ie SSS - F ‘STEMMING THE PLUTONIUM TIDE: | LIMITING THE ACCUMULATION | OF EXCESS WEAPON-USABLE | NUCLEAR MATERIALS STEMMING THE PLUTONIUM TIDE: LIMITING THE ACCUMULATION OF EXCESS WEAPON-USABLE NUCLEAR MATERIALS ‘ \Y WAY 9 y aN int v ae HEARING x SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MARCH 23, 1994 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs i : 5 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 80-838 CC WASHINGTON : 1994 | i For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-044899-9 aes eOeOreon ee x oe : COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York TOM LANTOS, California WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa HOWARD L. BERMAN, California TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota JAN MEYERS, Kansas CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey DANA ROHRABACHER, California ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey DAVID A. LEVY, New York ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois SHERROD BROWN, Ohio LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia EDWARD R. ROYCE, California MARIA CANTWELL, Washington : ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio PETER DEUTSCH, Florida ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland DON EDWARDS, California FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio LEWIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Chief of Staff JO WEBER, Staff Associate INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ‘OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana DAN BURTON, Indiana THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio ROBERT KING, Staff Director MICHAEL ENNIS, Republican Professional Staff Member BETH L. POISSON, Professional Staff Member THEODORE M. HIRSCH, Professional Staff Member ANDREA L. NELSON, Professional Staff Member (II) CONTENTS WITNESSES Page Robert J. Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State .........cccccccssccsessesccsesseceseereeeeee Norman A. Wulf, Acting Assistant Director, Bureau of Nonproliferation & Regional Arms Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ........... Harold P. Smith, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Deparcment of. Deterse ’25 css cc vesecrceers aisesas «oe eesS ach aes tase she ete Ls ancoueo setesnisns Robert W. DeGrasse, Jr., Director, Surplus Fissiles Materials Control and Disposition Project, Department of energy ..........scscsscessscessesecsecereseessenecasceresees Catherine M. Kelleher, senior fellow, foreign policy studies, The Brookings Mra S ETL UULOM Cees eec eee ec sere eee esac sees eee ata eaasocasaerensduotereccctitnee tnraieG aeme Brian G. Chow, senior physical scientist, National Defense Institute, RAND ... 18 Paul Leventhal, president, Nuclear Control Institute ............ccccsscsssesesscesseeseeees 20 APPENDIX Prepared statements: Robert oabhinhornee Ssee re Sees. Pere ohS TS Pe EL Ae Ss 29 Norman cAca Wil fix. bien. n cp anese casse ves evaarso so. deteass eee aed cava aes elo Eanes be 39 EAe arG Wiser INTEL ehEc c cr eae oreet eresa ce ce eS as ans sen azce cause aacestetecenscsscscessieets 44 PUCK UAV MCC PASSE felEe tte terete recec ore ercenccs nen aueessa sab peave,e ass raecdrasbas Rb parades Mees 54 CatherimenVicek Clete teS estecercccsce sco iecans enrene sects Noacc che netestactesuecrescvessteascuanes 64 Brien Gai Cho wir aie eee tee 2 IR SE LIE, rdek ascdatotiasaenosteoss 81 aulkeventha lle ta fara cc ae eset occa ca seen teee ghia aes ROS Hs EL ees 89 Responses to additional questions submitted for the record: Arms Control and Disarmament AGENCY <.2...1.2.<c-0scesaecescessesencesisesccuavseeceseents 101 Department; of Mmer gy zoe cese sa shores e sens sacaarers ceev aed cenn opoumuccsic ee edissvocsacdehsnessves 102 Wepartmentromotatewecc ee tect teres: ecsvetosssascacntaccsssrcsavseesesuveaversystvese'srsoeb s 103 Executive summary of RAND publication entitled “Limiting the Spread of Weapon-Usable Fissile DRAG Vals ree sence see cate ccscaba cco upis s sus scaseSuavesgaesWesaae e 105 “Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium”, prepublication copy, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National INGAGEM YON SCLOTIOCS ese ca ca Setndases cpu cnnectie tte eee nsnyc ass swat asters vias wats seve iene eee = cs Seeeee oat 120 184049 ere got eaec esa lepa ceese aches: Pi GEXe if 5 ae . canes tue tba = sate ote STEMMING THE PLUTONIUM TIDE: LIMITING THE ACCUMULATION OF EXCESS WEAPON- USABLE NUCLEAR MATERIALS WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1994 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:24 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Lantos (chair- man of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. LANTos. The Subcommittze on International Security, Inter- national Organizations and Human Rights will be in order. Let me begin by apologizing for starting late. Votes on the floor take precedence over all other activities. I would like to welcome our distinguished panelists. I am de- lighted you are able to join us in discussing this matter of the ut- most concern to international security: the rapid accumulation of surplus