-Mi IT M I e- 'I,, (. /. -YITAN DISTIBUION TATMflI Aq Approovre dp ublicr`7cre DitibtoeUr iie 1996103 01 The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (cid:127)TIOQr A P~z The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan Translated and Edited by Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Introduction by David M. Glantz, Former Director, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Graphics and maps by Stephan K. Stewman and Marcin E. 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Second Printing, August 1996 CONTENTS Foreword ........................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ........................................................................... x Introduction ......................................................................................... xi Preface ............................................................................................... xvii Frunze Comments .......................................................................... xxvi Frunze Foreword .......................................................................... xxviii Chapter 1: Blocking and Destroying Guerrilla Bands ........... 1 1. An airborne battalion searches Sherkhankel village ........... 2 2. Searching a populated area in the Charikar Valley ....... 5 3. Blocking and destroying a guerrilla band in Kunar Province ............................................................................... 9 4. Combing the city of Bamian and its outlying towns during the course of a raid ............................................... 11 5. Blocking and searching the green zone of the Arghandab River ............................................................... 15 6. Blocking, searching for and destroying a guerrilla force in Ishkamesh region ............................................... 19 7. Sweeping a green zone in Helmand Province ............... 24 8. Sweeping villages with Afghani and Soviet subunits ......... 27 9. Sweeping a potential ambush area ................................. 31 10. Blocking, sweeping and destroying the mujahideen in the Varduj Valley ........................................................ 33 11. Sequential blocking and sweeping of a mountain valley near Anushella ..................................................... 36 12. Blocking and sweeping an inhabited region ................. 40 13. Blocking the enemy in an area of villages and then destroying them during the sweep .................................. 44 V Chapter 2: The Offensive in Populated Areas and Mountains ..................................................................................... 47 14. Assault on the outskirts of Herat ..................................... 48 15. The actions of a MRB as a raiding detachment ........... 53 16. Assaulting Xadighar Canyon and seizing weapons and ammunition caches ................................................. 56 17. An airborne battalion seizes the Satukandav Pass ........ 60 18. Storming Spinakalacha village ........................................ 66 19. A motorized rifle battalion offensive at night in the mountains of the Andarab Canyon ..................... 70 Chapter 3: The Application of Tactical Air Assaults ............ 77 20. Tactical air assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces .................................... 78 21. An air assault in the area of Rumbasi village ................. 81 22. Air-assaulting and blocking the enemy in the Lar- M andikul' Valley .............................................................. 85 23. Destruction of a guerrilla force by a tactical air assault into Lowgar Province ........................................... 89 24. Seizing and holding a mujahideen training center with a tactical air assault ................................................. 94 25. An airborne battalion lands in Islam-Dara Canyon and seals it off ................................................................. 98 26. Conducting a tactical air assault in the "Melava" fortified region ..................................................................... 102 Chapter 4: Defense and Outpost Security ............................ 107 27. A motorized rifle platoon defends outside Jurm village..108 28. Organizing a security outpost in the suburbs of Kabul...112 29. Repelling a raid on a security post ..................................... 115 30. A mobile security patrol in combat near the village of C handaran ....................................................................... 118 31. A mobile security patrol destroys a guerrilla force in Kh injan C anyon .................................................................. 121 32. Repelling a mujahideen attack on a security detachment in the Panjsher valley .................................... 124 33. Securing a base cam p ......................................................... 126 34. LO C security ....................................................................... 129 vi Chapter 5: March and Convoy Escort ..................................... 135 35. Escorting a truck convoy from Kabul to Gazni ............... 136 36. An air assault company escorts a convoy in Kunduz Province ................................................................................ 140 37. Convoy escort and combat in the village of D aulatabad ........................................................................... 143 38. Convoy escort and battle near Maliykhel ......... 147 Chapter 6: Conducting Ambushes ........................................... 151 39. A reinforced MRC conducts an ambush in Ka ndahar Province .............................................................. 152 40. An airborne group ambushes a bridge site ....................... 156 41. A MRP conducts an ambush in the area of Aibak .......... 159 42. A MRC conducts an ambush in the Loy-Karez region .................................................................................... 163 43. An airborne platoon conducts an ambush in H elm and Province ............................................................... 167 44. A reinforced reconnaissance platoon conducts an ambush northwest of Surubi ......................................... 171 45. Conducting ambushes on the basis of radio intercept data in the area of Khanabad ............................ 