with the least force possible to expedite its departure, so that U.S. CT efforts can be engaged elsewhere against remaining Al-Qaeda affiliates. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK v i TABLE OF CONTENTS I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1  A.  BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1  1.  THE THREAT .....................................................................................1  2.  RESEARCH QUESTION ...................................................................1  3.  SCOPE AND PURPOSE .....................................................................2  4.  HISTORY .............................................................................................2  B.  METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................5  II.  ISLAMISM IN ALGERIA AND THE EVOLUTION TO AQIM ..........................7  A.  ALGERIAN ISLAMISM ................................................................................7  1.  Apolitical Islamists ...............................................................................8  2.  Political Islamists ...............................................................................10  3.  Revolutionary Islamists .....................................................................13  B.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GIA AND THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF AQIM ........................................................................................................16  1.  The Rise of the GIA ...........................................................................16  2.  The Al-Qaeda Connection and Takfiri Violence .............................19  C.  CHAPTER CONCLUSION ..........................................................................20  III.  AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND METHODS OF OPERATION ..............................................23  A.  ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF AQIM .......................................24  B.  AQIM’S METHODS OF OPERATION .....................................................30  C.  CHAPTER CONCLUSION ..........................................................................37  IV.  HOW COULD AQIM END? ....................................................................................41  A.  CHAPTER INTRODUCTION .....................................................................41  B.  POSSIBLE ENDS TO AQIM .......................................................................42  1.  Capture or Killing the Leadership ...................................................42  a.  Targeting Droukdel, the Supreme Commander of AQIM ....42  b.  Targeting the Council of Notables, AQIM’s War Council ...45  c.  Targeting the Shura Council ..................................................46  2.  Inability to Pass the Cause to the Next Generation ........................47  a.  Staying Relevant to Urban Algerians .....................................47  b.  Taking on the Tuareg Cause ..................................................48  3.  Achievement of the Cause .................................................................48  4.  Negotiations Toward a Legitimate Political Process ......................49  5.  Diminished Popular Support ............................................................50  a.  Public Fear of Government Repression .................................51  b.  Government Opportunity as a Drain to Terrorist Recruitment Efforts.................................................................52  c.  Outdated Ideology ...................................................................52  d.  Revulsion to the Violence of Terrorism .................................52  6.  Repression of the Terrorist Group ...................................................53  vi i a.  AQIM Pushed Outside of its Primary Target Area ...............53  b.  Future if AQIM Cannot Overcome the Repression ...............54  7.  Transition to Another Modus Operandi ..........................................54  a.  AQIM Transition to Insurgency .............................................55  b.  AQIM Transition to a Criminal Network ..............................55  C.  AQIM’S END, AND THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED ............................56  1.  Probable Ends: Obsolescence, Repression, Succession and Crime ...................................................................................................56  a.  Obsolescence in the Wake of Political Change......................56  b.  Repression: Nowhere to Run but into the Desert Wasteland ................................................................................57  c.  Failures of Succession: By Leader Targeting or Generational Gap ....................................................................57  d.  Crime Pays, a Failing Jihad Does Not ...................................58  2.  Improbable Ends: Success, Politics and Civil War ........................59  a.  AQIM Achieves its Goals ........................................................59  b.  AQIM Turns to Politics...........................................................60  c.  AQIM Ignites a Civil War .......................................................60  D.  CHAPTER CONCLUSION ..........................................................................61  V.  U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY TOWARD AQIM .............................................63  A.  CHAPTER INTRODUCTION .....................................................................63  1.  Definition of Key Terms ....................................................................63  2.  The Path From Policy to Strategy ....................................................64  B.  U.S. POLICY TOWARD AQIM ..................................................................65  1.  U.S. National Security Strategy ........................................................65  2.  U.S. National Counterterrorism Strategy ........................................67  3.  National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) ...................................70  4.  U.S. State Department .......................................................................71  a.  State Bureau for Counterterrorism ........................................71  b  State Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs ..................................75  c  The U.S. Ambassador to Algeria ............................................76  d  State Bureau for African Affairs ............................................78  C.  U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD AQIM ............................................................79  1.  Policy Reiterated in Strategy ............................................................79  a.  The National Defense Strategy ...............................................79  b  The National Military Strategy ...............................................80  2.  Where Policy and Strategy Meet ......................................................81  a.  The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Policy ............81  b  The Pentagon and Joint Staff .................................................82  3.  U.S. Strategy from the Bottom-Up against AQIM..........................84  D.  WHERE INTERESTS, POLICIES AND STRATEGIES CONVERGE; WHERE THEY DIVERGE .................................................86  E.  CHAPTER CONCLUSION ..........................................................................89  VI.  CONCLUSION: THE WAY AHEAD ....................................................................91  A.  THESIS SUMMARY .....................................................................................91  vi ii