SYRIA AND BEYOND: MANAGING RUSSIAN AMBITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University January 2018 Policy Workshop Final Report AUTHORS Alexander Brockwehl Amy Coppernoll Stefan Kondić Mary Ana McGlasson Margaret Mullins Marcelo Norsworthy Christine Östlund Jessica Sarriot James Smyth Kent Troutman Andi Zhou FACULTY DIRECTOR Daniel C. Kurtzer Lecturer and S. Daniel Abraham Professor in Middle Eastern Policy Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Former United States Ambassador to Israel and Egypt Cover photo: Presidents Hassan Rouhani of Iran, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey meet in Sochi, Russia, November 2017. (Photo courtesy President of Russia) Syria and Beyond: Managing Russian Ambitions in the Middle East PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This is the final report of a 2017 Policy Workshop, the capstone project of the Master in Public Affairs program at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Under the direction of Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer, former U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel, 11 graduate students spent several months researching U.S. and Russian foreign policy in the Middle East in order to present U.S. policymakers with recommendations about cooperation, competition, and conflict with Russia in the region. As Syria is the nexus of Russia’s campaign to expand its regional influence, the students decided to focus on Russian and American policy in that country. They consulted 28 current and former officials and scholars in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the United States. All authors participated in the preparation of this report. As a collaborative project, the report does not represent the views of Princeton University, Ambassador Kurtzer, anyone interviewed for this workshop, or any individual student. Each student also wrote an individual research paper on an aspect of the topic in preparation for this report. Summaries of these supplemental research papers are available in Appendix B. We would like to thank Dean Cecilia E. Rouse, Associate Dean Karen McGuinness, Associate Director of Fi- nance and Administration Jeffrey Oakman, Bernadette Yeager, and everyone at the Woodrow Wilson School who helped make this workshop possible. Policy Workshop members from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow, Russia, October 2017. 3 WWS Graduate Policy Workshop Report TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms ......................................................................................................................... 5 Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 6 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 7 Russia’s World View .......................................................................................................................... 7 U.S. Interests in the Middle East ....................................................................................................... 8 Russian Interests in the Middle East ................................................................................................. 9 Assumptions of the Current Environment ...................................................................................... 10 Goal 1: Reassert U.S. Leadership and Credibility ........................................................... 11 Turkey ................................................................................................................................................. 12 Saudi Arabia ..................................................................................................................................... 13 Israel ................................................................................................................................................... 14 Iraq ..................................................................................................................................................... 14 Jordan ................................................................................................................................................ 15 Egypt .................................................................................................................................................. 15 Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 17 Goal 2: Syria on the Ground and the Peace Process ...................................................... 19 The Syria Peace Process ................................................................................................................. 20 Stabilization or Reconstruction? ..................................................................................................... 21 Counterterrorism ............................................................................................................................... 22 The Syrian Kurds ............................................................................................................................... 22 Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 23 Goal 3: Limit Iranian Expansionism ............................................................................... 25 Russia-Iran Cooperation .................................................................................................................. 25 Potential Areas of Russia-Iran Conflict ......................................................................................... 25 The Importance of U.S. Credibility ............................................................................................... 