weapon-usable plutonium. ASSESSING THE PLUTONIUM THREAT We have been preoccupied lately by North Korea where troubling developments seem to occur daily. It is indeed an alarming and po- tentially explosive situation. In our haste to address this most seri- ous and glaring nuclear proliferation threat, however, we must be sure not to miss the forest for the trees. The United States is pressing for international inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities to determine whether it has di- verted sufficient plutonium to make one or two crude nuclear weapons. At the same time, global stocks of plutonium continue to escalate so that if something is not done soon, there will be enough surplus plutonium on hand in a decade to make perhaps more than 80,000 nuclear weapons. I urge our administration to take the lead in addressing this most serious problem. Where does all this excess plutonium come from? Basically, there are two sources. Roughly 200 metric tons of plu- tonium, enough for maybe 40,000 bombs, are expected to be recov- ered from dismantled warheads under the START I and START II treaties, as well as under agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union on tactical weapons. (1) 2 I am not, of course, suggesting that we renege on these arms con- trol agreements but rather that we give close attention to how best to manage this recovered plutonium both here and in Russia in order to minimize the risks of proliferation. In this context, I wel- come the developments of recent days and weeks. The majority of plutonium, However, will come not from disman- tled weapons but from reprocessing spent fuel from civilian nuclear reactors. In an October 1993 letter to a Member of Congress, the President made this comment about reprocessing, and I quote: “The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium. Its continued production is not justified on either economic or national security grounds and its accumulation creates serious proliferation and security dangers.” Two recent studies, one commissioned by the Defense Depart- ment and the other by then National Security Advisor Scowcroft, reach similar conclusions. I am very pleased that we have with us today two of the principal authors of these studies, Dr. Brian Chow of RAND, and Dr. Catherine Kelleher, Vice Chair of the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control. At their request, the executive summaries of these two excellent studies will be included in the record of this hearing without objec- tion. [The information appears in the appendix.] I should say a word about a particularly disturbing propaganda video relenceh by a Japanese Government-owned nuclear fuel com- | pany. The video depicts plutonium as a cuddly cartoon character named Pluto Boy who assures viewers that plutonium is safe enough to drink and that it is impossible to make a bomb from plu- tonium used in reactors. The fact is, of course, that an infinitesimal amount of plutonium causes cancer if absorbed into the body and that reactor-grade plu- tonium is only slightly less suitable than weapon-grade for making nuclear bombs. I commend Secretary O’Leary for her condemnation of this out- rageous and cynical attempt to hide the dangers of plutonium from the Japanese people. COUNTERING THE PLUTONIUM THREAT I am mostly concerned about two issues. First, what can be done to reduce the further accumulation of plutonium in the years ahead? And, secondly, what are the prospects for ensuring that sur- plus plutonium does not fall into the wrong hands? I am very pleased that the administration is making progress in limiting the accumulation of surplus plutonium. I once again wish to applaud Secretary O’Leary for recently concluding an agreement which will end Russian production of plutonium for nuclear weap- ons. I also commend the administration’s efforts in negotiating a_ global cutoff of plutonium production for weapons purposes. I would like now to say a word about the question of safeguard- ing and securing excess plutonium. The United States and Russia recently agreed to permit each other to inspect facilities used for storage of plutonium recovered 3 from nuclear weapons. This agreement goes a long way toward re- assuring each side that plutonium from dismantled warheads is not simply being returned to the other’s nuclear arsenal. The case of Iraq illustrates the fact that international safeguards as applied today are far from being foolproof. It is especially: dif- ficult to safeguard bulk plutonium facilities. Accounting uncertain- ties make it very difficult to determine if plutonium has been di- verted for weapons use. I understand that a government facility in South Carolina still has considerable problems in connection with this issue. In conclusion, I am concerned with the fact that the growing stockpiles of surplus plutonium may prove to be a welcome re- source to nuclear proliferators. I am very pleased by the steps the administration has taken to contain and safeguard this accumula- tion, especially on the military side. Yet, a great deal more needs to be done. The witnesses before us today possess a wealth of expertise on the subject and I look forward to their