TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE APOCALYPTIC NARRATIVE Kari Milner Strøm MASTER I POLITIVITENSKAP 2011 1 2 Abstract The ‘war on terror’ that President George W. Bush declared following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 is conducted on many levels, one of which is the debate concerning the need to ‘balance’ security and human rights. His early announcement that ‘you’re either with us or against us’ reinforces dualistic construction and leaves little room for a diversity of opinions and, consequently, for a comprehensive and clear-headed assessment of the means with which the war is being fought. Indicative of the fundamental human rights principles at stake is the question of whether the terrorist threat justifies the use of torture. Despite recent speculation that the war on terror might have been over with the killing of Osama bin Laden the open-ended process of ‘securitizing’ societies in order to minimize threat is likely to continue. The numerous textual and anecdotal glimpses included in this thesis aim to shed some light on how the articulation of threat among politicians and security professionals in particular creates more lay anxiety than necessary, and how everything from the focus on binary opposites to myths surrounding policing, media coverage of terrorist acts, the disciplinary power of the state, the voices of academia, and everyday conversations about surveillance can deeply affect democracy, perceptions of risk, terrorism and ‘the Other’. 3 Acknowledgments The first person I would like to thank is my supervisor, Ivar Fahsing, whose policing input and reading suggestions have been invaluable and whose no-nonsense approach is greatly appreciated. He also provided me with much needed encouragement that will keep me going for a while… The Norwegian Police University College also deserves thanks for giving me the opportunity to delve into an interesting and important area of study by admitting me to the Masters programme in Police Science. Lastly, I am grateful for the support from friends and family who are still wondering why I chose to do this. KMS Oslo, 1 June 2011 4 Table of contents Terrorism, democracy, and the apocalyptic narrative ..........................................................................1 Abstract ..............................................................................................................................................3 Acknowledgments ..............................................................................................................................4 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................7 2. The apocalyptic narrative ................................................................................................................9 2.1 Human rights in the age of counter-terrorism ......................................................................... 13 2.2 World leaders and public opinion post-9/11 ............................................................................ 15 3. Theoretical framework and research tools .................................................................................... 16 3.1 Ethical concerns ...................................................................................................................... 21 4. Key concepts in use ....................................................................................................................... 21 4.1 The narrative ........................................................................................................................... 21 4.2 Terrorism ................................................................................................................................ 23 4.3 Liberal democracies................................................................................................................. 27 4.4 Universal human rights............................................................................................................ 30 4.5 The ‘othering’ process ............................................................................................................. 31 4.6 Surveillance ............................................................................................................................. 35 4.7 The police................................................................................................................................ 37 5. The voices in the terrorism debate ................................................................................................ 39 5.1 The language of politicians ...................................................................................................... 39 5.2 The role of the media .............................................................................................................. 42 5.2.1 The relationship between terrorists and the media........................................................... 46 5.3 The everyday vernacular and life under GWOT and hyper-control ........................................... 48 5.4 Academic voices in the surveillance and security discourse ..................................................... 51 5.4.1 The panopticon, surveillance and visibility ........................................................................ 51 5.4.2 The surveillant assemblage ............................................................................................... 52 5.4.3 The role of counter-terrorism and surveillance studies ..................................................... 55 5.5 Summing up the voices and the discourse ............................................................................... 56 6. The politics of terrorism and counter-terrorism............................................................................. 57 6.1 A state of emergency .............................................................................................................. 60 6.2 Exceptionalism ........................................................................................................................ 62 6.2.1 How exceptional was 9/11? .............................................................................................. 63 6.3 Executive prerogative and neo-conservatism .......................................................................... 