Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy Susanne Langer and the Woeful World of Facts Volume 5, Number 2 Giulia Felappi EditorinChief KevinC.Klement,UniversityofMassachusetts EditorialBoard SusanneLangerismainlyknownastheAmericanphilosopher AnnalisaColiva,UniversityofModenaandUCIrvine who, starting from her famous Philosophy in a New Key (1942), GaryEbbs,IndianaUniversityBloomington worked in aesthetics and famously saw art as the product of GregFrost-Arnold,HobartandWilliamSmithColleges the human mind’s most important, distinctive and remarkable HenryJackman,YorkUniversity ability,i.e.,theabilitytosymbolise. ButLanger’slaterconsider- SandraLapointe,McMasterUniversity ationoftheconnectionbetweenartandsymbolispropagatedby ConsueloPreti,TheCollegeofNewJersey an early interest in the logic of symbols themselves. This rather MarcusRossberg,UniversityofConnecticut neglectedearlypartofLanger’sthoughtandherearlyinterests AnthonySkelton,WesternUniversity andlinesofreasoning,whichshesomehowabandonedlateron MarkTextor,King’sCollegeLondon to dedicate herself exclusively to the study of art, are the topic AudreyYap,UniversityofVictoria ofthispaper. RichardZach,UniversityofCalgary ReviewEditors JulietFloyd,BostonUniversity ChrisPincock,OhioStateUniversity AssistantReviewEditor SeanMorris,MetropolitanStateUniversityofDenver Design DanielHarris,HunterCollege jhaponline.org SpecialIssue: WomeninEarlyAnalyticPhilosophy ©2017GiuliaFelappi EditedbyMariavanderSchaarandEricSchliesser Susanne Langer and the Woeful World of ercisesontheappearanceofrelationalstructures,andtherewith,of Facts course,ontheformsinwhichproblemspresentthemselves. This [is]“notationalrelativity,”ashecalledit... (Langer1964,307).1 Giulia Felappi As we will see, this notion of notational relativity will be central fortheyoungLangerinreachingherconclusions. Afterhergraduationin1924,shestartedherPh.D.atRadcliffe Everyadvanceinlogicisagaininmetaphysicalinsight. in1925,theyearinwhichWhiteheadmovedtoHarvardandhe became her supervisor. In 1925, while Langer was his student, –Langer,ThePracticeofPhilosophy(1930b,101) Whitehead gave some lectures at Harvard that then led to his famousScienceandtheModernWorld. InthelecturesWhitehead 1. Introduction advancedhisfamousthesisthat SusanneLangerismainlyknownastheAmericanphilosopher ... nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the who, starting from her famous Philosophy in a New Key (1942), process...The realities of nature are the prehensions in nature, worked in aesthetics and famously saw art as the product of thatistosay,theeventsinnature. (Whitehead1925,74) the human mind’s most important, distinctive and remarkable Langer often stated that Whitehead’s ‘brilliant’ (Langer and ability,i.e.,theabilitytosymbolise,andtookartiststouseape- Gadol1950,120)notionofeventandhisconsequentprocessphi- culiar,non-discursive,incommunicablethroughlanguage,way losophyhavebeenhismostimportantsubstantivecontributions of symbolising, in order to express what they know about the to philosophy, which, as we will see, she explicitly inherited.2 humanmindanditsfeelings. But,asLangmaintained,Langer’s During her Ph.D., she studied Russell, Wittgenstein and the laterconsiderationoftheconnectionbetweenartandsymbolis American Pragmatists, while attending Whitehead’s and Shef- ‘propagatedbyanearlyinterestinthesymbolalone’(Lang1962, fer’slecturesonlogicandmetaphysics. In1926shedefendedher 349). This rather neglected early part of Langer’s thought and dissertation, A Logical Analysis of Meaning, and she also started her early interests and lines of reasoning, which she somehow publishingsomeoriginalpapersinMindandTheJournalofPhi- abandoned later on to dedicate herself exclusively to the study losophyonthelogicalparadoxes. Inthe1930sshewasoneofthe ofart,willbethetopicofthispaper. founders, together with Lewis, Church and Quine, of the As- Alreadyatthebeginningofthedevelopmentofherthoughts, sociation for Symbolic Logic and she was one of the editors of Langer is an eclectic reader and thinker. As an undergraduate theassociation’spublication,theJournalofSymbolicLogic,where at Radcliffe College, which offered to women the equivalent of she also contributed from 1936 to 1939 many reviews of works aHarvarddegree,shestudiedunderthesupervisionofSheffer, by Russell, Tarski, Fitch and Bocheński among others. In 1937, who introduced her to logic and in particular to the work of