POSTMORTEM CITY : TOWARDS AN URBAN GEOPOLITICS1 Stephen Graham Introduction: Confronting Place Annihilation in Urban Research «As long as people have lived in cities, they have been haunted by fears of urban ruin […]. Every city on earth is ground zero is somebody’s doomsday book» (Berman,1996,pp. 175-184). «To be sure, a cityscape is not made of flesh. Still, sheared-off buildings are almost as elo- quent as body parts (Kabul, Sarajevo, East Mostar, Grozny, 16acres of lower Manhattan after September 11th2001,the refugee camp in Jenin). Look, the photographs say, this is what it’s like. This is what war does. War tears, war rends. War rips open, eviscerates. War scorch- es. War dismembers. War ruins» (Sontag,2003,p. 5). «Today, wars are fought not in trenches and fields, but in living rooms, schools and super- markets» (Barakat,1998,p. 11). 1. The term «postmortem city» was first coined by Chris Hables Gray in his book Postmodern War. He coined the term to describe an aerial «damage assessment» map of Tokyo after the US fire bombing dev- astated the city on March 9th/10th,1945.This raid – the most murderous act of war in human history – killed over 130,000civilians in a few hours (see Gray,1997,p. 86). 165 Postmortem City Cities, warfare, and organised, political violence have always been mutual con- structions. «The city, the polis, is constitutive of the form of conflict called war,just as war is itself constitutive of the political form called the city»(Virilio,2002,p. 5, original emphasis). War and the city have intimately shaped each other through- out urban and military history. «There is […] a direct reciprocity between war and cities», writes the geographer Ken Hewitt. «The latter are the more thoroughgoing constructs of collective life, containing the definitive human places. War is the most thorough-going or consciously prosecuted occasion of collective violence that destroys places» (1983,p. 258). The widespread survival of massive urban fortifications – especially in Asia, North Africa, Europe and parts of Latin America – are a living testament to the fact that in pre-modern and pre nation-state civilisations, city-states were the actual agents, as well as the main targets, of war. In pre-modern times cities were built for defence as well as dominant centres of commerce, exchange and political, religious and social power.«The city,with its buttressed walls, its ramparts and moats, stood as an outstanding display of ever-threatening aggression» (Mumford,1961,p. 44). The sacking and killing of fortified cities and their inhabitants was the central event in pre-modern war (Weber,1958). Indeed (often allegorical) stories of such acts make up a good part of the Bible – especially Jeremiahand Lamentations–and other ancient and classical religious and philosophical texts. «Myths of urban ruin grow at our cul- ture’s root» (Berman,1996). In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as modern nation states started to emerge in Europe as «bordered power containers», they began seeking a monopoly on political violence (Giddens, 1985). «The states caught up with the forward gal- lop of the towns» (Braudel,1973,p. 398). The expanding imperial and metropoli- tan cities that lay at the core of nation-states were no longer organisers of their own armies and defences. But they maintained political power and reach. Military, politi- cal, and economic elites within such cities directed violence, control, repression, and the colonial acquisition of territory, raw materials, wealth, and labour power from afar (Driverand Gilbert,2003). By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, industrial cities in the global north had grown in synchrony with the killing powers of technology. They provided the men and material to sustain the massive, industrial wars on the twentieth century.At the same time their (often female-staffed) industries and neighbourhoods emerged as the prime targets for total war. The industrial city thus became «in its entirety a space for war. Within 166 Stephen Graham afew years […] bombing moved from the selective destruction of key sites within cities to extensive attacks on urban areas and, finally, to instantaneous annihilation of entire urban spaces and populations» (Shaw,2003,p. 131). Right up to the present day, the capture of strategic and politically important cities has «remained the ultimate symbol, of conquest and national survival» (Shaw,2001,p. 1). Given the centrality of both urbanization and the prosecution of political violence tomodernity, this subtle interpenetration of cities and warfare should be no surprise. «After all, modernity, through most of its career, has been modernity at war» (Pieterse, 2002,p. 3). It is no longer feasible to contain cities within defensive walls or effective cordons which protect their citizens from military force (Virilio,1987). But the delib- erate destruction and targeting of cities and their support systems in times of war and crisis is a constant throughout the eight thousand years or so of urban history on our planet. «Destruction of places», Hewitt continues, writing in 1987: «driven by fear and hatred, runs through the whole history of wars, from ancient Troy or Carthage, to Warsaw and