[ [ PEACEW RKS STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN LESSONS LEARNED, 2001–14 Edited by Scott Smith and Colin Cookman About the RepoRt In March 2015, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Chatham House, and Stanford University held a two-day conference on “State-Strengthening in Afghanistan 2001–2014: Learning from the Past to Inform the Future.” This report comprises a selection of papers presented at the conference. The papers look back critically at thirteen years of international intervention in Afghanistan, focusing on the impact of state- strengthening exercises on security, democratization, governance, the economy, rule of law, infrastructure, civil society participation, youth development, and women’s empowerment. They describe, from the perspective of Afghan and international policy makers and experts, the immense and often unforseen challenges in rebuilding the Afghan state. Cover photo: An Afghan village elder talks to International Security Assistance Forces from atop his home. Nate Derrick/Shutterstock.com. The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No. 116. First published 2016. ISBN: 978-1-60127-602-5 © 2016 by the United States Institute of Peace CONTENTS PEACEWORKS • MAY 2016 • NO. 116 3 Foreword ... 5 Summary ... 7 Introduction ... Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism: Complementary or Contradictory Strategies 9 Thomas Barfield ... Military and Civilian Assistance in Afghanistan: An Incoherent Approach 19 Barbara J. Stapleton ... Elections and Democratization in Afghanistan 35 Scott Seward Smith ... Subnational Governance in Afghanistan: Back to the Future 53 Jennifer Murtazashvili ... Rule of Law and Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Testing Theory with Practice 69 Erica Gaston and Erik Jensen ... Macroeconomic and Public Financial Management in Afghanistan 81 William A. Byrd ... Support to Afghan Private Sector Development 99 Paul Fishstein and Murtaza Edries Amiryar ... U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan: State Strengthening Through Infrastructure Building 111 Jodi Smith, John Drake, M. Annette Evans, and Scott C. Farquhar ... Role of the Media in Nation Forming 125 James Deane and Shirazuddin Siddiqi ... Afghan Youth and the Effects of Hybrid Politics 133 Mujib Mashal ... Women’s Empowerment: Challenging the Notion of Victimization 139 Orzala Ashraf Nemat ... 149 Recommendations ... 151 About the Authors ... STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN Foreword In March 2015, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Chatham House, and Stanford University held a two-day “Conference on State-Strengthening in Afghanistan 2001–2014: Learning from the Past to Inform the Future.” Hosted at the Institute’s headquarters in Washington, DC, participants included Afghan and international policymakers, academics, journalists, and representatives of the military, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations. This Peaceworks comprises a selection of papers presented at the conference during various panel discussions. The authors have revised the papers in light of these discussions, as well as subsequent developments in Afghanistan. Preceding the papers is a summary that outlines the main conclusions of the conference. At least two presumptions underlaid the decision to organize a lessons-learned exercise. The first is that lessons could indeed be learned. While the conference participants were asked to think about both positive and negative lessons, it was perhaps inevitable that most of the discussion focused on what could have been done better. The timing of the conference was surely a factor, being held in the first months of the new “National Unity Government” of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah. This was a moment of some hope for improved governance, but the memories of the 2014 presidential election crisis were still fresh. Even if the creation of the National Unity Government had successfully prevented the country from descending into a full-blown political crisis, the election was still a reminder of the fragility of Afghanistan’s transition and the unmet expectations that were set a decade before. The second presumption was that these lessons might indeed be applied. Participants were asked to think about the implications of the lessons for Afghanistan’s future, as well as possible “state-strengthening” projects. State collapse appears to be a defining phenomenon of our time, and each day our headlines are filled with the increasingly frightening consequences. It is therefore urgent that we learn as much as possible from recent attempts to strengthen state institutions. Afghanistan has become an unwitting laboratory for ongoing efforts to create political institutions that can foster stability, development, and respect for basic human rights; we now need to collate and internalize the lessons learned, effectively apply them, and monitor the outcomes. Preparations for the conference reminded us of the immense complexity of the Afghanistan situation. Our long discussions over how to break down the topics mirrored the policy debates of the previous decade. Fault will inevitably be found with this breakdown. We had to ignore some important topics, such as counternarcotics. We could have focused more on women, youth, and civil society. Different priorities revealed different analytical biases and “theories of