UUnniivveerrssiittyy ooff CChhiiccaaggoo LLaaww SScchhooooll CChhiiccaaggoo UUnnbboouunndd Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1972 TThhee AAppppooiinnttmmeenntt aanndd DDiissaappppooiinnttmmeenntt ooff SSuupprreemmee CCoouurrtt JJuussttiicceess Philip B. Kurland Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Philip B. Kurland, "The Appointment and Disappointment of Supreme Court Justices," 1972 Law and the Social Order 183 (1972). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Appointment and Disappointment of Supreme Court Justices' Philip B. Kurland* The recent controversy over President Nixon's appointments to the Supreme Court, and the institution of impeachment proceedings against Justice Douglas, have raised important questions concerning qualifications for, and behavior of, Supreme Court justices. In this Article, Professor Kurland discusses the important qualities that a Supreme Court justice should possess, the various competing pressures that often influence presidentials elections, the Senate's proper role in the confirmation process, and, finally-with special emphasis upon the impeachment proceedings against Justice Douglas-the available means of removing incumbent justices. An invitation to deliver a series of talks under such distinguished auspices as the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise-and in such an empyreal location as this Law School affords-may be reason enough for any academic to accept the opportunity. Nevertheless, it seems to me that to warrant the honor and to justify the imposition on the audience, it is incumbent on the speaker to have something to say. I hope that I do. Perhaps the primary reason that I have for choosing to talk about the appointment and disappointment of Supreme Court Justices is that it is a subject that has not wanted for great attention in recent months. It may appear to some that the extensive coverage already afforded the subject is an even better reason for not addressing the questions involved. But I suggest that much of what has been said and written has been both less and more than the truth. And perhaps a little of my dull prose will afford an appropriate antidote to the colorful tales already recorded. I do not, of course, mean that recent talk about the Court and its Justices has taken the form of "the big lie" that has made us so distrustful of both our national government and our national press. I mean rather that most of the commentary-including some of my own, I must concede-has been in the romantic vein. Whether fLectures delivered at Arizona State University College of Law on March 28, 29 and 30, 1972, under the aegis of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise. *Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; A.B. 1942, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1944, Harvard University. HeinOnline -- 1972 Law & Soc. Order 183 1972 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER [LAW & Soc. ORDm it has been damning or praising, it has been shaped in terms of the mystique of an institution that means many things to many men. Unlike most con- temporary fiction of note, however, the writing about the Court has featured a hero, even as it assumes the existence of the antihero. Whether heroes or antiheroes, however, the men who have performed the functions of Supreme Court Justices have been mere men. No record, not Mrs. Bowen's picture of the magnificent Yankee' nor even Beveridge's idolatrous biography of John Marshall,' has revealed men of superhuman accomplish- ments. And, if Marshall does not qualify for the status of a human god or a human devil, as the case may be, certainly no other Justice does. Such is not the stuff of which judges are made. The distortions of fact to which I have alluded are quite clearly a response to the Supreme. Court rather than to the men who served it and to the symbol rather than the reality. For the Court is a symbol of the majesty of the law and of the never-ending but never-accomplished quest for justice. I certainly would not deny that the symbol may be more important than the reality. Professor Whitehead often reminded us that we live by symbols,3 and so too did the jurist whose name these lectures bear. I may then, in what I am about to say, only demonstrate once again the validity of Coleridge's proposition: "How mean a mere fact is, except in the light of some compulsive truth."' I have, however, only facts and no "compulsive truth" to offer you. I want to discuss who some of these judges were, how they came to be appointed, why some were rejected when they proved disappointing, and even how and why they were forced, cajoled, or convinced to surrender the great mantle that was theirs. Obviously I cannot here tell the tale in full. To do so would certainly be beyond my capacities and your patience. And, in any event, the volumes of the Supreme Court history sponsored by the same source as sponsors these lectures will perform the task more fully-and in proper perspective. My job is but to essay an essay on this subject. I had better get to it. I. THE APPOINTMENT OF A JUSTICE Perhaps I can best epitomize my subject by recounting some facts about an historic Supreme Court appointment, one that only infidels, cynics, or scoundrels would-even today-challenge as unworthy. From 1882 until 1902, Mr. Justice Horace Gray occupied the place on the Supreme Court that was known-until Mr. Justice Frankfurter's retirement- as the "scholar's seat." Gray's twenty years on the highest court of the land had 1. C. BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS (1944). 