State of Authority Cornell University This page intentionally left blank Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker, editors State of Authority The State in Society in Indonesia SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM PUBLICATIONS Southeast Asia Program Cornell University Ithaca, New York 2009 SEAP Editorial Board Benedict R. O'G. Anderson Thak Chaloemtiarana Tamara Loos Keith Taylor Andrew C. Willford Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications 640 Stewart Avenue, Ithaca, NY 14850-3857 Studies on Southeast Asia No. 50 © 2009 Cornell Southeast Asia Program All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, no part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: he 978-087727-780-4 ISBN: pb 978-087727-750-7 Cover Design: Kat Dalton Cover Image: Photograph by Ian Wilson, reprinted with permission TABLE OF CONTENTS Map of Indonesia vii Introduction: State in Society in Indonesia 1 Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker Reflections on the State in Indonesia 17 Joshua Barker and Gerry van Klinken Negara Beling: Street-Level Authority in an Indonesian Slum 4 7 Joshua Barker Milk Coffee at 10 AM: Encountering the State through Pilkada in 73 North Sumatra Deasy Simandjuntak The Majelis Ulama Indonesia versus "Heresy": The Resurgence of 95 Authoritarian Islam John Olle Reading Politics from a Book of Donations: The Moral Economy of 117 the Political Class in Sumba Jacqueline Vel Provincial Business and Politics 149 Syarif Hidayat and Gerry van Klinken Governing Villages in Indonesia's Coastal Zone 163 Dorian Fougeres Their Moment in the Sun: The New Indonesian Parliamentarians 181 from the Old OKP Lor en Ryter Contributors 219 This page intentionally left blank INTRODUCTION: STATE IN SOCIETY IN INDONESIA Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker It was not a question of a single Dutch sovereignty in the far-flung archipelago, but a "dust cloud of sovereignties" such as had hung above the German principalities, the Swiss cantons, and the Italian states before their consolidation ... Arching above this "dust cloud of sovereignties" in some parts of the archipelago was the thickening mist of Dutch suzerainty.1 A major realignment is taking place in the way we understand the state in Indonesia. New studies on local politics, ethnicity, the democratic transition, corruption, Islam, popular culture, and other areas hint at novel concepts of the state, though often without fully articulating them. This book aims to capture some dimensions of this shift. One reason for the new thinking is a fresh wind in state studies more generally. People are posing new kinds of questions about the state, and they are developing new methodologies to answer them. Another reason for this shift is that Indonesia itself has changed, probably more than most people recognize. It looks more democratic, but also more chaotic and corrupt, than it did during the militaristic New Order of 1966-98. This book consists of case studies from many different settings around the archipelago. The studies focus on various types of state representatives, such as village heads, informal slum leaders, district heads, and parliamentarians. They explore the spaces and settings where the state is evident and where it is discussed: coffee houses, hotel lounges, fishing waters, and streetside stalls. They investigate state authority, both as a set of actual practices and as an image of what the state "ought" to be. The case studies, and the broader trend in scholarship of which they are a part, allow for a new theorization of the state in Indonesia that more adequately addresses the complexity of political life in this vast archipelago nation. The book builds on a central argument that has helped direct the recent shift in state studies, which is that the autonomy of the state is more limited than it is often imagined to be. States may portray themselves as generic and immensely powerful in their own right, but in reality they are intimately embedded in their societies in 1 G. J. Resink, Indonesia's History between the Myths: Essays in Legal History and Historical Theory (den Haag: van Hoeve, 1968), p. 335. 2 Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker historically contingent ways. In this book, we begin with the assumption that the state-society divide needs to be broken down. It is a divide that has been drawn far more sharply in the past than is warranted by the facts. We then develop a critique of older methodologies for studying the state. Rather than focusing on static units such as rulers and closed institutions, we focus on processes of interaction and techniques of rule. Rather than assuming that the state is a single, homogeneous and coherent entity with a will of its own, we zoom in on the evident divisions and internal contradictions that make the state a site of struggle among many competing groups. And, finally, we draw new conclusions: we show that authority is not as centered, unified, and hegemonic as it has often been taken to be. Where there appears to be unity in the state, it is likely to be an ideological image promoted by the state itself. Such images can be powerful cultural constructs with great practical significance, so they should not be dismissed, but neither should they be allowed to blind observers to the reality of how state power is deployed and contested in myriad ways. In developing these insights, we are not claiming to reinvent state studies. On the contrary, we find continued relevance and even fresh importance in many elements of the existing literature. We discuss some of these elements in detail in our literature survey in the next chapter. Our interest in building on insights from the new state studies literature is, in large part, a reaction to developments on the ground in Indonesia. These developments can be broadly characterized as processes of "democratization"2 and "decentralization,"3 although they are far less orderly—and far less predictable— than these terms might suggest. The New Order was characterized by a powerful