27 Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 27 Guiding Principles for Engaging Russia ......................................................................... 29 Appendix A: Field Interviews ......................................................................................... 31 Appendix B: Summaries of Supplemental Papers .......................................................... 33 Appendix C: Workshop Participant Biographies ............................................................. 38 Endnotes ......................................................................................................................... 40 4 Syria and Beyond: Managing Russian Ambitions in the Middle East ACRONYMS DMZ Demilitarized zone EU European Union ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action LANDCOM Allied Land Command, NATO NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries P5+1 The five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party PYD Democratic Union Party SDF Syrian Democratic Forces UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution YPG People’s Protection Units 5 WWS Graduate Policy Workshop Report EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Russia is actively competing with the United ISIS is nearly defeated from a military perspective, States for influence in the Middle East. but the United States still has an important, albeit limited, role to play on the ground in Syria and within The Syria crisis is one theater where Russia projects the peace process in order to address the humanitar- itself as a competitor in great power politics. It has ian crisis and prevent further conflict, instability, and taken advantage of opportunities there to strengthen terrorist recruitment. To counter Russia’s pro-regime ties with U.S. allies in the region and present itself as stance, the United States should bolster the Geneva a powerful broker of regime security, undermining process as the legitimate forum for achieving a politi- U.S. influence in the process. A key tactical partner in cal settlement in Syria on the basis of the Geneva this effort is Iran. Because Russia consistently defines Communique and UNSCR 2254. Renewed U.S. its interest in opposition to those of the West, its diplomatic engagement with partners in the region short-term tactics may have negative and destabiliz- will be crucial to returning the spotlight to Geneva. ing long-term consequences.1 In response, the United States should undertake a concerted diplomatic The United States should also focus on “Humanitar- campaign to defend its interests and allies while ian Plus” initiatives to restore basic shelter, electricity, signaling openness to working with Russia on issues safe water delivery infrastructure, essential medical of mutual concern. We recommend three strategies: services, and primary education in former ISIS-held areas outside of regime control, such as Raqqa and 1) Reassert U.S. leadership and credibility, counter- Deir Ezzour, and other areas the United States and its balancing Moscow’s influence in the region by allies, Turkey and Jordan, control or support. bolstering U.S. relations with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt. 3) Challenge Russia to restrain Iran. The resources the United States would need to devote Recent cooperation between Russia and Iran has to acquiring significant leverage in Syria should in- encouraged the perception that Moscow has influ- stead be spent reinforcing America's regional alliance ence over Tehran; indeed, Russia has acted as a de system. Russia has taken advantage of its strong facto representative of Iranian positions in talks with position in Syria to create transactional relationships other regional players such as the United States and selling arms and nuclear energy to traditional U.S. Israel. However, the Russia-Iran relationship is better allies. Although Syria itself is not crucial to U.S. characterized as opportunism rather than as a binding interests, the relationship with these U.S. allies is. The alliance. The United States should seek to highlight United States should therefore prioritize strengthen- differences between the two states’ objectives. ing bilateral relations with key regional actors to Since an Iran-Israel war would be in neither regain the upper hand. In addition to strengthening America’s nor Russia’s interests, the United States U.S. credibility and staying power, such an approach should engage with Russia on a UN Security Council will prepare the United States to grapple with the Resolution to create an expanded DMZ in southern Syrian conflict in the future if the situation devolves Syria. This would lend international legitimacy to into violence once again. U.S. efforts to distance Iranian forces from Syria’s 2) Maintain a military and diplomatic presence in southern border. Moreover, the United States must Syria to prevent a resurgence of ISIS and al-Qaeda stand by the JCPOA to preserve the credibility of its and promote an inclusive peace process in accord- threats and assurances to Russia and Iran, and to keep ance with UNSCR 2254. Russia accountable for preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. 