Journal of Philosophy, Inc. The Absurd Author(s): Thomas Nagel Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 20, Sixty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Oct. 21, 1971), pp. 716-727 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024942 . Accessed: 19/08/2012 01:08 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy. http://www.jstor.org 7i6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY The formers tands as valid only if we can findc riteriaf ora ssigning a differenlto gical formt o 'allegedly' than to 'compulsively'.I n this case, the criteriae xist: 'compulsively'i s a predicate, 'allegedly' a sentencea dverb. But in countless other cases, counterexampleasr e not so easily dismissed.S uch an example, bearing on the inference in question, is Otto closed the door partway ThereforeO tto closed the door It seems clear to me that betterd ata are needed beforep rogress can be made in this area; we need much more refinedl inguistic classificationso f adverbial constructionst han are presentlya vail- able, ifo ur evidencec oncerningv alidityi s to be good enough to per- mit a richerl ogical theory.I n the meantime,M ontague's account stands: therei s no reason to thinka morer efinedt heory,i fi t can be produced, should not be obtainable within the frameworkh e has given us. RICHMOND H. THOMASON Yale University THE ABSURD * M OST peoplef eelo n occasiont hatl ifei s absurd,a nd some feel it vividly and continually.Y et the reasons usually offeredi n defense of this conviction are patently in- adequate: they could not really explain why life is absurd. Why then do they provide a natural expressionf or the sense that it is? I Consider some examples. It is oftenr emarkedt hat nothingw e do now will matteri n a milliony ears. But if that is true, then by the same token,n othingt hat will be the case in a milliony ears matters now. In particular,i t does not mattern ow that in a milliony ears nothingw e do now will matter.M oreover,e ven if what we did now were going to matter in a million years, how could that keep our presentc oncernsf romb eing absurd? If theirm atteringn ow is not enough to accomplish that, how would it help if they mattered a milliony ears fromn ow? Whether what we do now will matter in a million years could make the crucial differencoen ly if its matteringi n a milliony ears depended on its matteringp, eriod. But then to deny that whatever * To be presentedin an APA symposiumon The Meaningo fL ife,D ecember2 9, 1971. Co-symposiastws illb e RogersA lbrittonan d WilliamR ichardsonn; either of theirp apersa re availablea t thist ime. THE ABSURD 7I7 happens now will matter in a milliony ears is to beg the question against its mattering,p eriod; for in that sense one cannot know that it will not matter in a million years whether (for example) someone now is happy or miserable,w ithoutk nowingt hat it does not matter,p eriod. What we say to convey the absurdityo f our lives oftenh as to do with space or time: we are tinys pecks in the infinitev astness of the universe; our lives are mere instantse ven on a geological time scale, let alone a cosmic one; we will all be dead any minute. But of course none of these evidentf acts can be what makesl ifea bsurd, if it is absurd. For suppose we lived forever;w ould not a lifet hat is absurd if it lasts seventy years be infinitelya bsurd if it lasted throughe ternity?A nd if our lives are absurd given our present size, why would they be any less absurd if we filledt he universe (eitherb ecause we werel argero r because the universew as smaller)? Reflectiono n our minutenessa nd brevitya ppears to be intimately connectedw ith the sense that lifei s meaningless;b ut it is not clear what the connectioni s. Another inadequate argument is that because we are going to die, all chains of justificationm ust leave offi n mid-air: one studies and works to earn money to pay for clothing,h ousing,e ntertain- ment,f ood,t o sustain oneselff romy ear to year, perhaps to support a familya nd pursue a career-but to what finale nd? All of it is an elaborate journey leading nowhere. (One will also have some effect on other people's lives, but that simply reproduces the problem, fort hey will die too.) There are several replies to this argument. First, life does not consist of a sequence of activitiese ach of which has as its purpose some later member of the sequence. Chains of justificationc ome repeatedlyt o an end withinl ife,a nd whethert he processa s a whole can be justifiedh as no bearing on the finalityo f these end-points. No furtherj ustificationi s needed to make it reasonable to take aspirin for a headache, attend an exhibito f the work of a painter one admires,o r stop a child fromp uttingh is hand on a hot stove. No larger context or furtherp urpose is needed to prevent these acts fromb eing pointless. Even if someone wished to supply a furtherj