The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict Contemporary Issues in the Middle East The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict BARRY RUBIN Syracuse University Press Copyright © 1981 by Barry Rubin First Published 1981 All Rights Reserved First Edition 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 6 5 4 3 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Rubin, Barry M. The Arab states and the Palestine conflict. (Contemporary issues in the Middle East) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Jewish-Arab relations —1917- .2. Arab coun tries—Politics and government. I. Title. II. Series. DS119.7.R75 327.5694017’4927 81-5829 ISBN 0-8156-2253-8 AACR2 ISBN 8-8156-0170-0 (pbk.) Manufactured in the United States of America “Interest of State is the main motive of Middle East Governments as of others, and here as elsewhere the idea of interest which determines policy is a blend of two elements: a certain concept of what is good for the State as a whole, and a concept of what is good for the rulers and the group which they immediately represent.” Albert Hourani, The Middle East and the Crisis of 1956 “All my friends ... Have but their stings and teeth newly ta’en out By whose fell working I was first advanced And by whose power I well might lodge a fear To be again displaced; which to avoid... Be it thy course to busy giddy minds With foreign quarrels....” William Shakespeare, King Henry IV, Part Two Barry ruBin is a Fel l ow at Geor get own Univer sit y Cent er for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author of Paved with Good Inten tions: Iran and the American Experience, The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941-1947: The Road to Cold War, and numerous articles on U. S. foreign policy and on the Middle East. Contents Preface ix Introduction xi 1. The Bitter Legacy of Defeat: 1948-81 1 2. Zionists, Hashemites, and Pan-Syrians: 1897-1930 23 3. Entrance of the Arab Kings: 1931-36 40 4. Domestic Politics and Palestine: Iraq and Egypt 53 5. The General Strike and the British Invitation: 1936 66 6. Opposition to Partition, Support for Revolt: 1937-38 81 7. Partition Abandoned, Compromise Denied: 1938-39 99 8. Fortunes and Misfortunes of War: 1939-42 117 9. The Division over Unity: 1943-45 133 10. The Failure of Arab Diplomacy: 1946-47 148 11. The Perils of Partition: 1947-48 165 12. The Slippery Road to War: January-May 1948 185 13. Abdallah’s Perilous Peace-Making: 1948-51 205 14. Egypt’s Revolution, Israel, and America: 1950-56 216 Notes 237 Bibliography 282 Index 293 Author’s Note I have always liked to examine important subjects that most people thought were obvious and yet had never really been studied systematically. In this case, the topic of my 1981 book published by Syracuse University Press in hardcover and paperback (three printings), was how did the Arab states become involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict? What resulted is a detailed and highly documented study that reveals some surprising things. One key theme is the difference among the regimes--Egypt and Jordan being moderate; Syria and Iraq militant; Saudi Arabia bloodthirsty in rhetoric but doing relatively little. Another was that the conflict had been avoidable and that a number of Arab leaders had not wanted to go to war in 1948. The other key turning point was 1939, when the British were ready to sell out the Zionists if the Arabs only gave them some minor concessions. The Palestinian Arab leader, Amin al-Husaini, was central in refusing any deal because he--along with his radical allies--were certain that Nazi Germany would win the coming war and bring them complete victory. Also of special interest is the story, based on interviews and archives, of the early 1950s, showing how U.S. policymakers discovered only gradually that they could not conciliate the new Arab radical nationalists. A good story in its own right, the book provides many parallels to present-day issues. Barry Rubin, October 2012 Preface Hundreds of books and thousands of articles have been devoted to the history and contemporary course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The confrontation within Palestine, the participation of Great Britain, the United States, and the United Nations, and the impact of these events on Jews and Palestinian Arabs have all been endlessly chronic led. Surprisingly little attention, however, has been devoted to the question of how the Arab states entered the battle in the first place. In addition to tracing the events involved in the growing intervention by Arab states in Palestine, this book attempts to analyze two specific issues. How did internal conditions in the various Arab countries affect their involvement in Palestine? How did the network of alliances and conflict among the Arab governments shape their Palestine policies? How can one hope to understand the conflict without exploring this essential dimension? If Arab nations have spilled so much passion, spent many lives and so many billions of dollars over this issue—and remain willing to do so—the tale of how they arrived at this position must be a compelling and revealing one. This story should be expected to reveal important principles of international relations and of the connections between domestic politics and foreign policy. In this sense, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and Israel’s independence represent not only a beginning but also an end. These developments marked the failure of diplomacy and indirect intervention by the Arab states. They seemed to mark as inevitable an evolution of affairs which might often have taken alternative paths. The remnants of pre-1948 ideas and relationships continued to play