Hiroshima in our own century. The miseries, uprootings, and deaths of civilians in besieged cities, especially after defeat, stand amongst the most terrible indictments of the powerful and victorious. In that sense, there is, despite the progress of weapons of devastation, a continuity in the experience of civilians from Euripides’ Trojan Womenor The Lamentationsof Jeremiah, to the cries of widowed women and orphaned children in Beirut, Belfast, the villages of Afghanistan, and those of El Salvador» (p. 469). Cities, then, provide much more than just the backdrop or environment for war and terror. Rather, their buildings, assets, institutions, industries, infrastructures, cultur- al diversities, and symbolic meanings have long actually themselves been the explicit target for a wide range of deliberate, orchestrated, attacks. This essential, urban, spatiality of organised, political violence is rarely recognised in the obsessively chrono- logical and temporal gaze of the historians who dominate the study of the urban violence of the twentieth century. Thus, the architectures, urbanisms, and spatial plan- ning strategies that sustain, reflect, and are intrinsic to strategies of informal and state terror all too often get overlooked (Cole,2003,chapter 2). For this explicit concentration on the (attempted) killing of cities in modern war, the geographer Ken Hewitt has coined the term «place annihilation» (1983). «For a social scientist», he stresses that «it is actually imperative to ask just whodies and whoseplaces are destroyed by violence» within such wars of place annihilation (1987,p. 464,original 167 Postmortem City emphasis). This is because such strategies are usually far from indiscriminate. Commonly, they involve a great deal of planning so that the violence and destruction achieves the political, social, economic, ecological and cultural effects, on the target population and their places, that are desired by the attackers. Since the end of the Cold War, this dominance of war casualties by civilians, rather than enlisted military personnel, has only accelerated further. Between 1989and 1998, for example, four million people were killed in violent conflicts across the world. An estimated 90%ofthese were civilians – primarily women and children (Pieterse,2002, p. 1). In short, since the end of the Cold War – with its global threat of instant urban- nuclear annihilation – «we have gone from fearing the death of the city to fearing the city of death» (Lang,1995,p. 71). As traditional state-vs-state wars in open terrain have become objects of curiosity, so the informal, «asymmetric» or «new» wars which tend to centre on localised struggles over strategic urban sites have become the norm (Kaldor, 1999). As Misselwitz and Weizman suggest: «It is now clear that the days of the classical, Clauswitzian definition of warfare as a symmetri- cal engagement between state armies in the open field are over. War has entered the city again – the sphere of the everyday, the private realm of the house» (2003,p. 272). Far from going away, then, strategies of deliberately attacking the systems and places that support civilian urban life have only become more sophisticated since World War II. The deliberate devastation of urban living spaces continues apace. Fuelling it is a powerful cocktail of intermeshing factors. Here we must consider the collapse of the Cold War equilibrium; the unleashing of previously constrained ethnic hatreds; the prolifer- ation of fundamentalist religious and political groups; and the militarisation of gangs, drug cartels, militia, corrupt political regimes, and law enforcement agencies. Wemust address the failure of many national and local states; the urbanisation of populations and terrain; and the growing accessibility to heavy weapons. Finally, the growing crisis of social polarisation at all geographical scales and the increasing scarcity of many essential resources must be considered (Castells,1997,1998). Tothis cocktail we must add the destabilising effects of the United States’ increasing- ly aggressive and violent interventions in a widening range of nations, and the deleteri- ous impacts of neoliberal restructuring and «structural adjustment» programmes, imposed on many nations by the IMF and WTO. Such programmes have added to the sense of crisis in many cities because they have resulted in the erosion of social and economic secu- 168 Stephen Graham rity and the further immiseration of the urban poor (and, increasingly, the middle class- es, too). All this has happened at a time when the scale of urbanisation is at an unprecedent- ed global level. During the nineties alone the world’s urban population grew by 36%. By 2003,900million people lived in slums. And the deepening polarisation of cities, caused by neoliberal globalisation, is providing many conditions that are ripe for extremes of civil, and militarised, violence (Vidal,2003,Castells,1997,1998). In fact, neolib- eral globalisation itself operates through a vast scale of violence, exploitation and crim- inality which works in similarly «rhizomatic» ways to transnational terrorism. «Our own politicians and businesses sail a strikingly similar pirate sea [to the al-Qaeda network]», suggests