ustificationf or pursuinga ll the thingsi n life that are commonlyr egardeda s self- justifying,t hat justificationw ould have to end somewheret oo. If nothingc an justifyu nless it is justifiedi n termso f somethingo utside itself,w hichi s also justified,t hen an infiniter egressr esults,a nd no chain of justificationc an be complete. Moreover, if a finitec hain of reasons cannot justifya nything,w hat could be accomplishedb y 7I8 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY an infinitec hain, each link of whichm ust be justifiedb y something outside itself? Since justificationsm ust come to an end somewhere,n othingi s gained by denyingt hat theye nd wheret heya ppear to, withinl ife- or by tryingt o subsume the multiple,o ftent rivialo rdinaryj ustifi- cations of action under a single,c ontrollingli fes cheme. We can be satisfiedm ore easily than that. In fact, throughi ts misrepresen- tation of the processo f justificationt, he argumentm akes a vacuous demand. It insistst hat the reasons available withinl ife are incom- plete, but suggestst herebyt hat all reasons that come to an end are incomplete.T lis makes it impossiblet o supply any reasons at all. The standard argumentsf ora bsurditya ppear thereforet o fail as arguments.Y et I believe they attempt to express somethingt hat is difficultto state, but fundamentallyc orrect. II In ordinaryl ifea situationi s absurd when it includesa conspicuous discrepancyb etweenp retensiono r aspirationa nd reality: someone gives a complicateds peech in supporto f a motiont hat has already been passed; a notorious criminal is made presidento f a major philanthropicf oundation;y ou declare your love over the telephone to a recordeda nnouncement;a s you are beingk nighted,y ourp ants fall down. When a person finds himself in an absurd situation, he will usually attempt to change it, by modifyingh is aspirations,o r by tryingt o bringr ealityi nto bettera ccord witht hem,o r by removing himselff romt he situation entirely.W e are not always willingo r able to extricate ourselves from a position whose absurdity has become clear to us. Nevertheless,i t is usually possible to imagine some change that would remove the absurdity-whether or not we can or will implementi t. The sense that lifea s a whole is absurd arises when we perceive, perhaps dimly, an inflatedp retensiono r aspirationw hichi s inseparablef romt he continuationo f human life and whichm akes its absurdityi nescapable,s horto f escape froml ife itself. Many people's lives are absurd, temporarilyo r permanentlyf, or conventionalr easons having to do with theirp articulara mbitions, circumstances,a nd personal relations. If there is a philosophical sense of absurdity, however,i t must arise fromt he perceptiono f somethingu niversal-some respecti n which pretensiona nd reality inevitablyc lash foru s all. This conditioni s supplied, I $hall argue, by the collision between the seriousnessw ith which we take our lives and the perpetual possibilityo f regardinge verythinga bout whichw e are seriousa s arbitrary,o r open to doubt. THE ABSURD 719 We cannot live human lives without energy and attention,n or withoutm akingc hoices which show that we take some thingsm ore seriouslyt han others.Y et we have always available a point of view outside the particularf ormo f our lives, fromw hich the seriousness appears gratuitous.T hese two inescapable viewpointsc ollide in us, and that is what makes life absurd. It is absurd because we ignore the doubts that we know cannot be settled,c ontinuingt o live with nearly undiminisheds eriousnessi n spite of them. This analysis requiresd efensei n two respects: firsta s regardst he unavoidabilityo f seriousness; second as regards the inescapability of doubt. We take ourselves seriouslyw hetherw e lead serious lives or not and whetherw e are concernedp rimarilyw ithf ame,p leasure,v irtue, luxury, triumph, beauty, justice, knowledge, salvation, or mere survival. If we take other people seriouslya nd devote ourselves to them,t hat only multipliest he problem.H uman life is fullo f effort, plans, calculation, success and failure: we pursue our lives, with varyingd egreeso f sloth and energy. It would be differenitf we could not step back and reflecto n the process, but were merelyl ed fromi mpulse to impulse withouts elf- consciousness.B ut human beingsd o not act solelyo n impulse.T hey are prudent,t heyr eflectt, heyw eighc onsequences,t heya sk whether what they are doing is worthw hile. Not only are theirl ives fullo f particular choices that hang together in larger activities with temporals tructure:t hey also decide in the broadest termsw hat to pursue and what to avoid, what the prioritiesa mong theirv arious aims should be, and what kind of people theyw ant to be or become. Some men are faced with such choices by the large decisions they make fromt ime to time; some merelyb y