Santa Clara Law Review Volume 32|Number 3 Article 7 1-1-1992 The Aftermath of Burnham v. Superior Court: A New Rule of Transient Jurisdiction Christine M. Daleidon Follow this and additional works at:http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview Part of theLaw Commons Recommended Citation Christine M. Daleidon, Comment,The Aftermath of Burnham v. Superior Court: A New Rule of Transient Jurisdiction, 32 SantaClara L. Rev. 989 (1992). Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/7 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE AFTERMATH OF BURNHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT: A NEW RULE OF TRANSIENT JURISDICTION? I. INTRODUCTION A resident of New Jersey travels to California and visits his children for the weekend. While in California, he is served with a court summons, compelling him to defend a lawsuit in that state. As a result, this man must travel to and from his home state of New Jersey in order to defend the action in this inconvenient forum. Although his initial purposes for visiting California are entirely unrelated to the lawsuit, the summons requires him to litigate in that state. This is the practical result of the "transient rule"' of in personam jurisdiction,' and these are the facts of the recent United States Supreme Court case, Burnham v. Superior Court.' This 1990 decision appears to breathe new life into the traditional doctrine requiring mere presence as a basis for jurisdiction. In this decision, the Court upheld jurisdiction as it pertained to a nonresident defendant present in the state for purposes unrelated to the litigation.' In order to render a valid and binding judgment, a court must have personal jurisdiction over each party.' Any judg- 1. The "transient rule" commonly refers to jurisdiction of a nonresident who is temporarily present in the forum. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 410 (3d ed. 1986). See also Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Ap- pnach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theo- ry, 30 EMORY LJ. 729, 729 n.2 (1981) (this theory of jurisdiction is also referred to as "gotcha" jurisdiction, or "tagged" theory of jurisdiction); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PesonalJ urisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 289 (1956). 2. In personam jurisdiction refers to "the power which a court has over the defendant himself in contrast to a court's power over the defendant's interest in property (quasi in rem) or power over the property itself (in rem)." Black's Law Dictionary 791 (6th ed. 1990). See generally 7 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 506 (1990); 16 CAL. JUR. 3D 63 (1990); JACK H. FRIEDENTrHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 3.1 (1985); ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 88 (1969). See also Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 37, 49-50 (1989) (general historical background of personal juris- diction). 3. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990). 4. Id. 5. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 2. See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 990 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 ment rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction is void." A plain- tiff voluntarily subjects himself to personal jurisdiction by filing the lawsuit. This comment focuses on the following question: At what point is the defendant subject to the court's jurisdic- tion? Traditionally, a court's exercise of jurisdiction over a de- fendant was limited to the defendant's physical presence within geographical and territorial boundaries! This basis for juris- diction was grounded on the concept of physical power.8 Once a court obtained physical power over a defendant, he would be amenable to a lawsuit in that jurisdiction. These concepts were immortalized in case law,9 and until the Burnham decision, were generally accepted. The implications arising from the traditional rule are broad.. If a defendant is in a forum for a brief period, and for reasons totally unrelated to the suit filed against him, the state is permitted to maintain power over him because he is within territorial boundaries. The rule provides an exception for de- fendants who are drawn into the state by force or fraud.' However, the Supreme Court has questioned the continued validity of the transient rule in Burnham v. Superior Court. (1877). 6. JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFUCT OF LAws 326 (1935). 7. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 2. 8. Id. Actual physical control over the defendant resulted from the common law's quasi-criminal nature of personal actions. In most actions, a defendant was required to be brought before the court and was kept under physical control of the court. It is said that from this "power concept" emerged the concept of territoriality as the basis for jurisdiction. But see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Tran- sient Rule of PersonalJ urisdiction: The 'Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) for an attack on the proposition that jurisdiction at common law was based on physical power. 9. See Pennoyer v. Neft 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (a court could not render a judgment against a party who was not within the territorial boundaries of the state); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1915) ("the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . . "). 10. See Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d. Cir. 1937). In this case, Wyman lured Newhouse to Florida, asserting that she wished to see him. When he came, he was served with process as he stepped off the airplane. The court held that Newhouse was induced to enter Florida by fraud, and this rendered the jurisdiction null and void. See also Wanzer v. Bright, 52 I1. 