TEMPLE LAW REVIEW © TEMPLE UNIVERSITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION VOL. 85 NO. 2 WINTER 2013 ARTICLES USING THE PRESS CLAUSE TO AMPLIFY CIVIC DISCOURSE BEYOND MERE OPINION SHARING Akilah N. Folami* ABSTRACT The First Amendment unambiguously proclaims that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” The First Amendment’s Speech Clause primarily bears the deliberative weight of protecting and maintaining the discursive space of America’s self-governing democracy. It has done so by indiscriminately protecting a broad array of expression from government intrusion. As a result, the Speech Clause has democratically legitimized such expression in America’s civic discourse. This legitimization is essential to a more deliberative democracy. The Speech Clause’s legitimizing function, however, has not helped to advance another essential element for a well-functioning deliberative democracy, namely, democratic competence. Instead, it has hurt it. Democratic competence relates to the cognitive empowerment of citizens within civic discourse and requires, at a minimum, deliberation-enhancing end-products and exchanges, grounded in factual truth and disclosure of corporate or government sponsorship when applicable. The protective scope of the Speech Clause has ironically contributed to the current * Associate Professor of Law at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. I would like to thank the organizers of the Northeast People of Color Conference hosted at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University for allowing me to present earlier ideas on this paper. Many thanks also to the Southern Methodist University Law School junior faculty forum, the organizers of the Association of the Study of Law, Culture, and Humanities, and the Lutie Lytle Black Women Law Faculty Black Writing Workshop for allowing me to present and receive feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. I extend a thank you to Professors Alafair Burke, Angela Kupenda, Erika George, Janai Nelson, Julie Steiner, Kamille Wolff, Lyrissa Lidsky, RonNell Andersen Jones, and Michelle Adams for providing helpful comments to earlier oral presentations or written drafts of this paper as well. I would also like to thank Bethany Simmons, Adam Kahn, and Melissa Mendoza for their invaluable research assistance on this project. 269 270 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 floodgates in American civic discourse of the opposite—unsubstantiated commentary, rumor, and manipulative spin. Developments in technology, citizen journalism, and online blogging have exacerbated this cacophony and discourage the production of deliberation-enhancing end-products and exchanges. This Article turns to the Press Clause to advance democratic competence and to in turn amplify civic discourse beyond mere opinion sharing. It aims to do so by incentivizing the production and dissemination of deliberation-enhancing end- products. In so doing, this Article proposes a new justification for the Press Clause, whose justification has long been the source of controversy and debate, and provides a reinvigorated way of looking at that Clause and its utility within the larger constitutional structure. This Article’s proposal leaves intact the Speech Clause’s expansive reach and legitimizing function, while proposing an alternate basis of constitutional protection for a narrower category of speech—deliberation-enhancing end-products. Moreover, using the Press Clause in this manner provides a constitutional framework through which exclusive privileges may be awarded to anyone who produces these qualifying end-products. These privileges can therefore be made available to others besides members of the traditional news media who are currently the primary beneficiaries of such privileges. Civic discourse can, as a result, be opened up without sacrificing the long-acknowledged value of deliberation- enhancing end-products to civic discourse. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................271 II. THE PRESS CLAUSE AND STEWART’S INSTITUTIONAL PRESS IN CONTEXT ........276 A. Originalism and The Press Clause—Early Press Function and Colonial Norms .......................................................................................278 B. The Early Press Clause Cases and the First Amendment ........................282 C. The Institutional Press and the Professionalization of Civic Discourse .................................................................................................285 D. Perpetuating News Media Hegemony .....................................................289 III. SPEECH CLAUSE LEGITIMIZATION .....................................................................293 A. Legitimizing Expansive Modes of Expression and Civic Discourse .......293 B. Legitimizing Hegemony in Civic Discourse: Core Speech and Reasoned Debate Alone...........................................................................295 C. Legitimizing Expansive Topics of Expression: Opinion and Other “Low Value Speech” ...............................................................................297 IV. DEMOCRATIC COMPETENCE AND THE PRESS CLAUSE .......................................302 A. The Value of the Press Clause and Newsgathering to Democratic Competence and Civic Discourse ............................................................302 B. The Criteria: Promoting Knowledge-Enhancing End-Products in a Defamed Civic Discourse ........................................................................306 1. End-Products that are Fact Based and Not Verifiably