1 Adam Smith’s Common Sense Onto-Epistemology in the Context of Cartesian Scepticism and Humean Agnosticism By Doğan Göçmen Smith never devoted an exclusive extensive work to epistemological questions. The main subjects of his work may be located in practical philosophy rather than theoretical philosophy. His work is penetrated by an epistemological theory that works in the background rather than in the foreground. But his Essays on Philosophical Subjects (EPS) could be read as a programmatic attempt to systematically clarify some of the major questions of modern epistemology. In EPS Smith, like Kant, for example, endeavours to provide a solution to questions of modern epistemology - particularly to those raised by Cartesian scepticism and Humean agnosticism. But in his reply, Smith follows an entirely different path. In this paper, I am going to set Smith’s epistemology, first, in the context of Cartesian scepticism about whether sense perceptions are of any relevance to the theory of knowledge, and second, in the context of Humean agnosticism about whether there are universals in both the material and the ideal world. The overall purpose of this paper is to give an overview over some of Smith’s major epistemological principles. 1 2 1. Smith’s theory of sense perception read against the background of Cartesian scepticism In Meditations, the particular question which Descartes investigates is about the origin of knowledge. He formulates therein an essential critique of common sense philosophy. When he criticise it, he has Aristotle’s common sense philosophy in mind as it is expounded in De Anima. In this work, Aristotle shows how external and internal senses may be employed to develop a sense of reality. He presents thereby a theory of perception that may be described as a common sense theory of perception and explores thereby the question of how sense perception may be located in a theory of knowledge. Descartes attacks this epistemological project of Aristotle’s in two closely connected respects. The first critique refers to sense perception and the second concerns the question whether the secondary qualities are relevant for epistemological theory. His critique culminates in his preposition of innate ideas as the source of general ideas prior to any experience. In his epistemological theory Smith seems to reply to both of these critiques and endeavours to develop a new approach to apriorism. 1. 1 Descartes’ critique of common sense theory of perception After having arrived at the ‘thinking I’ as a result of his mediations, Descartes comes to the conclusion that (the intuition of the) mind is the only reliable source of knowledge. He applies this principle to ‘the bodies which we touch and see.’1 Let us consider, he says, not ‘bodies in general – for general perceptions are apt to be somewhat more confused’; let us take instead one particular body: a piece of wax.2 It is fresh and therefore still sweet, and retains also the odour of the flowers; its colour, figure and size are apparent; it is hard, cold and if it is struck with the fingers, it will emit a sound. When we however approach fire with this fresh piece of wax, its taste exalts, the smell evaporates, the colour alters, the figure and size are 2 3 already changed or destroyed; it no longer hard and cold, but liquid and warm. It can no longer be handled and no sound is emitted. Now, is this still the same piece of wax?, Descartes asks. He affirms that this is the same wax. However, how about all those features perceived by the external senses (that are usually referred to as primary and secondary qualities)? They are all changed; nonetheless, it remains the same wax. When we consider attentively this wax that has undergone considerable changes and abstract from its all external qualities which do not belong to it, there will remain nothing except ‘something extended, flexible and changeable’.3 But what is meant here by “flexible” and “changeable”? Is it what I picture in my imagination: that this piece of wax is capable of changing from a round shape to a square shape, or from a square shape to a triangular shape? Not at all; for I can grasp that the wax is capable of countless changes of this kind, yet I am unable to run through this immeasurable number of changes in my imagination, from which it follows that it is not the faculty of imagination that gives me my grasp of the wax as flexible and changeable.4 Descartes continues: And what is meant by “extended”? Is the extension of the wax also unknown? For it increases if the wax melts, increases again if it boils, and is greater still if the heat is increased. I would not be making a correct judgment about the nature of wax unless I believed it capable of being extended in many more different ways than I will ever encompass in my imagination. I must therefore admit that the nature of this piece of wax is in no way revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind alone.5 3 4 These two passages summarise Descartes’ arguments against common-sense philosophy. What he suggests is that our external senses cannot be said to have perception as they provide us solely with changing and unreliable data. Similarly, imagination which is described as common sense can also not be said to have the capacity of perception because it admits infinitude of similar changes. Our ‘inspecto’ (intuition of the mind) is then the only capacity that can be said to have perception6 and it is the only locus where the general ideas of things can be found prior to any experience. 1. 