35 (1869) (state statute exempting service of process to those brought to forum by force or fraud); Malloy v. Brewer, 64 N.W. 1120 (S.D. 1895); Burroughs v. Cocke & Willis, 156 P. 196 (Okla. 1916) (exempted service of process because presence unrelated to judicial proceedings). 1992] TRANSIENT JURISDICTION In this plurality opinion, the Court was unable to agree on whether to completely discard the traditional rule of jurisdic- tion, or follow a new, less rigid approach. Justice Scalia, along with Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy, opted to stand behind the narrow traditional rule developed over the years from Pennoyer v. Neff." that the criterion of presence is sufficient to comport with due process, as it always has been.2 Justice White concurred with the majority of Scalia's opin- ion."3 He believed that unless it could be shown that the tran- sient rule is "so arbitrary and lacking in common sense," it should not be discarded.4 One instance in which he believed this showing could be made was when someone's presence in the forum was unintentional.5 Justice Brennan, along with Justice O'Connor and Justice Blackmun, viewed the transient rule as outdated and vulnera- ble to due process attacks.6 Their approach was to formulate a safeguard which used presence as an important factor in examining the question of jurisdiction, but also required the application of minimum contacts to all defendants, whether present in the forum or not." Justice Stevens, in his brief opinion, merely stated that this case was an easy one, clearly controlled by precedent. He be- lieved that the simplicity in deciding a case such as this was obvious. He felt that the Justices were converting an easy issue into an ambiguous, complex problem." All Justices, however, agreed in the final judgment. They decided that the defendant was served with process while knowingly and voluntarily in California, and should therefore be amenable to a lawsuit in that state.'9 11. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 12. Burnham v. Superior Court; 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1990). 13. Id. at 2119-20. 14. Id. Justice White also stated that "he could not possibly" strike down a rule that has been so widely accepted in this country. Id. at 2119. 15. Id. at 2120. 16. Id. 17. Id. at 2122. This is a departure from traditional analysis, which applies minimum contacts to a defendant, usually a corporation, who is not present in the forum. 18. Id. at 2126. 19. Id. at 2105. 992 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 The judgment in Burnham actually created a new legal framework for determining personal jurisdiction. This judg- ment not only adheres to the traditional rules of Pennoyer, but extends in personam jurisdiction to those who are in the state for purposes totally unrelated to the suit. After Burnham, the Supreme Court would most likely approve of service of a de- fendant as a passenger on an airplane while it is flying over the forum," or merely passing through the forum state for rea- sons unrelated to the litigation."1 The question is, how far will Burnham go?2 What if the defendant was on the Four Cor- ners National Monument, where one is able to walk across the borders of four states? What if the defendant is parachuting from the sky or in a hot air balloon? What about an astronaut? After Burnham, the limits are unclear. This comment focuses on the scope of the Burnham deci- sion and its aftermath. Section II discusses historical perspec- tives that provide the foundation for Burnham." This section also surveys how courts in the past have handled similar issues, and provides insight into the complexities posed in Burnham. Section III analyzes the problem that is created by the Court's unwillingness to agree on one approach,4 while Sec- tion IV tackles this problem with a discussion about the doc- trinal questions raised by Burnham." Section IV also critically analyzes the concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Brennan, and in doing so, attempts to predict an alternative to the tangled solution the Burnham decision presents to the legal community. Section V proposes a new approach to the views expressed in the Burnham decision.6 This moderate approach attempts 20. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) where a fed- eral district court upheld service of process on a defendant who was a passenger on an airplane flying over the forum state. 21. See Nielsen v. Braland, 119 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1963) (jurisdiction over defendant was valid when served while traveling through forum); Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 34 A. 714 (Conn. 1895) (jurisdiction -upheld over defendant served while in forum on business that was unrelated to the lawsuit). 22. Even Justice White in Burnham cautioned the use of the transient rule against those unintentionally present in the forum, but the Court as a whole did not put limits on its decision. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120. 23. See infra text accompanying notes 27-121. 24. See infra text accompanying notes 122-23. 25. See infra text accompanying notes 124-74. 26. See infra text accompanying notes 175-81. 1992] TRANSIENT JURISDICTION 993 to fill in the gaps between the two extreme positions that were articulated in the plurality decision. It seeks a compromise by allowing the analysis to focus on both presence and minimum contacts, but also seeks to limit judicial discretion. Under the proposed approach, minimum contacts would be analyzed as a factor in determining jurisdiction, but the allowable minimum contacts would be defined and certain. This new approach would contain the traditional basis of transient jurisdiction, but would also assure compliance with due process based on an objective analysis limited to certain factors. II. BACKGROUND A. Traditional TransientJ urisdiction:P ennoyer v. Neff Historically, a defendant was made amenable to in perso- nam jurisdiction if voluntarily present and served with process within the forum.7 This transient theory of jurisdiction was first conceptualized in Pennoyer v. Neff," where physical presence in the forum was deemed the necessary basis of juris- diction. Pennoyer involved two actions between Neff, a resident of California, and Mitchell, a resident of Oregon. In 1866, Mitch- ell sued Neff in Oregon to recover legal fees due him." Mitchell, in accordance with a state statute, published notice of the action in an Oregon newspaper.' Neff was never person- ally served, and as a result, was never made aware of the suit against him. Mitchell obtained a judgment in default, and Neff's property was sold at a court auction to satisfy the judg- ment.' Nine years later, Neff brought an action against Pennoyer, Mitchell's successor in the property.2 He contended that the sale was invalid because the Oregon court never obtained juris- diction over him in the initial action."3 The Supreme Court 27. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 28. Id. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 29. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719. 30. Id. at 720-21. 31. Id. at 719-20. 32. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 33. Id. at 719-20. SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 agreed.' Since Mitchell never personally served Neff in Ore- gon, he never obtained in personam jurisdiction." The Court based its decision on state sovereignty.6 A state, at that time, was deemed to have complete power over persons and things within its borders. States were to maintain complete independence, except when such independence in- fringed on due process rights." Personal service was the vehi- cle to (1) assert the state's power over a defendant, and (2) to give the defendant notice of the action so as to comply with due process. The Pennoyer decision is also recognized for its application of the then newly adopted due process clause"4 of the Four- teenth Amendment.9 Although Pennoyer only briefly discussed the concept of due process, later courts have interpreted Pennoyer's language to stand for the principle that a judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdiction violates due process." This case established the significance that this principle enjoys today: that due process requires fairness at every stage of our judicial system. Due process was defined in Pennoyer as "a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the pro- 34. Id. at 736. 35. Id. 36. Id. at 722. 37. Id at 720. 38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. (" . . . nor shall any State deprive any persons of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). Due process is generally defined as "law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (6th ed. 1990). Although this definition is vague, Pennoyer broadened the definition and made it more concrete with respect to service and notice requirements. 39. The Fourteenth Amendment came into existence in 1868. It is interesting to note that the due process clause was enacted after the original default action between Mitchell and Neff (this action occurred in 1866). See Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2113-14 (1990) Uustice Scalia undermined the significance of the earliest interpretations of due process, stating that "Pennoyer v. Neff, while renowned for its statement of the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment pro- hibits [exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident who had not been personally served in the forum], in fact set that forth only as dictum, and decided the case . . . under 'well-established principles of public law.'"). 40. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunleavy, 241 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1916); Coldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521 (1895); Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41, 46 (1892). 1992] TRANSIENT JURISDICTION 995 tection and enforcement of private rights."4 This included the "well-established principles of public law"4" that respected the jurisdiction of the states over persons and property. Thus, according to Pennoyer, due process required that the defendant be brought into the state to obtain jurisdiction over him," or that he be voluntarily present."' These early, simplistic notions of due process requiring mere presence for jurisdiction began to erode in later years. Even so, they still remain the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction. B. The Weakening of Pennoyer v. Neff The presence requirement of Pennoyer made a distinct impression on the American court system. State courts fervent- ly began to adopt presence as the sole criterion for jurisdic- tion." Pennoyer's influence, however, began to diminish in the nineteenth century when the courts began to weaken its rigid rules. A new age of mobility for defendants, combined with the increase in corporations engaging in multi-state business,46 41. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 42. Id. at 722. Public law is concerned with the "organization of the state, the relations between the state and the people that compose it, the responsibilities of public officers to the state, to each other, and to private persons, and the rela- tions of states to one another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990). 43. This is known as the "presence" requirement. In later years, the require- ment was expanded to include exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations on the theory that "doing business" in a state mandated presence. The rationale behind this is that a corporation is a group given legal personality, and this group is present whenever it is carrying on authorized group activities. I JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 360, 384 (1935). 44. This is known as the "consent" requirement. This requirement from Pennoyer was also expanded in order to acquire jurisdiction over corporations. This theory is based on the fact that a corporation is organized in one state, and if they want to carry on business in another state, they need consent by that state. Under this theory, that state may impose conditions on the corporation, such as requiring it to submit to jurisdiction brought against it within the state. 