shemoreoverpublishedherownIntroductiontoSymbolicLogic. Royce, which she took into great consideration (Langer 1927, 123,1937a,39). AboutSheffer,shesaid: 1InLangerandGadol(1950,125–26),shestatesthatthisdiscoverywasmade bySheffer,aswellasbyPeirce. Sheffer’schiefcontributiontologic,and(overhisprotests)tophi- 2For Whitehead’s influence on the later Langer, and in particular on her losophy,washisdemonstrationoftheinfluencewhichnotationex- aestheticsandphilosophyofmind,seeDryden(1997). JournalfortheHistoryofAnalyticalPhilosophyvol.5no.2 [38] ButtheyoungLangerwasnotmerelyatalentedlogician. She connectionwithallmyearlierstudies,whichhadcenteredaround wasinfactalreadyinfluencedbytheneo-Kantiantraditionand symbolic logic. This new view of symbolization and meaning alreadyinterestedintheissuesthattraditionwastryingtosolve. stemmed from the Kantian analysis of experience, and had been highlydevelopedinCassirer. (Langer1962,58) In an interview with the New Yorker in 1967 she said that she readKant’sCritiqueOfPureReasoninherearlyteens(Kuhlman In fact, as early as in 1930, she refers to Cassirer when it comes 2002,282),andin1962shemaintainedthatshestartedphiloso- to defining symbols (1930b, 158–64) and in 1927 she is already phyundertheinfluenceoftheKantianlineofthought,withits urging that we should not confine ourselves to propositional ‘newdominantnotion,thetranscendentalsourcesofexperience’ formsandsymbols(1927,123). (Langer1962, 55). Herfirstpublishedpapersintheearly1920s While Cassirer, Whitehead and Sheffer are her main explicit are reviews in the Journal of Philosophy of works by Erdmann inspirationsinheryoungreflections,shealsoreferredtoauthors (1924a), Cohn (1924b), and of a Festschrift for Natorp (1924c). so diverse as Meinong, Husserl, Dewey, Schiller, Peirce, Broad Inthislastreview,shepraisesneo-Kantianismingeneralforits (Langer1930b,21),LadyWelby(1930b,106),James(1930b,79), abilityto‘embracesomanyphasesofthisdisjointedworldinits Freud(1930b,149),Einstein,WeylandReichenbach(1930c,611), unifying perspective’ (1924c, 697). Moreover, she in particular SpinozaandRamsey(1933,179;seealsoInnis2009,8–9;Nelson praises, for its clarity and originality, a paper by Cassirer, who 1994, 290). Starting from this extremely heterogeneous back- would always be one of her main explicit inspirations. In 1946 ground, in the 1920s and 1930s Langer worked in logic and on LangertranslatedinEnglishafragmentofCassirer’sDiePhiloso- those‘philosophicalproblemswhicharisedirectlyfromlogical phiederSymbolischenFormenandinhertranslator’sintroduction considerations’ (1937a, 334). We will see those ‘philosophical shestatesthatCassirer’smaininsighthasbeenthat problems’ in §3. Before that, we need first to consider, in the next section, what she thinks the relevant ‘logical considera- Humanintelligencebeginswithconception,theprimementalac- tions’are. tivity; the process of conception always culminates in symbolic expression...thestudyofsymbolicformsoffersakeytotheforms ofhumanconception. Thegenesisofsymbolicforms—verbal,re- 2. Langer’s Idea of Logic ligious, artistic, mathematical, or whatever modes of expression therebe—istheodysseyofthemind. (Langer1946,ix–x) In1926,inherfirsttwooriginalarticles,Langerdealsprimarily with logical paradoxes, and in particular with the following This insight shaped Langer’s reflections right from the start of paradox: hercareerand, aswewillsee, thisrichnotionofsymbolwillbe relevant also in her early reflections.3 As she in fact retrospec- ... oneproblemseems...toreduceeven“scientificphilosophers,” i.e.,logicians,toasortofmysticism: thatistheproblemofrelating tivelystatedherself theabstractformofanythingtoitsspecificcontent...Thisrelation ItwasinreflectingonthenatureofartthatIcameonaconception offormandcontentraisesaninterestinganddifficultproblem. At ofthesymbolrelationquitedistinctfromtheoneIhadformedin firstsightitappearsobviousthattherecanbesucharelation;but if there is, then it can be expressed symbolically, as R(f,c); and 3ForCassirer’sinfluenceonthelaterLanger,seeSchultz(2000,chaps.10, therebywehavetransformedourempiricalcontentintoatermof 11). theformalstructure,i.e.,wehaveformalizedit,andarenolonger JournalfortheHistoryofAnalyticalPhilosophyvol.5no.2 [39] dealing with the non-logical content. Thus it seems there can be anyplace. Thelocationsodescribedisthendescribedviaaform nosuchthingastherelationbetweentheformofathingandthe which is relative, that is, relative to the