change.” These differing perspectives were further amplified during the conference deliberations but did not prevent consensus on a number of key issues, as the summary denotes. We are especially grateful to the authors of the enclosed papers for developing and revising such informative, evidence-based studies on their respective topics. All the authors are experts in their field and gave their time freely, demonstrating a sincere desire to learn and share knowledge for the sake of a better future for Afghanistan and other fragile states. Particular gratitude goes to Scott Smith, who oversaw the project; and Colin Cookman, who kept the editorial production effort on track and edited each paper. Karl Eikenberry Michael Keating Andrew Wilder Stanford University Chatham House United States Institute of Peace USIP.ORG 3 STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN Summary ■ State-strengthening interventions in Afghanistan have contributed to remarkable changes in the country’s physical, political, economic, and social landscapes; however, success has been limited by myriad approaches taken by multiple actors with multiple objectives— some of which have been conflicting or too short-term in nature. ■ International counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies aimed at dismantling the Taliban and increasing security have proven at times to be at odds with state- building objectives. ■ Lack of unity of effort and priority setting among military and civilian actors have severly hampered the nationbuilding process, allowing power brokers to maintain their strongholds; creating more opportunity for corruption; and preventing the establishment of sustainable, national instutitions. ■ The contentious second round of the 2014 presidential election that resulted in Ashraf Ghani’s inauguration was a clear indicator of the complexity of a political environment set within a civil conflict. The need for a negotiated solution to the electoral crisis undermined Afghanistan’s democratic institutions. National and local power dynamics hindered efforts to make the power-sharing government work. ■ The Afghan state remains highly centralized in theory and highly fragmented in practice. Instead of strengthening formal structures, parallel structures have been created, often leaving the Afghan people to rely on informal or illegitimate structures of power. The lack of formal decentralization has left subnational goverance hostage to informal actors. ■ Rule of law strategies were developed in tandem to rather than as part of political and security strategies and were underfunded given the expectations surrounding establishing a justice system and reducing corruption. Moreover, while international assistance provided Afghans access to courts, they tended not to use them given rampant corruption and lack of perceived legitimacy and fairness. However, the subsequent hybrid approach that employed informal, community-based mechanisms as well as formal mechanisms had the unintended consequence of increasing corruption. ■ Macroeconomic and public finance management performance has improved substantially, but income and wealth inequality persist, and the current fiscal crisis and decline in international funding is already having a negative impact on economic growth. Further, the lack of early attention to incentives and preventive measures to avoid corruption has led to fraud and theft in the banking system and customs facilities. ■ Significant investments in private sector development projects and economic activity more generally have had mixed results due to the duplication of efforts, misaligned incentives and corruption, short duration of projects, and lack of support for successful implementation (logisitics, human capital, political frameworks). Many argue that Afghanistan’s institutions were not ready for the abrupt transition to a market-driven economy. ■ Billions of dollars spent on rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure (buildings, roads, and energy) have provided security forces and Afghans with crucial transportation routes, facilities, and communication systems. However, the short-term nature of some of the projects has led to the lack of planning and funding for maintaining newly built infrastructure, including the national road system that is vital for political and economic connectivity. USIP.ORG 5 PEACEWORKS 116 ■ While Afghanistan now has a diverse array of TV channels, radio stations, and newspapers—making it one of the most open societies in the region from this point of view—they are at increasing risk from dwindling donor funds and advertising income and threats from powerholders and extremist groups. Also, the country’s open licensing regime has permitted the establishment of media channels that are free to promote divisive politics. ■ Despite the Afghan government’s recognition that youth will increasingly constitute the backbone of governmental and private instutitions, their advancement has been capped at the bureaucratic level and no long-term vision exists for embracing the potential of this increasingly well-educated segment of the population. The staying power of strongmen has also presented a challenge through their control of the political economy and employment. Declining economic growth is a major challenge for this new generation of increasingly disillusioned Afghans. ■ International interventions have included a major focus on women’s empowerment and ensuring their full participation in all aspects of public life. However, the underlying motivations and approaches have varied; and many, short-term, women-focused projects have been unable to challenge the deep structural aspects of women’s subordination and the influence of a patronage-based system of rule. This limits and threatens the sustainability of women’s advancements, especially given that the current political and donor environments do not support all women’s engagement as agents of change. 