UUnniivveerrssiittyy ooff NNoorrtthheerrnn IIoowwaa UUNNII SScchhoollaarrWWoorrkkss Honors Program Theses Honors Program 2008 SSoocciiaall ppoolliittiiccss aanndd ffrreeeeddoomm:: IInnccoorrppoorraattiinngg cciivviill ssoocciieettyy iinnttoo AArreennddtt''ss ppoolliittiiccaall tthhoouugghhtt Grant J. Rozeboom University of Northern Iowa Let us know how access to this document benefits you Copyright © 2008 Grant J. Rozeboom Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/hpt Part of the Political Science Commons RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Rozeboom, Grant J., "Social politics and freedom: Incorporating civil society into Arendt's political thought" (2008). Honors Program Theses. 18. https://scholarworks.uni.edu/hpt/18 This Open Access Honors Program Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Program at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Program Theses by an authorized administrator of UNI ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SOCIAL POLITICS AND FREEDOM: INCORPORATING CIVIL SOCIETY INTO ARENDT’S POLITICAL THOUGHT A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Designation University Honors Grant J. Rozeboom University of Northern Iowa May 2008 ABSTRACT: The possibility of human freedom has captivated philosophers throughout the ages, often leading them to conclude that freedom is a unique capacity of humanity, exemplifying our potential for politics, contemplation, and/or religious salvation. In the modern age, beginning with the political writings of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, freedom has been understood (at least within the early liberal tradition and common discourse) as unhindered and individuated economic movement, motivated by self- interest and actualized most fully in institutions such as the consumerist free market. Yet, we find that the more we devote our actions to fulfilling our individual interests and needs, the more our actions become subservient to physical/emotional impulses, leaving one to wonder how freedom can be found in these apparently necessitated activities. Hannah Arendt’s political theory, which draws on her personal experience of totalitarianism in Europe and her understanding of Greek culture and thought, offers a profoundly different and, in my estimation, superior understanding of freedom. It is not in individual, economic action that we find human freedom, but rather in the discursive and action-based associations we form with others. Thus, freedom is an essentially political phenomenon, and depends upon the willingness of humans to form public identities through their communal interactions with one another. This project first undertakes a critique of the conventional understanding of freedom by means of an analysis of the early liberal tradition’s attempts at defining freedom. I in turn formulate a novel definition of freedom based upon Arendt’s work in The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition, On Revolution, and Between Past and Future. Secondly, I will discuss the ways in which humans have lost their freedom in the modern age through an analysis of consumerism. Utilizing Arendt’s formulation of the “social realm,” I will explore how conformist and economically-functional behavior characterizes a realm of human activity which is fundamentally anti-political and, therefore, destructive towards freedom. Additionally, through my response to Hanna Pitkin’s critique of Arendt in Attack of the Blob, I will defend Arendt’s use of the social realm as both a relevant critique of the modern age and a prescient conceptual category, further suggesting that the phenomenon of megachurches evidences her related claims. Finally, I will utilize the tradition of civil society theorists beginning with Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America) and continuing with Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato to describe the specific type(s) of activities that will facilitate freedom within our own consumerist context. I will conclude by arguing that my concept of civil society fits within Arendt’s political framework (although she never explicitly dealt with the topic), focusing primarily upon her discussion of “social” forms of politics; most notable among these is Thomas Jefferson’s “ward system.” Such a move on my part is justified by drawing a nexus between the kind of freedom attributed to “civil society” in On Revolution with the way in which freedom is developed by Arendt in The Human Condition and other political writings. An Arendtian civil society, then, is not merely another, “more-friendly” form of politics, but rather ought to be viewed as the bearer of the conditions for freedom in our time. I. FREEDOM BEYOND RESTRAINT: An Arendtian Critique of the Early Liberal Tradition Man cannot be free if he does not know that he is subject to necessity, because his freedom is always won in his never wholly successful attempts to liberate himself from necessity. – Hannah Arendt How we define human freedom is inextricably related to the expectations we attribute to our political and social orders, for we treat freedom as an ideal which ought to be preserved, sought after, and shared by all members of our communities. Take, for example, the common understanding of freedom, which can be traced to some of the earliest formulations of