Slave Morality and the Revaluation of Values By Aaron Dopf Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ________________________________ Chairperson Assistant Professor Scott Jenkins ________________________________ Professor James Woelfel ________________________________ Professor Thomas Tuozzo ________________________________ Professor Jack Bricke ________________________________ Assistant Professor Misty Schieberle Date Defended: July 6th 2011 The Dissertation Committee for Aaron Dopf certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Slave Morality and the Revaluation of Values ________________________________ Chairperson Assistant Professor Scott Jenkins Date approved: July 6th 2011 ii Acknowledgments First and foremost I would like to thank my advisor Scott Jenkins who was an exceptional advisor. His encyclopedic knowledge of Nietzsche proved to be an invaluable resource throughout the dissertation process. It was truly a pleasure to work with him. His guidance was superb, his input instrumental, and his comments were always incredibly helpful and productive. I have also always enjoyed our regular conversations about college basketball. As with Nietzsche, however, the breadth of his knowledge concerning basketball proved him to be the master and myself the apprentice. Next I would like to thank my parents and family for their love and support over the years. From as far back as I can remember they both encouraged me to aim high in life and instilled in me the confidence that I could achieve any goal I set for myself. This, without question, is the highest goal I have achieved thus far in life. This being said, I am quite sure my father will consider a fair portion of my dissertation so much “liberal pabulum”. I would like to offer a special thanks to my sister Jill who has done so much for our family. But for me, in addition to setting up a donation fund that enabled me to acquire a much needed accessible van, she also was instrumental in finding an incredible surgeon who was able to perform a life changing and desperately needed neck operation. Thank you Dr Riew of Barnes Jewish Hospital – you changed my life. A special thanks to all the incredible friends I’ve made during my time at KU. Thanks goes to my older KU friends like Yancy Dominick, Deron Lee, Eric Berg, Matt Waldschlagel, Dusan Galic, Dan Hieber, and Kevin Dyck, as well as my newer friends like Russell Waltz. Thanks also to all the great friends I made in Germany during my year abroad in Mainz. And of course I have to also thank my best friends Tim McCollum and Jason Eyberg. ii i I would also like to thank my dog Katie for her companionship and loyalty. This despite the fact that she nearly got us both killed on the coldest night in 30 years in Kansas history back in January of 2010. When she bolted after a squirrel, she succeeded in getting my scooter stuck in the snow and unable to get back inside. Although we both survived, the horrible frostbite I suffered made it nearly impossible to type or get any work done for about 2 months. Next I would like to thank my exceptional dissertation committee including Professors Jim Woelfel, Thomas Touzzo, Jack Bricke, and Misty Schieberle. I would also like to thank the late Tony Genova. It was truly a pleasure to have known Tony. He served as my T2 advisor and was also scheduled to be on my dissertation committee. Additionally I would like to thank Professor Christian Lotz and the entire KU philosophy department including the staff. Thank you Cindi Hodges and Sondra Speer for all you’ve done for me over the years. There are many moments I will always remember about my time at KU, but the 2008 national championship is without question at the top of the list. So I would also like to formally thank Mario Chalmer’s for his unforgettable shot. Also, thank you Tyrel Reed and Matt Kleinmann for being exceptional students of mine. And finally, a special thanks goes to Matt Kleinmann whose insightful questions inspired me to devote an entire chapter to the Apostle Paul. iv Abstract I deny morality as I deny alchemy – Nietzsche (Dawn 103) What exactly does Nietzsche mean when he describes himself as an ‘immoralist’? Does he really reject all morality? Confounding the issue, Nietzsche himself seems to take a number of conflicting positions on the topic of morality. What is he really attacking – the moral values themselves or merely the effects of those values? Is he a moral nihilist, or is his criticism simply aimed at specific forms of morality? I maintain that neither of these possibilities is the case. Instead, I argue that Nietzsche’s immoralism is best understood in a straightforward literal sense – namely, Nietzsche is not a new kind of moralist offering a new moral system but an unapologetic iconoclast who challenges, not merely certain forms of morality, but morality itself. However, I argue that this does not commit him to some sort of value nihilism. Nietzsche is not opposed to valuing, just moral ways of valuing. Instead, Nietzsche’s values are related to health versus sickness – values that are ultimately