6 Syria and Beyond: Managing Russian Ambitions in the Middle East INTRODUCTION iven Russia’s structural economic the liberal order in the post-Cold War period and now G challenges, restoring Russians’ pride in must contend with Russia as a spoiler. their country’s international standing is an Russia sees itself as a deserving but denigrated and increasingly vital element of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy to shore up his dismissed world power. Many Russians, and certainly the leaders in the Kremlin today, view the 1990s as a domestic legitimacy. Projecting Russia as a major period when the West—namely NATO and the competitor of the United States in great power politics is crucial to this effort, and Syria is Russia’s United States—took advantage of Russia’s weakened position and built a world order without them. The primary platform for doing so in the Middle East. West’s expansion of its security and economic sphere Moscow’s intervention on behalf of the regime of into Eastern Europe and the walking-back of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has precluded the promises of investment, coupled with a preoccupa- United States’ preferred outcome of regime change; tion with the Middle East, left Russia and Russians bolstered the regional position of Russia’s tactical feeling isolated and forgotten. ally, Iran, a rival of the United States and its regional Vladimir Putin’s rule has two aims: 1) preserve the allies; and created opportunities for Russia to build system of patronage and personal enrichment he and constructive relationships with various American his allies created after breaking the power of the allies and undermine U.S. influence in the Middle East. Although Russia has stabilized Assad’s position, original oligarchs established in the 1990s; and 2) restore Russia’s role on the world stage and reassert it may have increased the potential for conflict in the its sphere of influence. The regime is opportunistic long term, particularly between Israel and the Iranian and focused on survival and profit. That survival is forces and militias in southern Syria. dependent on a base level of economic stability— Stymied by the Assad regime’s persistence and un- essentially, preventing a recurrence of the volatility of willing to intervene militarily to turn the tables, the the 1990s—and entrenching the regime in the iden- United States has ceded primacy in Syria to Russia. tity of the nation-state. However, the United States must not surrender Putin has actively promoted the image of himself as a regional leadership to Moscow. In this report, we modern (re)uniter and protector of Russian recommend policies for the United States to compete greatness. Unable to reconcile itself to the West’s with Russia for regional leadership, cooperate with it vision and values, Russia has sought to reassert itself on matters of mutual concern, and prevail in points of as an alternative diplomatic and military power, conflict. featuring lower standards for human rights and democracy coupled with access to and willingness to Russia’s World View use vast natural resources and territory. Russia has used protection of Russian minorities or former Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. policy Russian territory as a pretext for its attacks on establishment has struggled to formulate a Russia Georgia and Ukraine and support for frozen conflicts policy that simultaneously satisfies Russians' desire in Moldova and Armenia. With its armament and for recognition as more than a former power while support of the Syrian regime in the face of fierce acknowledging the power asymmetry between the international criticism, Russia has acted to protect its two countries. The United States and Western interests outside its traditional sphere of influence. In Europe failed to sufficiently incorporate Russia into each of these instances, Russia has sought to portray itself domestically and internationally as a defender 7 WWS Graduate Policy Workshop Report against NATO/EU/U.S. aggression, and paint the special operations forces to many other states in the resulting sanctions as unjust. region. With an economy largely based on the extraction of Although the United States has never played a natural resources, Russia is highly dependent upon significant role in Syria, the civil war has complicated the prices of major commodities, particularly oil and American policy because, as a failed state, Syria could gas, which alone accounted for 46 percent of federal destabilize U.S. allies and partners and serve as a government revenue over the past five years.2 As a haven for violent extremists and Iranian militants. result of weak commodity prices and heightened Moreover, the preservation of the Assad regime geopolitical risks related to Russia’s invasion of precluded the emergence of a democratic Syria that is Ukraine, the value of the ruble plunged3 in the second friendlier with the United States. half of 2014 and today remains almost 50 percent below its June 2014 value against the U.S. dollar.4 American interests in the region should include the following: This has caused a rapid decrease in living standards: household income growth in U.S. dollar terms has 1. Prevent growth of violent extremist organiza- been negative each year since 2014.5 Coupled with tions. U.S. domestic security concerns make ongoing and increasing sanctions and widespread preventing the rise and spread of organizations corruption, average Russians are measurably worse like ISIS and al-Qaeda a priority. off than they were four years ago, which has prompted renewed protests led by an organized 2. Support regional allies and partners. Turkey is a opposition that has garnered broader support than NATO ally. The United States continues to other recent movements.6 maintain a special relationship with Israel, whose security is threatened by the Iranian military and However, Putin’s United Russia party remains very militia presence in Syria. Other strategically popular, and we foresee no serious challenge in the significant regional partners include Saudi spring 2018 election, a