Strickland, M.J. Against the Lord's anointed: aspects of warfare and baronial rebellion in England and Normandy 1075-1265. In Garnett, G. and Hudson, J. (Eds) Law and government in medieval England and Normandy: essays in honour of Sir James Holt, Chap 3, pages pp. 56-79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1994) http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/4579/ 28th August 2008 Glasgow ePrints Service https://eprints.gla.ac.uk Against the Lord's anointed: aspects of warfare and baronial rebellion in England and Normandy, 1075-1265 Matthew Strickland For who can stretch forth his hand against the Lord's anointed and be guiltless?1 Within a framework of arbitrary, monarchical government, baronial rebellion formed one of the principal means both of expressing political discontent and of seeking the redress of grievances. So frequent were its manifestations that hostilities arising from armed opposition to the crown account for a large proportion of warfare waged in England, Normandy and the continental Angevin lands in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The subject of revolt, lying as it does close to the heart of crown- baronial interaction, is as fundamental as it is multifaceted, embracing many issues of central importance, for example the legal status of revolt and its complex relationship with concepts of treason; the nature of homage and fealty, and the question of the revocability of these bonds in relation to the king; the growth in notions of the crown, of maiestas and the influence of Roman Law; political theories of resistance and obedience; the limitations imposed by ties of kinship and of political sympathy among the baronage on the king's ability to suppress revolt and to enforce effective punishment; and the extent of the king's logistical and military superiority. A detailed examination of such major themes is naturally beyond the scope of a single essay.2 Elsewhere I have suggested how the context of revolt affected behaviour in warfare, 1. I Samuel 26: 9. 2. I hope to explore these themes further in a monograph, currently under preparation, on baronial rebellion and the nature of warfare in the context of revolt. 57 particularly in relation to conventions of war governing siege.3 What follows addresses the closely related question of how far the presence of the ruler - whether king, duke or count - affected the nature of warfare fought against rebellious vassals. Whatever the underlying disputes that had led elements of the baronage to resort to arms, be it grievances over land, title or the disbursement of patronage, a desire for enhanced local autonomy, or support for a royal cadet or other dynastic rivals to the throne, the failure ofthe political process and reversion to the mechanisms of war confronted opponents of the crown with a formidable series of dilemmas. Whether their avowed aim was the deposition of the king for a rival claimant, or merely the enforcement of a reform manifesto such as Magna Carta or the Provisions of Oxford, the successful prosecution of their claims would almost certainly entail a direct military confrontation with the king. They would thus have to resist by force or actively assault the christus domini, the Anointed of the Lord, the divinely sanctioned receptacle of legitimate authority, who had been elected, proclaimed and consecrated. The person of the monarch represented a fusion of two fundamental sources of authority, feudal lordship and sacral kingship.4 Hallowed by unction, set apart from and above other men, the king could command the fealty of all subjects, reinforced in the. case of many if not all of the effective political nation by liegehomage.5 Such homage, frequently extracted as an integral part of the process of designation of an heir,6 might also be demanded by the king at times of political crisis as a deliberate counter to actual 3. M. J. Strickland, 'The Conduct and Perception of War under the Anglo-Norman and Angevin Kings, 1075-1217' (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1989), ch. 4 pp. 145-76. 4. For the nature of kingship see J.E.A. Joliffe, Angevin Kingship (London, 1955), and E. Mason, Norman Kingship (Bangor, 1991). Also, for example, E. H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, 1957). 