2. A. BEVE,DcE, L FE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1916-20, 4 vols.). 3. See, e.g., A. WHrrEHEAD, SYMBOLISM 88 (1927). 4. Quoted in L,E DEL, HENRY JAMES, THE MASTER: 1901-1916, at 20 (1972). HeinOnline -- 1972 Law & Soc. Order 184 1972 1972:183] SUPREME COURT JUSTICES been preceded by eighteen years as Associate Justice and Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. By 1902 Gray had expended such energies as he could muster for the public service. His huge, once-strong body was twisted in paralysis. It was no longer possible for him to carry his share of the load. Even while McKinley was still President, Gray's imminent retirement was rumored. If it had come before McKinley's death, another would have sat in the seat that became Holmes'. In July 1902 Gray wrote a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt tendering his resignation from the Court to be effective at the pleasure of the President. The evidence reveals that shortly after receiving Gray's resignation, Roose- velt quite quickly thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes as his successor. Both Gray and Holmes were from Massachusetts; both had served long and ably on the Supreme Judicial Court and had become chief justice; both came from appropriately distinguished Boston families; both were cold, arrogant, intellectual. Holmes' career was probably more to Roosevelt's tastes, for how- ever cerebral, Holmes had been a man of action. None was more likely to subscribe to Holmes' sentiments as expressed in "The Soldier's Faith"' than "T.R. the Rough Rider" turned President. In this event, perhaps uncharacteristically, Roosevelt did not act precipit- ously. In filling this vacancy on the Court, which he regarded as the swing vote, he knew what he wanted and he wanted to be sure that he got it. Thus, although he informed Holmes that he was prepared to nominate him on July 24, 1902, he did not make a public announcement until August 12. In fact, Holmes' nomination was not sent to the Senate until December 2, where it was quickly processed and confirmed on December 4, so that Holmes could take his seat on December 8. Holmes was equally prudent. He did not resign from the Massachusetts court until after his Senate con- firmation. On July 10 Roosevelt had addressed a letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, expressing his expectations, his wishes, and his doubts about a Holmes appointment. He wrote that, on the one hand, he was in favor of a judge who could p reserve his aloofness of mind so as to keep his broad humanity of eeling and his sympathy for the class from which he has not drawn his clients. I think it eminently desirable that our Supreme Court should show in unmistakable fashion their entire sympathy ...for the men who most need that consideration.' Yet Roosevelt was not naive and he conceded that aloofness-even if it bent in the proper direction-was not all that he really had in mind. The letter 5. See OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 73 (M. Howe ed. 1962); see also id. at 100, 109, 158. 6. 1 SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HENRY CABOT LODE 517 (H. Lodge ed. 1925). HeinOnline -- 1972 Law & Soc. Order 185 1972 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER [LAw & Soc. ORDEa continued with phrases that would not sound alien to any President charged with nominating a Supreme Court Justice: In the ordinary and low sense which we attach to the words "partisan" and "politician," a judge of the Supreme Court should be neither. But in the higher sense, in the proper sense, he is not in my judgment fitted for the position unless he is a party man .... Now I should like to know that Judge Holmes was in entire sympathy with our views, that is your views and mine . . . before I would feel free in appointing him.' It appears that the necessary assurances were forthcoming from both Senator Lodge and his fellow Senator from Massachusetts. George Frisbie Hoar was one of the founders of the Republican Party, which meant that he was liberally inclined-of the camp of Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt rather than of Mark Hanna and William McKinley. What is difficult to understand is the basis for such assurances as they were willing to afford that Holmes was a party man. If the evidence did not differ from the data reported by the press, it was limited, indeed. True, Lodge was a long time friend of Holmes, and at one time they shared an interest in legal history. It was Lodge who conveyed Roosevelt's offer of appointment to Holmes, and Holmes later acknowledged, "[I] suppose I owe my appointment to him or Mrs. Lodge .... "' But whether Lodge's recommendations were based on supposed knowledge of Holmes' attitudes or on a loyalty that went back to their long friendship, any assurance that Holmes was "a party man" seems attributable either to wishful thinking or to Dr. Samuel Johnson's favorite source of error: ignorance. Or it may be only that our hindsight is far superior to Lodge's foresight on this question. The public and the press on the other hand quite clearly seemed to rest their approval or disapproval of Holmes' nomination almost entirely on his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner. In that case, Holmes first denied a temporary injunction and then dissented from the Massachusetts Supreme Court's grant of a final injunction to an employer against peaceful picketing by a labor union seeking to secure an increase in wages. Holmes' position on the question hardly seems startling today; it has long since been given constitutional sanction. But in 1896, when it was rendered, it was regarded as novel if not revolutionary. The point to be noted here is that for all his years of judicial effort, public opinion about his capacities to sit on the Supreme Court of the United States turned almost exclusively on a result- oriented reading of that single case. Holmes was riled, as he told his good friend Frederick Pollock: There have been stacks of notices of me all over the country and 7. Id. at 518-19. 