testimony. Before calling on our distinguished panel, let me ask each mem- ber to recognize the fact that our audience is a nontechnical audi- ence. I would ask you, therefore, very seriously to state your posi- tions and explain your points of view in a singularly nontechnical fashion. Your prepared statements, of course, will be entered in the record in their entirety but.I would like to hope that an intelligent and interested American citizen with no preparation or background or understanding of this field would be able to go away after listen- ing to you as having been greatly enlightened on an issue of enor- mous importance. I would also like before we begin the testimony to thank Ted Hirsch of the subcommittee staff and Mike Ennis on the minority staff for doing an outstanding job in preparation of this hearing. We will begin with you, Mr. Einhorn. STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. EINHORN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NONPROLIFERATION, BUREAU OF POLIT- ICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. EINHORN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the oppor- tunity to testify on the challenge et by the accumulation world- wide of weapons-usable, fissile materials, the challenge you alluded to in your opening remarks. The Clinton administration’s nonproliferation policy includes a comprehensive program to address this important challenge. A key element of that program is the President’s proposed multilateral ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons pur- poses, the so-called cutoff convention. A cutoff would put a verifiable cap on plutonium and highly en- riched uranium available for nuclear weapons programs worldwide, both in the five avowed nuclear weapon states, as well as in the so-called threshold states that have not yet joined the Nonprolifera- tion Treaty. A second element of our program is to submit all U.S. fissile ma- terial no longer needed for our defense programs to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards inspections. In this regard, the 4 President has agreed with President Yeltsin that United States and Russia would consider jointly how materials released from dis- armament could be Aiea under safeguards so as to promote transparency and to ensure that those materials would not be re- used in nuclear weapons. A third element of our policy, Mr. Chairman, is to discourage all fissile materials in regions of proliferation concern. In particular, a key goal for our handling of the North Korean nuclear issue is to ensure the full implementation of the North-South Joint Declara- tion on Denuclearization, which prohibits all reprocessing and en- richment facilities on the Korean Peninsula. A fourth element of our approach deals with’ plutonium produc- tion and use in civil energy programs. This is a question you men- tioned just a few moments ago. The United States is seeking to de- velop a consensus on the need to limit and eventually reduce the stockpiling of plutonium for civil nuclear programs and to ensure that existing material is subject to the highest standards of safety, security and international accountability. In this connection, we have stressed the importance of balancing supply and demand of separated plutonium in order to avoid the buildup of stocks that have no legitimate near-term use. One word, Mr. Chairman, about the U.S. attitude toward the civil use of plutonium and you quoted the President in his cor- respondence. Mr. LANTOS. I take it you agree with him. Mr. EINHORN. I absolutely agree with him. As you mentioned, we do not encourage the civil use of pluto- nium. We do not believe it is justified on economic or nonprolifera- tion grounds and our actions bear this out. We do not reprocess or use plutonium for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes. But at the same time, we do not use the leverage available to us through our consent rights over the disposition of U.S. origin fuel to interfere with the civil programs of nuclear cooperation partners in Western Europe and Japan that have strong nonproliferation records. We believe that using our consent rights in such a coercive fash- ion could lead to a confrontation with close friends and allies whose cooperation is essential to our broader nonproliferation goals such as pursuing a comprehensive test ban, a cutoff convention and stronger export controls. We need their cooperation, sir, and if we confront them on this issue, we are less likely to get it. A fifth element of our fissile materials policy involves—— Mr. LANTOS. But if I understand what you are saying, we would like to confront them on this issue but for reasons of what the French call force majeure we choose not to. Is that correct? Mr. EINHORN. Well, we have our own views on the utility, the ec- onomics, the nonproliferation consequences of civil uses of pluto- nium. The French, the British, the Japanese, our other friends, they understand those views. And, as I said, we put our money where our mouth is. We do not engage in these activities ourselves. But we think to use the leverage over them via our consent rights would lead to a confrontation and it would make these good