geometry employed in contentofthatform,sincethisrelationwouldentailatrueparadox the description. Other examples concern metaphysics: we can (Langer1926b,436) employ ‘notions such as “space-time events” or...Leibnizian which she takes to be ‘the basis of Mr. Wittgenstein’s mysti- “monads”’ (1930b, 135). Similarly, Whitehead’s different ways cism’ (1926a, 225-6), given that for Wittgenstein what is com- ofbreakingupthesubjectmatterofexperience—‘(i)events,(ii) mon to a form and its content can only be shown, not put into percipientobjects, (iii)sense-objects, (iv)perceptualobjects, (v) words. Langermaintainsthatparadoxesingeneraldonotreally scientificobjects’(1919,60)—areforLangerexamplesofdifferent threatenlogic: systems of forms. Another obvious example of form-relativity for Langer is relativity to language: when we put a thought ... intruth,thereisnometaphysicalvirtueinparadox. Thelaws into words, we can use different languages and the sentences of logic have not produced it; the world does not contain it. The of the different languages will have different forms (1933, 182). presence of a true paradox in any proposition is essentially an index of non-significance, and therefore it is a symptom of some Thus, Langer urges, we can analyse nature in terms of events philosopher’s muddle-mindedness, not an indictment of Reality or in terms of sense-objects and each analysis is relative to the oroflogic. (Langer1926b,435;seealso1933,181) kind of concepts (1930b, 131) we have chosen to employ, to the perspective we are seeing nature from. We can choose to use Paradoxes,antinomiesandothersophismshavebeenwithussince the beginning of philosophy, because no one could discover the sentences that employ the concept of event. These sentences confusion of concepts which engendered them. To Mr. Russell have their forms, but those forms should not be taken as the belongsthecreditforthisdiscovery. (Langer1926a,222) only possible forms, since we could use sentences that employ instead the concept of sense-objects and these sentences would ThusLangerthinksthatparadoxesshouldbedissolvedbyfind- havedifferentforms. Thuseachformisrelativetothesystemto ing a confusion and in the case of the paradox of form and con- whichitbelongsandeachsystemisoneofthepossiblewaysof tentshethinks(withRussell,intheintroductiontoWittgenstein analysis. In1933Langerstressesthispointevenmoreexplicitly: 1922,xxiii–v,whichsherefersto)thattheconfusionofconcepts is in the thesis that there is the form of something. For, as she ... the types of relationship which are exemplified in a proposi- says she learnt from Sheffer (1921; 1927) and Whitehead (1919, tion depend upon a certain way in which the subject-matter is 59–60),thereisno‘suchathingastheformofanything. Alog- construed. Constituentsandrelationsalikedependuponapartic- ularlogicalformulationofasystem,andthisinitialconception,the ical form is always relative to a system’ (Langer 1926b, 437; see primitivenotions,formthe“logicallanguage.” Therearetypesof also1930b,135–38). logicallanguage, whichyieldvarioustypesofsystem...alltypes Asanexampleofdifferentformswhichmighthelpusinun- ofrelationappearmerelyasspecial,moreorlessarbitraryformu- derstanding what she had in mind, in her articles in 1920s and lations. Thusinthelastcountnostructureisabsolute,norelation 1930s and in her first book, The Practice of Philosophy (1930b), peculiar to the material in hand, no analysis of fact the only true Langergivesthefollowing: ‘Ifnowwewoulddescribetheloca- one. (Langer1933,182) tionofanyplace,wemustuseonegeometryortheother’(1930b, Each different form exhibits only some aspects of what it is a 137;seealso1927,124). Thus,forexample,differentgeometries symbolof,sothateachformisnecessarily‘selective’(1930b,142). are different systems within which we describe the location of JournalfortheHistoryofAnalyticalPhilosophyvol.5no.2 [40] Influenced by the Pragmatists, Langer holds that in different This suggests that the totality of forms is illegitimate because circumstancesdifferentformswillbecomerelevant,depending therearemanyformsalsoforthisallegedtotality,andsosucha on the ‘purpose in hand’ (1930b, 141; see also 1933, 183), while totality is a totality only relatively to the language in which we maintaining, in a Kantian vein, that ‘this does not imply that aredefiningit. Asaconsequence,themembersareonlydefinable the categorical element, or structure, is a subjective ingredient; in terms