5. For the celebrated oath of Salisbury in 1086, see ASC, 'E', s.a. 1086, andJ. C. Holt, '1086', in Domesday Studies, ed. J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1987), pp. 41-64; and for submission and oath-taking as prominent features of the coronation ceremony see, for example, ASC, 'E', s.a. 1087 and 1100. Though not its principal aim, the inquest that resulted in the Cariae baronum of 1166 had as an important secondary purpose the discovery of undertenants who had not performed homage and sworn fealty to Henry II and his son, the young Henry, Red Book, I, 217, 400, 412, as did the Inquest of Sheriffs in 1170, Gervase, I, 217; Stubbs, Charters, p. 177, c. xiii. 6 See e.g. Robert of Torigny, in Chronicles of Stephen, Henry II and Richard, IV, 184, on 1155; ibid., 296, on II63; and 'Benedict', I, 6, on 1170. MATTHEW STRICKLAND or threatened rebellion.7 That Henry II kept a roll not only of those who had sworn him homage8 but also of those who had subsequently broken faith is strongly suggested by the extensive lists incorporated by Roger of Howden in his Gesta Hennci of those taken prisoner in the war of 1173-4, carefully stating date and place of capture and clearly drawn from an official source.9 Ecclesiastical writers, always quick to stress the enormity of violating such fundamental bonds, could be provoked to vociferous indignation by direct assaults on the person of the monarch during rebellion. Speaking of William Crispin's attack on Henry I at the battle of Bremule, 1119, where he succeeded in striking the king on the helmet, Orderic Vitalis exclaimed: What a rash crime he had attempted, when brandishing his sword in his right hand, he raised it above the head that had been anointed with the holy chrism by the hands of bishops and crowned with the royal diadem, while the people rejoiced and chanted grateful praises to God.lO Orderic's sentiments were clearly coloured by his deep-seated admiration for Henry I. Yet a century later, Matthew Paris, who was no royal apologist, could share the view that it was unction that rendered the person of the monarch inviolate, even if that monarch was King John. Interpolating a no doubt apocryphal anecdote into Wendover's chronicle, Paris has William d'Aubigny, commander of the rebel garrison of Rochester, prevent one of his crossbowmen from firing at John with the words, 'No, no! Far be it from us, base villein, to cause the death of the Lord's anointed.'ll This concept of unction as a potent mechanism for the hallowing and protection of kings had been inherited by the Norman rulers from their Old English predecessors in an already 7. See e.g. on 1209, CM, II, 525; Annals of Waverley, 262, Gervase, II, 104; cf. Holt, Northerners, p. 207. John again countered desertion in 1215 by requiring homage and a general oath of fealty, an act which the Barnwell chronicler believed to be a deliberate counterstroke to the baronial demand late in 1214 to confirm Henry I's coronation charter:Memoriale fratris Walteri de Coventria, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols. (RS, 1872-3),11,218; CM, 11, 584. 8. Such a list is revealed by the 1166 catla of the archbishop of York: Red Book, I, 412. Such a roll might also be kept by honotiallords. See e.g. Orderic, III, 184-5. 9. 'Benedict', I, 45-7, 56--7. 10. Orderic, VI, 238--g. 11. CM, II, 627. 'In this case', adds Paris, 'he was like David who spared Saul when he could have slain him. This circumstance was afterwards known to the king, who notwithstanding this, did not wish to spare William when his prisoner, but would have hung him had he been permitted.' 59 well-developed form.12 The author of the Vita Edwardi stressed Godwin's deep reluctance to fight against his lord the king and, following his successful revanche in 1052, compared him at length to David sparing Saul as the Lord's anointed.13 Even William I's Norman apologists experienced some discomfort in the fact that Harold had been consecrated king, leading William of Poitiers to declare this unction invalid since it had been administered by the schismatic Stigand.14 To the author of the Gesta Stephani, by contrast, the enormity of the king's defeat and humiliation at Lincoln in 1141 lay less in the violation of his sacral kingship than in the fact that a liege lord had been overthrown by his own vassals.15 While one clearly cannot take at face value the sentiments of contrition ascribed by the Gesta to Stephen's opponents, his comments may well echo the feelings of shock and confusion that some, perhaps many, would have felt at this drastic inversion of the natural order.16 Even William of Malmesbury, Robert of Gloucester's apologist, felt obliged to offer a lengthy justification for Stephen's defeat and seizure at Lincoln.17 12 Anglo-Saxon kingship in turn had been heavily influenced by Carolingian theory and practice. For the importance of unction for the legitimisation of the Arnulfing dynasty and in notions of Carolingian kingship in general see W. Ullmann, The Carolingian Renaissance and the Idea of Kingship (London, 1969), pp. 53-4. 