reflectiono n the course their lives are taking as the product of countless small decisions. They decide whom to marry,w hat professiont o follow,w hethert o join the CountryC lub, or the Resistance; or they may just wonder why they go on being salesmen or academics or taxi drivers,a nd then stop thinkinga bout it after a certain period of inconclusive reflection. Although they may be motivated froma ct to act by those im- mediate needs with whichl ifep resentst hem,t heya llow the process to continue by adhering to the general system of habits and the formo f lifei n whichs uch motivlesh ave theirp lace-or perhaps only by clingingt o lifei tself.T hey spend enormousq uantitieso f energy, risk, and calculation on the details. Think of how an ordinary individual sweats over his appearance, his health, his sex life, his emotional honesty,h is social utility,h is self-knowledget,h e quality 720 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY of his ties with family,c olleagues, and friends,h ow well he does his job, whetherh e understandst he world and what is going on in it. Leading a human life is a full-timeo ccupation, to which everyone devotes decades of intensec oncern. This fact is so obvious that it is hard to findi t extraordinarya nd important.E ach of us lives his own life-lives with himselft wenty- four hours a day. What else is he supposed to do-live someone else's life? Yet humans have the special capacity to step back and survey themselves,a nd the lives to which they are committed,w ith that detached amazement which comes from watching an ant struggleu p a heap of sand. Without developing the illusion that they are able to escape fromt heirh ighlys pecifica nd idiosyncratic position,t hey can view it sub specie aeternitatis-and the view is at once soberinga nd comical. The crucial backward step is not taken by asking fors till another justificationin the chain, and failingt o get it. The objectionst o that line of attack have already been stated; justificationsc ome to an end. But this is preciselyw hat provides universal doubt with its object. We step back to findt hat the whole systemo f justification and criticism,w hichc ontrolso ur choices and supportso ur claims to rationality,r ests on responses and habits that we never question, that we should not know how to defendw ithoutc ircularity,a nd to which we shall continue to adhere even after they are called into question. The thingsw e do or want withoutr easons,a nd withoutr equiring reasons-the thingst hat definew hat is a reason foru s and what is not-are the starting points of our skepticism.W e see ourselves fromo utside, and all the contingencya nd specificityo f our aims and pursuitsb ecome clear. Yet whenw e take thisv iew and recognize what we do as arbitrary,it does not disengageu s froml ife,a nd there lies our absurdity: not in the fact that such an externalv iew can be taken of us, but in the fact that we ourselves can take it, without ceasing to be the persons whose ultimate concerns are so coolly regarded. III One may try to escape the position by seeking broader ultimate concerns,f romw hich it is impossible to step back-the idea being that absurdityr esultsb ecause what we take seriouslyi s something small and insignificanta nd individual. Those seeking to supply their lives with meaning usually envision a role or function in somethingl arger than themselves.T hey therefores eek fulfillment in service to society, the state, the revolution, the progress of history,t he advance of science, or religiona nd the gloryo f God. THE ABSURD 721 But a role in some larger enterprisec annot confers ignificance unless that enterprisei s itselfs ignificantA. nd its significancem ust come back to what we can understand,o r it will not even appear to give us what we are seeking.I f we learned that we were being raised to providef oodf oro therc reaturesf ondo f human flesh,w ho planned to turnu s into cutlets beforew e got too stringy-even if we learned that the human race had been developed by animal breedersp re- cisely fort his purpose-that would still not give our lives meaning, for two reasons. First, we would still be in the dark as to the sig- nificanceo f the lives of those other beings; second, although we might acknowledge that this culinary role would make our lives meaningfult o them,i t is not clear how it would make them mean- ingfult o us. Admittedly,t he usual formo f servicet o a higherb eing is different fromt his.O ne is supposed to beholda nd partakeo f the gloryo f God, fore xample, in a way in which chickens do not share in the glory of coq au vin. The same is true of service to a state, a movement,o r a revolution.P eople can come to feel,w hen they are part of some- thingb igger,t hat it is part of them too. They worryl ess about what is peculiar to themselves,b ut identifye nough with the largere nter- prise to findt heirr ole