liberal political thought and generally understands freedom as unhindered, individual movement, motivating this movement from economic self-interest. “Freedom” thus has been most fully actualized in institutions such as the consumerist free market, within which persons are encouraged to gratify their desires for commodities and profit in an unimpeded manner. Yet, a strange paradox arises if this unhindered “motion within the body of a man”1 is the culmination of our freedom. For, it seems to me, the degree to which we give sway to our individual desires and needs is also the degree to which our actions are made to be subservient to those appetitive impulses and is, therefore, the extent to which those actions are devoid of freedom. Shall we say, then, that all hope for human freedom is lost? The answer must be “yes,” unless we are willing to move beyond the individualistic presuppositions that are expressed first in the beginnings of the liberal tradition. In the following paper, I will justify such a move through my critique of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. While far from comprehensive, this critical analysis will serve the purpose of demonstrating the conventional understanding of freedom, insofar as it is rooted in Hobbesian and/or 1 Lockean thought, to be both incoherent and undesirable.2 I will go from there to argue for a notion of freedom that is grounded in the theoretical categories of Hannah Arendt, who, in her description of politics and freedom, was able to discern crucial linkages between the polis of ancient Athens and the “public happiness”3 of America’s Founders. This kind of freedom is capable of breaking the shackles of individuated self-interest through the formulation of common goods and public identities, and thus relies upon the differentiation of private and public ways of living. Hanna Pitkin, a respected Arendt scholar, has accused Arendt of being exclusivist and unjust on this point, claiming that the poor are effectively banished from politics in Arendt’s theoretical system.4 In order to rectify this common misunderstanding and defend the careful distinctions drawn by Arendt, I will include a response to Pitkin within my discussion of Arendt’s “public freedom.” Furthermore, I will use James Mensch’s phenomenological interpretation of Arendt’s writings to delineate the ways in which public relationships facilitate this freedom through the formation of public identities and the presentation of novel possibilities.5 Such an exclusively public definition of freedom demands some guarantee of security for its citizens, and so I will conclude with an argument for the political significance of promises and forgiveness using Arendt’s explication of Jesus of Nazareth’s political thought.6 I - LIBERTY in the EARLY LIBERAL TRADITION: HOBBES and LOCKE - In the wake of the paradigm-shifting discoveries of Galileo and his “new science” of matter in motion, Thomas Hobbes’ political theory emerged as a concerted effort to explain human nature in terms of physical laws and principles. What Galileo had done with inanimate objects and mathematical formulas, Hobbes attempted to do with human 2 behavior and his State of Nature thought experiment. Accordingly, Hobbes’ political thought can be seen as a project to reduce the vast complex of human life and interaction to physical laws and the movement they govern. The result is a depiction of humans as creatures subject to the influences of Appetite and Aversion, which act as “small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in … visible actions.”7 Consequently, in our “natural condition,” Hobbes imagined that humans live as isolated seekers of self-preservation, for, as individuals, we can do no more than pursue the fulfillment of our pressing physical desires. A strange sort of “equality of hope in the attaining of our ends” is achieved in this state of affairs, as is a vicious enmity among all persons: as we cross each others’ paths, we will inevitably impede each others’ pursuits of self-interest.8 Therefore, since frustration and violence are bound to occur when persons are prevented from pursuing their physical desires, freedom can mean nothing more than “the absence of [these] external impediments.”9 Just as a ball placed on a downward slope will continue rolling freely in the same direction until some sort of obstacle is placed in its path, so will humans carry on with their chase after appetite’s objects until some hindrance is placed before them. Freedom, then, simply describes the way in which humans conduct themselves prior to meeting one another and is, therefore, only existent in individuals who are quite literally left to their own devices. It is not an ideal worth striving towards, and it certainly does not warrant much political concern. In fact, once persons are willing to form a political community (Hobbes used to the term “Commonwealth”), freedom is immediately and necessarily lost, for with the security offered by a government comes “impediments” in the form of laws and public obligations. Any freedom that remains after the formation of 3 this Social Contract is therefore private and/or economic: “the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.”10 Much could be said towards the disparagement of Hobbes’ vicious and despotic political system, but my critique will remain focused on his