71-11O. As Ullman (p. 54) notes: 'The Germanic Ruler embodied a sacred and magical mythos because of his blood kinship with distant ancestors; this was now replaced by an equally sacred mythos that was derived from divine sanction and grace.' 13 The Life of King Edward, ed. and tr. F. Barlow (London, 1962), pp. 27-30. 14 G. S. Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda: Some Implications of the Norman Claim to the Throne of England in 1066', TRHS, 5th ser., XXXVI (1986), 9B-9. 15 As in all probability a bishop himself, he reserved his homily against touching the Lord's anointed for Stephen's attack in 1139 on the Le Poer bishops, where the author quotes Zechariah 2: 8, 'He that toucheth you toucheth the apple of mine eye' and Psalm 105: 15, 'Touch not mine anointed.' He saw the king's subsequent defeat and capture at Lincoln as divine retribution for this act: GS, pp. xviii-xl, 76-7, 110-15. 16 GS, pp. 112-I5: 'When at length they disarmed him and he kept on crying out in a humbled voice of complaint that this mark of ignominy had indeed come upon him because God avenged his injuries, and yet they were not innocent of a monstrous crime in breaking their faith, condemning their oath, caring nothing for the homage they had pledged him, and rebelling so wickedly and so abominably against the man they had chosen of their own will as their lord and king, they were all so much softened by tender emotions of pity and compassion that they not only broke forth into tears and lamentations but repentance was very deeply imprinted in their hearts and faces.' 17 HN, pp. 47-8. Equally, it was Malmesbury who noted that on his release Stephen laid a complaint before the Council of Westminster, summoned by his brother Henry of Blois, 'because his men had both captured and almost killed, by the grievous burden of their insults, one who had never refused them justice (p.62). 60 Such sentiments flowed naturally from the pens of ecclesiastics, not only imbued with Old Testament notions of kingship, but also who saw in the person of the monarch the most effective guarantee of order, stability and, above all, peace for Holy Church. Yet, if we seek a more official expression of such notions, we need look no further than the laconic statement in clause 61 of Magna Carta, which, while empowering the baronial committee of twenty-five to distrain John 'by seizing castles, lands, possessions, and in such other ways as they can', adds simply, 'saving our person and those of our queen and our children'.18 The inviolacy which unction conferred upon the person of the king, however, was not simply passive and defensive. The king emanated a potent 'mythos and aura' ,19 which might receive tangible expression both in his thaumaturgical powers or in concepts such as the king's hand-given peace.20 So too in war, the power of the king's presence might assume an aggressi.ve, offensive quality which one might almost term a 'military ( charisma'. Wallace-Hadrill, speaking of the early Frankish kings, described them as Heerkonigen, warrior kings, men who fused the roles of rex sacerdos and dux. Success lay in being possessed of jortitudo or military virtus, and jelicitas, that is a 'fruitful good luck that stems from nobilitas' .21 Naturally, the increasing sophistication of kingship by the twelfth century must qualify this parallel. But though the virility of the king might no longer be seen to bless the land with fecundity, there can be no doubt that one of the king's primary functions - arguably the primary function remained as a warleader, and that his virtus continued to be a vital ingredient in his military and political success, as it was still felt to be when Machiavelli wrote his Prince. And though perhaps not imbued with the same depth of meaning as to a Merovingian observer, contemporaries of the Anglo-Norman kings were clearly aware of a kind of jelicitas, an aura that accompanied a ruler 18 Holt, Magna Carta, pp. 470-1. 19 The phrase is UlImann's: Carolingian Renaissance, p. 54. 20 See M. Bloch, Les Rois thaumaturges. Etude sur la caractere supernaturel attribuei a la puissance royale particulierement en France et Angleterre (Strasbourg, 1924). For the concept of the royal handgrith or mund, see LHP, 10 I, 12 la, 13 I, Downer, pp. 108, 114, 116 (which draw on I Cnut 2 2 and I Cnut 3 3), and LHP68 2, Downer, p. 214. Violation of the peace given by the king's own hand was a crime unatoneable by money (12 la, Downer, p. 114) and might be punished by loss of limb (79 3, Downer, p. 246). 21. J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings (Oxford, 1962), pp. 154-7, 163. 