The Blitzkrieg Legend An Association of the U.S. Army Book The Blitzkrieg Legend The 1940 Campaign in the West Karl-Heinz Frieser with John T. Greenwood Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland Naval Institute Press 291 Wood Road Annapolis, MD 21402 © 2005 by Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt (MGFA) All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The original edition was published under the title Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 Munich: Oldenbourg (2nd edition) 1996 (= Operationen des Zweiten Weltkriegs, 2) First Naval Institute Press paperback edition published in 2012. ISBN: 978-1-61251-358-4 The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows: Frieser, Karl-Heinz. [Blitzkrieg-Legende. English] The Blitzkrieg legend : the 1940 campaign in the West / Karl-Heinz Frieser with John T. Greenwood. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Western Front. 2. Lightning war. I. Greenwood, John T. II. Title. D756.3.F7513 2005 940.54’21—dc22 2005016997 This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 First printing Contents Lists of Charts Editor’s Introduction Preface Abbreviations and Translations of Frequently Used Foreign Terms Introduction: The Miracle of 1940 1 The Blitzkrieg: Word and Concept The Word “Blitzkrieg” The Concept of Blitzkrieg 2 Blitzkrieg without the Blitzkrieg Concept: The Background of the Campaign in the West Did Hitler Have a Strategic War Concept? Was the Polish Campaign a Blitzkrieg? Did the Time Factor Work for or against the Wehrmacht? Was There a Blitzkrieg Economy before the Campaign in the West? Was the Army’s Organizational Structure Geared to a Blitzkrieg? Was the Wehrmacht Superior in Terms of Strength? Was the German General Officer Corps for or against the Campaign in the West? 3 The Struggle over the Sickle Cut Plan The First Three Deployment Directives Manstein and the Development of the Sickle Cut Plan The Revolving Door Effect of the Schlieffen Plan and the Sickle Cut Plan The Opposition to the Sickle Cut Plan among the German General Officer Corps Conclusion: The Sickle Cut—A Go-for-Broke Gamble 4 The 1940 Ardennes Offensive Panzer Group Kleist: A Disputed Operational Experiment The Importance of Logistics Planning the Offensive—A Preprogrammed Chaos The Advance through the Ardennes: A Near Catastrophe The Impact of Operational-Level Mistakes at the Tactical Level: The Example of the 1st Panzer Division The Ardennes Offensive from the Allied Perspective 5 The Decisive Battle: The Breakthrough of Panzer Corps Guderian at Sedan The French Army’s Six Fatal Mistakes at Sedan German Preparations for the Crossing of the Meuse River The Meuse River Crossing on 13 May The Advance from the Bridgehead on 14 May Sedan 1940—Turning Point in Military History 6 The Collapse of the Meuse Front Seal the Gap and Counterattack: French Operational Countermoves after the Breakthrough at Sedan Panzer Corps Reinhardt Breaks Through at Monthermé—A Victory over His Own Command Panzer Corps Hoth Breaks Through at Dinant Panzer Corps Hoepner Attacks the Dyle Line: A Diversionary Maneuver on the Operational Level French Divisions Pinned Down in the Maginot Line 7 The Push to the Channel Coast and the Problem of the Exposed Flank Hitler’s Halt Order at Montcornet and the No-Show French Counterattack Rommel’s Unauthorized Push at Avesnes The British Counterattack at Arras: A Tactical Failure with Unsuspected Operational Consequences 8 The “Miracle of Dunkirk” Background of the Halt Order The Halt Order Operation Dynamo: The Evacuation of the Allies Digression: Did the Dunkirk Halt Order Decide World War II? Hitler’s Alleged Motives for the Halt Order Hitler’s Real Motive: Asserting His Leadership Claim against the General Officer Corps 9 The End of the Campaign in the West Case Red—Only an Epilogue The Campaign in the West: The Statistics 10 Causes of Victory and Defeat France’s Collapse The Myth of the National Socialist Blitzkrieg The Secret of the Success of the German Blitzkrieg: The Blend of Traditional Military Principle with Modern Technology 11 Summary and Epilogue Summary Epilogue: The Delusion of the Worldwide Blitzkrieg Table of Equivalent Ranks Notes Bibliography Index of Personalities Index Charts Charts Armed Forces High Command, May 1940 Armed Forces High Command/Army High Command Organization, May 1940 Trained Soldiers of the German Army, Autumn 1939 Lance Comparison: Steel Tip—Wooden Shaft Comparison of the Most Important Tank Types: Germany, Great Britain, and France Comparison of the Most Important Aircraft Types: Bombers and Fighters Comparison of Forces, 10 May 1940 Encirclement Battle at Cannae, 216 B.C. Organization of Army Group A, 10 May 1940 Differing Ideas for the Employment of Panzer Group Kleist on the Four Roads of Advance in the Ardennes Piecemeal Employment of Panzer Group Kleist on the Four Roads of Advance in the Ardennes Organization of 1st Panzer Division, 10 May 1940 Organization of French 5th Light Cavalry Division Organization of the French 55th Infantry Division, 13 May 1940 Organization of Infantry Regiment Großdeutschland, 10 May 1940 Organization of 7th Panzer Division, May 1940 Editor’s Introduction When Karl-Heinz Frieser and I began working on an English translation of his Blitzkrieg- Legende: Der Westfeldzug, 1940 (The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West) back in 1996, we never expected it to take so long to see the finished book. This project began as a cooperative undertaking between the Military History Research Office of the German Armed Forces in Potsdam, Germany, and my former employer, the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where I was then the chief of the Field Programs and Historical Services Division. Since that time, I have become the chief historian for the Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, and the project moved to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) in 2000. As a result of the support of Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Army (Ret.), president of AUSA and former chief of staff, U.S. Army, and with the encouragement and solid backing of Lt. Col. Roger Cirillo, U.S. Army (Ret.), who heads up the AUSA book publishing program, Karl-Heinz Frieser’s book is at long last appearing in English. Mr. Gerald Lewis Geiger, a World War II and Korean War veteran who served in the U.S. Army in Europe and later in the U.S. Air Force, completed the original translation for Schreiber Translations of Rockville, Maryland. Mr. Geiger’s efforts made possible the editorial work that Karl-Heinz and I then undertook over the next nine years as the project stumbled along like the French army facing Heinz Guderian and his Panzers on the Meuse River in May 1940. Karl-Heinz has been intimately involved in all aspects of the manuscript’s preparation—he has read and commented on every page of every revision that I have completed. He has quickly and completely answered every question I have had. His deep, personal commitment to the completion of this work despite his heavy workload as an author and branch chief at the MGFA (Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt) has been the major reason for its successful completion. Putting Karl-Heinz’s German text into publishable English text that is historically and militarily accurate in all its German, French, and English aspects has been an interesting voyage of discovery. I quickly learned that German and American footnoting and bibliographical styles were dissimilar enough to produce significant additional work. I have adopted the standard American practice of a full source citation in the initial note and an abbreviated form thereafter. With sources in German, French, English, and a few other European languages, and citations required in English for all the non-English titles, the editing workload has been significant. Again, Karl-Heinz’s assistance has been critical to completing this project. In the end, I believe I was able to resolve most of the issues associated with footnotes and sources. In accordance with U.S. Naval Institute Press style, the footnotes have been converted to endnotes at the back of the book. The editor and translator are responsible for all insertions in the text that are set off in square brackets, except those in direct quotations, which are the author’s interpolations. English translations of foreign words and phrases are given in parentheses. In the text, ranks of the German personnel are retained in German in their initial appearance while all others are in English. I have tried to minimize unneeded repetition of