Stalin's Keys to Victory: The Rebirth of the Red Army Walter S. Dunn, Jr. PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Stalin’s Keys to Victory PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL ADVISORYBOARD Board Cochairs LochK.Johnson,RegentsProfessorofPublicandInternationalAffairs,SchoolofPublic andInternationalAffairs,UniversityofGeorgia(U.S.A.) PaulWilkinson,ProfessorofInternationalRelationsandChairmanoftheAdvisoryBoard, CentrefortheStudyofTerrorismandPoliticalViolence,UniversityofSt.Andrews(U.K.) Members The late Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), former Director of Force Transformation,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(U.S.A.) Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies and Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity(U.S.A.) Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies(U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Atomic Energy Commission), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Professor of History of War, Oxford University, and Pro- fessorofMilitaryandNavalHistory,YaleUniversity(U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy(U.S.A.) PaulM.Kennedy,J.RichardsonDilworthProfessorofHistoryandDirector,International SecurityStudies,YaleUniversity(U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, OxfordUniversity(Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Gov- ernmentandPolitics,UniversityofMaryland(U.S.A.) Jusuf Wanandi, co-founder and member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and InternationalStudies(Indonesia) FareedZakaria,Editor,NewsweekInternational(U.S.A.) Stalin’s Keys to Victory The Rebirth of the Red Army WALTER S. DUNN, J . R PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut London (cid:1) LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Dunn,WalterS.(WalterScott),1928– Stalin’skeystovictory:therebirthoftheRedArmy/WalterS.Dunn,Jr. p.cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0-275-99067-2(alk.paper) 1. Soviet Union. Raboche-Krest’ianskaia Krasnaia Armiia—History—World War, 1939–1945. 2. WorldWar,1939–1945—Campaigns—EasternFront. I. Title. D764.D7995 2006 940.54'147—dc22 2006001237 BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable. Copyright#2006byWalterS.Dunn,Jr. Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,withoutthe expresswrittenconsentofthepublisher. LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:2006001237 ISBN:0-275-99067-2 Firstpublishedin2006 PraegerSecurityInternational,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881 AnimprintofGreenwoodPublishingGroup,Inc. www.praeger.com PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Thepaperusedinthisbookcomplieswiththe PermanentPaperStandardissuedbytheNational InformationStandardsOrganization(Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents Preface vii Key to Abbreviations xi 1 Introduction 1 2 Creating a New Red Army 7 3 Mobilizing Arms Production 23 4 Maintaining the Divisions 43 5 Frustrating the Germans: Moscow, 1941 63 6 From Disaster to Victory: Stalingrad, 1942 95 7 Hitler’s Last Hurrah: Kursk, 1943 127 8 The Death Blow: Belarus, 1944 147 9 Conclusion 163 Bibliography 171 Index 177 Preface Manyhavedifficultycomprehendingthemiraclethattookplaceinlate1941and early1942intheSovietUnion.Inthesummerof1941,theGermanArmyrouted the Red Army as it had routed the Polish, British, French, and other armies in 1939,1940,andearly1941.NonehadbeenabletowithstandGermanmightmore than a few weeks. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, it ap- pearedtomostthatHitlerwouldsucceedashehadbefore.Amajorportionofthe prewar Red Army was completely annihilated, millions of prisoners taken, and the mostpopulous and developed provinces of the Soviet Union were occupied by the Germans andtheir allies. ThepurposeofthisworkistodetailhowtheSovietUnionwasabletocreate a new army in late 1941 and early 1942 and how the new rifle divisions and brigades and new tank brigades were formed and deployed. The deployment of thenewunitrevealsthetruestrategicobjectivesofStalinandhisgenerals.Soviet historiestendtodismissasdiversionsoperationsthatdidnotsucceed,butsome oftheseoperationsreceivedmajorreinforcementsofnewunitsbeforebeginning to attack. One does not invest major assets in a venture that does not have a significant objective. The assignment of the new units is of special importance because of the logistical nightmare faced by the Soviet high command from June 1941 to the summerof1944.TheonlypracticalwaytomovelargeformationsintheSoviet Union was by rail. There were comparatively few good roads and far from enough trucks to spare for strategic as opposed to tactical troop movements. Marchingthetroopsandcarryingtheirequipmentandsupplieswithhorse-drawn wagonswaspainfullyslow.Therefore,oncecommittedtoafront,thatunitwould remain there for some time. viii PREFACE The Soviet rail network generally served the large cities. Few lines were available to the Russians after December 1941. The single rail line east of Le- ningradwascutbytheGermans.AfewraillinesledsouthfromMoscowandeast to the Siberian military districts. Lateral north-south movement by rail was extremely difficult, usually accomplished by sending the trains first to Moscow and then from Moscow to the front. Therefore, once a division was ready for combat, itmoved by rail toan army on the front and, for the most part, there it remained.WhenadecisionwasmadetosendadivisiontotheMoscowareaorto the south, that was tantamount to a final commitment