Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Facultad de Filosofía y Letras Departamento de Historia Antigua y Medieval, Paleografía y Diplomática Tesis que para obtener el grado de Doctor en Estudios del Mundo Antiguo se presenta bajo el título: Lo ético y el más allá del lenguaje: la idea de sustitución vicaria y la noción de "contravida" (ἀντίψυχος) en 4 Macabeos Ethics and the Beyond of Language: Substitutionary Atonement and the Concept of "Counterlife" (Ἀντίψυχος) in 4 Maccabees Doctorando: D. Cameron James Doody Directores de tesis: Dr. D. José Pascual González Dr. D. Carlos A. Segovia Madrid 2014 Dedicated to the memory of my mother, Pauline Elizabeth Doody (1955-2004) Ὦ φύσις ἱερὰ καὶ φίλτρα γονέων καὶ γένεσι φιλόστοργε καὶ τροφεία καὶ µητέρων ἀδάµαστα πάθη (4 Maccabees 15.13) ÍNDICE GENERAL / TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface and Acknowledgements: For My Interpreters _____________________ i Abreviaturas / Table of Abbreviations __________________________________ vi Índice de figuras / Table of Figures ____________________________________ ix Nota sobre las traducciones / Note on Translations_________________________x Introducción: 4 Macabeos como écfrasis según la lógica “deconstructiva”_____1 Introducción_______________________________________________________1 1. 4 Macabeos: una introducción general a la obra _________________________2 2. Las interpretaciones de 4 Mac y el “giro postestructuralista” ______________21 3. Presentación del problema: 4 Mac y el ἀντίψυχος en perspectiva “deconstructiva”_____________________37 4. La ocasión, el objetivo y el contenido de la tesis ________________________57 Introduction: 4 Maccabees as Ekphrasis in “Deconstructive” Logic ___________67 Introduction ______________________________________________________67 1. 4 Maccabees: a general introduction to the work_______________________68 2. Interpretations of 4 Macc and the “poststructuralist turn” _______________86 3. Presentation of the problem: 4 Macc and the ἀντίψυχος in “deconstructive” perspective________________101 4. The occasion, aim and content of the thesis___________________________121 Chapter 1: Between Jew and Greek: The “Egyptian”____________________130 Introduction _____________________________________________________130 1. 4 Macc as Jewish text____________________________________________131 2. 4 Macc as Greek text ____________________________________________140 3. Thought experiment: 4 Macc as “Egyptian” text________________________150 Conclusion______________________________________________________158 Chapter 2: Between Economy and Sacrifice: The “Impossible Gift”________160 Introduction _____________________________________________________160 1. The coin of the world: economy and laws____________________________161 2. The coin of God: sacrifice and the Law ______________________________170 3. A counterfeit coin: “unbinding” justice and concord and the “impossible gift”_________________176 Conclusion______________________________________________________188 Chapter 3: Between Aion and Chronos: The Kairos _____________________190 Introduction _____________________________________________________190 1. “Life after death” in 4 Macc ______________________________________191 2. “Eternity” and “time”: αἰών “as opposed to” χρόνος____________________200 3. Ἀντίψυχος as "counter-actualisation" or pure event ____________________208 Conclusion______________________________________________________216 Chapter 4: Between Masculine and Feminine: The Androgynous __________218 Introduction _____________________________________________________218 1. “Male” and “female” in antiquity __________________________________219 2. Masculine men in 4 Macc ________________________________________221 3. Feminine women: Dinah and Eve __________________________________224 4. Feminine men and masculine “women” _______________________________226 5. Implications of the “androgyny” of the martyrs for our understanding of the ἀντίψυχος________________________________238 Conclusion______________________________________________________245 Chapter 5: Between Subject and Object: The Abject ____________________247 Introduction _____________________________________________________247 1. Towards a definition of the “subject” of 4 Macc ________________________248 2. The feminine-maternal as the “object” of 4 Macc______________________256 3. The martyrs of 4 Macc as “abject”__________________________________265 Conclusion______________________________________________________274 Chapter 6: Between the Other and the Same: The Psyche ________________277 Introduction _____________________________________________________277 1. The Other in Levinas ____________________________________________278 2. The Other in 4 Macc: interpretation as interruption_____________________282 3. The Same in Levinas ____________________________________________289 4. The Same in 4 Macc_____________________________________________294 5. Substitution and the psyche (ἀντίψυχος) in Levinas and 4 Macc __________298 Conclusion______________________________________________________305 Chapter 7: Between Tyranny and Democracy: The Antipolitical___________307 Introduction_____________________________________________________307 1. Tyranny in 4 Macc _____________________________________________308 2. Theocracy and democracy in 4 Macc________________________________316 3. The antipolitical in 4 Macc _______________________________________323 Conclusion______________________________________________________333 Conclusión: lo sublime______________________________________________335 1. Resumen de la tesis y alcance de la conclusión________________________335 2. Lo indecidible en 4 Mac como “anagrafía”___________________________341 3. De lo indecidible en la anagrafía al “estremecimiento” ________________349 4. Del estremecimiento a lo sublime __________________________________353 5. Epílogo_______________________________________________________357 Conclusion: The Sublime____________________________________________359 1. Summary of the thesis and scope of the conclusion_____________________359 2. The undecidable in 4 Macc as “anagraphy”__________________________365 3. From the undecidable in anagraphy to the “shudder” __________________373 4. From the shudder to the sublime ___________________________________376 5. Epilogue______________________________________________________381 Bibliografía / Bibliography___________________________________________382 Índice de citas / Index of Passages ____________________________________417 Índice de autores modernos / Index of Modern Authors___________________432 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: FOR MY INTERPRETERS Replacement, deputy, relief, proxy, surrogate, locum… With these words and their kin my mother tongue, English, invites its speakers to voice the idea of the “substitute”: to name the person who stands in (sub-) the place (stituere, statuere) of another. Spanish, my adopted language, extends its own bidding: sustituto, suplente, relevo, representante… We have then in these terms, and their cognates in other languages, the means by which to imagine the substitute and “substitution”—the work she performs—but to really think and know and understand these concepts—to hold them to the light, to feel and smell and taste and hear them— this is a step which may prove, in the end, to be beyond our human pace to take. Part of the problem, it seems, lies in the fact that in the word, substitute, we have only an approximation to the concept: sub-, according to some other lines in the dictionary, means “somewhat,” “nearly,” “more or less”: subantarctic. Or else it has the sense of “at a lower level or position”—subalpine—or denotes “subsequent or secondary action of the same kind”—sublet, subdivision. In which category, then, does the substitute fit? She does not come from below me, nor stands beside me; neither is she my inferior nor even of my kind, not “somewhat,” not “nearly,” not “more or less”: she is my shadow, in my skin, my ransom, my releasing even from the invisible bonds of the mirror. Alter ego and locum tenens, she occupies now the selfsame coordinates at which I was myself but a moment ago, or less, thus cutting me loose, freeing me up—but for what? If my substitute substitutes “for” me, then what “me” could be left? There will be those who will say that I am being too (melo)dramatic, and that in any case the art of substitution is either just a metaphor or else extends to only one particular part of who I am: my work, my place on a committee, my position in a team. The beginning of a reply forms on my lips—relief—as if this effect or this condition of the substitution reveals, and guarantees, what has been at stake from the very beginning. And then I think of the risks my substitute—my guarantor, proxy, deputy, agent—would run for me, should I ever fall in bad faith… i I also reply with the one word of which consists the present thesis in its entirety: ἀντίψυχος, “my life in exchange for theirs” (4 Maccabees [4 Macc] 6.29), “a ransom for the sin of our nation” (4 Macc 17.21). Again in this word, as with substitute, we have a semantic indetermination that obscures what it would ostensibly make manifest: anti-, as we know from anti-aircraft, antibacterial, anticlimax, antipope, and so on, usually means “opposed to,” “preventing,” “the opposite of,” “a rival.” But how could it be that this substitute, this ἀντίψυχος, is opposed to, closed off to, the very opposite of the life (or soul, mind, spirit, etc.: ψυχή) for which it would offer itself? Some will argue that in Greek the ἀντί- is capable of other values beyond those of “opposite” or “against,” perhaps thinking of these lines in Bion of Smyrna: “And Echo calls back [ἀντεβόασεν], “Fair Adonis is dead!”” (Ep. Adon. 1.38; trans. Reed 1997: 125). Echo is here repeating what she has heard of the lament of Aphrodite for Adonis (-βοάω), but more than that—and as the Desires and all the mountains, the trees, the rivers, springs and flowers have all done up to this point in the poem—she seeks to express her solidarity with Aphrodite by giving voice to her own mourning. Is my substitute, then—my ἀντίψυχος—my Echo who cries with me, mourns with me: a presence who consoles me by whispering my pain—our pain—into my ear? But then the question will have become that of how best to translate Bion’s idiom into languages—modern English and Spanish—that would seem to have no room for it. The historical-critical method can take one so far in this task of translating the ἀντίψυχος—that figure so close to me she is the echo of my very breathing, my sighing, my torment (ψύχω)—but it clearly cannot paint the whole picture. Comparative philology knows, for example, of the following parallel with the ἀντίψυχος of 4 Macc 6.29 and 17.21 in the Old Testament book of Leviticus: For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you for making atonement for your lives on the altar; for, as life [ἀντὶ τῆς ψυχῆς], it is the blood that makes atonement. (Lev 17.11) “The life of the flesh…in the blood…that