2 Smith’s reply to the Cartesian critique of sense perception In his epistemological theory, Smith departs from sense perception. He differentiates between external and internal senses. External senses enable to perceive external objects, whereas internal senses help, on the one hand, to combine the data perceived by external senses, and on the other hand, to perceive ourselves in relation to external objects perceived. He draws thereby on Aristotle’s theory of perception. Aristotle operates based on a broad and a narrow conception of life. To differentiate between these two conceptions, he refers, on the one hand, to the capacity of ‘self-nutrition’7, and on the other hand, to the sense of touch. He suggests that self-nutrition is the precondition of life as such and belongs to plants as well as to animals. However, the sense of touch applies only to animals. He asserts that ‘some classes of animals have all the senses, some only certain of them, others only one, the most indispensable, touch.’8 Like Aristotle, but unlike Reid, for example, Smith refers to the sense of touch as an inseparable feature of animated nature. Reid ascribes to our sense of touch an important role too. But he defines the sense of seeing as the ‘noblest’ of our five senses.9 Similarly, Smith suggests that the sense of touch is not ‘confined to any particular organ’, it is rather ‘diffused through almost 4 5 every part of the body; if we except the hair, the nails of the fingers and toes’.10 But in contrast to Reid, Smiths concludes from this assertion consistently that it is the sense of touch that is ‘essential to, and inseparable from, the nature of animal life and existence.’11 In Smith’s account there is an important difference between external and internal sense perceptions. External sense perceptions are always accompanied by internal sense perceptions. If we see or smell, touch or taste an object, we become aware of it. But our awareness of it is at the same time a self-perception and self-awareness. If we perceive a tasty smell, for example, it excites in us, say, an appetite for the object. As a reaction to this, our internal sense directs us towards the object in question. Therefore, smell ‘not only excites the appetite, but directs to the object which can alone gratify that appetite’12 In short, our external senses are always accompanied by our internal senses and they direct thereby our internal senses. But the same cannot be claimed of internal sense perceptions. The internal sense perceptions do not need to be accompanied by external sense perceptions. They may affect, inform and direct our external senses but they do not need to be accompanied by external sense perceptions. If we feel hungry, for example, we hardly perceive at the same time an object or objects that might satisfy our hunger. This asymmetry between external and internal sense perceptions arises from the fact that the internal sense perceptions are above all self-perception rather than perception of an external object. Smith point to this when he asserts that ‘[t]he word feeling, though in many cases we use it as synonymous to touching, has however, a much more extensive signification, and is frequently employed to denote our internal, as well as our external, affections. We feel hunger and thirst, we feel joy and sorrow, we feel love and hatred.’13 So, if we feel for example hunger or thirst we perceive our body in a certain state affecting our mind we do not necessarily perceive at the same time some external objects; these 5 6 internal feelings may direct us to some external objects; but we do not feel hunger or thirst because we perceive external objects; indeed, sometimes ‘the Smell of agreeable food’, for example, ‘excites and irritates the appetite’14 but we do not feel hungry because we smell an agreeable food. We feel hungry because our ‘stomach is empty’15. The same principle applies to the perception of higher feelings. If we feel the need, say, of joy or love we feel our mind in a certain state affecting our body. But if we feel the need of these kinds of internal needs we do not perceive at the same time the ‘objects’ of the gratification of these feelings. 1. 3 Smith’s reply to Descartes’ dismissal of secondary qualities The differentiation between primary and secondary qualities has always been a controversial issue. Smith deals with this issue in a rather neutral or perhaps in a slightly critical way. He neither rejects the differentiation explicitly nor does he develop arguments in favour of or against it. However, because this differentiation implies a kind of value judgment in the sense that the secondary qualities are less important than the primary qualities, he seems to suggest that this differentiation should be approached in a value neutral way and ‘speak’ of the secondary qualities ‘more properly’ as other ‘classes of Sensations’.16 This might have been one of the reasons why Descartes refused to attribute any importance to the secondary qualities. Smith regards the secondary qualities as important as the primary qualities. In his epistemological theory Smith criticises Hume’s merely phenomenological approach as well as Descartes’ pure universalism. He aims to develop a dialectical theory of epistemology that takes into account universal as well as phenomenological aspects. Accordingly, when he differentiates between primary and secondary qualities he asserts that primary qualities ‘are in reality, inseparable from that idea or conception, and the solid substance cannot possibly be 6 7 conceived to exist without them. No other qualities or attributes seem to be involved, in the same manner, in this our idea or conception of solidity.’17 But he points at the same time out: ‘[i]t would, however, be rash from thence to conclude that the solid substance can, as such, possess no other qualities or attributes. This very rash conclusion, notwithstanding, has been not only drawn, but insisted upon, an axiom of the most indubitable certainty, by philosophers of very eminent reputation.’18 The first of these passages can be read against Hume’s pure phenomenological approach and the second can be seen as a critique of Descartes’ pure universalism. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that secondary qualities do not belong to the qualities of substances. Rather, in a comprehensive epistemological theory they must be acknowledged as much as the primary qualities. 1. 