Neither Seen Nor Heard: The Absent Child in the Study of Religion1 Paula M. Cooey Macalester College [email protected] Only since the 1970s have gender analysis and critique played a central role in understanding and approaching what we designate as religion. Prior to this time, scholars 1 I thank Ashley Geisendorfer for the opportunity to work together on related projects. As I was writing this article, she was doing her research and writing on the legal and religious status of children who die as a result of their parents’ religious beliefs and practices for a Keck summer research project and, later, for her senior honors thesis. Her work enhanced mine greatly. Her senior thesis, titled “The Christian Science Child: Subjectivity and Social Marginalization,” can be found in the DeWitt Wallace Library, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota. Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 1 of 31 ignored women’s social construction as other to men and their gender-specified practices; in short, their status as subjects worthy of study. Scholars otherwise viewed women only as extensions of the interests of men, essentially subordinated to them. This situation has changed so dramatically since the seventies that lack of consideration of gender difference where relevant to one’s work is now considered questionable and fundamentally poor scholarship. Not so with children. Few scholars attend to the value, status, and role of children in religious contexts as bearers of an emerging religious agency,2 theoretically relevant to the formation of adult identity and, equally importantly, to their own identities as children, in ways that may have something significant to say about the formation of religion (the general category), religions (the reified particular traditions like Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity) and the religious (a dimension of culture or an attribute of some kind of human behavior related to religion) as these interact with economics and politics.3 Rather, scholars of theory and method in religion in general theorize children, if at all, almost exclusively as extensions of the interests of their parents and 2 Bonnie Miller-McLemore also uses the term “emerging agency” in a book written for laity, titled In the Midst of Chaos (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007). 3 There are works published on children and childhood as represented in specific traditions. See for example, Don S. Browning and Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, eds., Children and Childhood in American Religions (Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2009), and Don S. Browning and Marcia J. Bunge, eds., Children and Childhood in World Religions: Primary Sources and Texts (Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2009). The former contains essays by scholars across American traditions that range from descriptive studies to cultural critique; the latter, as appears in the title, is a collection of primary texts from the so-called “axial” traditions. Neither theorizes at length the significance of children, childhood, or “the child” in relation to theory and method in the academic study of religion as a whole. Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 2 of 31 the State, as temporary but necessary way-stations to adulthood.4 This omission has serious implications for the study of religion. This lack of attention to children as religious agents, constructed as others to adults, and to the role of “the child”5 in discursive religious practices, as in the earlier case of women, arises conceptually in part due to limited assumptions and models regarding human agency. In addition, lack of attention to the adult/child binary and the role it plays in the production and performance of the man/woman binary reflects an insufficient conception of gender difference, most especially in religious contexts. Lack of consideration in part arises historically in tandem with the European colonization of children in general, along with women in general, peasants, members of the urban underclasses, people of non-European or mixed descent, and animals—a socio-political process that has been ongoing at least since the sixteenth century. This neglect is presently grounded in economic shifts that shape the value that urban societies attach to children today. 4 The “Introduction” to Children and Childhood in American Religions addresses this issue at length and notes that whereas anthropologists do include children as religious subjects as a necessary part of their research, they tend to restrict their research to local populations rather than addressing the so-called major or axial traditions (9). I note further that making this very distinction between major, world, or axial traditions and local ones is itself beset with theoretical and methodological problems that have serious ethical implications for the study of religion (for example, a history of colonialism out of which the categories emerge, see David Chidester, Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996). 5 Hereinafter I will not embed child in quotations. I do so here to emphasize that the concept while often used in the courts in respect to particular children is also used as reification as if there were a universal or universalizable child. “Child” and its cognates are variable terms, necessarily contextualized to grasp specific meaning, and may refer to all humans who have not reached puberty, to all humans ranging from birth to legal majority, to the offspring of parents no matter what the age, and metaphorically to the offspring of deities no matter what the age, and so on. Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 3 of 31 In regard to theory, then, children, childhood, and the child remain largely unexamined as concepts with histories that play ongoing discursive roles in cultural construction, concepts that reciprocate with adulthood, adults and the adult in a variety of contexts, especially religious ones, to reflect and produce power interests and arrangements. In short, children constitute, metaphorically speaking, a relatively unexplored terrain in social production. I propose to examine here both the conceptual limitations and some of the economic conditions that currently render children neither seen nor heard for the most part in the academic study of religion. A word of caution is in order at the onset, however. While critique of theoretical assumptions has extraordinary ethical, legal, and theological implications, I will not seek to resolve ethical, legal, and theological dilemmas posed on the ground for how we as scholars and practitioners conceive of children.6 Instead I will focus on the theoretical assumptions and the conceptual underpinnings of the discipline as a whole. The study of religion, by