False .............306 2. End-Products that are Transparent ....................................................311 V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................313 2013] USING THE PRESS CLAUSE TO AMPLIFY CIVIC DISCOURSE 271 I. INTRODUCTION With the development of twenty-four hour cable television, the Internet, and wireless communication, the ability to distract and deceive an audience both with information and through emotions has seen an exponential increase . . . . . . . [T]he scope of information, the weakness of guidelines to help us determine what is important and what is merely distraction . . . makes it difficult for the consumer of information to . . . pursue precise and deliberative public action.1 With technological developments that have liberated information sharing on the Internet and twenty-four-hour cable news services, the information cup metaphorically runneth over, with many voices (including corporate interests)2 inundating the political public sphere. This explosion of, and unprecedented access to, unfiltered information has ironically not resulted in a more democratically competent and civically engaged citizenry.3 Instead, a corporate-controlled news media4 and robust populist commentary on the Internet provide the public with a considerable share of unsubstantiated opinions, false speech,5 rumor, partisan spin,6 “infotainment,”7 and manipulative 1. WAYNE LE CHEMINANT & JOHN M. PARRISH, MANIPULATING DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRATIC THEORY, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, AND MASS MEDIA 157 (2011). 2. The Supreme Court has granted full protection under the First Amendment to the political advertisements of corporations. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914–16 (2010); see also Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (applying the holding of Citizens United to state law). 3. See Akilah N. Folami, Deschooling the News Media–Democratizing Civic Discourse, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 489, 493–95 (2012) (citing statistics indicating the downward spiral of American civic engagement). 4. See Akilah N. Folami, Freeing the Press from Editorial Discretion and Hegemony in Bona Fide News: Why the Revolution Must Be Televised, 34 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 367, 398–400 (2011) (noting broadcast deregulation and corporate consolidation). See generally Folami, supra note 3 (discussing the corporate consolidation of broadcast news and the negative impact on civic discourse and engagement). 5. Arguably, false speech is distinguishable from defamatory speech with the latter more readily regulated and restricted. Defamation law restricts false speech that allegedly defames private persons as it relates to purely private matters. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–348 (1974). It however also requires a breathing space for civic discourse to flourish by requiring the defamed to prove falsity and fault on the part of the defamer on public matters regardless of whether the subject of the speech is a public figure or private person. Id. at 348–349 (holding that a private citizen’s recovery for defamation is limited if liability is not based on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (noting that a public official or public figure cannot recover under defamation unless the statements were made with actual malice). Moreover, the burden of establishing fault is considerably higher (i.e., actual malice) for comments that allegedly defame public officials or public figures. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. Hence, false speech that harms the reputation of another in connection with matters relevant to the public may still make its way into the political public sphere if the plaintiff (the allegedly defamed) cannot meet the requisite showing of fault on the part of the defamer. Id. See infra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of false speech in the political public sphere. 6. The news media however is often presumed, although not constitutionally required, to be objective, responsible, and nonpartisan when it receives select privileges from the courts. See Folami, supra note 4, at 403–04 (noting the FCC’s preference to assume a good faith broadcast judgment of a potentially partisan television appearance). 272 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 political rhetoric.8 This Article turns to the Press Clause to help advance civic discourse beyond mere opinion and manipulative spin, and towards the production of more deliberation- enhancing9 end-products10 and exchanges that are essential to attaining the goal of a deliberative democracy11 advanced by some political theorists. I adopt Dean Robert Post’s term “democratic competence,”12 discussed in his recent book titled Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom,13 to capture this purpose as it is uniquely applied to the Press Clause herein. Democratic competence is the “cognitive empowerment” of citizens in civic discourse,14 and it necessitates the production of knowledge-enhancing end-products and exchanges.15 I have discussed elsewhere that in order to effectuate a more deliberative democracy, the law must provide ample space and in turn legitimization for a wide array of end-products and the varied methods in which they are expressed.16 This 7. BONNIE M. ANDERSON, NEWSFLASH: JOURNALISM, INFOTAINMENT, AND THE BOTTOM-LINE BUSINESS OF BROADCAST NEWS x–xi (2004); GEOFFREY BAYM, FROM CRONKITE TO COLBERT: THE EVOLUTION OF BROADCAST NEWS 2–3, 5 (2010) (defining infotainment as information that is presented on television or radio as serious news or other factual material in a manner and style intended primarily to entertain and distract rather than civically inform). 