makes atonement,” then: such is one definition of the ἀντίψυχος that historical-critical philology yields. But then what would it mean that this parallel in Leviticus appears in the midst of a particular prohibition on eating blood (Lev 17.10-16)? Or that, at the same time that it affirms ii that “the life of all flesh [πάσης σαρκὸς] is in the blood” (17.11; cf. 17.14), the text here makes a reference to the blood of animals and birds (17.13; cf. 17.15)—that is, to the particular non-human victims that are to become burnt offerings or sacrifices of well-being (e.g. 17.3-4)? Historical-critical philology helps one see, then, that the ἀντίψυχος is a sacrifice through whose blood, indeed—and through whose “death as an atoning sacrifice [τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου τοῦ θανάτου]”—“divine Providence preserved Israel that previously had been mistreated” (4 Macc 17.22). But if there is a displacement around the ἀντὶ τῆς ψυχῆς or ἀντίψυχος between Leviticus and 4 Macc from animal sacrifice to human then that will require, at the very least, a turn from strict philology to the ethical and political—that is, to the consideration not just of who the ἀντίψυχος is but of how to live with her: how to deal with the “statute” mandating her sacrifice (cf. Lev 17.7), and how to bear the guilt for the shedding of her blood from within—or cut off from—the people of Israel (17.4, 16). For again: if one admits that the ἀντίψυχος has become a human sacrifice in 4 Macc, how are we now to understand the presence of the animal victim before the Lord in the middle of the camp, in the tabernacle (ἀπέν-αντι, Lev 17.4, 6)? How can one take, and refigure, one part of the metaphor and leave the other? Expressed in these ways—as ideas that push the limits of language (whether English, Spanish, or Greek) and therefore of thought, or vice versa—the notions of substitution and of ἀντιψύχωσις (the work of the ἀντίψυχος) take on the character of philosophical aporiae as opposed to mere semantic, historical-critical or religio-scientific curiosities. This is, at any rate, the approach I have taken on the question in the present thesis, and I would therefore beg the indulgence of the reader as I seek to explain in more detail, and to justify, my framing of the problem in this way in the pages that follow. As for the particular use I make here of the guiding thread let out by Derrida and his “deconstruction”: I can only ask the reader to bear in mind throughout the course of this study what I have already signalled with regard to the travails of translation. From Bion we already have the idea of the ἀντί- as condoling echo; for -ψυχή, on the other hand—recognising its equivalence with blood in Leviticus to be inadequate1—we could turn to other important influences on the 1 In the light, for example, of Finlan’s very useful summary of the passage from Leviticus under discussion: “Blood, carrying the life-force, can somehow reverse the anti-life of sin and pollution. When the blood is poured on a ritually-polluted temple installation [cf. Lev 17.6], the life-force cleans iii author of 4 Macc, as we shall see in this thesis—viz., Chrysippus and the Stoics—and translate it as the “pneuma integral to our nature”: as voice, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch (Galen, De plac. Hipp et Plat. 3.10-11; quoted in Gill 2009: 413). But again the same problem returns: how could we capture, in a word or two of English or Spanish, this idea that the ἀντίψυχος would be the comforting echo not only of all my speaking but of my hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and so on as well? If, in short, the question of the ἀντίψυχος can be thought of as a philosophical aporia, then perhaps some (minimal) elucidation of it can be found in seeking an adequate translation of the term. “[T]he thesis of philosophy is translatability,” said Derrida in another time and place (1988: 119-20 [120]): “that is…the transfer of a meaning or a truth from one language to another without any essential harm being done.” It is here, then—at the crossroads of translation and philosophy in which the ἀντίψυχος is to be found—that I would like to situate the present work. * I cannot think of my thesis as a contribution to the interpretation of 4 Maccabees in particular and of Jewish and Christian origins more generally without thinking of all those people who, over the course of my life thus far, have helped me to understand myself and to make myself and my work understood. I remember here, in the first place, my Spanish teachers in Alcalá de Henares—Cristina and Cecilia in particular— without whom I would never have had the confidence to go on and continue my studies in Spain. My grateful thanks also extend to my family in Spain—Felipe, Magdalena, David, Ana, and Jorge—who have never failed in their patience with and support of this new member in their company. One most certainly cannot survive let alone study in Spain without understanding the culture, history, traditions, and other peculiarities of the country, and for their unflagging willingness to explain all this to me from their perspective I am tremendously grateful to my in-laws. Along with my loved ones in Australia—Ray, Paula, Nathan, Elizabeth, and Anthony—my family in Spain have given me the space, security, and self-belief necessary to be able to understand myself away the anti-life, pollution” (2004: 41). If, in other words, blood is the “life-force” here and sin the anti-life, what place is there left conceptually for the ἀντί-ψυχος? iv