in it fulfilling. However, any such largerp urposec an be put in doubt in the same way that the aims of an individual life can be, and for the same reasons. It is as legitimatet o findu ltimate justificationt here as to findi t earlier,a mong the details of individual life.B ut this does not alter the fact that justificationsc ome to an end when we are content to have them end-when we do not find it necessary to look any furtherI.f we can step back fromt he purposeso f individuall ifea nd doubt theirp oint,w e can step back also fromt he progresso f human history,o r of science, or the success of a society, or the kingdom, power, and gloryo f God,' and put all these thingsi nto question in the same way. What seems to us to conferm eaning,j ustification, significance,d oes so in virtue of the fact that we need no more reasons aftera certain point. What makes doubt inescapable with regard to the limited aims of individuall ifea lso makes it inescapable withr egardt o any larger purpose that encouragest he sense that life is meaningfulO. nce the fundamentald oubt has begun, it cannot be laid to rest. Camus maintainsi n The Mytho f Sisyphus that the absurd arises because the world fails to meet our demands for meaning. This suggests that the world might satisfy those demnandsi f it were differentB. ut now we can see that this is not the case. There does ICf. RobertN ozick," Teleology,"M osaic,x u, 1 (Spring1 971): 27/8. 722 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY nota ppeart o be anyc onceivablwe orld( containinugs ) aboutw hich unsettlablde oubtsc ould not arise. Consequentlyth e absurdityo f our situationd erivesn ot froma collisionb etweeno ur expectations and the world,b ut froma collisionw ithino urselves. IV It may be objectedt hat the standpointf romw hicht hesed oubts are supposedt o be feltd oes not exist-that if we take the recom- mendedb ackwards tep we willl and on thina ir, withouta ny basis forj udgmenta bout the naturalr esponsesw e are supposedt o be surveyingI.f we retaino ur usual standardso f what is important, thenq uestionsa bout thes ignificancoef w hatw e are doingw itho ur livesw illb e answerablien t heu sualw ay.B ut ifw ed o not,t hent hose questionsc an mean nothingt o us, since therei s no longera ny contentt o the idea of whatm attersa,n d hencen o contentt o the idea thatn othingd oes. But thiso bjectionm isconceivetsh en atureo f theb ackwards tep. It is not supposedt o give us an understandinogf what is really importants,o thatw e see byc ontrastt hato url ivesa re insignificant. We never,i n the courseo f theser eflectionasb, andont he ordinary standardst hat guideo ur lives. We merelyo bservet hemi n oper- ation,a nd recognizet hat if theya re called into questionw e can justifyt hemo nlyb y referencteo themselvesu,s elesslyW. e adhere to themb ecauseo f the way we are put togetherw; hats eemst o us importanto r seriouso r valuable would not seem so if we were differentcloyn stituted. In ordinaryli fe,t o be sure,w e do not judge a situationa bsurd unlessw e have in minds omes tandardso f seriousnesss,i gnificance, or harmonyw ithw hicht hea bsurdc an be contrastedT.h is contrast is noti mpliedb y thep hilosophicajul dgmenot fa bsurditya,n d that mightb e thoughtt o maket hec onceptu nsuitablef ort hee xpression of such judgmentsT. his is not so, howeverf, ort he philosophical judgmentd ependso n anotherc ontrastw hichm akesi t a natural extensionf romm oreo rdinaryc ases. It departsf romt hemo nlyi n contrastintgh ep retensionosf lifew itha largerc ontextin whichn o standardsc an be discoveredr,a thert hanw itha contextf romw hich alternativeo,v erridinsgt andardsm ay be applied. v In thisr especta, s in othersp, hilosophicaple rceptionof thea bsurd resemblese pistemologicaslk epticism.I n both cases the final, philosophicadl oubt is not contrastedw itha ny unchallengecde r- taintiest, houghi t is arriveda t by extrapolatiofnr ome xampleso f doubtw ithint he systemo f evidenceo r justificationw,h erea con- trastw itho therc ertaintieiss impliedI. a bothc aseso url imitedness THE ABSUD 723 joins with a capacity to transcend those limitations in thought (thus seeing them as limitations,a nd as inescapable). Skepticism begins when we include ourselves in the world about whichw e claim knowledge.W e notice that certaint ypeso f evidence convince us, that we are content to allow justificationso f belief to come to an end at certainp oints,t hat we feelw e know many things even without knowingo r having grounds for believing the denial of others which,i f true, would make what we claim to know false. For example, I know that I am looking at a piece of paper, al- thoughI have no adequate grounds to claim I know that I am not dreaming;a nd if I am dreamingt hen I am not lookinga t a piece of paper. Here an ordinaryc onceptiono f how appearance may diverge fromr eality is employed to show that we take our world largely for granted; the certainty that we are not dreaming cannot be justifiede xcept circularly,in termso f those very appearances which are being put in doubt. It is somewhatf ar-fetchedto suggest I may be dreaming; but the possibilityi s only illustrative.I t reveals that our claims to knowledged epend on our not feelingi t necessaryt o exclude certain incompatiblea lternatives,a nd the dreamingp ossi- bility or the total-hallucinationp ossibilitya re just representatives for limitlessp ossibilitiesm ost of which we cannot even conceive.