8. 1 HoLMEs-LAsmi LETTERs 741 (M. Howe ed. 1953). 9. 167 Mass. 92 (1896). HeinOnline -- 1972 Law & Soc. Order 186 1972 1972:183] SUPREME COURT JUSTICES the immense majority of them seem to me hopelessly devoid of personal discrimination or courage. They are so favorable that they make my nomination a popular success but they have the flabbiness of . . .ignorance. . . . A s to my judicial career they don't know much more than that I took the labor side in Vegelahn v. Guntner and as that frightened some money interests, and such interests count for a good deal as soon as one gets out of the cloister, it is easy to suggest that the Judge has partial views, is brilliant but not very sound, has talent but is not great, etc., etc. It makes one sick when he has broken his heart in trying to make every word living and real to see a lot of duffers, generally I think not lawyers, talking with the sanctity of print in a way that at once discloses to the know- ing eye that literally they don't know anything about it.' Holmes was offered balm for his wound by Pollock, a fellow snob, who used language that may strike a note of recognition among our younger generation: How should the lay gentry, or even the average lawyer, understand the development of the Common Law, or the work of men such as you and Bowen put into it? . . . [Y]our work and his have both been thought, at times, by fairly competent persons to be a little too finely edged for cutting the blocks of common business. A crude lay version of this line of criticism seems to have found its way into your newspaper cuttings, though the notion that what is brilliant cannot be sound is dear to our friend the reasonable man, who in -the flesh is a Philistine pig, on the general principles of pig-piety. Wherefore, disquiet not thyself with what he saith, but leave him to worship his god Dagon anddivers, to wit, thirty thousand cartloads of other devils, and if he ever gets a soul, the Lord have mercy on it.1" Henry James, another of Holmes' friends, who perhaps had a better under- standing of human character than did either Lodge or Roosevelt, also com- mented on Holmes' appointment. According to Leon Edel: [James] continued to marvel at the Associate Justice's "faculty for uncritical enjoyment and seeing and imagining." What struck him as unusual about Holmes was that he remained himself, in all his integrity, unmodified by time.... To the new Associate Justice Henry wrote, "You were born historic."1' The key word is integrity, and for Holmes judicial integrity called for the exclusion of political bias. Roosevelt may have wanted a partisan, but there was almost nothing of the political partisan in Holmes because there was almost nothing political about him. Politics-nay, public events-made no call on him. Imagine a man, let alone a public man, who, in the days before radio or television, chose not to read newspapers. This Yankee from Olympus suffered none of the emotional hangups of the gods that once inhabited that place: he was more Yankee than Olympian. He served in the Union 10. 1 HOLmEs-POLLOcK LETTEmS 106 (2d ed. M. Howe 1961). 11. Id. at 107. 12. L. EDEL, supra note 4, at 165. HeinOnline -- 1972 Law & Soc. Order 187 1972 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER [LAW & Soc. ORDER army from a sense of duty not because of belief in the cause. His tempera- ment was as cold and detached as that of any man who ever donned the black robes of justice. Roosevelt had asked for aloofness. That he certainly got. It is not strange that he didn't fully appreciate it. It wasn't long into Holmes' tenure on the Supreme Court that he was called upon to pass judgment on an important element of Roosevelt's trust- busting campaign. The prosecution of J.P. Morgan's railroad consolidation, which followed hard on the heels of that tycoon's successful merger of the steel industry, culminated in the Northern Securities Case" with a five-to- four victory for the government. Lo and behold, Holmes wrote a dissenting opinion. Even Holmes' most ardent admirers later found it necessary to excuse his conclusion. Roosevelt and Lodge were allegedly outraged. Although one Roosevelt biographer" denied any resulting coolness on Roosevelt's part toward Holmes, there is ample testimony from Holmes himself about the reaction. Thus, while Pringle cited the absence of any documentary evi- dence in Roosevelt's files expressing a distaste for Holmes' position in Northern Securities," he advanced a documented anecdote apparently to support the continued exchange of at least biting humor between them. Typical of the Holmes reporting is a letter to Pollock of a much later date: A good letter from you, just after reading Theodore Roosevelt & His Time, a class of work that I eschew. Of course I pretty well made up my package about him a good