66 USIP.ORG STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN Introduction Since 2001, Afghanistan has transformed physically, politically, and socially. Even if the outcome of the 2014 presidential election was contentious, the core notion of democracy has grown, with citizens increasingly expressing their demands for participation and accountability. The pool of human capital has expanded and deepened, especially among youth, many of whom are aspiring and motivated citizens eager to make a positive difference. The status of women, while still unequal, has improved profoundly since the fall of the Taliban regime. There is a pluralistic media and a level of political sophistication that would not have been imaginable thirteen years ago. These advancements have been drowned out by an overarching narrative of failure. Considerable international aid and assistance has contributed to Afghanistan’s transformation. From 2001–14, state-strengthening interventions focused on not only improving security but also on supporting democratization, rule of law, and governance; rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure; strengthening macroeconomic management and private sector participation; and increasing civil society involvement, especially by youth, women, and the media. However, these interventions employed varying approaches and had both positive and negative effects. This report analyzes those effects and offers specific lessons learned and broad recommendations for future interventions. During the March 2015 conference on state strengthening, the below overall opportunities and challenges were highlighted. Opportunities International interventions should capitalize on following the factors that represent opportunities for further advancement: • A new government with a reformist outlook that recognizes the importance of building less corrupt and more sustainable institutions, generating revenue streams from new economic activity, engaging the West on security and other matters, and having the president visibly play the role of commander-in-chief of the military. • Domestic pressure for reform articulated through the media, civil society groups, and private sector professional associations. • Recognition among Afghanistan’s political leaders that some devolution of government functions and decision making to bodies outside of Kabul is needed. • Reduction in excessive international funding, which can allow support to be calibrated at a sensible but predictable level, putting the brakes on excessive ambition as well as reducing problematic parallel structures. • Indications of a possible new, more helpful approach by Pakistan toward allowing a stable Afghanistan, encouraged by President Ashraf Ghani’s reaching out and reinforced by China’s interests in regional stability and in helping to establish a peace process. Challenges In addition, international interventions should account for the following factors that serve as challenges to achieving state-strengthening objectives. • Throughout history, Afghan governments have fallen when external support has been withdrawn. Largely due to the international community’s sharp reduction in aid over the last two years, Afghanistan’s resources are low, even to the point where it USIP.ORG 7 PEACEWORKS 116 may struggle to pay salaries. Similar to the 1990s post-Soviet period, collapse of the Afghan state would have severe regional and international consequences. • The National Unity Government will need to function at a pace more in line with citizen expectations and the unfolding regional political situation. Economic progress, including in the trade sector in the short term and the promising extractives sector in the long term, requires that steps be taken to improve governance. Progress to date in forming a cabinet and articulating programs is widely viewed as inadequate and must be accelerated. • Reforming state institutions and reducing endemic corruption will be a long-term and challenging process that is more likely to be successful if the international community adopts longer-term horizons and funding commitments rather than a series of one-year projects that often result in merely symbolic actions. • The Afghan state’s failure to deliver on governance and become a more responsive state may fuel insurgency as well as “soft extremist groups” working through educational and other institutions. • U.S. politics and inter-institutional rivalries can degrade clear thinking about what makes strategic sense for the United States, including reconciliation with the Taliban and levels and types of support to Afghanistan. From the start of international intervention, shortcomings, including the late start on building the Afghan National Security Forces in earnest, have resulted from the lack of agreement on objectives, poor coordination among U.S. institutions and with allies, and the lack of an overarching strategy. 8 USIP.ORG