Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. The Letort Papers In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorer and fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there was a garrison on Letort Creek at what is today Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barracks lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was a bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure point for further exploration. Today, as was the case over two centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home of the U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition and transformation. In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled the men and women who, like Letort, settled the American West, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) presents The Letort Papers. This series allows SSI to publish papers, retrospectives, speeches, or essays of interest to the defense academic community which may not correspond with our mainstream policy-oriented publications. If you think you may have a subject amenable to publication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wish to comment on a particular paper, please contact Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of Research, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. The phone number is (717) 245-4058; e-mail address is [email protected]. We look forward to hearing from you. The Letort Papers SOMALIA: LINE IN THE SAND— IDENTIFICATION OF MYM VULNERABILITIES Eloy E. Cuevas Madeleine Wells September 2010 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of De- fense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Stud- ies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeop- ardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the inter- est of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may also be obtained free of charge by placing an or- der on the SSI website. The SSI website address is: www.Strategic- StudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the re- search of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newslet- ter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute. army.mil/newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-460-0 ii FOREWORD Continuing instability in Somalia has increased concern that terrorists who seek to establish a foot- hold in Africa may use such insecure places as a safe haven and launching pad. Several attempts have been made to establish lawful governments in Somalia; however, warlord and clan interests have managed to take center stage among the population. The Somali- based al-Shabaab (also known as the Mujahidin Youth Movement [MYM]) is a militant organization born out of both successive regional turmoil and international salafi-jihadi ideology, which continues to actively un- dermine the United Nations (UN)-supported African Union (AU) peacekeeping force, the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and all UN efforts to support Somalis in creating a stable state. Al-Shabaab’s ability to orchestrate a strategic commu- nications campaign has resulted in support from both al-Qa‘ida and Usama bin Laden, as well as funding and personnel recruitment from pockets of Somali di- aspora throughout the world. While U.S. administration officials deny direct U.S. support for AU forces, AU leadership claims the contrary, suggesting direct U.S. military support has been crucial to fighting al-Shabaab over the past few years. Any direct effort the United States undertakes in favor of the TFG against al-Shabaab and its asso- ciated militias must involve a whole of government approach focused on the areas where al-Shabaab has demonstrated vulnerabilities. Such interagency action to leverage these vulnerabilities will certainly limit al-Shabaab’s strategic, operational, and tactical (SOT) iii prowess more than military campaigns and objectives alone. The authors of this monograph identify al-Shabaab SOT vulnerabilities organized according to four sources of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). After exploring the group’s inherent and apparent weaknesses, the au- thors then provide some suggestions on what efforts or capabilities may be leveraged in defeating and de- terring the group. Such instruments do not have to be kinetic or military in nature, but can be diplomatic, economic, or persuasive. The authors concentrate on those diplomatic and informational options and do not address the military or economic implications at this time. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute iv ABOUT THE AUTHORS ELOY E. CUEVAS is a Strategic Intelligence officer in the U.S. Army and recently completed a fellowship at the Research and Development (RAND) Corpora- tion. He is currently assigned to the Office of the Sec- retary of Defense. While assigned to RAND, he pro- vided support to U.S. Army and federal interagency research projects. Lieutenant Colonel Cuevas has a B.A. in history and political science from Texas A&M University-Kingsville, an M.A. from Webster Univer- sity in human resource development, and an M.S. in strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intel- ligence College. MADELEINE WELLS is a Research Assistant at the RAND Corporation, where she analyzes religious extremism and terrorism, focusing on the Arabian Gulf and Horn of Africa. She also does work on global health and infrastructure in Palestine and terrorism in Russia and Central Asia. She is currently assisting the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. Ms. Wells has a B.A. in government and Near Eastern studies from Cornell University and an M.A. in Islamic stud- ies from Columbia University. v SUMMARY The influence of Islam on governance and clan politics has both negatively and positively affected the people of Somalia. It has facilitated justifying the removal of national, regional, and grassroots or clan leadership, especially if socioeconomic conditions and quality of life standards have been degraded or the leadership failed to ensure the safety of the people. Additionally, charismatic clan leaders have leveraged the low level of education among the Somali popula- tion to incite leadership changes. On a positive note, enforcement of Islamic law (Sharia) has been a major factor in helping to stabilize the lawlessness that has gone unchecked throughout the ungoverned parts of Somalia. By establishing courts and increasing the ap- pointment of judges, Islamic leaders have attempted to bring normalcy to people’s daily lives, amid all the street-level battles, clan intra and interconnected struggles for leadership and influence, and the pres- ence of foreign fighters on both sides of the conflict. The al-Shabaab Organization, also known as the Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM), and its al- lies have been active opponents in undermining the United Nations (UN)-supported African Union (AU) peacekeeping forces, the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and all the UN efforts to support the Somali people. Al-Shabaab’s use of the in- ternet and control of the local news media has resulted in its ability to disseminate its story to the Somali pub- lic, to sympathizers throughout the world, and to the greater Islamic community. It is able to accomplish its strategic communication campaign through the use of organic websites, publication of online magazines and vii newsletters, and with international press conferences and interviews. If the last 2 years is an indicator of what may hap- pen in Somalia, the United States needs to consider un- dertaking a more direct role in limiting the demise of the TFG, and extending itself to counter any advances that al-Shabaab may gain. However, as military lead- ers and policymakers have suggested, this effort to limit the advances of al-Shabaab must be focused and involve a whole of government approach. This whole of government approach must be focused on the areas where al-Shabaab has been shown to have vulnerabili- ties. The authors of this monograph identify al- Shabaab’s strategic, operational, and tactical vul- nerabilities organized according to four sources of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). After exploring the group’s inherent and apparent weaknesses, the authors then provide some suggestions on what efforts or capabili- ties may be leveraged in defeating and deterring the group. Such instruments do not have to be kinetic or military in nature, but can be diplomatic, economic, or persuasive. The authors concentrate on diplomatic and informational options and do not address the mil- itary or economic implications at this time. viii