while ago, and I don't think I was too much disturbed by what you admit to and what was formulated by a Senator in his day, thus: "What the boys like about Roosevelt is that he doesn't care a damn for the law." It broke up our incipient friendship, however, as he looked upon my dissent to the Northern Securities Case as a political departure (or, I suspect, more truly, couldn't forgive anyone who stood in his way). We talked freely later but it never was the same after that, and if he had not been restrained by his friends, I am told that he would have made a fool of himself and would have excluded me from the White House- and as in his case about the law, so in mine about that, I never cared a-damn whether I went there or not. He was very likeable, a big figure, a rather ordinary intellect, with extraordinary gifts, a shrewd and I think unscrupulous politician. He played all his cards- if not more. R.i.p. 7 II. THE SUPREME CouRT FtmcnON The facts about the Holmes nomination may be taken as typical of the High Court appointment process, however atypical the appointee in the case described. Some if not all of the factors that call for notice were present here: Presidential predilections; the role of the Senate and of Senators (the 13. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 14. H. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT 263 (1931). 15. Id. 16. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 10, at 63-64. HeinOnline -- 1972 Law & Soc. Order 188 1972 1972:183) SUPREME COURT JUSTICES two are not the same); the absence of hard data on which judgments are in fact based; the part to be played by the press and the bar; the element of chance; and the existence or nonexistence of competing claims to the office. At the outset, I would suggest that the prime difficulty in evaluating appropriate standards for such appointment-assuming the appointments are to rise above mere personal preferences-is the absence of consensus or understanding of what the proper duties of a Supreme Court Justice are. If we are to essay a description of what talents, capacities, and experience an appointee should have, surely we must do so in light of what we expect him to do. It may be that, just as every private in Napoleon's army was assumed to carry a marshal's baton in his knapsack, so too every lawyer in the United States may be considered to hang the judicial robes of a Supreme Court Justice in his closet. Surely it is true that every time a vacancy on the Supreme Court occurs, the hearts of a very large number of American lawyers beat faster in anticipation of the impossible. But the fact is that neither the marshals of France nor the Justices of the Supreme Court-with notable exceptions in both cases-have risen from the ranks. Obviously not every member of the bar qualifies for the post; yet it is equally clear that only lawyers can qualify. Whatever its powers, the Court's processes are those of judicial resolution of controversies between litigants. However diluted it may have become, the constitutional requirement for a case or controversy remains. If the controversies calling on the Court's judgment must be resolved in a way that establishes doctrine for applications beyond the immediate case, the process for resolution is the time-honored method of appellate courts and not that of the legislative or executive branches of the government. Hence the need for lawyers, or so it has always been assumed. In its broadest description, the work of the Court falls into two com- partments. On the one hand, the Court is to be the voice of the majority in determining the meaning of legislative enactments. Certainly in matters of statutory construction, the Court has no mandate other than to effectuate the will of the legislature; it is not expected to substitute its own. To distort coigressional purpose or to supplant congressional objectives with its own is clearly to usurp a power that does not belong to it. On the other hand, the Court has the even more important role of restrain- ing the majority will in accordance with the principles established by the Constitution. It is here that the Court is most likely to be involved in public controversy. The task of thwarting the expression of the majority-however temporarily-to protect individuals and minorities from what Tocqueville called the tyranny of the majority, is a vital task in a democratic society and one that is never likely to be popular. HeinOnline -- 1972 Law & Soc. Order 189 1972 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER [LAw & Soc. ORmDE Although public attention is likely to be focused on the constitutional problems that bedevil the Court, problems of statutory construction make demands on the jurists that are not easily met. I recall the description by the one judge above all whose judgment I respect in this regard, Judge Learned Hand: [H]is task.. . is no less than to decide how those who have passed the "enactment" would have dealt with the "particulars" before him, about which they have said nothing whatever. Impalpable and insoluble as that inquiry may be, the method which he must pursue is toto coelo different from that open to him, were he free to enforce his own choices. What then are the qualities, mental and moral, which best serve a judge to discharge his perilous but inescapable duty? First he must be aware of the difficulty and the hazard. He must hesitate long before imputing more to the "enactment" than he finds in the words, remembering that the "policy" of any law inheres as much in its limits as in its extent. He must hesitate long before cutting down their literal effect, remembering that the authors presumably said no more than they wanted. He must have the historical capacity to re- construct the whole setting which evoked the law; the contentions which it resolved; the objects which it sought; the events which led up to it. But all this is only the beginning, for he must possess the far more exceptional power of divination which can peer into the purpose beyond its expression, and bring to fruition that which lay only in flower. Of the moral qualities necessary to this, before and beyond all he must purge his mind and will of those personal presup- positions and prejudices which almost inevitably invade all human judgments; he must approach his problems with as little preconcep- tion of what should be the outcome as it is given to men to have; in short, the prime condition of his success will be his capacity for detachment. There are those who insist that detachment is an illusion; that our conclusions, when their bases are sifted always reveal a passional foundation. Even so; though they be throughout the crea- tures of past emotional experience, it does not follow that the experi- ence can never predispose us to impartiality. A bias against bias may be as likely a result of some buried crisis, as any other bias. Be that as it may, we know that men do differ widely in this capacity; and the incredulity which seeks to discredit that knowledge is a part of the crusade against reason from which we have already so bitterly suf- fered. Hard as is the task of statutory construction, constitutional exegesis is far more difficult. It is more difficult because some words of constitutional command--due process of law, equal protection of the laws, privileges and immunities of citizenship, to suggest a few-are likely to be even more Delphic than those of the most abstruse statute. It is more difficult because a constitution often seeks to protect inconsistent purposes and conflicting values. It is more difficult because the constitutional language is usually a product of a society remote from the one in which the words are sought to be applied. 17. L. HAND, TnE Sparr oF LmrY 164-65 (1st Vintage ed. 1959). HeinOnline -- 1972 Law & Soc. Order 190 1972 1972:1831 SUPREME COURT JUSTICES To apply a constitution drafted for a bucolic people to an urbanized one, to apply a constitution created for a society of artisans, mechanics, and merchants, all of whom were individuals, to a society where capital and labor are equally collectivized; to apply a constitution drafted when communica- tions and transportation depended on the horse, the canal, the ship, or even the railroad, to one that receives messages from alien planets, certainly is an awesome task. It is no less so when the government that the constitution was intended to tether invades every nook and cranny of everyone's life, often with, frequently without, his consent. Mr. Justice Frankfurter described the demands of the office, long before he became a Justice: Of course a Justice should be an outstanding lawyer in the ordinary professional acceptance of the term, but that is the merest begin- ning. Once recognize the true nature of the judicial process in these constitutional cases, and the determining factors in the qualifications of a Justice become his background, the range of his experience, and his ability to transcend his experience. For the part played by the familiar and the unconscious is tremendous ... With the great men of the Court constitutional adjudication has always been statecraft. The deepest significance of Marshall's magis- tracy is his recognition of the practical needs of government, to be realized by treating the Constitution as the living framework within which the nation and the States could freely move through the inevit- able changes wrought by time and inventions. Those of his successors whose labors history has validated have been men who brought to their task insight into the problems of their generation. . . . Not anointed priests, removed from knowledge of the stress of life, but men with proved grasp of affairs who have developed resilience and vigor of mind through seasoned and diversified experience in a work-a-day world are the judges who have wrought abidingly on the Supreme Court."8 A capacity for disinterestedness and the statesmanship derived from the experience of dealing with important and basic issues in the real world are not alone sufficient for the work that is done daily by the Supreme Court of the United States. I should add qualities described by Cardozo when speaking about constitutional adjudication. The "chief worth" of the Court is "in making vocal and audible the ideals that might otherwise be silenced, in giving them continuity of life and expression, in guiding and directing choice within the limits where choice ranges."9 It is, he said, a power to be "exercised with insight into social values, and with suppleness of adaptation to changing social needs."0 Finally, I would add still another capacity that is perhaps the most difficult of attainment but nevertheless of utmost importance if the judiciary is to play its role in American constitutional government. 18. FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 120-22 (P. Kurland ed. 1970). 19. B. CA ,Dozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 94 (1921). 20. Id. HeinOnline -- 1972 Law & Soc. Order 191 1972