for that division. The Soviets could not move large numbers of divisions laterally as did the German Army. Oncecommitted, the Soviet division remainedinthe general area. Tomakethisstudymorepalatable,Ihavelimitedtheexaminationtorifleand motorized divisions, rifle brigades, and tank brigades. These units were the building blocks of the armies and tank corps. The number of divisions alone is staggering when one considers that the United States employed less than 100 divisions and Great Britain less than that in campaigns against Germany, Italy, and Japan. While Soviet divisions had fewer men, they had comparable fire- power. Listingtheindividualunitswithnumbersindicatingtheirlineageisnecessary because otherwise the message would not be clear. Simply stating that 84 rifle divisionswereformedintwomonthsnotonlyfailstomakeanimpression,butis passed off as anexaggeration not based on anyexisting document. More than 9,000 Soviet units of battalion size or greater are included in my computer database, which gives a month-by-month history of each unit and its components.BecausetheRussiansusedthesamenumberasmanyasfourtimes todesignateunits,Ihavecreatedasimplifiedlineageforeachrifledivision,rifle brigade, and tank brigade. This new designation includes the various numbers used by each unit. Many of the divisions were originally created as rifle brigades, then built up into rifle divisions, then renumbered with the designation of a division that had been destroyed, and finally renumbered as guard divisions. A large block of divisions were formed with 400 series numbers and then renumbered with the numbersofdestroyeddivisionsorthosethathadbeendesignatedguarddivisions. In1941,someriflebrigadesanddivisionswereincombatafewmonthsafterthey were formed, but this practice quickly gave way to longer periods of training. PopularmythhasitthatmanyRussiandivisionsweresentintobattlewithafew weeks ormonths oftrainingand were slaughtered bythe Germans, becausethe numberhadrecentlyappearedintheorderofbattleeventhoughtheunithadbeen inexistence for monthsunder adifferent designation. Where these new units would be committed was determined by the Soviet strategicplans.OftentheGermanintelligencemapswouldincludeanotationof theexistenceof60orsounidentifiedandunlocatedrifledivisions.TheGerman taskofidentifyingtheseunitswasmadeimmeasurablymorecomplicatedbythe Sovietpractice ofusingthe samenumbers repeatedly. PREFACE ix AlthoughthisrebirthoftheRedArmyhasbeendescribedingeneralterms,the exactdetailshavebeendifficulttoextract.Sovietreluctancetoreleasedetailshas been a major obstacle. The Soviet decision in late 1941 to give the numbers of destroyed divisions to the new divisions has caused some confusion. Stalin’s decision to disguise some of the new divisions as volunteer divisions similar to those created in Leningrad by his political rival added to the mystery. The practiceofcreatingariflebrigade,acomparativelysimpleorganization,firstand thentransformingitintoafull-fledgeddivisionwassignificantinconcealingthe length of time taken to train the division. After 40 years of study, I have not resolved that problem completely—rifle brigades disappear from the order of battleanddivisionsappearforthefirsttime,butIhavenotestablishedallofthe links. Lack of agreement between Soviet orders of battle and other documents add to the confusion. German intelligence reports often provide useful clues to resolve some problems. TheRedArmyidentifieddifferentdivisionswiththesamenumberbyadding a roman numeral in parentheses; for example, 34(II) was the second for- mation bearing the number 34. The different divisions were identified in some Russian documents as 137th Rifle Division (I), 137th (II), and so on. However, the roman numerals do not appear in the Russian orders of battle. German in- telligence continued to collect data on the various divisions with the same number on the same card butin published lists dididentify the new versions of eachdivision.AcommonGermanerrorwastodesignateaunitasanewdivision whenitsimplyhadbeenwithdrawnfromcombatforrestandrehabilitationand then returned to combat with the same leadership. Such errors continue to ob- scurethe picture for historians andreaders. Inthiswork,Ihavesimplifiedthedesignationusingcapitalletters,34Bbeing the second formation of a division bearingthe number 34. To indicate the line- age of a unit, I have placed slashes between the various designations. For ex- ample,34rb/345/101B/34Gdesignatesthe34thBrigade,whichbecamethe345th RifleDivision,whichbecamethe101(II)RifleDivision,whichinturnbecamethe 34thGuardDivision.Thesignificanceofestablishingthisrelationshipisthatthe unitwasformedinSeptember1941asabrigadeandtrainedforseveralmonths. Conversion ofbrigadestodivisionswasaccomplishedeither bycombining two brigades and adding some replacements or adding a replacement regiment and formingnewbattalionswithcadresdrawnfromtheexistingfourbattalionsinthe brigade.Thesame alternativeswereusedfortheartillery,engineers,andsoon. Thenewdivisionreceivedthenumberofadestroyeddivision,andperhapslater in the war it was awarded guard status. However, it remained the same unit, in most cases commanded by the same general. The essential personnel provided cohesionregardlessofexpansionorreplacementoflosses.Forthisreason,when these divisions entered combat they generally performed quite well. They were notthemassesofuntrainedmenportrayedinsomeaccounts. UnitintegritywasassignificantintheRedArmyasinotherarmies.Intimate knowledge of the character and abilities of the regimental, battalion, and