notion of freedom. The ways in which Hobbes describes the freedom of pre-political persons in the State of Nature and of subjects in the Commonwealth are plagued with a common limitation, one that is quite troubling and in the following passage is acknowledged by Hobbes himself: “Liberty, and necessity are consistent: as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel; so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of man’s will … proceedeth from some cause … they proceed from necessity.”11 Because persons are “naturally” unhindered in their attempts to satisfy biological desires sprung from “their will,” Hobbes detects an element of freedom in all human action. And yet, because of his insistence on reducing human behavior to physical laws and logical formulas, he must also admit to a pervasive sense of necessity – or, to use a different term, determinism – within his analysis of human behavior, as well. Credit may be given to Hobbes for admitting this perplexity, but his attempt to resolve it by appealing to “God, that seeth, and disposeth all things”12 seems of little help for our purposes. There is an inevitable paradox in calling free those actions whose end is the satisfaction of bodily needs, for the fulfillment of physical needs is never a matter of freedom. Rather, we must take the word “need” to imply those desires and impulses which act as masters over us, punishing us with discomfort or pain until we take the necessary action to assuage them. 4 To begin a definition of freedom within these circumstances of predetermined needs is therefore quite odd and self-defeating. In his Second Treatise of Government, John Locke followed the methodology of Hobbes by constructing a systematic political theory based upon the description of humankind in an imagined natural existence – the State of Nature. However, unlike Hobbes, Locke did not attempt to reduce human action to predictable, physical principles; rather, his overarching focus was private property and the protection thereof, and all other aspects of his political theory (including freedom) are properly seen as subordinate in comparison. Consider Locke’s State of Nature, which is “a state of perfect freedom” only because persons can “dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit.”13 Here, what is most significant is the absence of external authority that can lawfully constrain humans from fully enjoying their property. Furthermore, Locke inserts one crucial proviso to this natural freedom through his explication of the Law of Nature: “Though man in [the State of Nature] have an uncontrolable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself.”14 With this, another demonstration of the primacy of private property is seen through an argument for its status as a “natural” right. Locke places the origin of property is within each individual’s body and affords it protection in the State of Nature through the universal enforcement of the Law of Nature, a universal maxim that acts as an across-the-board prohibition of self-destruction. This results in the absolute and inalienable protection of property’s most basic and natural form – the human body. Thus, the development of the Law of Nature allowed Locke to formulate private property as a necessary political principle without compromising its pre-political quality in the State of Nature. 5 To Locke, the laboring process also is fundamental and prior to any understanding of freedom, since laboring is the activity by which persons extend their bodies (the elemental form of property) into nature in order to obtain more property.15 Freedom, then, can be understood as an internal capacity which simply functions alongside labor for the acquisition of external forms of property, and is defined both positively and negatively by Locke. First, economic autonomy emerges positively through the self-directed ordering of one’s own property, for, as previously mentioned, persons are free when they “order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and person as they see fit.” Secondly, in order for Locke’s laborers to exist freely, they must be unhindered (and therefore isolated) in their acquisition of property. This is implied by Locke with the phrase “as they see fit,” and is negative insofar as it emphasizes a lack of external interference (e.g. greedy neighbors, overreaching state authority, etc.). Both aspects of this freedom are most fully realized when persons are allowed to labor and obtain possessions for themselves and their families with as little interruption as possible, and consequently, freedom itself is a form of property to be preserved and enjoyed. Accordingly, it can be taken and/or destroyed, and thus warrants defense: “Man … hath by nature a power … to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty, and estate”16 (emphasis added). Ultimately, Locke constructs his theory of governance around a Social Contract analogous to Hobbes’, but with one important distinction. Locke considers the voluntary consent of all persons to be governed as the key to rightful political authority.17 Since persons naturally have absolute, free reign over their bodies and the possessions they acquire, the formation of a Commonwealth necessitates the voluntary surrender of this private rule. In return, citizens expect their government to protect their property through 6