45. Williams v. Simon, 122 S.E. 772 (S.C. 1924); Hieston v. National City Bank of Chicago, 104 A. 281 (Md. 1918); Bowman v. Flint, 82 S.W. 1049 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904); Lee v. Baird, 36 So. 720 (Ala. 1904); ; Smith v. Gibson, 3 So. 321 (Ala. 1888). 46. Wasserman, supra note 2, at 52. Part C of this article emphasizes the changes that emerged in the nineteenth century that convinced courts to depart from the territorial limits imposed by Pennoyer. Included in this revolution were many modern inventions including the telephone and the automobile. In addition, the railroad construction boom also made for a more mobile society. Wasserman, supra note 2, at 52 n.75. The author also cites to Supreme Court cases that re- flect this view of change: Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia S.A. v. Hall 466 996 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 made the Supreme Court aware of a need for a more flexible rule that did not require physical presence within the forum state. One way in which the state courts tried to circumvent the inflexibility of Pennoyer was to create legal fictions to deal with these new situations.47 The courts would attempt to uphold personal jurisdiction not by following the rule in Pennoyer, but by following their own ideas of what conduct should be the basis ofjurisdiction, including "doing business" within the state and "implied consent" to jurisdiction."8 The strict limits of Pennoyer"9 were specifically set aside by a group of Supreme Court decisions that deviated from the presence rule. In St. Clair v. Cox,' the Court upheld a Michi- gan statute providing that one condition of doing business in the state was that a state agent had to be appointed as a proxy for the company. This made the company amenable to any suit pursued in that state.' In Hess v. Pawlowski,' a Massachusetts statute providing for in-s tate "substituted service of process" for nonresident motorists who caused injuries in that state was upheld.-" In Kane v. New Jersey," the Court also upheld a New Jersey statute as a method to issue service of process to a nonresident. These cases were upheld during this period on the grounds that due process was not violated because the presence and consent requirements set forth in Pennoyer were satisfied. U.S. 408, 422 (1984) (an expanding national economy) and St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882) (increase in amount of corporations). Wasserman, supra note 2, at 52 n.74. 47. See I JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 360, 382 (1935) (a comprehensive discussion on the presence and consent theories of juris- diction, and the author's criticism of these fictions). 48. Id. 49. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 50. 106 U.S. 350 (1882). 51. Id. at 353-57 (the statute authorized service of process on "any officer, member, clerk, or agent" of a foreign corporation doing business in the state to obtain personal jurisdiction). See also Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 408 (1856) (Ohio statute imposed service on a corporation's agent as a substitute for personal service). 52. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 53. Id. at 356-57. Substituted service refers to the fiction that a state may appoint an agent as a proxy for anyone entering the state, in order to obtain jurisdiction. BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990). 54. 242 U.S. 160, 169 (1916). 1992] TRANSIENT JURISDICTION 997 During this period, courts were apprehensive in applying the presence rule too stringently since this would unduly place burdens on those corporations who were "physically present" in many states by nature of their business. This would also burden those individual defendants who traveled frequently from state to state. The courts instead chose to circumvent these problems by expanding the application of the presence rule for these mobile people. One such expansion was the "minimum contacts" test. C. InternationalS hoe and the Birth of Minimum Contacts In International Shoe v. Washington," the Supreme Court rejected the legal fictions that were previously used and creat- ed a new, more flexible rule concerning in personam jurisdic- tion. In this case, the Court addressed the issue as to whether the State of Washington could assert in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation not physically present in the state, but still conducting business in Washington.' Chief Justice Stone articulated the new test for obtaining jurisdiction to persons not physically present in the state. He stated: [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a de- fendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini- mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and sub- stantial justice."57 This test entails a two-step inquiry. First, are there the requisite minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state? Secondly, is due process violated by denying or granting jurisdiction in that particular forum? 55. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 56. In International Shoe, taxes for unemployment compensation were assessed on International Shoe Co., a Delaware corporation with its principle place of busi- ness in Missouri. Some of the corporation's salesmen lived and worked in the state of Washington. When International Shoe Co. refused to pay the tax to the state of Washington, the state sued. The Washington statute provided that service of process could be performed by serving one of International Shoe's salesmen, who were considered agents of the corporation, in addition to sending a copy of the summons to the main office. The Supreme Court held that there were enough minimum contacts in Washington to assert jurisdiction. Id. 57. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).