year in which Russia will Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt. showcase itself on the world stage by hosting the FIFA World Cup. The Syria campaign is the first time 3. Limit Iranian expansionism. The United States Russia has forward-deployed military personnel and has a political and security interest in containing assets since the 1980s.7 Russia sees in Syria not only Iranian influence and military expansion in the an opportunity to maintain its foothold in the region Levant. Iran is funding actors such as Hezbollah via its military bases, but also to demonstrate to the and the Assad regime that are hostile to U.S. international community—and its own electorate— interests and allies. At the same time, the United that it has the capability and influence to be a great States should continue to support the JCPOA as a power. means of forestalling Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. U.S. Interests in the Middle East 4. Maintain stability in global energy flows. Middle East energy supplies are crucial to the Since the conclusion of World War II, the end of world economy. A rules-based order and European colonialism in the region, and more functioning trade partnerships facilitate Ameri- recently the September 11th attacks, U.S. interests, can prosperity. partners, and presence in the Middle East have increased significantly. Today, the United States 5. Reassure allies and partners in NATO and the maintains a significant conventional military European Union. The effects of mass migration footprint in Iraq and Afghanistan and has deployed to Europe as well as the threat of ISIS- and al- Qaeda-trained or inspired terrorists are top 8 Syria and Beyond: Managing Russian Ambitions in the Middle East priorities for European leadership, particularly whether a long-term resolution to the Syria crisis is an key U.S. allies facing far-right and populist urgent priority for Russia; while the Kremlin could challengers. burnish its global prestige by brokering a successful settlement, Russian withdrawal would reduce Russian Interests in the Middle Moscow’s contact points with other regional players absent new opportunities for involvement. East Russian interests can be summarized as follows: Although Russian influence in and engagement with 1. Reassert influence on the world stage. the Middle East diminished following the dissolution Reenacting the Soviet Union’s role as a major of the Soviet Union, Russia has reasserted itself in player in the Middle East and conducting recent years. It rhetorically defends the right of successful military operations outside their “near regimes to preserve sovereignty and stability by any abroad” reinforce the domestic perception of means necessary, a position analogous to its own doctrine on domestic politics. Otherwise, Russia’s Russia as a global power while simultaneously undermining U.S. and European leadership. diplomatic relationships are chiefly transactional in nature, with tangible points of interest taking 2. Gain and maintain regional influence. The precedence over formal alliances. Syrian government has long been friendly to Russia has used transactions—specifically arms sales Russia and is now dependent on it. Syria’s and energy deals, among other means—to build neighbors must consult with Russia to ensure the crisis does not spill over their borders. Moreover, productive relationships in the Middle East. There Russia’s naval base in Tartus and air base in are typically no strings attached to these Latakia facilitate power projection in the Middle arrangements; as such, divergence in interests is not East and Mediterranean. necessarily an obstacle to bilateral relations, as exemplified by the increasingly constructive 3. Maintain and grow economic partnerships. The Russian-Israeli relationship. Russia does not intend current cycle of low oil prices incentivizes oil- to recreate U.S.-type relations with Middle Eastern exporting nations to cooperate with each other. countries, but rather to undermine U.S. hegemony in Although Russia and OPEC are traditionally the region by ensuring there is more than one rivals, in the last year they have coordinated on oil influential external actor. Thus, the threat Russia supply in attempts to affect prices. Using Syria as poses is not that it will supplant the United States, but a showcase for its weapons, Russia has also rather that it will undermine U.S. bilateral security proactively expanded its arms clientele in the alliances—a core component of U.S. influence in the region, notably inking new deals with Iran as well Middle East—by diminishing the essentiality of U.S. as U.S. partners Egypt and Turkey. security guarantees for key countries in the region. 4. Prevent the spread of violent extremist Russia primarily pursues its objectives in the Middle organizations. There are more foreign fighters in East through its current role in Syria. Although Syria Syria from Russia than from any other European under the Assads has been Russia’s primary regional nation.8 Russia remains concerned about a client from even before the Soviet Union’s demise, possible uprising in Chechnya, where the the Kremlin has positioned itself in the center of majority of those fighters originated. Though its Syrian politics through its military intervention, and methods are not in keeping with U.S. rules of in the center of multilateral talks on Syria’s future by engagement, Russia has an interest in preventing organizing negotiations in Astana and Sochi parallel the growth of violent extremist organizations in to the struggling Geneva track. It is unclear to us Syria due to both domestic security concerns and 9