military, centralized decision-making, violent repression, and ideological control. Elections were largely ceremonial and served to return the same ruling party and much the same cast of characters to power year after year. The dramatic fall from grace of the military in 1998 marked the end of this regime. A decade later, the military shows no signs of regaining its former prestige. Furthermore, new groups have appeared on the political stage: an increasingly assertive middle class, indigenous groups, NGOs, militias, and Islamists, to name just a few. Political parties of all stripes have taken root, and there has been a quick succession of openly contested elections (including a new direct presidential election), yielding a new crop of national and sub-national leaders. The government relaxed its restrictions on the press and on public gatherings, which allowed open public debate to flourish. This opening up of the political process was not always smooth. As political temperatures 2 Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia, Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury, eds., Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1999); Donald K. Emmerson, ed., Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition (New York, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999); Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman, eds., Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition (Adelaide: Crawford House, 2001); R. William Liddle, ed., Crafting Indonesian Democracy (Bandung: Mizan, 2001); Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen, eds., Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000). 3 Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds., Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003); Maribeth Erb, Carole Faucher, and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, eds., Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005); Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling, eds., Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Minako Sakai, ed., Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local Societies in Indonesia (Adelaide: Crawford House, 2002). Introduction: State in Society in Indonesia 3 rose, young men sometimes flocked to join ad hoc local militias aiming to protect their respective communities. "Money politics" is still important, and competition among parties and religious groups has sometimes turned violent. Nonetheless, the change has been remarkable. For the first time since measurements began in 1972, Freedom House classified Indonesia as "free" in its global survey of 2006.4 It had rated the country "not free" in the 1990s, upgrading it to "partly free" after 1998. In concert with this rather fitful democratization, the Indonesian government has also undergone significant decentralization. Provinces and districts have won greater autonomy and more money to run their own affairs. In 2001, the government began implementing two somewhat sketchy 1999 laws on decentralization, one on finances and one on government structures. In 2004, a new law on decentralization (no. 32) elaborated and partly qualified the two earlier laws. As a consequence of these laws, regional parliaments have become new power centers, able to make and unmake key government executives. Much of the money has flowed under the table. New opportunities and unclear rules have caused corruption and ecological abuse to flourish. But popular protests against such crimes have also become louder. In some places such as Maluku, Central Sulawesi and parts of Kalimantan, the combination of democratic freedoms and rapid decentralization produced violent forms of communitarian competition, in which thousands died tragic deaths and hundreds of thousands were displaced. In other areas, the transition proceeded remarkably peacefully. One of the unexpected spin-offs of decentralization was the proliferation of new districts and provinces. Their proponents defended them as "bringing government closer to the people," but, once in power, these new bureaucratic chiefs misspent large amounts of money on constructing new office space in places that had little need for them.5 Gradually, decentralization appears to have become better regulated and more democratic. In 2005, as a result of popular disgust with "money politics" in provincial and district parliaments, Jakarta introduced direct elections for district chiefs and provincial governors (pilkadd), similar to the presidential election. Hundreds of such elections passed off peacefully in that year and have continued to do so since. All these changes have dramatically affected the structure of state power. With only a little exaggeration, we can say that Indonesia's multiple local arenas have begun to resemble the late nineteenth century "dustcloud of sovereignties'' of which Resink wrote. Not just Indonesia has changed, but so have states everywhere. Globalization, which in the South tends to be viewed as an imperialistic project carried out by the rich and militarily mighty North,6 has been reshaping the things a national state can 4http: / / www.freedomhouse.org /uploads / fiw09 / CompHistData / FIW_AllScores_Countries.x Is (accessed April 11, 2009). 5 Also new was a proliferation of reports by multilateral agencies mixing detailed statistics with plentiful advice on Indonesia's governance; see USAID-DRSP, "Stock Taking on Indonesia's Recent Decentralization Reforms," report (Jakarta: USAID Democratic Reform Support Program [DRSP], 2006); World Bank, "Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia's New Opportunities—Indonesia Public Expenditure Review 2007," report, published by the World Bank, Jakarta, 2007. 6 Many scholars prefer the term "global South" to the term "Third World," which has Cold War associations, or the term "underdeveloped countries," which elevates industrialism as a progressive value. All three terms refer to the same large group of countries, located predominantly in the southern hemisphere, by contrast with the richer nations in the northern hemisphere.