SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES IN PHILOSOPHY Editors: WILFRID SELLARS, University ofP ittsburgh KEITH LEHRER, University ofA rizona Board ofCon~ulting Editors: JONATHAN BENNETT, University ofB ritish Columbia ALAN GIBBARD, University of Pittsburgh ROBERT STALNAKER, Cornell University ROBERT G. TURNBULL, Ohio State University VOLUME 14 MICHAEL J. LOUX The University ofN otre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTE A Study in Ontology D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY DORDRECHT : HOLLAND / BOSTON: U.S.A. LONDON: ENGLAND Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Loux, Michael J. Substance and attribute (Philosophical studies series in philosophy: v. 14) Includes bibliographical references and index. I. Attribute (Philosophy) 2. Universals (Philosophy) 3. Substance (Philosophy) 4. Ontology. I. Title. BD352.L68 III 78-12989 ISBN-13: 97X-90-277-0955-4 e-ISBN-13: 97X-94-009-9874-2 DOl: 10.10007/978-94-009-9874-2 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland Sold and distribu ted in the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Inc. Lincoln Building, 160 Old Derby Street, Hingham, Mass. 02043, U.S.A. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1978 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint of the hardcover I st edition 1978 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any informational storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD ix PART ONE: ATTRIBUTES CHAPTER ONE / ATTRIBUTE-AGREEMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS 3 I. Attribute-Agreement: Three Interpretations 3 II. Attribute-Agreement: The Nature of the Debate 8 CHAPTER TWO / PREDICATION AND UNIVERSALS 13 I. Realism and Predication 13 II. Alleged Counter-Examples to (I) 15 III. The Alleged Circularity of (I) 21 IV. (I) and Infinite Regresses 22 V. The Reference of Predicate-Terms 27 VI. The Truth of Subject-Predicate Discourse 33 CHAPTER THREE / RESEMBLANCE AND UNIVERSALS 44 I. The Alleged Non-Eliminability of Resemblance 44 II. The Alleged Incompleteness of Resemblance-Claims 47 III. The Ground of Resemblance 49 CHAPTER FOUR / ABSTRACT REFERENCE AND UNIVERSALS S4 I. Higher Level Quantification S4 II. Abstract Singular Terms 61 III. Extreme Nominalism and Abstract Singular Terms 6S IV. Nominalism and Abstract Singular Terms 73 V. The Metalinguistic Interpretation of Abstract Singular Terms 77 VI. Conclusion 86 CHAPTER FIVE / TOWARDS A REALISTIC ONTOLOGY 89 I. The Existence of Universals 89 II. Universals as Necessary Beings 92 III. More Platonism 96 viii T ABLE OF CONTENTS IV. The Identity-Conditions for Universals 99 V. How Many Universals Are There? 101 VI. Conclusion 102 pART TWO: SUBSTANCES CHAPTER SIX / TWO THEORIES OF SUBSTANCE 107 I. Bare Substrata 107 II. Bundles, Clusters, and Collections 112 III. Problems in the Bundle Theory: Bare Substrata Revisited 115 CHAPTER SEVEN / THE BUNDLE THEORY 121 I. The Contingency of Substance 121 II. Identity and Change 124 III. Subject-Predicate Discourse 126 IV. The Identity ofIndiscernibles 131 V. Russell's Way Out 134 CHAPTER EIGHT / BARE SUBSTRATA 140 I. The Introduction of Bare Substrata 140 II. Empiricism and Bare Substrata 143 III. The Inconsistency of Substratum Ontologies 146 IV. Bare Substrata and Essential Properties 147 V. Modified Substrata and Individuation 149 CHAPTER NINE / TOWARDS A SUBSTANCE-THEORY OF SUBSTANCE 153 I. The Dilemma of Individuation 153 II. Substances and Their Kinds 158 III. A Substance-Theory of Substance 163 IV. Essentialism 166 V. Substances and Their Parts 170 VI. Genera and Species 173 VII. Individual Essences 175 EPILOGUE 181 INDEX OF NAMES 183 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 185 FOREWORD In this book I address a dichotomy that is as central as any in ontology - that between ordinary objects or substances and the various attributes (Le., properties, kinds, and relations) we associate with them. My aim is to arrive at the correct philosophical account of each member of the dichotomy. What I shall argue is that the various attempts to understand substances or attri butes in reductive terms fail. Talk about attributes, I shall try to show, is just that - talk about attributes; and, likewise, talk about substances is just that - talk about substances. The result is what many will find a strange combina tion of views - a Platonistic theory of attributes, where attributes are univer sals or multiply exemplifiable entities whose existence is independent of "the world of flux", and an Aristotelian theory of substance, where substances are basic unities not reducible to metaphysically more fundamental kinds of things. Part One is concerned with the ontology of attributes. After distinguishing