of that total, and then it is to be ruled out according to forms are found in experience, not added to it’ (1930b, 143). Russell’s principle.5 Langer’s conclusion is then that if there Since it will be the purpose that will make one particular form weretheformofsomething,thenwewouldhaveaparadoxcon- relevant, as such all forms are on a par, no one is privileged, cerningtherelationbetweensuchaformanditscontent,andwe thereisnothingliketheform. wouldbeledtomysticismaboutsuchrelation. Butthenotionof She then considers whether we can take the form to be ‘the theformistheproductofsomephilosopher’smuddle-mindedness, class of all possible forms under which the object in question it ‘exhibits no true paradox, and therefore does not necessarily can be conceived’ (1926b, 437) and maintains that this form as inviteourmysticalcontemplation’(1926b,438). theclassofallpossibleformsshowsaswellaconfusionofconcepts. From the alleged paradox we can learn, according to Langer, LangerrelieshereonRussell’snotionofillegitimatetotalitiesand also what logic should be really taken to be about. Follow- hisviciouscircleprinciplei.e.:4 ing Royce, she took logic to be the study of patterns and forms (Langer 1927, 123; 1930b, 83), the tracingof types and relations By saying that a set has “no total,” we mean, primarily, that no amongabstractedforms(1937a,39),suchthatsomethingmight significantstatementcanbemadeabout“allitsmembers.” become a symbol of something else. Propositional logic and Theprinciplewhichenablesustoavoidillegitimatetotalitiesmay language are, as we just saw, some forms among many, and bestatedasfollows: “Whateverinvolvesallofacollectionmustnot therefore logic, as the study of forms, should go beyond them, beoneofthecollection”;or,conversely: “If,providedacertaincol- anditstopicshouldbemuchwider: lectionhadatotal,itwouldhavemembersonlydefinableinterms ofthattotal,thenthesaidcollectionhasnototal.” (Whiteheadand Russell1910,39–40) ... anything may be said to have form that follows a pattern of anysort,exhibitsorder,internalconnection...andthebridgethat andsuggeststhatsuchaclassofformsprovesuponinspectionto connectsallthevariousmeaningsofform—fromgeometricform bejustonemoreillegitimatetotality. Sheisnotexplicitonwhy to the form of ritual or etiquette—this is the notion of structure. suchaclassistobeconsideredillegitimate,butshesaysthatthe Thelogicalformofathingisthewaythatthingisconstructed,the wayitisputtogether(1937a,23-24).6 variousformsare‘radicallydiverse’(1926b,437),‘incompatible, actuallyareincommensurable’(1930b,138),sothat 5ToescapeWittgenstein’smysticism,alsoRussellsuggests,asanhypothe- There is no “Interlingua” which is an abstraction from languages; sis,totakesuchtotalityofformstobeillegitimateand,asmuchasLanger,does wecanuseonlyonelanguageoneachoccasion,andwemustuse notspecifywhyitisillegitimate. Russellmoreoverurges: ‘Suchanhypothesis justone. (Langer1926b,437–38;seealso1933,182) isverydifficult,andIcanseeobjectionstoitwhichatthemomentIdonot know how to answer’ (introd. to Wittgenstein 1922, xxiv–xxv), although he 4SheattributesthenotionandprincipleonlytoRussellbecause,shesays, doesnotsaywhattheseobjectionsare. Langerreferstothesepassages,but ‘[w]ehaveProf.Whitehead’sauthoritytostatethatMr.Russellistheoriginator doesnotconsideranyobjectiontoherandRussell’swayoutofmysticism. ofthetype-theory’(1926a,222n1). 6In1926,Langermaintainsthatalthoughlogicshouldgobeyondlanguage, JournalfortheHistoryofAnalyticalPhilosophyvol.5no.2 [41] Sinceanythingmaybesaidtohaveform,itisunjustifiedtolimit Butwhatkindofimportantlogicalrelationscanthisricherlogic logictoconsiderationsonpropositionalforms. Moreover, such save from their present metaphysical limbo, i.e., what kind of philo- a wider ranging logic solves the paradox of form and content sophical topics will this logic lead us to, and how? Among the andmoregenerally‘promisestosavesomeimportantlogicalre- ‘philosophical problems which arise directly from logical con- lationsfromtheirpresentmetaphysicallimbo’(1927,129). Thus siderations’(1937a,334)isforLanger‘therelativityoflanguage, accordingtoLanger,logicisnotmerelyatoolforphilosophy,al- logicalpatterns,and“facts”’(1937a,334)andforadecade,from thoughapowerfulone,butalsomay‘leadusnaturallytophilo- 1926 to 1937, she worked on those issues or, as she also calls it, sophicaltopics,asindeeditwill—toproblemsofepistemology, on‘thewoefulworldoffacts’(1933,181). Inthenextsectionwe metaphysics, and