65 5 6.4 Secrecy and national security .................................................................................................. 70 6.5 The temporal factor: Futur anterieur ....................................................................................... 73 6.6 Terrorism and its causes .......................................................................................................... 75 7. Delegating the task of governing and policing unease ................................................................... 78 7.1 Policing myths and dilemmas .................................................................................................. 79 7.2 Racial/religious profiling .......................................................................................................... 84 7.3 Transparency, accountability and the rule of law ..................................................................... 89 7.4 The thick green line ................................................................................................................. 91 8. Surveillance, counter-terrorism and human rights ......................................................................... 92 8.1 The lack of resistance to counter-terrorism and surveillance ................................................... 93 8.2 Rights skepticism ..................................................................................................................... 94 8.3 ‘Balancing’ security and rights ................................................................................................. 97 9. Threats to our sense of security .................................................................................................... 99 9.1 Challenges to democracy ....................................................................................................... 101 10. Can SWOT shed some light on GWOT? ...................................................................................... 105 10.1 The rule of law .................................................................................................................... 106 10.2 An open society ................................................................................................................... 107 10.3 Resistance and public engagement ...................................................................................... 107 10.4 Democratic policing ............................................................................................................. 109 10.5 Community relations and diversity ...................................................................................... 109 10.6 Resources and resilience ..................................................................................................... 110 11. Summary and conclusion .......................................................................................................... 111 Bibliography.................................................................................................................................... 115 6 He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. Friedrich Nietzsche 1886/Wikiquote 2011 1. Introduction Examining the evolving strategy of policing George Kelling and Mark Moore relate that the reform era promoted an image of policing in which ‘*t+he proper role of citizens in crime control was to be relatively passive recipients of professional crime control services’ (2005: 95). The metaphor used to describe the police and their relationship to the community – ‘the thin blue line’ – is more relevant than ever given that ‘*i+t connotes the existence of dangerous external threats to communities, portrays police as standing between that danger and good citizens, and implies both police heroism and loneliness’ (Kelling and Moore 2005: 95). After the attacks against the United States on 11 September 20011 the police have joined forces with other modern day heroes standing between ordinary citizens and chaos. Among these are the military and the world leaders who promote the idea of a ‘war’ on terror as the only viable solution to the allegedly ‘new’ form of terrorism. In contrast to ‘the thin blue line’, ‘the thin red line’ refers to the armed forces’ role as a bulwark against external threats (Wikipedia 2011b). The apocalyptic narrative is the story of an epic battle between the ‘new’ terrorists and the defenders of democracy. The military’s involvement in fighting what is essentially a crime is counter-intuitive to democratic societies. As initiator of a nineteenth century reform period in Britain the Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel, was intensely aware of English hostility to ‘any institution that smacked of a military presence or a political surveillance of the population’ (Emsley 2003: 67). In order to differentiate the police from the military he engaged in impression management making sure that the uniforms of the new Metropolitan Police ‘did not look military’ (Emsley 2003: 68). Peel was further concerned that the police should be held accountable, that they should be trustworthy, and that policing should take place in a spirit of co-operation, summarized in the principle that ‘the police are the public and the public are the police’. 1 The attacks of 11 September 2001 will hereinafter largely be referred to as ‘9/11’. 7 Along with intelligence and security services the military and the police are the main instruments used to combat terrorism, but the presence of so many actors implies challenges in terms of jurisdiction and how the war should be fought, nationally as well as internationally. In his outline of waves of terror occurring prior to 9/11 David Rapoport notes that ‘*t+errorist tactics invariably produce rage and frustration, often driving governments to respond in unanticipated, extraordinary, illegal and destructive ways’ (2002: 1). The persuasiveness of the Islamist threat narrative has led to rights abuses and to the implementation of ever stricter security measures. Voices expressing concern for the manner in which some of these measures can pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law largely go unheeded. One of the most potent and potentially destructive weapons in the war has been the compelling use of binary opposites in threat narratives, rhetoric, and propaganda, as witnessed in