virtue of ignoring the relevance of childhood and children in their right, misses important issues concerning the role of religion in the production of human identity and agency. To the extent that children are neglected as proper subjects, themselves agents of a sort and persons in their own right, the adults studied remain abstracted from their full historical context, not sufficiently entangled in contexts of power or economic exchange. Viewed as autonomous and often independent of cultural constructions of 6 For an example of theological work, see virtually all the publications of Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, but initially Let The Children Come: Reimagining Childhood from a Christian Perspective (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003). For an example of legal study, see Martha Minow, ”Child Endangerment, Parental Sacrifice: A Reading of the Binding of Isaac,” in Julia E. Hanigsberg and Sara Ruddick, eds., Mother Troubles: Rethinking Contemporary Maternal Dilemmas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999). Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 4 of 31 adulthood in relation to childhood, adults become simply individuals who use reason to contract relationships without regard to significant historical circumstances, including religious ones, that produced them (one of those unintended consequences of, among other things, a covenant model emerging from the Protestant Reformation). The very notion of what constitutes religious discipline and practice is thus flawed, and this deficit has implications for the nature and status of belief or attitude as central to religion. The concept religion once again defaults to worldview, reflecting as usual a Protestant Christian bias, albeit in secularized form.7 There are additional problems that result from the neglect of attention to children. However children are constructed in whatever context during whatever period of history, the adult/child distinction forms a binary of social, cultural, political, and economic significance, a binary that is heavily marked by religious phenomena: rituals that register birth, first menses, arrival as an adult; symbol systems that depend on narratives involving childhood; ethical teachings regarding the proper treatment of children taught in religious contexts, just to name a few examples. Lack of attention to this binary, especially from the starting point of the “child,” again renders the academic study of religion incomplete and lacking in richness. 7 This is not a new insight. It goes back as far as Robert Bellah’s positive view of this phenomena in “Civil Religion in America,” Daedelus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 96/1 (1967) 1-21. For a relatively more recent, more negative critique, see Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). See also Paula Cooey, Willing the Good: Jesus, Dissent, and Desire (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2006). Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 5 of 31 Conceptual Issues A. Legal Models for Agency or Subjectivity One way to capture the disappearance of children from view rather dramatically is to examine their ambiguous legal status in Western society, particularly in the United States, specifically with respect to cases involving a clash between religious practice and secular law (though this clash may also take the form of pitting free expression of religion against State establishment of religion). While court cases can hardly be said to cause religious scholars to fail to see children as religious agents or to consider the discursive role of children in the formation of religion and its formation of religious identity, court cases nevertheless reflect this absence rather startlingly. Cases directly involving children, cases that also specifically involve the practice of religion, serve as a limit example of how children become palpably absent except for their function as projection screens of the interests of their parents and the State.8 The courts, like religious education in religious communities, the media, and the market, flag the making of religion, religions, and the religious “on the ground” so to speak, processes on which scholars often build with lack of sufficient awareness and critique. As such these cases reflect cultural attitudes that residually infest scholarly practices. 8 Wisconsin v. Yoder could be viewed as an exception though as I recall, no effort was made to ask the adolescent boy involved what his own understanding of the issues might be or his preferences. The case involved the removal of a fifteen-year-old Amish boy from mandatory public education on the grounds that it violated his (his parents actually) right to religious freedom; the Amish educate only to through roughly the eighth grade, and the values expressed in the public school system often conflict directly with Amish practices and belief. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 6 of 31 The subset on which I focus will be limited to cases prosecuting Christian Science parents whose children die as a result of the parents’ rejection of conventional medical treatment. I have chosen this subset precisely because the cases pose serious legal and ethical dilemmas surrounding the significance of children in a religiously plural, variously secular society, because they represent the simultaneous centrality yet absence of children in the extreme and because they elicit extreme responses within the courtroom (as well as the wider culture). Let me repeat that it is not my aim here to address or resolve the highly complicated legal and ethical issues involved in such cases. I am a secularized Christian who supports State intervention under certain circumstances, notably the welfare of children placed at risk by the practices and other behavior of their parents.9 I propose here only to look critically at the implications of this particular subset of such cases for the study of religion as an academic discipline. Rather than proceed tortuously, case by case, I will simply summarize some of the issues involved that typify such cases and the analyses of legal scholars relevant to them. As tried, the cases have most often been argued in terms of parents’ rights to free expression versus the State’s right to act in place of the parent to intervene in behalf of the child where she is at risk. Missing throughout the dialogue of prosecution and defense is the possibility of the child as a religious 9 For my early views on the theological and ethical treatment of children in religion-state conflicts see Family, Freedom, & Faith: Building Freedom Today (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1996). I have since decided that I did not go far enough in affirming children, albeit always embedded in relations (just like the rest of us, I hasten to add) as persons apart from relations to adults, by which I mean as having worth apart from adult and State needs and interests, and I certainly did not go far enough in examining the power relations in which they are embedded as they play the quintessential other to adults. Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 7 of 31 agent with the right to be religious.10 Because much of the controversy erupts over whose rights stand most in need of protection, a preliminary word on Constitutional rights is in order. The Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either rights for children or rights for parents to rear their children according to their specific religious or secular practices and worldviews. Quite the contrary. Two particular Supreme Court cases establish the State’s right to override parental free exercise of religion by intervening on behalf of the children—Davis v. Beason (1890) and Prince v. Massachusetts (1944). The first case subordinates free exercise to criminal laws, and the second establishes the State’s role as parens patriae with respect to children’s health and employment. At the level of the individual state and specifically in regard to medical care, individual state law varies and within states is applied inconsistently from case to case. Christian Science parents who opt for faith healing in lieu of conventional medicine whose children subsequently die have been particularly vulnerable to criminal charges ranging from child neglect to murder, as these laws come into conflict with state exemption laws. Parents often assume that religious exemption laws, that is, laws that exempt them from 10 For a summary of the most prominent cases, their decisions, and the full spectrum of the legal issues involved, see Janna C. Merrick, “Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids, and the Law: Inequities in the American Healthcare System,” American Journal of Law and Medicine, Symposium: “Inequities in Healthcare” (2003) 269. Merrick argues for children’s rights to conventional medical care on secular grounds, in short, for a child’s right to be secular irrespective of a parent’s religious identity. She does not argue for the child’s right to be religious within the traditions of her parents. For an understanding of the issues involved from a Christian Science perspective, one that basically defends parents rights to raise there children according to there religious traditions, see Stephen Gottschalk, “Spiritual Healing on Trial: A Christian Scientist Reports,” Christian Century (June 22-29, 1988) 602. For a secularist attempt to address constructively the dilemmas involved from an ostensibly child-centered perspective, again where the child becomes only a religiously neutral child, see Ira C. Lupu, University of Chicago Law Review, 61:4 (Autumn 1994) 1317-1373. Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 8 of 31 prosecution for refusing conventional medical care, protect them. For the parents criminal charges of neglect, abuse, manslaughter, or second-degree murder are incomprehensible. Furthermore, their religious identities, if central and primary in their lives, give them no option except to provide faith healing if they are to be true to their own traditions. To do otherwise is go against the fundamental practices and tenets of their tradition in ways that put both their own eternal futures and those of their children at risk. From a Christian Science perspective, it is also to go against the best interests of their children, here understood by implication in terms of extension of their parents’ religious identities. Apparent contradiction between federal judicial practice and state law, as well as ambiguity surrounding state application, only reinforces confusion. The federal Supreme Court has tended to refuse to review cases, once state supreme courts determine them. By and large state supreme courts, as courts that hear appeals of the initial cases, avoid addressing them as conflicts within First Amendment or between the exercise of religious expression and the State as the precedents Davis v. Beason and Prince v. Massachusetts establish. The cases themselves are initially often defended on grounds of First Amendment free expression, while they are likewise prosecuted on grounds of State establishment—an argument in which the child who is the occasion for the trial has no role. Rather the focus is basically over the status of the religious rights of the adults being prosecuted as opposed by the religious rights of the rest of the adult population. The state supreme courts, usually the courts of last appeal, tend to focus on the rights of the parents to due process, thus avoiding ruling on the religious Constitutional issues altogether. Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 9 of 31 As one judge cautions in an appeal hearing on Commonwealth v. David C. Twitchell, “If there is a new trial, the judge should exercise great care that the religious beliefs of the Twitchells and other Christian Scientists are not implicitly or explicitly placed on trial. If the prosecution seeks to cross-examine a witness about church doctrine or his or her religious beliefs, on objection the judge should consider carefully the relevance of the evidence sought in relation to any prejudice that may result.” N.17 (S-6115) This particular text is noteworthy not only for its avoidance of dealing with religious expression and establishment as such, but also for essentializing religion as primarily belief, a default assumption made by U.S. courts since the first religion case, Reynolds v. the United States, was tried in 1878. (Assumptions that separate practice and belief would not only be unthinkable to Christian Scientists, but to most non- secularized religious people around the world.) Regardless of judicial attempts to avoid bias in trying religious cases, troubling assumptions about religion (troubling to scholars at least) permeate judges’ opinions and decisions. Although issues of Due Process and the Fourteenth Amendment consume the appeals process, projections of both the parents’ interests and the State’s interests not surprisingly dominate initial court proceedings. Parents initially project their religious interests onto their children in the form of arguing for their parental rights to bring up their children according to their own traditions. From the parents’ perspective, to conceive of their children as outside their own religious communities of discipline and practice is unthinkable. State law, hence the State’s interests, particularly at the more local level is ambiguous. Individual state law often comes into conflict internally or with federal legislation on faith Journal of Childhood and Religion Volume 1, Issue 1 (2010) ©Sopher Press (contact [email protected]) Page 10 of 31