even ethics. Logic applies to everything in willseewhatshethoughttheproblemwas,whathersolutions the world’ (1937a, 41). She in fact urged that she learnt from are,andthereasonssheadducesintheirsupport. Whitehead that logic influences philosophy (1930a, 362).7 For Langermetaphysicsis 3. The Woeful World of Facts ... a rational science. It proceeds from complicated general con- ceptstothediscoveryoftheirimplications,itexhibitstheirmean- Inher‘Facts: theLogicalPerspectivesoftheWorld’(1933),where ings... Metaphysics makes explicit all that a concept such as for shemainlydealswiththewoefulworldoffacts,Langer’sstarting instance “the World” or “Life” contains; it seeks to discover the pointisthefollowing: takeatruesentencesuchas‘MontBlanc meaning... (Langer1930b,34–35) ismorethan4,000metershigh’. Langerasks,if Sincemoreover‘meaningisexpression,whichdependsuponor- (A) Truesentencesexpressfacts der...forms...patterns’(1930b, 101–02), logicbeingthestudy offorms,then‘everyadvanceinlogicisagaininmetaphysical and insight’(1930b,101). (B) Facts are composed of objects and are the fundamental ingredientsoftheworld, languageisstillthecriterionforknowledge: ‘wecannotknowwhatcannot (insomelanguage)betalkedabout’(1926b,428). Butshethenquitequickly doesnot changedhermind. InLanger(1930b),inasectioninwhichCassirerisoften referredto,sheinfacturges: ‘non-discursivereasoning...isaconstituentin (C) Realobjects,notconcepts,areexpressedinpropositions ordinary intelligence, and, like all knowledge, involves the appreciation of symbolic structures qua symbols. A theory of meaning which either must ‘inevitably follow’ (1933, 185)? Of course it does. Langer then ignoresuchphenomenaasthesignificanceofArt...andtheexistenceofin- communicableknowledge...commitsexactlythesinsofnarrownesswhich quicklyurgesthat(A)istobetakenastrue,bysimplyremarking logical philosophy is supposed to avert’ (1930b, 152). Thus while logic in- that if a sentence is true, it should be faithful to reality and tendedasthestudyoflanguageisnotdelimitingwhatisthinkableandwhat then express a fact. Still, she rejects the conclusion (C) since canbeknown,logicasthemuchwiderstudyofsymbolsis,sinceallthoughts she maintains that there are logical reasons to reject (B). She has aretheproductofthemind’sabilitytosymbolize. 7 ShewouldthenretrospectivelysaythatshelearntthisalsofromPeirce twologicalargumentsfortheconclusionthat(B)isfalse. Before andRoyce(Langer1957,175). consideringwhatrejecting(B)leadsto,letusseeeachargument. JournalfortheHistoryofAnalyticalPhilosophyvol.5no.2 [42] Langer’s first, more developed argument, is composed of the “Coleridge drank opium,” “Coleridge ate opium.” The form re- followingthreesteps: mains unchanged throughout this series, but all the constituents (RejB1) Langer holds that ‘an excellent account of the logi- are altered. Thus form is not another constituent, but is the way theconstituentsareputtogether. Itisforms,inthissense,thatare cal prerequisites for meaning is given by Ludwig Wittgenstein’ theproperobjectofphilosophicallogic. (Russell1914,34) (Langer 1930b, 118; see also 1927, 124; 1933, 183) and together with him8 and, as she says, with Whitehead as well (Langer ThustheformLangerisinterestedinhereiswhatwewouldcall 1930b,108),shemaintainsthattruesentencesarepicturesoffacts thelogicalform10 and,againtogetherwithWittgenstein,shealso (1933, 183).9 What needs to hold in order for a sentence to be endorsestheclaimthatasapictureofafact,asentenceshould a picture of a fact? Also in answering this question, Langer sharewiththefactitisthepictureofitslogicalform,i.e.,should is Wittgenstenian. She holds that sentences have forms, and be analogous, i.e., have the same structure (1930b, 88, 115). She in order to give an account of the sort of form that belongs to reports a large number of the Tractatus’s sentences and, among language,sheholdsthatshe‘cannotdobetterthantoquoteRus- others, the following, for example, are all mentioned (1930b, sell’s admirably lucid exposition’ (1930b, 91) and often quotes 118–21): (1930b, 91–92; 1937a, 32–33) the following passage from ‘Logic astheEssenceOfPhilosophy’: 2.1Wemaketoourselvespicturesoffacts. 