8. LE CHEMINANT & PARRISH, supra note 1, at 70–75. 9. The terms “deliberation-enhancing” and “knowledge-enhancing” are used throughout and interchangeably to denote the published, factually true, and transparent content and expression that this Article aims to incentivize via the Press Clause function and criteria proposed herein. 10. “End-products” as used herein refers to the expressions generally protected under the Speech Clause. The term is used interchangeably with the term “speech” unless otherwise noted. 11. Joseph Bessette is credited with coining the phrase “deliberative democracy” in 1980. See Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government, in HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102, 102–16 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980). Deliberative democracy is a form of democracy that deems wide and open public deliberation as central to decision making. Colin Farrelly, Making Deliberative Democracy a More Practical Political Ideal, 4 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 200, 200 (2005) (“Deliberative democrats are thus concerned with the normative legitimacy of a democratic decision . . . .”). For a deliberative democracy, deliberation is the primary source of legitimizing the lawmaking process in that it requires that all citizens be given an opportunity to influence and express their opinions about the laws affecting them. Id. The legitimacy of decision making turns “on the degree to which those affected by [such decisions] have . . . had the opportunity to influence the outcomes.” Id. (quoting IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 5–6 (2000)). 12. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 33–34 (2012). 13. Id. 14. Id. “Civic discourse” as used herein relates to deliberation relevant to the political public sphere in particular. 15. See id. at 32–34 (stating that “[c]ognitive empowerment is necessary . . . for intelligent self- governance” and describing knowledge as capable of being tested and verified). 16. I have focused primarily on protecting such space within the context of media, namely broadcast radio and television, which has arguably become the central location upon which deliberation and public opinion is waged. See Akilah N. Folami, Deliberative Democracy on the Air: Reinvigorate Localism—Resuscitate Radio’s Subversive Past, 63 FED. COMM. L. J. 141, 171–79 (2010) [hereinafter Folami, Deliberative Democracy] (analyzing the deliberative value of music generally and early rock-and-roll infused rhythm and blues in particular in a racially segregated America); Folami, supra note 4, at 404–08 (analyzing the counter-hegemonic and deliberative value of certain politicized content as provided on cable entertainment programming like The Daily Show); Akilah N. Folami, From Habermas to “Get Rich or Die Tryin”: Hip Hop, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Black Public Sphere, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 235, 285–304 2013] USING THE PRESS CLAUSE TO AMPLIFY CIVIC DISCOURSE 273 Article focuses on promoting democratic competence as distinguished from democratic legitimization—although the two are not conceptually mutually exclusive. Generally, democratic competence aims to empower citizens cognitively, while democratic legitimization aims to indiscriminately provide citizens with an expressive outlet for their opinions and ideas. A primary function of the Speech Clause has been to indiscriminately protect a broad array of expression from government intrusion.17 In doing so, the Speech Clause has helped legitimize expression in America’s civic discourse but has not particularly assisted in advancing democratic competence.18 This Article is the first to propose democratic competence as a Press Clause function and to advance criteria that aim to incentivize the production and dissemination of the knowledge-enhancing end-products necessary to promote it. Specifically, this Article embraces calls for Press Clause protections of the newsgathering process—a proposal recently advanced by another Press Clause scholar for other notable reasons.19 To receive newsgathering protection however, this Article’s criteria require speakers not only to engage in newsgathering activity but also to create and publish knowledge-enhancing end-products developed from the raw materials gathered from such newsgathering activity. Finally, to qualify as knowledge-enhancing end-products entitled to Press Clause protections, this Article’s criteria require end- products to be published, factually true, and transparent with full disclosure of any underlying corporate or government sponsorship. This Article’s Press Clause function would result in the protection of a narrower category of speech (namely, knowledge-enhancing end-products) than that of the Speech Clause. It therefore provides an alternative basis of constitutional coverage given that these end-products would likely still receive full protection under the Speech Clause. The benefit of the additional or alternate Press Clause coverage proposed herein, however, is that it also serves as the basis upon which qualifying end-products (2007) (analyzing the deliberative value of commodified gangsta rap and images). First Amendment scholars have made comparable claims about the deliberative value of most expression to civic discourse be it explicitly political in content or not. POST, supra note 12, at 16–20, 23. Some deliberative democracy theorists however would likely disagree with my assertions and contend that only public opinion resulting from reasoned debate alone rather than varied modes of expression is of deliberative value in the public sphere. E.g., Jürgen Habermas, Further Reflections on the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 421, 423–24 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992). Similarly, some First Amendment theorists contend that only expression that is explicitly political on its face rather than broader in content is entitled to the highest level of First Amendment protections. E.