three different patterns of metaphysical thinking about attributes, I examine, in turn, the phenomena of predication, resemblance, and higher order quanti fication. I argue that none of these phenomena by itself is sufficient to establish the inescapability of a Platonistic interpretation of attributes. Then, I discuss the phenomenon of abstract reference as it is exhibited in the use of abstract singular terms. Here I consider a large number of attempts to reduce talk involving the use of abstract Singular terms to philosophically less prob lematic discourse, and I argue that none of them succeeds. The only satisfac tory account of abstract reference, I argue, is provided by the Platonist; and so I conclude that we are justified in embracing the doctrine of metaphysical realism. I conclude Part I by examining some of the properties of attributes, arguing, among other things, that they are necessary beings, that they are ingenerable and incorruptible, that they are immutable, and that they are non-denumerably infinite in number. In Part Two, I invoke the Platonistic interpretation of attributes in examin ing the other half of this perennial ontological dichotomy. Here, I consider in detail two opposing theories about the ontological structure of ordinary objects - the bundle theory which construes substances as complexes whose constituents are exclusively properties, and the substratum theory which ix x FOREWORD contends that substances incorporate a constituent over and above their properties - a bare substratum. I argue that while both theories are stronger than is usually realized, both are ultimately unsatisfactory in that neither provides a solution to what I call the problem of individuation. I argue that we can resolve this problem only if we reject the reductionistic assumption underlying both of these views, the assumption that substances are complexes of metaphysically more basic entities. The position I arrive at in the end is an Aristotelian account which holds that lowest level substance-kinds provide the ontologist with concepts of fully individuated and fully articulated sub stances. Substances, I conclude, are just that - substances or members of lowest level substance-kinds. I have a number of debts to acknowledge. I want, first, to thank Professors Robert Turnbull, James Cargile and Glenn Kessler, who read the manuscript for this book and provided many helpful suggestions. I also want to thank the students in my graduate seminars in metaphysics at the University of Notre Dame and the University of Virginia. In retrospect, they can see how this book developed from the discussions in those seminars. Thanks are also due the editor of Philosophical Studies for allowing me to include a page or so from 'The Concept of a Kind' (1976) in Section iv of Chapter Nine, the editor of the Review of Metaphysics for allowing me to include a revised version of part of 'Kinds and the Dilemma of Individuation' in Section ii of Chapter Nine, the editor of the University of Notre Dame Press for granting his per mission to include scattered snipets from 'The Existence of Universals' (from Universals and Particulars) in Chapters Two and Three, the editors of D. Reidel Publishing Co. for allowing me to reprint the last few pages of 'Rules, Roles, and Ontological Commitment' at the end of Section v of Chapter Four, and George Thomas, who is editing a memorial volume on Bertrand Russell forthcoming from George Allen and Unwin, for permitting me to use revised versions of two parts of my contribution to the Russell volume in Section iii of Chapter Six and Section v of Chapter Seven. Finally, I want to thank three philosophers who, in different ways, have influenced what fol lows - Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alvin Plantinga, and Wilfrid Sellars. The first introduced me to the problems with which this book is concerned in my first quarter of graduate study at the University of Chicago and for the fourteen years since has been a sympathetic audience and stimulating critic of the views expressed here. The second, in both personal conversations and his writings, has made me sensitive to the need for rigor, clarity, and argument in philosophy. He has as well, doubtless to the nausea of many readers, con vinced me of the importance of the "possible worlds" approach to problems FOREWORD xi in ontology. The third has taught me the importance of the historical dimen sion of the philosophical enterprise and the need for a systematic approach to philosophical problems. He will most certainly disagree with almost every thing I say here; but I think he will see his own influence on the book and will recognize that the views I argue for here are merely his own inverted. M.J.L.