2.161 In the picture and the pictured there must be something Ineverypropositionandineveryinferencethereis,besidesthepar- identicalinorderthattheonecanbeapictureoftheotheratall. ticularsubject-matterconcerned,acertainform,awayinwhichthe constituents of the proposition or inference are put together...If 2.17Whatthepicturemusthaveincommonwithrealityinorder I say a number of things about Socrates—that he was an Athe- tobeabletorepresentitafteritsmanner—rightlyorfalsely—isits nian,thathemarriedXantippe,thathedrankthehemlock—there formofrepresentation. isacommonconstituent, namelySocrates, inallthepropositions I enunciate, but they have diverse forms. If, on the other hand, 2.2Thepicturehasthelogicalformofrepresentationincommon I take any one of these propositions and replace its constituents, withwhatitpictures. one at a time, by other constituents, the form remains constant, butnoconstituentremains. Take(say)theseriesofpropositions, (RejB2) Langer’s second point does not come from Wittgen- “Socrates drank the hemlock,” “Coleridge drank the hemlock,” stein, but from Sheffer and Whitehead, and is the thesis we already saw that form is not an absolute notion, since a logical 8AccordingtoInnis(2009,19,40),Wittgenstein’spicturetheoryisforthe formisalwaysrelativetoasystemandisalwaysjustoneamong mature Langer working in aesthetics just ‘really a metaphor, a model and many. doesnotconstituteanyclaimtoastrictidentityorisomorphism’. Nomatter (RejB3)Langersays: whether this is really the case, also Innis maintains that the young Langer, whowasconcernedwithwhathecalls‘technicaldetailandclaims’(19),took Wittgenstein’s account seriously, by citing him as reaching the very same 10Shesaysthat‘[t]hefoundersofsymboliclogic...havecalledthissortof conclusionsaboutlanguageasshewasreaching. pattern“propositionalfunction”. ButIshallspeakofitasa“propositional 9Wittgensteindoesnotsaythattruesentencesarepicturesoffacts. Butit form”,whichmeansthesamething’(1930b,93–94). Moreover,itshouldbe seemsadvisabletorestrictLanger’sconsiderationstotruesentences. Onthis, notedthatpropositionhere,asinRussell(1918,lect.1),forexample,standsfor seebelow. asentenceandnotwhatthesentenceexpresses,asitiscommontoday. JournalfortheHistoryofAnalyticalPhilosophyvol.5no.2 [43] ... hastheobjectonlyonepattern? Thisquestionisoftheutmost jects’(1933,180). ShetracesthisthesisbacktoWittgensteinand philosophicalimportance;itsanswerentailsawholemetaphysics shequotestheTractatus’s oftruthandofreality. (Langer1930b,134). 2.01Anatomicfactisacombinationofobjects(entities,things). It should now be clear why she thinks that the question is of the utmost philosophical importance. For a logical form is always (RejB5) But then, she holds, since a sentence and the fact it relativetoasystemandisalwaysjustoneamongmany,asinac- expressesshouldsharetheform,asinaccordancewith(RejB1), cordancewith(RejB2),sothatthequestionshouldbeanswered aproposition,ifitweretomirroranatomicfact,oughttodothis inthenegative. Butthensincefactsandsentencesshouldshare by combining the names of objects in a way analogous to the theform,asinaccordancewith(RejB1),then,contraryto way the objects themselves are combined in the fact, ‘[t]hat is, ifthefactisatomic,thepropositionshouldbeentirelysingular. (B) Facts are composed of objects and are the fundamental Allitsconstituentsshouldbenames’(1933,180). ingredientsoftheworld, (RejB6) But, she observes, sentences are not simple collec- tionsofnames,sinceinasentencethereshouldbeapredicative factsarecomposednotofobjects,butofobjectsasalreadyinter- element, which is not a name of an object: ‘the factors of the pretedrelativelytooneamongmanysystemsofinterpretation: propositiondonotalldenoteparticulars’(Langer1933,181;see ‘there is no logical formulation which renders the form of any also1927,120–22). reality’ (1933, 182) ‘of a real thing, or of an event’ (1930b, 135). (RejB7)Then,sheconcludes,weshouldrejectthefirststepin Langerconcludesquiteexplicitlyasfollows: theargument,i.e. I think Mr. Wittgenstein’s analysis of meaning, expressed in the (B) Facts are composed of objects and are the fundamental words: “We make ourselves pictures of facts,” etc., is probably ingredientsoftheworld, correct. Butitisonlywithreferencetowhathehimselfwouldcall a“projection”thatwecouldsay, “Theworldiseverythingthatis andthereforedenythatfactsarecomposedofpiecesofreality. the case,” for only with such reference can there be any “case.” Langer’s second argument to the conclusion that facts are (Langer1933,187) not composed of objects, contrary to (B), is less general than She moreover disagrees explicitly with Russell (Langer 1933, the first, because it reaches its conclusion by relying on the 179, 184), who famously took