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971). For a more detailed discussion of scholars’ First Amendment protection preferences, see infra Section II. 17. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (noting that the First Amendment prevents nearly all government regulation based on the content or subject matter of expression). 18. See POST, supra note 12, at 25, 34–35 (discussing that the Speech Clause’s expansive reach and protection in legitimizing voices often undermines the development of democratic competence). 19. Sonja West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1068–70 (2011) (presenting a convincing argument for an independent function of the Press Clause—namely protecting the news-gathering process). Professor West stops short however of considering the deliberation-enhancing value of the end- products that result from such newsgathering process. This Article aims to continue that discussion by proposing a means by which the production and dissemination of these deliberation-enhancing end-products are specifically incentivized. See infra Part IV.A for a more detailed discussion of West’s article. 274 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 might also receive additional and exclusive Press Clause privileges. Endorsing any specific privilege, for example the reporter’s privilege that permits the news media20 to refuse to disclose confidential sources in certain situations, is beyond the scope of this Article, but will likely be considered in future projects. This Article does not, however, foreclose the possibility that such privileges may be granted, indeed may be necessary, to effectuate democratic competence. This Article’s broader contribution is that it provides a constitutional framework under the Press Clause through which such privileges may be evenly and uniformly granted to all pursuant to this nation’s firm commitment to a wide, open, and robust civic discourse. It does so without sacrificing the long-acknowledged deliberation-enhancing function that news media end-products have traditionally served in civically informing and engaging the public. Reserved for future scholarly inquiry and analysis is the considerable effect this Press Clause proposal will likely have on other areas of law, namely commercial speech, privacy, and copyright law.21 Finally, with a function independent of the Speech Clause, the Press Clause is rescued from being what some have described as an interpretively vague, unhelpful, and redundant constitutional provision.22 Indeed, while the Supreme Court has determined that the Press Clause is a fundamental personal right guaranteed to each individual,23 it has not specified how such rights are distinguished from those granted under the Speech Clause.24 The Supreme Court has also not conclusively elaborated on any uniquely identifiable Press Clause protections, or on who might qualify to receive them.25 In the absence of definitive constitutional clarity regarding the Press Clause, many federal courts and administrative agencies, along with numerous state legislatures and courts, have awarded members of the news media with exclusive privileges and 20. Although this Article does not disregard broader categories of “news media” if their end-products satisfy the Press Clause function and criteria advanced herein, the term “news media” in this Article refers to the profession traditionally and generally understood as part of the institutional press like newspapers, broadcast network news, and other public affairs programming provided on cable. See POST, supra note 12 at 20 (“First Amendment coverage presumptively extends to media for the communication of ideas, like newspapers . . . .”). 21. The proposal advanced herein essentially strips news media end-products of their presumed democratically enhancing value and function. It, as a result, calls into question any granting of special privileges to the news media pursuant to such presumptions such as are arguably present in some aspects of privacy law and the newsworthiness doctrine, and copyright and fair use exception. 22. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 650 (1975) (“If ‘speech’ is held to refer to all forms of expression, it would include speech by newspapers and other segments of ‘the press,’ and freedom of the press would be a meaningless redundancy.”); West, supra note 19, at 1027–28 (discussing First Amendment jurisprudence and noting that the concurring and dissenting opinions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission suggest that the Supreme Court “has, in essence, dismissed the [Press C]lause as a constitutional redundancy”). 23. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 24. West, supra note 19, at 1027–29. 25. Id.; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 708–09 (1972) (holding the institutional press must disclose all relevant information pursuant to a grand jury investigation but also opining that there may be some level of newsgathering protection under the Press Clause). 