4 Smith’s common sense theoretical approach to apriorism One of the crucial and controversial questions in epistemological theory concerns the issues about apriorism – in both of its senses internal and external apriorism. Do we need any prepositions in epistemological theory? If yes, what should they look like? As Smith is quite often placed wrongly in the empiricist tradition, he may be expected to have rejected any form of apriorism. He rejects merely traditional approaches to it. Smith operates for example based on two forms of apriorism. He presupposes, on the one hand, the apriority of external objects, and on the other hand, instinctive perception as self-perception. Davie asserts that ‘Scottish democracy develops on the basis of a two-world view of man as a creature whose cognitive equipments depends on a sort of balance between an instinctive a priori, revealed by introspection and reflection to learned and unlearned alike, on the one hand, and the a posteriori facts revealed to the systematic observation and experimentations of the expert on the other…’19 Davie’s reference to ‘instinctive a priori’ as man’s ‘cognitive equipment’ points to 7 8 what I call internal apriorism and his pointing to ‘a posteriori facts revealed to the systematic observation and experimentations’ highlights what I deal with as external apriorism. It may be disputed whether his generalisation applies to all Scottish philosophers. But it is surely valid for Smith’s account of apriorism 1.4.1 Smith’s approach to external apriorism If we follow Smith we perceive external objects always as external to and independent of us. By senses of touch, taste and sight we perceive shapes, coercion, colours and tastes of external bodies. By using the sense of touch and taste we may perceive the features of their surfaces, their hardness and softness, their solidity and fluidity; by using the sense of sight we can guess the features of the surfaces; but in order to find out how they really feel we must touch them; by the sense of taste we can find whether the objects are savoury or bitter, sweet or spicy. By the senses of sight and touch we can find out the dimensions of the external objects – (in Smith’s view) by the sense of touch three dimensions, whereas by the sense of sight only two dimensions. Moreover, by the sense of sight we perceive also ‘colour, and those modifications of colour’20 which the surface of objects reflect, and can thereby determine our position, i.e. perspective and distance to the objects in question. We can of course gain also a vague notion of perspective and direction to the objects by our senses of hearing and smelling. However, this would remain vague as long as we do not use our sense of sight in addition. But whatever and however we perceive by our external senses we perceive external objects ‘altogether external to us, so we necessarily conceive’ them ‘as something altogether independent of us.’21 1.4.2 Smith’s account of internal apriorism 8 9 The issues concerning internal apriorism are usually discussed under the heading of ‘innate ideas’ and ‘tabula rasa’. The former claims that there are innate ideas (prior to the birth and experience) implanted in men’s mind and remembered if their corresponding objects are perceived, whereas the latter suggests that there are no such ideas in the mind. Rather, it looks rather like a blank piece of paper and perceives those ideas from external objects. With regard to internal apriorism, Smith endeavours to establish a new pattern. He rejects both of these theories; because they both, though starting from opposite presuppositions, seem to reduce the clarification of epistemological questions to the investigation into the mind (the former more than the latter) and reduce cognising subjects to passive percipients; the former by assuming fixed a priori categories prior to perception and the latter disregards the fact that cognising subjects always somehow interested in the object they approach. Unlike these two approaches, Smith wants, on the one hand, to take into account that cognising subjects are never naïve if they approach an object, and on the other hand, he aims to show that the exploration of the questions concerning internal apriorism cannot be reduced to the investigation into the mind. In his exploration of the question whether there are a priori categories, or ‘preconception[s]’ as Smith calls them, he takes into account the whole body with all its functions and capacities, and discusses the issue in question in relation to external and internal senses, intellectual and bodily capacities. He does not limit his discussion to adults and he does not restrict his observations to human beings as is common in epistemological theories. Rather, he provides us with comparative discussions about the commonness among and the differences between human beings and animals (including the ‘young’ of other animals and human children).22 Smith is therefore rather critical of the concepts of ‘innate ideas’ and ‘tabula 9 10 rasa’. In his epistemological theory, Smith prefers to take into account the whole complexity of the human constitution and situation. In his theory of perception Smith differentiates between remote and contact senses. This differentiation is very crucial and originates in the nature of these senses. The objects that are perceived by remote senses are mediated by light and air, whereas that of the contact senses are perceived by direct contact with the objects. Touch and taste perceive objects by direct contact. Therefore, contact perception cannot be said to be instinctive perceptions or preconceptions. The conception that is developed by direct contact may not be fully developed but they cannot also be said to be instinctive perceptions or preconceptions. He refuses, therefore, to ascribe to the senses of touching and tasting any kind of instinctive perception. Smith does not presuppose a priori categories, but he is prepared to ascribe to remote senses (seeing, smelling and hearing) a kind of ‘instinctive perception’23 or a ‘vague notion’24 or even a ‘preconception’ of ‘some external thing or place which is the casue of those respective sensations’25. It follows that, as opposed to Descartes, Smith does not place ‘preconception’ in the mind. He ascribes it to a certain state of the whole body. He asserts therefore that ‘all the appetites which take their origin from a certain state of the body, seem to suggest the means of their own gratification; and even long before experience, some anticipation or preconception of the pleasure which attends that gratification.’26 When Smith ascribes to human beings a kind of ‘anticipation’ or ‘preconception’ ‘long before experience’ or elsewhere ‘antecedent to all experience’27 he seems to operate here based on a rather narrow conception of experience, namely experience with external objects. However, his conception of experience is much broader and includes one’s experience with oneself too. So for example if we feel that our ‘stomach is empty’, then we experience our stomach in a certain state. Hence, what Smith 10