true sentences to express facts, assumption, in (RejB4), that atomic facts are only composed whicharemadeofpiecesofreality. of objects. While this might have been a thesis Wittgenstein Langer’s second, sketchier, argument to the conclusion that maintained,itisclearthatonemighttrytorejectit. Onecouldin (B)isfalse,goesinsteadasfollows. facttrytoholdthatatomicfactsaresurelycomposedofobjects, (RejB4)Langerstartsbystressingthat,iftheworldwerecom- but also of properties and relations. Thus there seems to be posed of facts, as in accordance with (B), then it would ulti- at least one way to reject Langer’s second argument. What matelybecomposedofatomicfacts,i.e.,thoseforwhich‘[t]here about the first argument? Langer seems absolutely right that is no form over and above the particular way the objects hang indifferentlogicalsystemsoringeneralindifferentlanguages, together, nouniversalfactorwhichcombinestheparticularob- thesamesubject-mattermightberenderedindifferentways,as JournalfortheHistoryofAnalyticalPhilosophyvol.5no.2 [44] inaccordancewithherstep(RejB2). Theonlywaytorejectthis Moreover, Langer stresses that taking facts to be not composed argument would be to deny the first step, (RejB1), according to of objects does not make them any less ‘objective’ (1930b, 150). whichasentenceandthefactitisthepictureofshouldsharethe InalettertoFregethatLangercouldnothaveseen,Russellurged same form. Thus what the argument really shows us is that if that‘inspiteofallitssnowfieldsMontBlancitselfisacomponent weholdontotheWittgensteinianthesisthatsentencesexpress partofwhatisactuallyassertedintheproposition“MontBlanc facts because they share the logical form of those facts, then, is more than 4,000 meters high”’ (Russell 1904, 169). For if differently from what she took Wittgestein to hold, it becomes weinsteadfollowFregeandholdthat‘MontBlanc’contributes difficulttomaintainthatfactsarecomposedofobjects. a sense, ‘we get the conclusion that we know nothing at all Becausesheherselfdoesnotreject(RejB1),shethensuggests aboutMontBlanc’(169). AlthoughRussellisverysketchyhere, thatsentencesexpresssomethingremarkablysimilartoFregean using a current terminology, the idea might be put as follows. senses.11 Famously,Frege,heldthefollowingaboutsenses: Sentencesexpresspropositionsandpropositionsaretheobjects ofourpropositionalattitudes,suchasknowledgeandbelief. If Thereferentofapropernameistheobjectitselfwhichwedesignate by its means; the conception, which we thereby have, is wholly what sentences express is always a mode of presenting either subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer MountBlancoranotherpieceofreality,thenallwecanknowis subjectiveliketheconception,butisyetnottheobjectitself. (Frege always a mode of presenting reality, and never reality itself. In 1892/1948,213) fact, this is exactly Langer’s conclusion: ‘there is no such thing Langersimilarlyremarksthatsheisspeakingofconceptsandnot as pure experience...All knowledge is interpretation’ (1930b, ideas ‘in order to avoid confusion with psychological elements’ 135, 149; see also 1926b, 436; 1933, 183). For many, this would (1930b, 37; see also 1927, 121) and when it comes to defining clearlybeunacceptable. meaningshestates: Moreover, there seem to be further quite contentious points inLanger’sproposal. Iffactsareinterpretationsofreality,what Theinterpretantisathirdterminthetotalmeaningrelation—the isthisrealitythatwehavealreadyinterpretedwhenwehavea subject(notnecessarilyaperson)forwhichthesymbolmeansitsob- ject...allmeaningrelationsaretriadic...Butitthrowsintosharp fact? In 1926 she holds that it is ‘Kant’s Thing-in-itself’ (1926b, reliefthepsychologicalfactorsasagainsttheobjectivelylinguistic 438n7), and adds that ‘it can not really be related to the phe- ones;itallowsustostudythepossibilitiesofmeaningapartfrom nomenon because all the categories of form and relation are consciousappreciation,andtounderstandontheotherhandwhy foreign to it. That is why many philosophers have condemned it is ever correct, and in what limits it is possible, to distinguish itasanunprofitablenotion’(1926b,438n7). In1933,sheinstead between “my meaning” and some other meaning of a symbol. avoids any reference to Kant’s Thing-in-itself and briefly intro- (Langer1930b,122–23) ducesthenotionofeventsheinheritsfromWhiteheadandsays 11SheneverreferredtoFrege,eventhoughshewasobviouslyawareofhis that a fact is ‘a perspective of an event’ (1933, 185). There