2013] USING THE PRESS CLAUSE TO AMPLIFY CIVIC DISCOURSE 275 protections that are not also granted to average citizens who are not members of the news media (non-news media).26 To Justice Scalia’s disagreement, Justice Stevens contended that the Press Clause provided the news media with First Amendment protections not accorded to non-news media speakers.27 Any selective protection (and privileges) provided exclusively to the news media alone under the Press Clause is problematic because they suggest that only the news media can perform such a deliberation-enhancing function.28 This approach further presumes that the news media’s disseminated end-product is of deliberative value solely because it was created by a member of the news media profession.29 Moreover, such an approach assumes that the judicially valued functions ascribed to the news media’s end-product (like objectivity, neutrality, and nonpartisanship) have been, or can ever be, accomplished.30 Finally, this Article’s Press Clause function and criteria 26. Several federal courts have recognized a common law reporter’s privilege. E.g., Fox v. Twp. of Jackson, 64 F. App’x 338, 340 (3d Cir. 2003); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987). Almost all states have either specifically enacted legislation or recognized such rights in their courts. Joshua A. Faucette, Note, Your Secret’s Safe with Me…or So You Think: How the States Have Cashed in on Branzburg’s “Blank Check”, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 183, 197–98 (2009). Other privileges include exemptions under FOIA that waive document production fees for the news media. See Stephen J. Markman, New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance, DEP’T OF JUSTICE FOIA UPDATE, Winter/Spring 1987, at 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_VIII_1/viii1page2.htm (discussing the factors weighed in deciding a request for a FOIA fee waiver and that “[i]t reasonably may be presumed [] that those ‘representatives of the news media,’ as defined in the OMB Fee Guidelines, who have access to the means of public dissemination, readily will be able to satisfy [the contribution to public understanding] aspect of the statutory requirement”). Moreover, the news media benefits from other nonjudicial privileges such as congressional and executive press passes, access to courtroom proceedings, and privileged treatment from federal regulatory bodies stemming from their continued presumption of the democratically-enhancing value of news media’s end-products. SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESS AND RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE 87–90 (2007); see also Folami, supra note 4, at 390–92 (discussing the ways in which the FCC has presumed that the broadcaster’s public interest convenience and necessary standard, imposed in exchange for their free use of the nation’s airwaves, was satisfied by the networks news programming). Finally, some state jurisdictions have also implicitly granted the news media special rights to invade individual privacy rights in the event such private information is deemed as newsworthy—a determination often presumptively defined by such news media. See, e.g., Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 293 (N.J. 1988) (“The ‘newsworthiness’ defense in privacy-invasion tort actions is available to bar recovery where the subject matter of the publication is one in which the public has a legitimate interest.”). 27. Id. at 951–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 928 n.7 (Scalia, J, concurring) (arguing that speech by an authorized corporate spokesperson should not be treated differently from the press’s freedom to publish ideas). 28. Cf. CARNE ROSS, THE LEADERLESS REVOLUTION: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE CAN TAKE POWER AND CHANGE POLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 108–12 (2012) (encouraging people to take back decision-making responsibility); Folami, supra note 3, at 498–500 (considering the role of professional broadcast journalists in limiting the agency of average nonprofessional citizens in civic discourse as examined through the lens of Ivan Illich’s deschooling theory). 29. Folami, supra note 4, at 398–400. 30. See David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 103–04 (1975) (noting that professional journalists are self-interested if not by monetary rewards then by reputational acknowledgment). In addition, this “objective” approach ultimately dismisses the possibility that press activity resulting in partisan end-products or nonmanipulative yet persuasive appeals to emotions can be of deliberative value. See Folami, supra note 4, at 404–06; see, e.g., POST, supra note 12, at 21–22 (noting that First Amendment jurisprudence must factor in the myriad ways in which the “rational” citizen deliberates). 