rooted in Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power. I maintain that this is what he means by a ‘revaluation of all values’ – he wants to reorient the very way in which we (or at least some of us) value. Chapter 1 explores Nietzsche’s critique of the various forms of morality while Chapter 2 establishes the anchor for his revaluation of values in the form of the will to power and his notion of health. In Chapter 3 I examine the sickness of the ascetic ideal while Chapter 4 contrasts Paul’s revaluation with Nietzsche’s. In the final chapter I contrast Nietzsche’s positive ideal of health (rooted in the will to power) with the full array of sick types delineated in Chapter 2. Based on this analysis, I then articulate Nietzsche’s positive views in connection to major features of his thought like the will to power and the eternal return. v Table of Contents Title Page.....................................................................................................................................i Acceptance Page..........................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgements......................................................................................................................iii Abstract........................................................................................................................................v Table of Contents.........................................................................................................................vi Introduction...................................................................................................................................vii Chapters I. The Senses of “Morality”...............................................................................................1 i. The Primary Kinds of Morality and Nietzsche as a Morality Critic. ii. “Higher Morality” and the Will to Power. iii. The Slave Revolt in Morality. II. The Will to Power........................................................................................................33 i. The Will to Power and the Concept ‘Natural’. ii. The Will to Power and Eudaimonia. III. Slave Morality and Self Punishment: the Desire to be Commanded...........................64 i. The Desire to be Commanded. ii. Metaphysical Motion Sickness. iii. Ressentiment and O.C.D. IV. The Apostle Paul..........................................................................................................90 i. The Historical Context of Paul. ii. Paul and Master/Slave Morality. iii. Nietzsche and the Apostle Paul. V. The Revaluation of Values..........................................................................................119 i. The Value of Values. ii. Free Will, Autonomy, and Kant. iii. Conclusions. Primary Source References.........................................................................................................155 Bibliography................................................................................................................................156 vi Introduction The following dissertation will explore and analyze Nietzsche’s infamous ‘revaluation of all values’ and his notion of ‘slave morality’. This will require us to engage in a deep analysis of concepts like ‘natural’ versus ‘unnatural’, ‘strength’ versus ‘weakness’, and ‘sickness’ versus ‘health’. We also have to explain not only the complex mechanisms that create slave moralities, the bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal, but also the mechanisms that exploit slave morality and the bad conscience. Much of this critical analysis will be rooted in Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power. The will to power will serve as the bedrock for my critical analysis of Nietzsche’s revaluation of values. After a detailed survey of Nietzsche’s critique of morality and his status as a morality critic, I will focus on the phenomena of slave moralities and the ascetic ideal. I will try and explain just how slave morality culminates in the ascetic ideal. At this point I attempt to unify Nietzsche’s critique of morality with the psychology of slave moralities. Specifically, I will analyze the ascetic ideal in terms of what I will call a desire to be commanded – a complex form of closeted autonomy that I will argue is a product of a corruption of the will to power. This condition is therefore a kind of sickness according to Nietzsche. Finally I will use the Apostle Paul as a unique case study and argue that slave moralities cannot simply be understood as conspiracies promulgated by some priestly class; nor are they rare products of specific conditions. Instead, I will argue that, to varying degrees, slave moralities are everywhere in history and society. Finally I will delineate Nietzsche’s vision of a ‘higher morality’. Chapter 1 will explore the various senses of ‘morality’ Nietzsche utilizes. This, I will argue is necessary because many of Nietzsche’s claims about morality seem to be conflicting and at odds with each other. Accordingly, I argue that Nietzsche is