Keller Easterling: «slipping between legal jurisdictions, leveraging advantages in the differential value of labor and currency, brandishing national identity one moment and laundering it the next, using lies and disguises to neutralize cultural or political differences» (2002,p. 189). In many cases some or all of these factors have combined in the post-Cold War to force nothing less than the «implosion of global and national politics into the urban world» (Appadurai,1996,p. 152). This has led to a proliferation of bloody, largely urban, wars. Many of these, in turn, stimulate vast migrations and the construction of city-scale refugee camps to accommodate the displaced populations (which stood at a global figure of 50million by 2002)(Agier,2002;Dikenand Laustsen,2003). Appadurai argues that such «new» urban wars «take their energy from macroevents and processes […] that link global politics to the micropolitics of streets and neighbour- hoods» (1996,pp. 152-153). He observes that: «In the conditions of ethnic unrest and urban warfare that characterize cities such as Belfast and Los Angeles, Ahmedabad and Sarajevo, Mogadishu and Johannesburg, urban war zones are becoming armed camps, driven wholly by implosive forces that fold into neighbor- hoods the most violent and problematic repercussions of wider regional, national and glob- al processes […]. [These cases] represent a new phase in the life of cities, where the con- centration of ethnic populations, the availability of heavy weaponry, and the crowded conditions of civic life create futurist forms of warfare […] and where a general desolation of the national and global landscape has transposed many bizarre racial, religious, and lin- guistic enmities into scenarios of unrelieved urban terror» (Appadurai,1996,pp. 152-193, original emphasis). 169 Postmortem City All of which means that contemporary warfare and terror now largely boil down to contests over the spaces, symbols, meanings, support systems or power struc- tures of cities and urban regions. As a result, war, «terrorism» and cities are redefining each other in complex, but poorly explored ways. Such redefinitions are, in turn, bound up with deeper shifts in the ways in which time, space, technology, mobility and power are constructed and experienced in our societies as a whole (Virilio, 1986). Given all of this, it is curious, then, that warfare and organised political violence targeting the spaces, inhabitants, and support systems of cities have been persistent- ly neglected in critical social scientific debates about cities and urbanisation since World War II (Mendieta,2001). By contrast, this period has seen vast libraries filled with theoretical, empirical and policy books addressing urban de-velopment, con-struc- tion, re-generation, modernisation and growth (Bishopand Clancey,2003). In 1983 the geographer Ken Hewitt argued that, from the perspective of urban social science, the «destruction of cities, as of much else, remains terra incognita» (Hewitt, 1983, p. 258). Another cocktail of factors can be diagnosed to help explain this neglect. Three are particularly important. First, a simple, and understandable, desire to forget the scale and barbarity of urban slaughter in the last century can be diagnosed. For exam- ple, many wider cultural taboos have inhibited dispassionate, social scientific analy- ses of the aerial annihilations of German and Japanese cities in World War II (although these are now slowly being overcome – see Sebald,2003). In the Anglo-Saxon world, whilst the «air war» that killed perhaps 1.6million urbanites in those two countries is widely glorified and fetishised – what Chris Hables Gray calls «bomber glorioso» (1997,p.87)–equally powerful taboos, and the instinct to self-censor,have meant that the perspective here has been overwhelmingly aerial. The annihilated cities, and the hundreds of thousands of carbonised dead on the ground, barely exist at all in these popular narratives. When they are represented, huge controversy still ensues. The victims of more recent US bombings in Kabul and Baghdad have been ren- dered equally invisible and uncounted by the ferocious power of Western propagan- da and self-censorship. An «information operations» campaign has also emerged that leads US forces to bomb any independent TV station that has the temerity to show the civilian carnage that results, on the ground, even with so-called «precision strikes» – the inevitable reality behind the repulsive euphemisms of «collateral damage» in urban bombing. 