CORPORATION Technological Lessons from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident Cynthia Dion-Schwarz, Sarah E. Evans, Edward Geist, Scott Warren Harold, V. Ray Koym, Scott Savitz, Lloyd Thrall For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR857 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-8827-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In March 2011, northern Japan was subjected to a devastating earth- quake and tsunami. One of the many secondary effects of these disas- ters was a loss of control of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear plant. This led to the dispersal of radioactive material into the environment, both immediately and over the following months. The focus of this research is on how various technologies were used to ascertain the extent of radioactive contamination, to prevent the spread of radioactivity that had already dispersed into the wider environment, to decontaminate areas or items, and to store radioactive material for extended periods, all while limiting human exposure to radiation. By capturing lessons regarding how technologies were used successfully, as well as identify- ing capability gaps that could have been alleviated through the better use of technologies or the development of novel technologies, this research is intended to help improve technological preparedness for any future radiological or nuclear incidents. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intel- ligence Community under Contract W91WAW-12-C-0030. For more information on the RAND Acquisition and Technol- ogy Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/atp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Summary ..........................................................................vii Acknowledgments .............................................................. xxi Abbreviations .................................................................. xxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 The Events Leading to the Contamination ..................................... 1 Motivation .......................................................................... 3 Organization of This Report ...................................................... 6 CHAPTER TWO Characterizing the Extent of Contamination ............................... 7 The Fukushima Experience with Characterizing the Extent of Contamination ................................................................ 9 Potential Solutions ................................................................12 Chapter Findings ..................................................................14 CHAPTER THREE Preventing Radiation Damage and Further Dispersion of Material ...17 The Problem of Radiation Suits and Collective Protection ..................17 The Problem of Personal Dosimetry ............................................19 The Problem of Medical and Genetic Aspects of Radiation Health Effects......................................................................... 22 The Problem of Agriculture, Food, and Drinking Water ................... 23 v vi Technological Lessons from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident The Problem of Containing Contaminated Materials to Prevent Further Dispersion ...........................................................25 Chapter Findings ................................................................. 26 CHAPTER FOUR Decontamination and Collection of Radioactive Material ..............29 Physical Methods of Decontamination ........................................ 30 Chemical Methods of Decontamination .......................................31 Decontamination of Water.......................................................32 Biological Methods of Decontamination.......................................33 The Fukushima Experience ..................................................... 34 Potential Solutions to the Decontamination Problem ........................35 Chapter Findings ................................................................. 36 CHAPTER FIVE Disposing of Contaminated Materials .......................................37 Chapter Findings ................................................................. 40 CHAPTER SIX Robotics Issues ...................................................................41 Chapter Findings ................................................................. 43 CHAPTER SEVEN Earlier Lessons from the Chernobyl Experience ...........................45 The Chernobyl Experience with Characterizing the Extent of Contamination ...............................................................45 The Chernobyl Experience with Decontamination .......................... 46 The Chernobyl Experience with in Situ Containment of Radioactive Contamination ...............................................................49 Chapter Findings ................................................................. 50 CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusions and Recommendations .........................................51 References .........................................................................55 For Further Reading ............................................................59 Summary Following the earthquake and tsunami in Japan on March 11, 2011, through December 2013, RAND analyzed how technologies had been used to address radioactive environmental contamination caused by the loss of control of the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The goal of this study is to analyze lessons from the Fukushima experience so that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) can be better prepared to respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies in the United States or overseas.1 Given prospective DoD needs and responsibilities following an incident, DoD stakeholders were keenly interested in understand- ing how technologies contributed to all of the following at Fukushima: • characterizing the extent of contamination over space and time • prevention and limitation of human exposure 1 For example, in the event of an attack in the United States using a nuclear weapon or a radiological dispersion device, DoD would likely be called upon to provide defense support to civil authorities (DSCA). If the attack happened in the vicinity of a military base, DoD would also need to respond to protect its own personnel and assets. In addition, DoD could be called upon to provide DSCA following a major release from a nuclear power plant in the United States, an accident involving nuclear weapons, or a leak from a nuclear-powered air- craft carrier or submarine. Overseas, DoD could be called upon to help respond to nuclear or radiological attacks against allied nations or U.S. bases within them. It may also need to respond to releases of radioactivity on battlefronts or in captured areas. Finally, DoD may help to respond to an accidental release overseas, as it was following the devastating earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident in Japan (DoD’s response was termed Operation Tomodachi, meaning “friend” in Japanese). See Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), “Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex,” June 2008; and FEMA, “Federal Radio- logical Preparedness Coordinating Committee,” FEMA website, updated June 26, 2013. Also see U.S. Northern Command, “Joint Task Force Civil Support,” website, undated. vii viii Technological Lessons from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident • decontamination operations • disposal of radioactive material. DoD was especially focused on understanding what gaps in response capabilities could have been addressed using technologies that are either not yet available or that have not yet been integrated in a way that would make them useful in the context of a radiation-dispersal incident. Potential investment in such technologies can make DoD more capable in responding to future radiological or nuclear incidents. Key Themes and Findings We found three recurring themes throughout our research: 1. Response capability requirements will be diverse. Specific response capability requirements will vary considerably from one incident to another, particularly if the incident is of a dif- ferent type (for example, a nuclear detonation, rather than loss of control at a nuclear plant). Requirements can also be highly localized over space and time within a single incident. 