is a work. Forexamplein1937bshereviewedScholzandBachmann’spaperson tension between Kant’s Thing-in-itself and events. Differently Frege’sNachlass,in1950(LangerandGadol1950,128)sheurgedthatFrege’s fromwhatisthecasewiththeThing-in-itself,aneventseemsto workwasfundamentalfortheflourishingofphilosophyintheUSAinthefirst halfofthe20thCentury,andin1951shewasoneoftheeditorsofthecollected fallindeedundercategoriessince,assheherselfsays,‘eventsare volumeinwhichthefamousChurch(1951),inwhichChurchdiscussesand past,presentorfuture’(1933,186). Herintroductionofeventsas developsFrege’sideas,waspublished. JournalfortheHistoryofAnalyticalPhilosophyvol.5no.2 [45] thethingsfactsareperspectivesofisnotonlyintensionwithher turesin1917–18leadingtoPhilosophyofLogicalAtomism,Russell remarks on Kant’s noumenon, but also with her other remarks famouslyurged: on events. As we saw, she took ‘notions such as “space-time ... it does not seem to me very plausible to say that in addition events”’ (1930b, 135) and Whitehead’s events to be one among to facts there are also these curious shadowy things going about many different ‘form systems’ (1926b, 437). Thus events are such as “That today is Wednesday” when in fact it is Tuesday. I concepts, and concepts stay with facts and interpretations, not cannot believe they go about the real world. It is more than one canmanagetobelieve,andIdothinknopersonwithavividsense withwhatthesefactsareperspectivesof. ThusLanger’saccount ofrealitycanimagineit. (Russell1918,56) mightbeveryunsatisfactoryforsomebodywhoisoneofthose manyphilosopherswhofindKant’snotionunprofitable,because Ontheotherhand,herecognisedthatasentenceascribingafalse noalternativehasbeenreallyprovided. beliefseemstointroducetheseshadowythings: ifJohnbelieves AnotherlacunainLanger’saccountconcernsfalsesentences. that Mont Blanc is a rabbit, there seems to be something, i.e., True sentences express facts. But what about false ones? In thatMontBlancisarabbit,thatJohnbelieves. Hethenfamously 1930,whilequotingtheTractatus’ssentence suggestedthat Itisnotaccuratetosay“Ibelievethepropositionp”andregardthe 2.17Whatthepicturemusthaveincommonwithrealityinorder occurrence as a twofold relation between me and p...the belief tobeabletorepresentitafteritsmanner—rightlyorfalsely—isits doesnotreallycontainapropositionasaconstituentbutonlycon- formofrepresentation. tains the constituents of the proposition as constituents. (Russell 1918,58) she adds the following footnote: ‘We cannot really speak of a ItishardtobelievethatLangerwasunawareofthissuggestion false picture. If the analogy does not hold there is no logical that could lead to an account of falsities,12 but she disappoint- picture. ButMr.Wittgensteinrepeatedlyusestheterm’(1930b, inglydoesnotevenmentionit,oranyotherproposalconcerning 119n3). Thusfalsesentencesarenotfalsepicturesoffacts. What falsesentences,showingthatfalsitywasprobablynotoneofher do they express, then? She only tangentially tackles the issue, main concerns. Thus falsity is another topic Langer does not bysaying: developasmuchasonemightwant,andappearstoshowsome Propositionsdousuallyrefertomattersoffact,butnotnecessarily weaknessinheraccount. so...This may be the structure of reality, as in assertions of fact, But Langer thinks that her account has a strong point in its orofanimaginedworldasinthecaseof“poetictruth,”orofcare- favour. For what about, for example, true negative sentences fully constructed beliefs as in hypothesis...when I say “Hamlet such as ‘Mount Blanc is not a rabbit’ or general sentences and lovedOphelia,”thesymbolreferstoastructurebeyondthemere modal sentences? If, with Langer, we take facts to be interpre- conceptualcounterpartofthewords;itreferstoastructurewhich tations of reality, then there is no problem because negation, existsinadefiniteconsistentorder,andthisorderisShakespeare’s Hamlet. (Langer1927,127–28) generality,modality,etc.belongtointerpretation,nottoreality: 12Russell’s logical atomism is mentioned by Langer, but only in her 1962 Whiletheintuitionmightbetransparenttous,Langerdoesnot (33), and concerning a different, although related, topic, i.e., the thesis that reallydevelopfurtherthesenotionsofimaginedworld,constructed ‘thesimplestconceptsintowhichwecouldbreakdownourideasofacomplex beliefs,thinkablesituations,anddefiniteconsistentorder. Inhislec- phenomenondenotedtheactualelementsofthatphenomenon’. JournalfortheHistoryofAnalyticalPhilosophyvol.5no.2 [46]