170 Stephen Graham Second, Ryan Bishop and Gregory Clancey (2003,p. 64), have recently suggest- ed that modern urban social science in general has shown marked tendencies since World War II to directly avoid tropes of catastrophism (especially in the west). They argue that this is because the complete annihilation of urban places conflicted with its underlying, enlightenment-tinged notions of progress, order and modernisa- tion. In the post-war, Cold War period, especially, «The City», they write, had a «heroic status in both capitalist and socialist storytelling» (ibid., p. 66). This worked against an analysis of the city as a scene of catastrophic death. «The city-as-target» remained, therefore, «a reading long buried under layers of academic Modernism» (ibid., p. 67). Bishop and Clancey also believe that this «absence of death within The City also reflect- ed the larger economy of death within the academy: its studied absence from some dis- ciplines [urban social science] and compensatory over-compensation in others [histo- ry]» (ibid.). In disciplinaryterms, the result of this was that the «urban» tended to remain hermetically separated from the «strategic». «Military» issues were carefully demarcated from «civil» ones. And the overwhelmingly «local» concerns of modern urban social sci- ence were kept rigidly apart from (inter)national ones. This left urban social science to address the local, civil, and domestic rather than the (inter)national, the military or the strategic. Such concerns were the preserve of history, as well as the fast-emerging disci- plines of international politics and international relations. In the dominant hubs of English-speaking urban social science – North America and the UK – these two intellec- tual worlds virtually never crossed, separated as they were by disciplinary boundaries, scalar orientations, and theoretical traditions. The final factor stems from the fact that urban social science finished sediment- ing into modern intellectual disciplines during the Cold War.During this time, urban annihilation, always minutes away,was simply a step on the way to a broader,species- wide, exterminism (Mumford,1959,Thompsonet al, 1982). This also seems to have inhibited critical urban research on place annihilation. Waves of secrecy and para- noia about the urban-targeting strategies of the super powers further worked to under- mine critical analysis of what nuclear Armageddon would actually mean for an urban- ising planet (Vanderbilt,2002). And the inevitable vulnerabilities of cities to nuclear attack were exploited by a wide range of interests seeking to radically decentralise, and de-urbanise, advanced industrial societies (Farish, 2003; Light, 2003). As Herbert Muschamp has argued, cities were, in many ways, «among the casualties» of the Cold War years (1995,p. 106). 171 Postmortem City Encouragingly, the persistent neglect of place annihilation in urban research has been slowly overcome since Hewitt wrote the above words. A broadening range of promising work has emerged in critical and interdisciplinary urban research, partic- 2 ularly in the pages of City. Unfortunately, however, such work has yet to gain the momentum necessary to bring the critical analysis of place annihilation into the heart of urban social science. It is still the case, for example, that only a small number of volumes have systematically delved into the dark terrain which emerges where the city becomes a pre-eminent site for political violence, warfare, «terrorism»; where urban de-struction, devastation, de-generation, de-modernisation, and annihilation haunt dreams of urban modernity and development; and where the promise of the city reveals its Janus-face in orgies of hatred, killing, murder, bombing and violence (see Picon, 1996;Lang,1995;Ashworth,1991;Vanderbilt,2002;Davis,2002;Cole,2003; Schneiderand Susser,2003). The starting point for this essay is that, in our post-Cold War and post 9/11world, both the informal («terrorist») and the formal («state») violence, war and terror that are engulfing our planet are actually constituted by the systematic and planned targeting of cities and urban places.This extended essay seeks to place such attacks – and the wider «state of emergency» within which they are embedded – within their theoretical and historical context. In so doing, I aim to help urban social research to further confront the taboos which have, over the last 50years, tended to inhibit research on, and recognition for, organised political violence against cities within critical social science. In particular, my purpose in this extended essay, drawing on Paul Virilio’s (1996) term, is to start mapping out what a specifically urbangeopolitics might amount to. I take «geopolitics» here to mean a concern with understanding the discourses, strate- gies and structures which emerge at the intersections of territory,spatiality,and polit- ical power and violence (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995). This essay’s central con- cern is to argue that the parallel transformations of urbanism and political violence in the post-Cold War period, and the increasing constitution of war and terror by acts of violence carefully targeted against urban, local sites, makes the development of such a specifically urban geopolitics an urgent imperative. As states, wars, empires, resistance movements, terror networks and economic, social and cultural formations 2. See, for example, Catterall (2001), Mendieta (2001), Safier, (2001), Prodanovic (2002), Coward (2002), Berman (1996), Diken and Laustsen (2002), Lang (1995), Farish (2003), Vanderbilt (2002), Davis (2002), Schneider and Susser (2003), Cole (2003), Bishop and Clancey (2003), Gregory,(2003), Bollens (2001), Graham (2003,2004a, b, c). 