175 46. A reinforced motorized rifle company conducts an ambush to the northwest of Jalalabad .......................... 180 47. A recon platoon conducts an ambush in enemy-controlled territory ................................................. 185 48. A reinforced recon company conducts an ambush west of Bagram ...................................................... 190 49. Conducting an ambush on the Yakpay Mountain Pass ........................................................................................ 193 Chapter 7: And in conclusion ................................................... 197 Glossary .......................................................................... 209 About the authors .......................................................................... 213 Map symbols ................................................................................... 214 Maps of Afghanistan ..................................................................... 216 vii FOREWORD When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their sol- diers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult ter- rain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tac- tical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival. Battalion and company commanders, platoon leaders and sergeants will find realistic issues within these vignettes to discuss with squad and team leaders, and with vehicle commanders and dri- vers. Basic and Advanced Infantry Officer and NCO courses will find useful applications for both classroom and field instructions. Senior leaders may find invaluable insights into the dangers and opportunities tactical units under their command may face in limited wars. Above all, the lessons in this book should help small unit lead- ers understand the need for security, deception, patrols, light and lit- ter discipline, caution, vigilance, and the ability to seize the initiative in responding to unpredictable enemy actions and ambushes. Hans Binnendijk Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people contributed to this book. Colonel General Fedor M. Kuzmin, the Commandant of the Frunze Academy, made this book possible. Other Frunze Academy officers who helped me immensely were General Major Ivan N. Vorob'ev and Colonel Analtoli Malin. Mary Fitzgerald of the Hudson Institute suggested the present book lay- out. Michael Orr of the United Kingdom's Combat Studies Research Centre in Sandhurst and Allen Curtis of the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California read and commented on the manuscript. Colonel (Ret) Dave Glantz, the former director of the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), read and commented on the manuscript and wrote the introduction. My directors, Colonel Tod Milton and Colonel Charles Johnston, and my co-workers at FMSO, Dr. Graham Turbiville, Colonel (Ret) Bill Mendel, Dr. Jacob Kipp, LTC (Ret) Tim Thomas, LTC (Ret) Bill Connor, LTC John Sray, LTC Geoff Demerest, Major Brian Dando, Major Ray Finch and Major Steve Button read and com- mented on the manuscript. Randy Love of FMSO and my good friend Michael Gress painstakingly checked my translation. Stephen Stewman of FMSO did a fantastic job on the maps. General Yahya M. Nawroz, former Chief of Operations of the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense, mujahideen strategist, and interim Minister of Defense, read and correct- ed my manuscript and identified and corrected place names. Colonel Ali AhmadJalali, former Afghan Army and mujahideen commander and noted author, also read and corrected my manuscript and identified and corrected place names. SPC Marcin Wiesiolek cleaned up and scrubbed the graphics. Peter D. Neufville provided good counsel and direction based on his experience in Afghanistan and research on the Panjsher operations. James H. Brusstar and Fred Kiley guided the man- uscript through the acceptance process at National Defense University. Richard Stewart of the Special Operations Command at Ft. Bragg found additional publication funds, and Jonathan Pierce of NDU Press did the final edit and design. Finally, Gina Grau, my bride of 29 wonderful years, helped with encouragement and understanding. Thank you all for your help. The mistakes are mine, the product is ours. x INTRODUCTION Sixteen years after its commencement and six years after its ces- sation, the Soviet-Afghan War remains an enigma for Westerners. Set against the backdrop of earlier successful Soviet military interven- tions in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968), and occasional Soviet military pressure on Poland, the stark military power of the Soviet state seemed to be an irresistible tool of indefatigable Soviet political power. Ever concerned about the specter of a Soviet theater strategic offensive across the plains of Europe, the West was thankful that nuclear deterrence maintained the Cold War balance, and was conditioned to accept, albeit reluc- tantly, the results of Soviet intervention within its Socialist common- wealth or in Soviet border regions. Having suffered through the trau- ma of Vietnam, Americans, in particular, watched curiously to see how the vaunted Soviet military machine would deal with the ill- equipped tribesmen of this inhospitable region. A few recollected the Afghan experiences of the British in the late Nineteenth Century, when British imperial power was humbled by the ancestors of these very same tribesmen. Few Westerners, however, doubted that the Soviets would ultimately prevail. Some even projected their European fears to Asia, and pondered the applicability of the Soviet theater-strategic offensive to southern Asia. More than a few strate- gic pundits and military planners envisioned a bold Soviet strategic thrust from southern Afghanistan to the shores of the Persian Gulf, to challenge Western strategic interests and disrupt Western access to critical Middle Eastern oil. Despite these fears and dire warnings, the Soviet Afghan military effort soon languished as the British experience began to repeat itself. Although appearing to have entered Afghanistan in seemingly surgi- cal fashion and with overwhelming force, the Soviet military com- mitment was, in reality, quite limited, and the immense and stark ter- ritory of Afghanistan swallowed the invaders up. Across the largely barren landscape, guerrilla fighters multiplied, and, within months, xi