61 successful in war, be it as a general, a besieger or as an individual warrior. It was this concept of royal feticitas that Orderic had in mind when, censuring William the Conqueror for his execution of Earl Waltheof in 1076, he noted that after this deed, the luck in battle that had always hitherto attended William disappeared through divine vengeance.22 William of Malmesbury was similarly con- scious of William I's good fortune in war and conquest,23 while Snorri Sturluson, though writing nearly two centuries later, regarded Harald Hardradi's 'great victory-luck' in war as one of his outstanding attributes.24 Even in adverse situations, the king's person might still com- mand a respect verging on awe. William of Malmesbury records how, during the siege of Mont-St-Michel against Prince Henry, Rufus, although alone, charged a group of Henry's knights, 'confident that none would resist him'. One of the knights slew his horse, however, and was drawing his sword on the prostrate monarch when Rufus shouted in alarm that he was the king. His erstwhile opponents drew back, then at once helped him respectfully to his feet and gave him a fresh mount. The king then asked which of the knights had unhorsed him, and received the reply from the knight who had, 'It was I, who took you not for a king but for a knight.' Rufus - and this was the reason for Malmesbury's anecdote - rewarded his courage and honesty by granting him membership of the familia regis.25 The king's attendance or absence from a campaign was there- fore of the profoundest importance. The king's presence bolstered the morals of royal forces and might intimidate the enemy. When in 1146 Ranulf of Chester attempted to persuade Stephen to accompany him against the Welsh, he stated, according to the Gesta Stephani, 'that the enemy would be alarmed merely by hearing the king's name' and 'that he [Ranulf] would dishearten them more by the dread of the king's presence than if he strove to bring with him many thousand fighters without 22 Orderic, II, 350-1. 23 GR, II 317. 24 King Harald's Saga, tr. M. Magnusson and H. Palsson (Harmondsworth, 1966), pp. 160, and 149. where at Stamford Bridge Harold Godwinsson is made to say of Hardradi, 'What a big, formidable man he is: let us hope his good luck has now run out.' 25 GR, II, 364. MATTHEW STRICKLAND it' .26 As late as 1513, Henry VIII's arguments to the Privy Council for leading the expedition to France in person were not only that there had been a long tradition of English kings leading their men to victory, but that defeats had been suffered because of the absence of the king. Men were eager to face death when led by their sovereign, whereas with any other commander, however able, troops would be milder in nature and fight badly.27 Conversely, Richard of Hexham noted that the absence of Stephen from the royal army at the battle of the Standard in 1138 was a severe blow, the king being their principem et conductorem belli, and no doubt the vast armoury of spiritual weaponry in the shape of relics and banners mustered by Archbishop Thurstan was designed in large part to compensate for this handicap.28 Similarly, in 1173 the royal forces under the justiciar, Richard de Lucy, marched to battle against the earl of Leicester's army at Fornham with the banner of St Edmund at their head.29 One -potent source of psychological aid was needed to replace another. Nowhere in war, moreover, was the king's presence more significant than in the context of rebellion. For while rebels were prepared ipso facto to defy the king's authority, some, perhaps even the majority, were reluctant to face the person of the king in armed conflict. When in her Livre des faiz darmes Christine de Pisan urged princes not to risk their lives in battle lest their deaths bring political and military disaster, she made the crucial exception of situations of revolt. Here kings should lead the army, 'since in the nature of things the subject fears to offend the majesty of his sovereign lord, especially when the latter is present in person'.30 It was an acute observation. When during the mounting political crisis in 1051, Godwin and his sons mustered their forces, they were 26 CS, pp. 193-4. 27 The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil, AD 1485-1537, ed. and tr. D. Hay, Camden Soc., NS, LXXIV (1950), p. 197. 28 De gestis regis Stcphani et de bello Standardii, ed. J. Raine in The Priory of Hexham, its Chroniclers, Endowments and Annals, 2 vols., Surtees Soc., XLIV (1868), I, 87, 90-1. Similarly, in 1194, an Anglo-Norman force under Count John and the earl of Leicester felt unable to confront Philip's army which was operating in Normandy not simply because they were outnumbered but because they lacked the king's presence: Howden, III, 253. 29 'Benedict', I, 61. 