172 Stephen Graham are reconstituted, in parallel, into stretched, transnational webs which intersect, and constitute, the same sets of strategic urban sites, so this imperative will only gain more momentum. It follows that there is an urgent, parallel, need for the real recent progress in devel- oping a critical geopolitics. (ÓTuathail,1999)to move beyond an exclusive concern for nation-states, international relations, and international terror networks. Critical geopol- itics must also become sub-national. This is necessary so that the increasingly crucial roles of strategic urban places as geopolitical sites can be profitably analysed. A blizzard of ques- tions provides fuel here. For example, on our rapidly urbanising planet, how do the control, targeting, destruction, and reconstruction of urban sites intersect with chang- ing geopolitical structures and discourses? How are cities, and urban everyday life, being affected both by the umbilically connected interplay of terror and counter-terror? What roles do constructions, and imaginations, of «homeland» and «non-homeland» cities play within the emerging US «Empire», a hegemonic neoliberalism, and a proliferation of sites and sources of resistance (Hardtand Negri,2000)? What place do the systems of mobility, communication, infrastructure and logistics that are so central to contempo- rary urban life play, as targets and weapons, within the emerging crisis? How does the urbanisation of terrain influence the «asymmetric wars» that are emerging which pitch high-tech Western and U.S. forces against both poorly equipped local fighters and anti- globalisation movements? Finally, what are the prospects for creatively blending critical urban and geopolitical theory to match the parallel rescaling of political violence and urbanism in today’s world? In sum, this essay has been written in the belief that both a specifically geopolitical urbanism, and a specifically urban geopolitics, are now urgently required. A construc- tive dialogue between such usually separated research communities would, I believe, open up many extremely promising avenues for theory,analysis and activism. What follows is designed to help such a dialogue along. Toachieve this, my simple aim is to help illus- trate the inseparability of war, terror and modern urbanism. I do this by revealing a range of «hidden histories» of what I call the «dark side» of urban modernity – the propensity for urban life to be attacked, destroyed or annihilated in acts of organised violence. Ten Tales of Urban Geopolitics: On the «Dark» Side of Urban Modernity «Biologists have prepared ‘red books’ of extinct or endangered species; ecologists have their ‘green books’ of threatened habitats. Perhaps we need our ‘black book’ of the places 173 Postmortem City destroyed or nearly destroyed by human agencies. Actually it would take many books and street maps packed with remembrances to record the settlements, neighbourhoods, and buildings in those places destroyed in recent wars» (Hewitt,1987,p. 275). Arguably, humankind has expended almost as much energy, effort and thought to the annihilation and killing of cities as it has on their growth, planning and con- struction. Such city annihilation or urban warfare requires purposive work. It needs detailed analysis. Often, it involves «scientific» planning and operational strategy- making of extraordinary complexity and sophistication. Thus, it is necessary to assume that a continuum exists connecting acts of building and physical restruc- turing, on the one hand, and acts of all-out, organised war on the other. By way of mapping the diverse ways in which place annihilation is utterly intrinsic to both urban modernity, and modern urbanism and planning, I offer below a range of ten illustrative «tales». Architectures of Annihilation: The «War Ideology of the Plan» First, civilian urban planning, development, modernisation and restructuring often actually involve levels of devastation of cities, ruination, and forced resettlement that match that which occurs in all-out war. Even in supposedly democratic soci- eties, planned urban restructuring often involves autocratic state violence, massive urban destruction, the devastation of livelihoods, and even mass death. In both author- itarian and democratic societies, ideologies of urban planning have often actually invoked metaphors of war and militarism. This has been wisely practised as a means of comparing the purported need for violent restructuring in cities to achieve desired effects with the mass violence of states. Anthony Vidler (2001,p. 38)calls this «the war ideology of the plan». Thus, place annihilation can be thought of as a kind of hidden – and sometimes not so hidden – planning history (Sandercock,1998). The planned devastation and killing of cities is a dark side of the discipline of urban planning that is rarely acknowl- edged, let alone analysed. It is rarely realised, for example, that the analytical and sta- tistical methods so often used in post-WWII civilian planning have also been used – some- times by the same demographic, economic, and planning «experts» – to spatially organise the Apartheid regime in South Africa; to plan the systematic fire-bombing of German and Japanese cities; to organise the house-by-house demolition of Warsaw in 1945;to set up the giant urban-regional process of the Holocaust; or to starve many Eastern 174