2. The scale of response required is a major driver behind the challenges involved. Given the vast areas and quantities of material affected by a large-scale incident, cost-benefit analyses are imperative. 3. Public perceptions will be a major factor shaping response. Even the most scientifically sound approaches cannot be imple- mented in the face of public opposition due to popular misper- ceptions or a loss of trust. As a result of our examination of the technological response to the Fukushima disaster, we found several promising areas for further technological development, along with a cautionary note regarding the use of some technologies: Summary ix • Distributed, wide-area sensors for rapid, real-time measurement— along with the employment of information technology to share data—will be critical for an effective response. • Unmanned systems—especially ground systems that are able to negotiate obstacles and operate autonomously in hazardous areas—are needed in austere, contaminated environments. • Personalized protection—hazmat suits, personal dosimetry, and medicine—will enable fuller and safer responses after a nuclear disaster. • Cost-effective technologies to decontaminate and store large quantities of water, land, and artificial surfaces would most cer- tainly be a game-changing set of technologies in such an event. • Public perceptions will powerfully shape the response to such a disaster—and may preclude some feasible and affordable techno- logical solutions. The Events Leading to the Contamination When the massive 9.0 moment magnitude2 earthquake shocked the Tohoku region on March 11, 2011, engineers and technicians immedi- ately initiated emergency shutdown procedures on the operating reac- tors at Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power station, about 160 kilometers away from the earthquake’s epicenter. The reactors, although suffering some damage, were built to withstand the large earthquakes common in Japan, with emergency backup power generators supplying electric- ity to operate crucial water-circulation equipment used to cool the fuel. Boron rods were automatically inserted into the fuel to stop the chain reaction, and operators initiated emergency water circulation powered by backup diesel generators. Then, an hour after the earthquake, tsu- nami waves up to 15 meters in height breached the 6-meter sea wall at Fukushima, and all power was lost, including the backup systems. 2 Readers may be more familiar with the Richter scale as a measure of an earthquake’s mag- nitude. Professional geologists have used the moment magnitude measure since about 1980 as a more precise measure of an earthquake’s energy release. The scales are quite similar, so a 9.0 moment magnitude earthquake is indeed a very large, once-in-a-generation event. x Technological Lessons from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident With the loss of power after the tsunami, passive heat genera- tion by the nuclear fuel continued, and the cooling water in reactors began to super-heat and corrode the fuel, thereby generating hydrogen gas. By day four, three of the reactors had experienced meltdowns and hydrogen explosions in the buildings housing several of the reactors, resulting in contamination of the surrounding countryside. Nuclear fission products—primarily comprising radioactive tellurium (half-life 14 seconds), iodine (half-life 8 days), and cesium (half-life 2 years or 30 years, depending on the isotope)—spread by the plants’ explosions contaminated the surrounding farmland, trees, villages, and ground and sea water. The tellurium and iodine rapidly decayed into harmless byproducts, but the cesium persists. The Japanese government is committed to cleaning up the immense area and will fully decommission the plant at Fukushima Dai-Ichi over the next several decades. This report discusses the suc- cesses and failures of the technologies used in the cleanup. Characterizing the Extent of Contamination and Personal Exposure Knowing the extent and nature of contamination as a function of time and space is essential for minimizing human exposure, designating the extent to which areas or resources can be used, and undertaking effec- tive decontamination efforts. While modeling can contribute greatly to such understanding, it needs to be supported and updated by data collection, given uncertainty about the quantity of radioactive materi- als released and their patterns of migration through the environment. Effective characterization can reduce the risk to both responders and the general populace and, in doing so, may boost public confidence in the response effort. It can also reduce the amount of material, time, and manual labor required to mount an effective response, as it reduces duplication of effort and increases efficiency. Shortly after the Fukushima event, a number of aerial surveys were conducted to rapidly enable broad decisionmaking regarding response. However, these aerial surveys had limited granularity in characterizing Summary xi local variations in radiation emissions, so subsequent ground surveys were necessary to provide more-detailed characterization. Radiation levels can vary appreciably over distances of as little as a few meters, due to topography, biological concentration, and other environmental factors. Radiation levels also change dynamically over time, as radioac- tive particles both migrate and decay. Further, air conditions (particu- larly wind, precipitation, and particulate matter) can interfere with reli- able and granular airborne characterization. Finally, an aerial survey can misinterpret higher-altitude areas, which are closer to the aircraft, as being more highly contaminated than lower-lying areas with the same or greater degrees of contamination. Moreover, aerial surveys are resource-intensive and costly; experts whom we interviewed cited a desire for a larger number of simpler, less-expensive methods. Unfortunately, ground surveys by vehicles and robots were greatly impeded by the destruction of the area’s infrastructure, including fuel supplies, road networks, electricity, potable water supplies, and com- munication networks. Despite these problems, both personnel in vehi- cles and robots conducted a great deal of ground survey work. Unfor- tunately, the data sets collected by these surveys were not integrated into a common operational picture. Overall, gaps in knowledge of radioactive contamination contributed to both response shortfalls and additional risk to personnel. In the event of a future attack or accident releasing radiation, DoD would likely be called upon to help characterize radiation levels (as it did in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident). In many pos- sible circumstances, the affected area’s physical infrastructure would be degraded due to a concomitant disaster or attack, as it was in Fuku- shima. As such, aerial surveys would likely be a useful initial source of information. Moreover, based on the Fukushima experience, there is a need for rapidly deployable distributed sensors that can report continu- ously on local radioactivity and wind conditions. Such sensors could be situated on inhabited or unmanned vehicles, or distributed from such vehicles onto the ground and other surfaces. Naturally, the sen- sors would need to be small, rugged, low-cost, radiation-hardened, and long-endurance. They would need to provide low-bandwidth trans- missions to relay platforms, such as unmanned aerial vehicles or aero-