the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ forces. The US and Europe have admittedly adopted contrasting responses to the threat, wherein the former views terrorism as war and the latter approaches terrorism as a crime, but the linguistic mechanisms employed are largely the same. A telling feature of the discourse is that it seems nearly impossible to speak of terrorism without resorting to military metaphors such as ‘war’, ‘combat’, ‘arsenal’, ‘weapon’, ‘strategy’, ‘tactics’, ‘intelligence’, ‘national security’, ‘fallout’ and so on, a phenomenon which appears supportive of the terrorism-as-war agenda. With respect to recent developments, media speculation following the killing of Osama bin Laden in early May 2011 revolved around numerous issues chief among which are whether the war on terror is over, whether al-Qaeda has been weakened, whether the world can expect revenge attacks and, if so, will such attacks be large- or small-scale. For now, the conclusion appears to be that the war goes on, at least as far as the United States is concerned. The seemingly muted response to bin Laden’s death in Muslim communities and the fact that he was living in Pakistan when he was killed may well pour gasoline on the Islamophobic fires burning in certain sections of liberal democracies. This may in turn strengthen the martial approach to terrorism. What follows is an exploration of the intersection of threat narratives and counter-terrorism measures adopted during the protracted ‘emergency’ situation and a closer look at their 8 implications for liberal democracies. Chapter 2 initiates the examination of the apocalyptic narrative and its influence on liberal democracies. The theoretical framework and tools employed in the thesis are outlined in Chapter 3, while Chapter 4 defines key concepts in use. Chapter 5 presents some of the voices in the terrorism debate. Chapter 6 addresses the politics of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Some of the main actors and problem complexes associated with governing unease will be examined in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 deals with human rights, and the threats to our sense of security will be summarized in Chapter 9. Another important aim is to highlight an element that has largely remained unaddressed by the creators of threat narratives and their critics alike, i.e. the strengths, rather than the weaknesses of democracies. This will be done in Chapter 10, which will be followed by a summary and conclusion in Chapter 11. 2. The apocalyptic narrative Edward Said writes that certain words are capable of conjuring up a whole body of apparently objectively valid and morally neutral information, information acquiring an ‘epistemological status equal to that of historical chronology or geographical location’ (1978: 205). In the case of ‘9/11’ the chronology and geographical location are given but the term is also associated with the war triggered by the event. In light of the importance of rhetoric in politics it comes as no surprise that the war on terror is literally being fought with words, as ‘*m+astery of a culture’s symbolic communication allows one to manipulate the symbolic order – and is a source of great power in modern society’ (Kappeler and Kappeler 2004: 181). G. Matthew Bonham, Daniel Heradstveit, Michiko Nakano and Victor M. Sergeev view ‘the war on terrorism’ as a powerful metaphor. Through the use of affective rhetorical language the metaphor functions as a highly persuasive form of political communication (Bonham et al. 2007: 11) and contains symbolism on several levels. Dwayne Winseck (2009) identifies the US Information Operations (IO) doctrine as one of the weapons deployed and, based on his examination of the US propaganda campaign, Anders Romarheim states that one of the most important goals of the administration up until 2005 9 was ‘To win the “battle of words”, effectively choking counterpropaganda’2 (Romarheim 2005: 62). Propaganda, censorship and surveillance are the three pillars of the information power of nation-states, and in the US ‘IO encompasses the surveillance, control, and destruction of communications networks, psychological warfare and propaganda, and more routine methods of public affairs and media relations’ (Winseck 2009: 151). The apocalyptic narrative is an integral part of the information war. Sometimes it is not easy for authorities to get their stories straight and the US has supplied the world with different tales of the circumstances surrounding Osama bin Laden’s death, for example. If, as has been stated, ‘the global war on terrorism’ (GWOT) has primarily been about taking him out of the picture it is indeed time we ask ourselves what the ongoing war is about. Though former British prime minister Tony Blair maintains that the war on terrorism is as urgent as ever and Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi still speaks of fighting ‘evil’, the mere suggestion that the war might have been over with bin Laden’s death could be another step in the ongoing process of deconstructing the Islamist threat narrative. In an exploration of the effects of narrative and language a description of power given by French philosopher and historian of ideas Michel Foucault can be a useful starting point: ‘power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted “above” society’ (Foucault 1982: 791). Accordingly, ‘[p]ower acts through the smaller elements: the family, sexual relations, but also: residential relations, neighbourhoods etc.’ (1973: 1). For his part, Bruno Latour relates that ‘power in society is exercised through a complex mix of not only traditional power-brokers, but also enlisted allies of humans, non-human artifacts, and semiotic structures’ (in Taylor 2004: 496). From conversations around dinner tables in suburbia, to high level political discussions in the United Nations Security Council the words used to describe terrorism affect our sense of threat in ways we cannot ignore. Hence a look at the terrorism discourse as it manifests among politicians, the police, the mass media, academics who research terrorism and surveillance, and in the popular vernacular could possibly increase our understanding of the apocalyptic narrative’s impact on liberal democracies. 2 At the time the Norwegian government was also accused of attempting to stifle dissent (Bakkeli 2008: 54-55) 10