not always careful with his v ii terminology and that he actually refers to various distinct senses of morality. I maintain that there are two primary kinds of morality and four additional senses of the term “morality”. The two primary kinds of morality have to do with the contrast between slave morality and other sorts of morality. I will proceed to lay out some of the defining features of slave morality and the conditions under which slave morality emerges. I will then compare and contrast slave morality with various senses of the term “morality” – specifically ‘the morality of mores/custom’ and the ‘morality of intention’. I will then consider two additional kinds of morality, beginning with what Nietzsche describes as ‘higher moralities’ in passages like BGE 202 and 32. I will discuss what makes these forms of morality superior to the other senses of morality, and whether they should even be considered moralities at all. The final kind of morality refers to non- Christian forms of slave morality and will be briefly discussed in this chapter but a lengthier discussion will be reserved for Chapter 5. So this chapter will set up the general framework of Nietzsche’s critique of morality and will also attempt to properly situate Nietzsche as a morality critic. In Chapter 3 I will further address slave morality and the way in which it is ‘sick’ and ‘unnatural’ according to Nietzsche. I will argue that it is essential to tie this analysis directly to Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘will to power’ and critically assess competing models of the will to power offered by philosophers like B. Reginster, B. Leiter, M. Clark, and P. Foot. In the course of this analysis I will explore the nature of the will according to Nietzsche and the ascetic ideal. I will draw on J. Richardson’s analysis of what he calls ‘positive/negative’ and ‘active/reactive’ wills. This will help to make clear what Nietzsche considers a healthy and natural will as opposed to the sickness of the ascetic ideal. In order to do this I will also draw on Aristotle’s notion of Eudaimonia. viii Chapter 3 will continue to focus on slave morality and the ascetic ideal. I will explore the psychological mechanisms at work in slave morality and the ascetic ideal. In particular I will analyze what I call the desire to be commanded. To understand this we will have to discuss how slave morality creates and exploits what Nietzsche calls the ‘bad conscience’ and ‘ressentiment’. Drawing heavily on passages like GS 347 and HAH 139 I will describe this desire to be commanded in terms of various forms of Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and what I will call “metaphysical motion sickness”. In light of the analysis of the ascetic ideal and slave morality I will focus specifically on the Apostle Paul in Chapter 4 and the way in which he not only is the architect of slave morality according to Nietzsche but also serves as a very interesting case study in light of Nietzsche’s critique of morality. Specifically the question will be: on what non-hypocritical grounds can Nietzsche criticize Paul in the way he does in the Antichrist? After all, Paul was not an ascetic and, like Nietzsche, he was also engaged in a project of revaluating all values. Moreover he was pursuing the difficult task of not only establishing a new moral system but also a new vision of man. So if Paul was in concert with the will to power as laid out in Chapter 2 and was not like the ascetic described in Chapter 3, on what grounds can Nietzsche justify his criticism of the Apostle Paul? In the final chapter I will address Nietzsche’s revaluation of values head on. With the optics of Nietzsche’s moral landscape firmly in place we will try to discern what Nietzsche’s positive vision of a ‘higher morality’ would look like. Specifically what exactly does Nietzsche mean by higher/noble kinds of morality? With the first four chapters having established the moral landscape as it pertains to Nietzsche’s critique, chapter 5 will discuss Nietzsche’s positive views. Chapter 1 explored Nietzsche’s critique of various forms of morality while chapter 2 ix established the anchor for his revaluation of values in the form of the will to power. Chapter 3 then explored the sickness of the ascetic ideal while Chapter 4 contrasted Paul’s revaluation with Nietzsche’s. In Chapter 5 we will now be able to contrast Nietzsche’s positive ideals (related to health and the will to power) with the full array of sick types first delineated in Chapter 2. This will allow us to finally articulate Nietzsche’s positive views in connection to major features of his thought like the will to power and the eternal return. This analysis will also allow us to compare and contrast Nietzsche’s ‘higher morality’ with moral systems like Kant’s deontological ethics. In the final analysis I will argue that Nietzsche’s ‘higher morality’ really doesn’t constitute a morality at all but rather a set of values rooted in health and strength. In light of this I will offer some final thoughts and conclusions regarding slave morality. x