276 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 do not presume that deliberation-enhancing end-products can only be created by the news media,31 nor do they require such products to be neutral or objective.32 Instead, this Article acknowledges that some form of self-interest has always been present in the news media and will likely always remain, especially given the commoditized and corporate-controlled media environment of the twenty-first century. It turns to the Press Clause to try to achieve a deliberatively useful end-product anyway that will advance democratic competence and in turn amplify civic discourse. Section II of this Article explores the historic origins of, and early interpretive approaches to, the Press Clause. This Section also elaborates on the presumptions underlying the granting of special privileges to the news media. Finally, this Section considers instances where the Supreme Court has found value in deliberation- enhancing activity but refrained from explicitly etching out its constitutional protection under the Press Clause due to the Speech Clause’s legitimizing function or to the definitional problems long associated with defining “the press” under the Press Clause. Section III discusses the jurisprudential development of the Speech Clause’s legitimizing function and its resulting challenges to democratic competence. Section IV advocates for democratic competence as a functional purpose of the Press Clause—a purpose that is consistent with deliberative values long acknowledged by the Supreme Court, and that offers a viable resolution to some of the challenges to democratic competence and civic discourse highlighted in Section III. II. THE PRESS CLAUSE AND STEWART’S INSTITUTIONAL PRESS IN CONTEXT The Constitution neither defines the meaning of the word “press” referenced in the First Amendment’s Press Clause nor grants specific or exclusive protections and privileges to the news media alone pursuant to that Clause.33 As with the First Amendment generally, the First Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses are not defined in the Constitution.34 Moreover, neither the Constitution nor early constitutional history reveal conclusively which freedoms the Framers aimed to protect in either the Speech Clause or the Press Clause, whether such undefined freedoms were distinct or duplicitous of each other, or whether one Clause enhanced the freedoms granted by the other.35 Also lacking was clear guidance about who or what constituted 31. Lange, supra note 30, at 103–04. 32. See Brent Cunningham, Re-Thinking Objectivity, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 2003, at 24, 28–31 (suggesting that journalists should acknowledge that their work is far more subjective than their objective aura implies). Persuasion and appeals to emotion are fine, but manipulation that deprives citizens of, and distracts them from, cognitive empowerment is not. LE CHEMINANT & PARRISH, supra note 1, at 70–75 (distinguishing deliberation-enhancing persuasion from strategic manipulative persuasion with the latter categorized as inhibiting deliberative choice and democracy). 33. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 34. See POST, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that the First Amendment is “mute about its purpose,” and therefore such a purpose must be constructed). 35. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California—one of the earliest cases on the First Amendment— extolled the values of the first Amendment as self-fulfilling and as enhancing democratic dialogue. 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). He did not, however, tease out the specific values that either the Speech or Press Clauses protected in furtherance of either causes. See Lange, supra note 30, at 102 (noting that B randeis’s opinion, while thoughtful, was not particularly helpful or instructive “about how the values are to 2013] USING THE PRESS CLAUSE TO AMPLIFY CIVIC DISCOURSE 277 the press or press function protected under the Press Clause, and which speech36 and speakers were protected under either or both Clauses.37 While the Supreme Court has developed a fairly comprehensive Speech Clause jurisprudence,38 it has not resolved the interpretive issues related to the Press Clause.39 Some contend that the Court has instead rendered the Press Clause a constitutional redundancy to the expansive scope of the Speech Clause.40 This interpretive redundancy conflicts with a long standing constitutional canon that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be without effect.”41 Although the Court has not expressly addressed the issue of the Press Clause’s constitutional meaning, one member of the Court, Justice Potter Stewart, did so over three-and-a-half decades ago.42 In a now well-known speech at Yale Law School, Justice Stewart proclaimed that the Press Clause applied only to the institutional press and by extension to its members—professional journalists.43 Citing several Supreme Court cases that had recently been decided, Stewart asserted that these cases evidenced a developing Supreme Court Press Clause jurisprudence that privileged the institutional press and endowed it with such enhanced freedoms under the Constitution.44 More specifically, Stewart contended that under the Press Clause, the institutional press was a protected fourth estate that was privileged with certain freedoms, including being exempt from compelled disclosure of be parceled out between individuals and the press” if it all). 36. The term “speech” itself was left undefined in terms of whether it related to oral utterances, conduct that communicates a message, or written communication. 37. See Nimmer, supra note 22, at 645–46 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)) (discussing the Court’s failure in Columbia Broadcasting to efficiently distinguish between Press and Speech Clause speakers while aptly balancing First Amendment values). 38. End-products covered by the Speech Clause extend far beyond verbal expressions. Spence v. Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974). Coverage includes verbal, written, and even symbolic expressions. See W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (“[T]he flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind.”). See infra Part III.C for a more detailed discussion of Speech Clause coverage. 39. Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“If the Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy.”). 40. E.g., West, supra note 19, at 1070 (“[T]he Press Clause has been interpreted to mean nothing more than the freedom to publish or disseminate individual speech—a right that is of dubious value considering that the Speech Clause protects these same freedoms.”). Although the Press Clause may have originally related to written communications, some contend that the expansive scope of the Speech Clause that covers written communications as well has essentially rendered the Press Clause redundant or at the very least unclear as to what distinct protections the Press Clause now provides. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Methodology in Free Speech Theory, 97 VA. L. REV. 549, 556 n.21 (2011) (welcoming the redundancy of the First Amendment in its protection of individual rights). 41. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); accord Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 643 (2008). 42. Justice Stewart presented before the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation on November 2, 1974, the remarks of which were reprinted in the Hastings Law Journal. See Stewart, supra note 39, at 631. 43. Id. at 633. 44. Stewart cited to the then-recent libel, right to access, and reporter privilege cases that had recently been decided by the Court, which presumably prompted his remarks on the issue. Id. at 631–36. See infra Part I I.D for a more detailed discussion of these cases. 278 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 confidential sources in grand jury investigations.45 To Stewart, these privileges and protections were not also available to non-news media speakers but were instead reserved only for this fourth estate and its professional members who disseminated information in that capacity.46 Presumably, the institutional press provided a valued service to America’s self-governing democracy and to civic discourse that other American speakers did not, or implicitly could not.47 Through its professional journalists, the institutional press provided responsible, verifiable, objective, and neutral expert analysis and critique, which in turn checked government, exposed abuses of power, and enhanced the deliberative capacity of American citizens.48 Therefore, to Stewart, the Press Clause protected and privileged the collective expression of the institutional press49 while the Speech Clause protected individual expression.50 For him, such exclusive privileges under the Press Clause were in exchange for the institutional press’ provision of a much-needed end-product that enhanced civic discourse.51 A. Originalism and the Press Clause—Early Press Function and Colonial Norms Prior to Justice Stewart’s speech at Yale, the Supreme Court had never made such an explicit affirmative determination regarding the Press Clause’s meaning, particularly as it related to a selective application of the Clause.52 In fact, the matter remains open and unresolved by the Court, as evidenced by the recent disagreement between Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia in the concurring opinions of the Citizens United decision.53 45. Stewart, supra note 39, at 634–35; see also Floyd Abrams, The Press is Different: Reflections on Justice Steward and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 564–65 (1979) (discussing Justice Stewart’s view that the Press Clause protects the press as an autonomous institution). 46. See id. at 635 (stating that the Supreme Court has never found the First Amendment to provide individuals immunity from defamation liability or nondisclosure of source protection). This professionalized capacity to Stewart reflected the norms and ethics of the responsible and professional journalists who were socially construed as the gatekeepers of civic discourse and the disseminators of reliable, objective, and civic knowledge to the public. Id. See infra Part II.D for a detailed discussion of Justice Stewart’s views on news media hegemony and the Press Clause. 47. See infra Part II.C for a more detailed discussion of the professionalization of civic and political discourse. 48. See Stewart, supra note 39, at 634 (arguing that the constitutional protection of a free press was motivated by a desire to create an additional check on the three branches of government). 49. In referring to the institutional press it is not clear whether Justice Stewart was referencing newspapers only or other news media sources such as broadcast journalism. Unless otherwise noted, this Article uses the term “institutional press” to refer specifically to the structured and organized profession of newspaper journalism in particular and uses the term “news media” to refer to professional journalism more broadly in other mediums, including the institutional press. 50. Stewart, supra note 39, at 633. 51. See id. at 634 (recognizing that the institutional press was meant to act as a check on the three official branches of government). 52. Id. at 632 (noting that from the 1920s to the 1970s, First Amendment cases did not consider the guarantee of a free press). 53. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928–29 (2010) (Scalia, J, concurring); id. at 951–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also West, supra note 19, at 1027 (noting that in the Citizens United case the two “justices were blowing the dust off of a constitutional question that the Court had not addressed in thirty years”).