30 The Book of Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye Translated and Printed by William Caxton from the French Original by Christine de Pisan, ed. A. T. P. Byles (Early English Texts Society, 1927), p. 19 nevertheless 'reluctant to stand against their royal lord' , and when Edward summoned all the thegns to his standard, Godwin's army melted away.31 Faced with the revolt of William of Arques in 1054, Duke William's men urged him to wait for the arrival of his main army before attacking Arques itself, but 'they were reassured by the reply that those rebelling against him would not dare anything when they saw he himself was present'.32 That such an assumption was not simply the inflated rhetoric of William of Poitiers is suggested by other incidents. At the siege of Courcy in 1091, for example, Hugh de Grandmesnil offered his lord, Robert Curthose, two hundred livres if he would withdraw from the besieging forces for just one day , so that Hugh could sally out and attack Robert de Belleme in the duke's absence. 'It seems', Orderic has Hugh say to the duke, 'that Robert [of Belleme] trusts too much in your protection and keeps the besieged in check more through their respect for their fealty to their lord than from fear of enemy arms. '33 Similarly, Joinville recorded how, in 1230, the young St Louis had marched to the aid of the count of Champagne against the baronial coalition headed by Peter of Brittany, and offered them battle. The barons, however, 'sent and begged him to withdraw himself in person from the fight', pledging that if he would do so they would give battle with the count of Champagne and the duke of Lorraine with 300 knights less than the count or duke. But Louis refused, saying 'that he would not let them fight against his men unless he himself was there in person with them', whereupon the baronial army withdrew.34 Here, Joinville sought to stress the courage and puissance of St Louis even as a boy, just as Orderic had been eager to demonstrate the vassalic propriety of Hugh, a leading patron of St-Evroul. Yet both incidents show the constraints that might be placed on baronial action by the presence of king or lord, and the desire to proffer financial or military concessions to circumvent this problem. Though space precludes a discussion of the relation in war between the Capetians and their Norman and Angevin vassals in 31 ASC, 'E', 'D', s.a. 1051. 32 GC, p. 56. 33 Orderic, IV, 234-5. 34 Joinville's Life of Louis, tr. M. R. B. Shaw in Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 185. this context,35 one cannot here omit reference to Henry II's refusal to attack Toulouse in 1159 once his lord, Louis VII, had entered the city. Some French historians such as Boussard have dismissed this motive for Henry's withdrawal as merely an excuse for over- extended lines of communication and logistical problems.36 In the light of these and other examples, however, one must be more circumspect. Henry was still young, and such acts of propriety may have featured strongly in his self-perception as a warrior, or indeed as a king himself. A revealing passage in fitzStephen's Life of Becket suggests that there was disagreement over Henry's actions within the army itself. Becket, then chancellor, had urged an assault on Toulouse, since the size of Henry's army guaranteed the capture of both the city and the French king. Henry, however, followed the advice of others, and from foolish scruples and respect for the king of France his overlord, hesitated to attack the city, although the Chancellor argued to the contrary that the French king had forfeited his position as overlord by engaging in hostilities against the English king in defiance of existing treaties.37 Similarly, William ofPoitiers, anxious to stress his hero's propriety as a wronged vassal, recorded how Duke William opposed the attacks of King Henry I of France on Normandy, but 'not without showing ... the regard due to an old friendship as well as to the royal dignity. He carefully restrained himself from engaging in battle with the king's army, with him [Henry I] present, unless he was constrained only by necessity.'38 Contemporaries, whether opponents or supporters of the crown, clearly distinguished between the gravity of varying acts of hostility in revolt. Thus in the incidents recorded by Orderic and joinville, the baronial rebels had refused to fight against the person of the ruler, but were still prepared to engage with his forces in his absence. Such distinctions are seen still more clearly in 1233, when the political opposition of Richard Marshal and his suppbrters to Henry III degenerated into localised warfare in the 35 See, however, J. F. Lemarignier, Recherches sur l'hommage en marche et les frontieres feodales (Lille, 1945)' 36 J. Boussard, Le gouvemement de Henri 11 Plantagenet (Paris, 1956), p. 420 and n. I. 37 MTB, III, 334. 38 GG, pp. 28-9.