SOUTH AFRICA AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions in the Context of International N on-Proliferation Policies J. D. L. Moore Palgrave Macmillan ISBN 978-1-349-07830-1 ISBN 978-1-349-07828-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-07828-8 ©J. D. L. Moore 1987 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1987 All rights reserved. For information write: Scholarly & Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 100 I 0 First published in the United States of America in 1987 ISBN 978-0-312-74698-8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Moore, J.D.L. (John Davey Lewis) South Africa and Nuclear proliferation. Bibliography: p. Includes index. I. Nuclear weapons - South Africa. 2. South Africa - Military policy. I. Title. U264.M66 1987 335.8'25119'0968 86~ 17693 ISBN 978-0-312-74698-8 Filmsetting by Vantage Photosetting Co. Ltd Eastieigh and London Contents List of Tables and Figures viii Preface IX List of Abbreviations and Units XI Introduction Xll 1 The Technology of Nuclear Weapons 1 Fissile material and the thermal reactor fuel cycle 1 Bomb assembly 6 Resources required 7 2 The International Non-proliferation Regime 10 From atomic secrecy to Atoms for Peace II The IAEA and international safeguards 14 The Non-Proliferation Treaty 18 Sensitive nuclear exports to developing countries 22 The Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines 25 The US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 29 The Anglo-Saxons' loss of nuclear leverage 33 Uranium oversupply: less concern about the plutonium economy 37 Non-proliferation policy today: the emphasis on motivations 39 Conclusion 43 3 South Africa's International Relations 46 The outcast state 46 The campaign against apartheid 49 The military response 53 Relations with African states 57 Relations with the West 60 South Africa's strategic situation 62 Free market or siege economy? 64 The league of the desperate 66 4 Uranium Mining in Southern Africa 70 The development of South Africa's uranium resources 70 Uranium exports 74 VI Contents Uranium exports and non-proliferation 77 The Rossing mine in Namibia 79 5 The Development of South Africa's Nuclear Capability 82 Early nuclear research and development 82 Mr Vorster's 1970 announcement 84 The nature of the South African enrichment process 85 The STEAG-UCOR relationship 88 Changing plans for enrichment capacity 90 Uranium hexafluoride conversion 93 The Koeberg power reactors 95 Problems with enriched uranium fuel supplies 97 The problem solved 100 Conclusion 102 6 South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation 105 South Africa and the IAEA 105 South Africa's non-proliferation policy and the NPT 108 The 1977 Kalahari incident III Nuclear explosions over the southern oceans? 115 7 South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Capability 119 Fissile material 120 Financial and manpower resources 122 Delivery systems 124 8 South Africa's Nuclear Intentions 126 Black Africa and nuclear weapons 126 Military motivations 128 Economic and prestige considerations 131 The uranium export weapon 134 The politics of nuclear uncertainty 137 Changing nuclear motives 138 9 Conclusions for Western Policy 142 Intelligence, secrecy and uncertainty 142 The effect of non-proliferation policies on South Africa's nuclear programme 144 Efforts to induce South Africa's signature of the NPT 148 Nuclear relations and Western foreign policy towards South Africa 151 South African or Western leverage? 153 Contents Vll Appendix Uranium Enrichment 157 The principles of uranium enrichment 157 Global development of commercial enrichment capacity 162 A comparison of enrichment technologies 167 Notes and References 176 Bibliography 208 Index 218 List of Tables and Figures Table 1.1 Material masses needed for a nuclear explosive device 2 Table 1.2 Critical masses for enriched uranium 5 Table 2.1 Nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon states not subject to IAEA or bilateral safeguards 20 Table 3.1 South Africa's defence expenditure, 1955-80 54 Table 4.1 Western world uranium resources 71 Table 4.2 Western world uranium production 73 Table 5.1 Nuclear fuel cycle installations in South Africa 103 Table A.I SWU and natural uranium requirements for enriched uranium products 160 Table A.2 Western world commercial enrichment production and capacity 165 Table A.3 Comparison of enrichment technologies 172 Figure 1.1 Thermal reactor fuel cycles 4 Figure A.I Typical relationship between feed, tail and product streams in an enrichment plant 159 Figure A.2 Cross-section of tubular separation element for Becker nozzle process 170 viii Preface This book examines South Africa's nuclear capabilities and intentions in the context of international non-proliferation policies aimed at prevent ing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries. From a brief survey of the human, financial and material resources required to produce a nuclear weapon it is seen that the production of such a weapon is well within South Africa's capabilities. A tentative assessment is made of the number of weapons South Africa could have produced. The means by which South Africa has acquired her nuclear capability and the incentives (and disincentives) the country may have for developing nuclear weapons are discussed. Although South Africa is arguably one of the nations most isolated and shunned by the international community, Western non-prolifera tion policies do not seem to have been applied any more rigorously to that country than to other potential 'nth' nuclear weapon states. The book concludes by looking at why this may be so, a major factor being the considerable bargaining strength possessed by South Africa by virtue of being one of the world's major producers of natural uranium and now a producer of enriched uranium. Western non-proliferation policy-makers may have been more concerned to obtain a cooperative attitude on the part of South Africa in her exports of nuclear technology and materials, principally uranium, than with the possible development of a South African nuclear weapon for which there would seem to be little or no military requirement. South Africa's tactic may thus be to use uncertainty about her uranium export policy and possible possession of nuclear weapons as a political or diplomatic bargaining card in order to maintain close relations with, and extract political, economic and strategic concessions from, the West. This book is a revised version of a thesis submitted for a Master's degree in the Department of Science and Technology Policy of the University of Manchester. I would like to thank Roger Williams and Philip Gummett of that department for originally sparking my interest in the subject. Thanks are also due to Philip Gummett for his wise critical comments on the draft copy of the thesis and to the Science Research Council and the Social Science Research Council for jointly funding me on the Master's course. I am very grateful to Professor Spence of Leicester University for being kind enough to read the thesis and encourage its publication. I would also like to express my gratitude to IX x Preface Anne Akeroyd, Christopher Hill, Lan White and Harry Wilson, all of York University's Centre for Southern African Studies, for their help, patience and tolerance whilst this work was being completed. Thanks are due to Liz and Patience for the typing. Of course, responsibility for the content of the book is mine alone. Finally I would like to acknowledge the loving support provided by my family, especially my young sons, Jonathan and Richard, to whom this book is dedicated. J.D.L.M. York, January 1986