} Once we have taken the backward step to an abstract view of our whole system of beliefs,e vidence, and justification,a nd seen that it works only, despite its pretensions,b y taking the world largely forg ranted,w e are noti n a positiont o contrasta ll these appearances with an alternativer eality.W e cannot shed our ordinaryr esponses, and if we could it would leave us with no means of conceiving a realityo f any kind. It is the same in the practical domain. We do not step outside our lives to a new vantage point fromw hich we see what is really, objectivelys ignificantW. e continue to take life largelyf org ranted while seeing that all our decisions and certaintiesa re possible only because therei s a great deal we do not bothert o rule out. Both epistemologicals kepticisma nd a sense of the absurd can be reached via initial doubts posed withins ystemso f evidence and justificationt hat we accept, and can be stated withoutv iolence to our ordinaryc oncepts. We can ask not only why we should believe therei s a flooru nderu s, but also whyw e should believet he evidence of our senses at all-and at some point the framableq uestions will I am awaret hats kepticismab outt hee xternawl orldi s widelyt houghtto haveb eenr efutedb,u tI haver emainecdo nvinceodf i tsi rrefutabilsiitnyc eb eing exposeda t Berkeleyto ThompsonC larke'sl argelyu npublisheidd eas on the subject 724 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY have outlasted the answers.S imilarly,w e can ask not only why we should take aspirin,b ut why we should take troubleo ver our own comforta t all. The fact that we shall take the aspirin without waiting fora n answer to this last question does not show that it is an unreal question. We shall also continue to believe,t here is a flooru nder us withoutw aiting fora n answer to the other question. In both cases it is thisu nsupportedn aturalc onfidencet hat generates skeptical doubts; so it cannot be used to settle them. Philosophical skepticism does not cause us to abandon our ordinaryb eliefs,b ut it lends thema peculiar flavor.A ftera cknowl- edgingt hat theirt ruthi s incompatiblew ithp ossibilitiest hat we have no groundsf orb elievingd o not obtain-apart fromg roundsi n those very beliefsw hich we have called into question-we returnt o our familiarc onvictionsw ith a certaini ronya nd resignation.U nable to abandon the natural responseso n whicht heyd epend, we take them back, like a spouse who has run offw ith someone else and then decided to return;b ut we regardt hemd ifferently(n ot that the new attitude is necessarilyi nferiort o the old, in eitherc ase). The same situation obtains after we have put in question the seriousnessw ith which we take our lives and human life in general and have looked at ourselves without presuppositions.W e then returnt o our lives, as we must, but our seriousnessi s laced with irony.N ot that ironye nables us to escape the absurd. It is useless to mutter:" Life is meaningless;l ifei s meaningless.. . " as an accompa- niment to everythingw e do. In continuingt o live and work and strive,w e take ourselvess eriouslyi n action no matterw hat we say. What sustains us, in belief as in action, is not reason or justifi- cation, but somethingm ore basic than these-for we go on in the same way even afterw e are convinced that the reasons have given out.' If we tried to rely entirelyo n reason, and pressed it hard, our lives and beliefs would collapse-a form of madness that may actually occur if the inertialf orceo f taking the world and life for grantedi s somehowl ost. If we lose our gripo n that, reason will not give it back to us. As Hume says in a famousp assage of the Treatise:" Most fortunatelyit happens,t hat sincer easoni s incapableo f dispellingt hesec louds,n atureh erself sufficest o that purpose,a nd cures me of this philosophicaml elancholya nd deliriume, itherb y relaxingt hisb ento f mind,o r by somea vocation,a nd lively impressionof mys enses,w hicho bliteratael l thesec himerasI. dine,I playa game of backgammonI, c onversea,n d am merryw ithm yf riendsa;n d whena ftert hree or fourh ours'a musementI, wouldr eturnt o theses peculationst,h eya ppear so cold, and strain'd,a nd ridiculoust,h at I cannotf indi n my heartt o enteri nto thema ny farther"(B ook 1, Part 4, Section7 ; Selby-Biggep, . 269).